European Defence: Between Urgency and Indecision
Victor Ângelo
International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General
Published on: 8 May 2026
The construction of a Common European Defence is a geopolitical imperative. With the brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the issue shifted from theory to a pressing urgency. However, whilst there is much talk, the results remain meagre.
Strategic paralysis has been one of the greatest shortcomings of European leaders. Without resolute leadership, major decisions are relegated to the drawer of ambiguity. This is despite there being no insurmountable obstacle to a common defence. The deadlock lies with the political leaders—fond of fine dining, embraces, and pleasantries, but incapable of explaining with political clarity to their electorates the state of insecurity in which we currently find ourselves.
In 2026, Europe is a behemoth in military expenditure, yet it acts in an operetta where it reveals its feet of clay regarding strategic definition and operational coordination. It brings much and varied weaponry to the stage, but governments do not dance to the same tune. Each group follows a different baton. And some still believe that the grand maestro, the man who chooses the music and sets the tempo, lives in a vast white house across the ocean. An ocean that is increasingly wide and turbulent.
In 2025, the defence spending of the 27 EU member states will have reached 381 billion euros at current prices (that is, an amount exceeding 2% of the bloc's GDP), an increase of 11% compared to 2024 and around 63% when compared to 2020. This 2025 figure equates to more than double the investment made by the Russian Federation in defence. But Moscow has a single leader, which provides it with a crucial advantage in terms of unified command.
A significant portion of EU expenditure financed the acquisition of vehicles, aircraft, ships, missile systems, and other weapons and ammunition. Initiatives such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), which aim to bolster industrial innovation and interoperability among the armed forces of the various member states, already support over 100 cutting-edge technology projects. Nevertheless, the proportion of funds expended by the EU on Research and Development remains relatively modest, at just over 17 billion euros in 2025. Greater importance must be attached to innovation, technological development, target identification systems, drone prototypes, cybernetics, and space protection. These are the domains of the future, as the wars against Ukraine and Iran have demonstrated.
The question of Europe's strategic autonomy cannot bypass a fundamental inquiry: how can European participation in NATO be strengthened?
The concept of a "European pillar" within NATO is gaining increasing attention in light of the uncertainty surrounding Washington's foreign policy. In my view, the military disengagement of the US from Europe is an inevitable fact. Washington has other priorities—namely in its competition with China and the control of new strategic domains (the oceans, both surface and deep-sea; space; Artificial Intelligence; rare earth minerals; energy; new spheres of influence, particularly in Asia, etc.)—which have little or nothing to do with what Europe can offer.
Presently, Europe still relies on the US for approximately 70% of its critical capabilities (for example: missile defence, satellites, air-to-air refuelling, cutting-edge intelligence, and target identification). Transforming NATO into a predominantly European vehicle runs up against these fundamental deficiencies, as well as the lack of an autonomous nuclear deterrent (restricted to France and, with technical reliance on Washington, the United Kingdom), and the need for bilateral guarantees for the Eastern Flank. It is further hindered by the absence of a shared vision regarding threats.
There is equally another realm of divergence: should Turkey be integrated into the project of European autonomy or not? This question does not arise when dealing with the United Kingdom, but it is central in the case of Turkey.
The integration of Turkey would bring immediate military gains. It is not, however, an issue that garners unanimity among Europeans, despite Turkey possessing the second-largest armed forces in NATO, controlling vital straits, and serving as a barrier of containment between Europe and the Middle East.
When discussing potential coordination with Turkey, the issue of identity emerges as a political obstacle that is difficult to surmount. The civilizational difference generates a perception of "otherness" that impedes the mutual trust required for a stable defence alliance. A Common European Defence presupposes a community of values. The divergence between the current Turkish model of governance and European democratic standards is viewed by many as a risk to the political homogeneity of the military command. For the European electorate, the inclusion of a power with a distinct cultural matrix within sovereign decision-making structures provokes identity-based resistance that cannot be ignored.
Despite these differences, I concede that European defence requires an agreement with Turkey. It would be a partnership built gradually, as trust between the parties solidified and as democracy, respect for universal values, and the rule of law were progressively consolidated in Turkey. It would entail a pragmatic and phased approach—a selective cooperation, progressively reinforced through the execution of joint exercises, complementary logistics, border control adhering to shared criteria, and, above all, forged from common policies regarding Russia, Israel, and the Middle East.
In reality, and taken as a whole, European autonomy must result from a step-by-step process: consensus in threat analysis, economies of scale, complementarity, and the uniting of forces. Only in this way will the construction of a European Defence, the urgency of which is indisputable, be politically and technically viable.
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