The Bear Meets the Big Brother, the Dragon: Putin and Xi Jinping

 

An Alliance Between Unequal Powers: Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin

Victor Ângelo

Op-ed published in Diário de Notícias on 22/05/2026

 

When Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin meet—as happened once again this week—we witness a highly choreographed geopolitical display, rich in symbolism. They speak of a multipolar world and toast to a ‘new era’ and a ‘no limits’ partnership—the celebrated expression coined during their February 2022 meeting, just days before the launch of Russia’s inadmissible war of aggression against Ukraine. The messages they seek to send to the rest of the planet, particularly to Europe, are highly explicit, and they were repeated this week. First, that China and Russia are bound by an unbreakable alliance, indispensable for constructing the new world order they deem necessary. Second, they intend for this order to differ from the one established in recent decades by the Western world, especially since the era of the Reagan-Thatcher tandem and the period following the end of the Cold War. We are clearly facing a Sino-Russian project to reorder international relations in their own fashion.

 

It is, however, a flawed partnership, an unequal relationship—from an economic perspective, for instance. China is undisputedly the centre of gravity and the primary axis of its neighbour’s economy. It now accounts for between 40% and 45% of Russian imports. This is an overwhelming dependency. Conversely, barely more than 4% of China’s foreign trade is conducted with Russia, according to Bloomberg data. This is an insignificant percentage when compared to the volume of trade between China and other economies, be they the US, the EU, or ASEAN. Furthermore, the Chinese currency, the yuan, is the predominant tender in Moscow’s financial market. The yuan has virtually replaced the majority of transactions previously executed in US dollars, with the remainder settled in roubles.

 

Political inequality compounds this economic disparity. This is the most significant dimension of the asymmetry between the two countries. A tacit hierarchy exists that places the Chinese president at the top. One might say that Xi envisions, proposes, and makes things happen. Putin follows when he can, provided he sees that it does not jeopardise his domestic political image, where he still dictates the law.

 

Xi Jinping intends to be the architect of the new international structure, built with calmness, firmness, and time. He plays without unnecessary haste. He is entirely convinced that, before long, his country will be a rival on an equal footing with the US, and that global challenges will place China at the heart of multilateral responses.

 

Vladimir Putin, for his part, mistook pompous parades for military capability. He ended up bogged down in an intensely draining war, which he made the blunder of initiating with utter disregard for international law and with armed forces that recall the highly doubtful legend of Potemkin villages. Putin continues to believe he is a strategic giant, when in reality Ukraine is laying bare his feet of clay. Putin is likewise a stain on Xi Jinping’s international reputation. Xi finds himself forced to defend him in various political arenas, even though he knows this entails reputational costs for his regime, which wishes to be seen as the champion of peace and multilateral cooperation.

 

Xi’s strategic objectives are essentially twofold. On the one hand, to ensure Chinese dominance in the region defined by the Pacific and Indian Oceans. On the other, to gain the lead regarding the technologies that are shaping the twenty-first century. Achieving this requires time, and it requires China’s main rival powers to remain distracted by other matters.

 

This is where Putin’s political blunders prove to be of immeasurable value to China. Though it is seldom considered, the endless war in Ukraine keeps a significant portion of the strategic capabilities, military resources, and diplomatic attention of China’s main rivals far removed from potential criticism and measures against Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Every crisis meeting at NATO headquarters or in EU capitals represents a tactical distraction for Washington and creates rifts between Europe and the US. All of this allows President Xi to continue the process of economically and politically subordinating Russia, while modernising the People’s Liberation Army and shielding China’s economy against potential Western sanctions. Putin is thus an excellent political distraction.

 

Xi’s greatest anxiety regarding Russia concerns the martial philosophy that continues to prevail in the Kremlin. When Moscow hinted that it might use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, it was Beijing—and not just Washington—that also silently but firmly drew a red line before Putin’s intentions. Xi needs a prolonged and draining conflict that bleeds the West, but he cannot afford to permit or promote an apocalyptic escalation that would destroy the global order upon which China’s rise depends.

 

Consequently, Xi’s support for Russia has strict, albeit undeclared, limits. That is the reality, despite public assertions. China buys Russian oil and gas at a discount, in yuan, and within limits—there was no agreement on the new trans-Siberian pipeline, which deeply disappointed the delegation from Moscow. And it supplies Moscow with ‘dual-use’ goods, including military-applicable items like microchips and drone components. It does so discreetly, but in vast quantities. It denies, however, any accusation of direct lethal military aid. Why? To avoid secondary Western sanctions against its economy, which relies heavily on foreign trade. The ‘architect’ knows that a direct confrontation with the West at this juncture would derail his ambitions and imperil the authority of the Chinese Communist Party.

 

The essential thing is to understand the true nature of the relationship between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin and to respond to the serious risks it poses. Note the various agreements signed during this visit—for example, in the fields of atomic energy, space, and AI. These matters do not allow for simplistic analysis. China and Russia do not represent the same type of challenge. Yet, despite the asymmetries, a dangerous strategic convergence exists between both regimes.

Trump goes to Xi Jinping 's empire: what for?

 Trump's visit to China

(Published in Portuguese in Diário de Notícias - Lisbon - on 15 May 2026)

When the Air Force One touches down in Beijing, Donald Trump imagines that a brief two-day visit to China will be consecrated by the American electorate as a personal triumph. Yet, the reality that matters is entirely different. Beneath the handshakes and the protocol-driven photographs with Xi Jinping, a contemporary version of Thucydides’s Trap is taking shape: the clash between two superpowers—one established, attempting to preserve its hegemony (the US), and the other, emerging, in rapid ascension (China).

For Trump, the purpose of this summit is neither to redraw the security architecture of the twenty-first century nor to speak of peace, harmony, or global challenges—themes that rarely find a place on his agenda. What he seeks is a tactical spectacle. Brief and marketable as a victory, ahead of the midterm elections in November.

The American president seeks to return with results that are easy to communicate: signs of commercial detente (commitments to additional purchases in sectors relevant to the MAGA electorate) and, ideally, some Chinese gesture that reduces the risk of disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. Image management is an integral part of his strategy. The domestic media landscape in the United States has grown increasingly asymmetric: influential segments amplify partisan narratives, shaped by commercial incentives and the polarization surrounding Trump.

The problem with this transactional approach is that it exposes the true American weakness: an obsession with the short term erodes trust and alienates allies. Taipei watches, anxious, at the prospect of its security being converted into a bargaining chip. In Europe, the visit is interpreted as an indicator of volatility in Washington’s strategic orientation. This tends to reinforce debates regarding European defense autonomy, economic resilience, and technology policy.

On the other side of the table, Xi Jinping moves his chess pieces without haste and free from the constraints of electoral calendars. Beijing’s immediate interest is simple: to manage Trump’s unpredictability, to employ personal diplomacy to extract rhetorical concessions over Taiwan, and, above all, to buy time. The Chinese leadership operates on the assumption that the long-term trend—in industrial capacity, technology, semiconductors, Artificial Intelligence, and external influence—favours them, and therefore privileges strategies of attrition and the extension of the decision-making horizon.

At first glance, China appears armed with trumps that are difficult to counter. A centralized political system allows it to define priorities and mobilize resources across a multi-year horizon—as seen in the Five-Year Plans—thereby reducing coordination costs in strategic sectors. The alignment with Moscow, described by both leaderships as a partnership "without limits", grants Beijing additional leeway in matters of energy, diplomacy, trade routes, and security, though it exposes it to reputational risks and secondary sanctions. Internationally, China seeks to consolidate its influence and power among the countries of the Global South through the financing of infrastructure and logistics chains (the Belt and Road Initiative) and via expanding forums such as the BRICS.

Yet, this appearance of invincibility conceals vulnerabilities capable of altering the course of events. What Beijing projects to the outside world as "cohesion and stability" is, more often than not, an internal peace imposed by force and by an apparatus of surveillance and repression. China is far from a monolith: it is a mosaic of 1.41 billion people, 56 ethnic groups, hundreds of languages, and tens of millions of citizens belonging to minorities. In vital regions such as Xinjiang (with over 26 million inhabitants) and Tibet (around 3.6 million), forced assimilation replaces political autonomy—and tensions do not disappear; they accumulate.

The true threat to the regime dominated by the Communist Party may not come from the peripheries, but from the center: From the rising expectations of the Han majority in the megacities; From frustrated, highly educated youth struggling within an increasingly competitive society; And from the persistent asymmetry between hyper-technological coastal cities—such as Shanghai and Shenzhen—and the deeply traditional rural interior living on the brink of subsistence. 

In systems with mechanisms of accountability and mediation—a relatively free press, civic associations, room for public demonstrations, independent courts, and competitive elections—dissent tends to be channeled and absorbed through institutional avenues, reducing the probability of abrupt ruptures.

In an autocratic regime, where public expression is limited and the correction of policies depends chiefly upon those who lead the Party-State, errors can accumulate for longer and become more difficult to reverse. When economic, demographic, or legitimacy shocks converge, the management of social conflicts becomes more demanding, and the cost of maintaining stability rises.

In strategic terms, both China and the United States possess incentives for a minimum understanding to reduce potential conflicts: managing crises before they escalate, avoiding military incidents at sea and in the air, and stabilizing expectations within technological, digital, and commercial competition.

These are the themes that Trump and Xi ought to discuss—not as gestures of goodwill, but to construct an architecture of mutual restraint. Such an arrangement does not erase the rivalry. It is, however, the only way to prevent a miscalculation from ruining everything. Thucydides’s Trap could then pass definitively into history.

Reflecting about the United Nations: today and the future

Navigating the Thucydides Trap: The Pragmatic Rebirth of Global Governance

The current discourse surrounding the post-1945 global order often falls into a trap of fatalism. It is true that reading the present institutional reconfiguration as a mere "evolutionary phase" without acknowledging the raw geopolitical realities can seem like academic escapism. We are indeed caught in the gravitational pull of the Thucydides Trap—navigating the perilous structural collision between a ruling hegemon (the United States) fighting to maintain its primacy, and a rising challenger (China) determined to reshape the global architecture.

However, to declare the multilateral system "dead" or to view this transition solely through the lens of catastrophic collapse is to miss the profound, pragmatic evolution taking place. The global order is not being crushed; it is being stress-tested and forced to shed its utopian illusions in favour of a much more resilient, realistic, and decentralized architecture.

Here is why the new geopolitical game offers a genuine pathway to stability and a renewed, albeit different, form of global cooperation:

1. The P5 Monopoly: From "Gridlock" to the Architecture of Mutual Containment.

 Critics rightly point out that the Permanent Five (P5) of the UN Security Council act as a cartel, and that true, egalitarian reform of the veto system is highly unlikely. However, in the context of the Thucydides Trap, the veto is not a fatal flaw—it is a vital safety valve.

The UN was never designed to be a world parliament; it was designed to prevent World War III. The fact that the US, China, and Russia possess veto power ensures that the system cannot be used to cross their existential red lines, thereby preventing direct kinetic conflict. What critics call "terminal gridlock" is, in reality, the operationalization of mutual deterrence. This friction forces great powers to negotiate "minimum understandings" outside of maximalist rhetoric. By acknowledging that universal consensus is impossible, the P5 are inadvertently creating a realistic architecture of mutual containment, ensuring that the US-China competition remains cold, calculated, and manageable rather than explosive.

2. The UN Secretary-General: The Power of Quiet Diplomacy

 It is easy to lament the P5’s preference for a compliant "Secretary" over a crusading "General" under Article 99. But in an era of hyper-polarized superpower competition, a megaphone is often less effective than a back-channel.

As we approach the selection of a new UN Secretary-General in 2026, the need is not for a polarizing visionary who will publicly shame Washington or Beijing or Moscow —which would only accelerate institutional withdrawal—but for a master of quiet diplomacy. A pragmatic, consensus-building Secretary-General can serve as the indispensable geopolitical shock absorber. By keeping the lines of communication open when public rhetoric (whether from a Trump, Putin or a Xi) runs hot, the Secretary-General can quietly defuse localized crises and facilitate transactional compromises that keep the global machinery humming.

3. "Agile Interdependence": The Evolution of Functional Cooperation

 The era of "weaponized interdependence" is undeniably here. The dividing lines between security and functional cooperation have blurred, with semiconductors, AI, oceans, space, and rare-earth supply chains acting as the new battlefields.

Yet, there is profound cause for optimism here: the sheer cost of decoupling is acting as a modern form of deterrence. 

Complete economic bifurcation is impossible. While universal bodies like the WTO or WHO face immense pressure, functional cooperation is not dying; it is becoming more agile and modular. We are witnessing the rise of "coalitions of the willing," public-private partnerships, and issue-specific agreements. Superpowers may fight over quantum computing, but they remain functionally tethered by the undeniable need to manage climate change, stabilize global debt, and secure food supply chains. 

This "weaponized interdependence" forces a cautious pragmatism: adversaries must cooperate on planetary survival.

4. Pluralism: The Healthy Democratization of Power 

The fracturing of the globe into distinct blocs is often viewed cynically as a march toward war. However, the rise of the SCO, the expansion of BRICS, the EU and the cementing of the Quad represent a genuine, long-overdue democratization of global power.

For the first time in centuries, middle powers like India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and and other democracies have the agency to choose, balance, and demand better terms from both Washington and Beijing (Moscow is losing influence). This multipolarity introduces critical "institutional shock absorbers" into the global system. By engaging in multiple, overlapping regional forums, middle powers are actively preventing a binary, zero-sum showdown between the US and China. 

They are forcing the superpowers to compete through investment, diplomacy, and development rather than sheer military coercion.

Conclusion: A Pragmatic Renaissance 

The universal, idealistic multilateralism envisioned in 1945 is indeed transitioning, but what is replacing it is not a descent into chaos. We are moving toward a mature, transactional balance-of-power politics that acknowledges the Thucydides Trap and actively works to defuse it.

To embrace this new era is not to rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanic; it is to build a more seaworthy vessel. By accepting the limits of the P5, embracing the agility of modular cooperation, and empowering the pluralism of the Global South, we can construct a robust architecture of mutual survival. The new global order will be less poetic and more hard-nosed, but in its brutal realism lies the greatest hope for sustaining peace in the 21st century.

The European Defence: can the ambition become a reality in the near future?

 

European Defence: Between Urgency and Indecision

Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published on: 8 May 2026

The construction of a Common European Defence is a geopolitical imperative. With the brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the issue shifted from theory to a pressing urgency. However, whilst there is much talk, the results remain meagre.

Strategic paralysis has been one of the greatest shortcomings of European leaders. Without resolute leadership, major decisions are relegated to the drawer of ambiguity. This is despite there being no insurmountable obstacle to a common defence. The deadlock lies with the political leaders—fond of fine dining, embraces, and pleasantries, but incapable of explaining with political clarity to their electorates the state of insecurity in which we currently find ourselves.

In 2026, Europe is a behemoth in military expenditure, yet it acts in an operetta where it reveals its feet of clay regarding strategic definition and operational coordination. It brings much and varied weaponry to the stage, but governments do not dance to the same tune. Each group follows a different baton. And some still believe that the grand maestro, the man who chooses the music and sets the tempo, lives in a vast white house across the ocean. An ocean that is increasingly wide and turbulent.

In 2025, the defence spending of the 27 EU member states will have reached 381 billion euros at current prices (that is, an amount exceeding 2% of the bloc's GDP), an increase of 11% compared to 2024 and around 63% when compared to 2020. This 2025 figure equates to more than double the investment made by the Russian Federation in defence. But Moscow has a single leader, which provides it with a crucial advantage in terms of unified command.

A significant portion of EU expenditure financed the acquisition of vehicles, aircraft, ships, missile systems, and other weapons and ammunition. Initiatives such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), which aim to bolster industrial innovation and interoperability among the armed forces of the various member states, already support over 100 cutting-edge technology projects. Nevertheless, the proportion of funds expended by the EU on Research and Development remains relatively modest, at just over 17 billion euros in 2025. Greater importance must be attached to innovation, technological development, target identification systems, drone prototypes, cybernetics, and space protection. These are the domains of the future, as the wars against Ukraine and Iran have demonstrated.

The question of Europe's strategic autonomy cannot bypass a fundamental inquiry: how can European participation in NATO be strengthened?

The concept of a "European pillar" within NATO is gaining increasing attention in light of the uncertainty surrounding Washington's foreign policy. In my view, the military disengagement of the US from Europe is an inevitable fact. Washington has other priorities—namely in its competition with China and the control of new strategic domains (the oceans, both surface and deep-sea; space; Artificial Intelligence; rare earth minerals; energy; new spheres of influence, particularly in Asia, etc.)—which have little or nothing to do with what Europe can offer.

Presently, Europe still relies on the US for approximately 70% of its critical capabilities (for example: missile defence, satellites, air-to-air refuelling, cutting-edge intelligence, and target identification). Transforming NATO into a predominantly European vehicle runs up against these fundamental deficiencies, as well as the lack of an autonomous nuclear deterrent (restricted to France and, with technical reliance on Washington, the United Kingdom), and the need for bilateral guarantees for the Eastern Flank. It is further hindered by the absence of a shared vision regarding threats.

There is equally another realm of divergence: should Turkey be integrated into the project of European autonomy or not? This question does not arise when dealing with the United Kingdom, but it is central in the case of Turkey.

The integration of Turkey would bring immediate military gains. It is not, however, an issue that garners unanimity among Europeans, despite Turkey possessing the second-largest armed forces in NATO, controlling vital straits, and serving as a barrier of containment between Europe and the Middle East.

When discussing potential coordination with Turkey, the issue of identity emerges as a political obstacle that is difficult to surmount. The civilizational difference generates a perception of "otherness" that impedes the mutual trust required for a stable defence alliance. A Common European Defence presupposes a community of values. The divergence between the current Turkish model of governance and European democratic standards is viewed by many as a risk to the political homogeneity of the military command. For the European electorate, the inclusion of a power with a distinct cultural matrix within sovereign decision-making structures provokes identity-based resistance that cannot be ignored.

Despite these differences, I concede that European defence requires an agreement with Turkey. It would be a partnership built gradually, as trust between the parties solidified and as democracy, respect for universal values, and the rule of law were progressively consolidated in Turkey. It would entail a pragmatic and phased approach—a selective cooperation, progressively reinforced through the execution of joint exercises, complementary logistics, border control adhering to shared criteria, and, above all, forged from common policies regarding Russia, Israel, and the Middle East.

In reality, and taken as a whole, European autonomy must result from a step-by-step process: consensus in threat analysis, economies of scale, complementarity, and the uniting of forces. Only in this way will the construction of a European Defence, the urgency of which is indisputable, be politically and technically viable.

Comparing sanctions regimes: Iran and North Korea

The prevailing strategy toward the Middle East in 2026—characterized by "maximum pressure," maritime blockades, and paternalistic threats of "punishment"—represents a catastrophic regression in international statecraft. This "predatory diplomacy" is not only ethically bankrupt but strategically illiterate, particularly when contrasted with the long-standing, paralyzed "soft approach" toward North Korea.

1. The Paternalism of "Misbehaviour": A Diplomatic Dead End

The current rhetoric reduces the complex, millennia-old "political DNA" of Iran to a juvenile dynamic. Terming the actions of a regional power as "misbehaving" is a fundamental category error that sabotages any prospect of a lasting settlement.

• The Iran Context: By treating Tehran as a wayward child rather than a sovereign adversary, Washington ignores the reality that Iranian strategic culture is rooted in a "resistance economy" and a deep-seated suspicion of Western diktats.

• The North Korea Contrast: While Iran is threatened with renewed strikes for "bad behaviour" despite its 14-point peace proposal, North Korea has built a nuclear arsenal under decades of "Strategic Patience." The global order is effectively telling Tehran: “Negotiate and we will suffocate you; arm yourself to the teeth like Pyongyang and we will eventually grant you a summit.”

2. The Myth of the "Surgical Strike" and "Elimination"

The political demand to "eliminate" a nation’s missile capacity through military force is a dangerous fantasy.

• The Iran Context: Military infrastructure in Iran is hardened, dispersed, and embedded within civilian hubs. A "strike" is never just a strike; it is a declaration of total war that would inevitably trigger asymmetric retaliation across the Strait of Hormuz—the world’s most sensitive energy artery.

• The Failure of Force: History shows that technical knowledge cannot be bombed out of existence. Strikes on the Iranian "brain trust" only accelerate the resolve to achieve the ultimate deterrent, mirroring the North Korean path where every round of pressure resulted in a more advanced missile test.

3. Economic Suffocation: Humanitarian Crime as Strategy

The current "suffocating" blockade, which prevents even medical and basic cargo from reaching civilian ports, is a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of international law.

• The Iran Context: Claiming that a blockade is "doing very well" because soldiers cannot be paid ignores the millions of civilians whose food and energy security are being held hostage for a "quick-win" deal.

• The North Korea Contrast: For years, the international community provided food aid and "Sunshine Policy" engagement to Pyongyang to avoid humanitarian collapse. Applying a total blockade to Iran while having historically subsidized North Korea’s survival exposes a glaring lack of moral consistency.

4. The Geopolitical Chessboard vs. The Oil Market

Linking peace talks to the UAE leaving OPEC or driving down oil futures exposes the true, cynical motivation of the current escalation: Resource Coercion.

• The Critique: When the US Treasury frames a blockade as a success because it might lower gas prices for Western consumers, it erodes any claim of "defending humanity." It reveals the conflict as a mercantilist war, where Iranian sovereignty is being sacrificed to manipulate the global energy market.

5. The Dangerous Erasion of the UN

Perhaps the most severe failure is the total marginalization of the UN Secretariat and the UN Charter in favour of personalized, "family-business" diplomacy.

• The Strategic Risk: By conducting negotiations through personal envoys and son-in-laws rather than the UN’s institutional framework, the current administration is building a "house of cards." Without the UN's "Blue Book" of neutral mediation and the legitimacy of the Security Council, any deal made is temporary, non-binding, and destined to collapse the moment the political winds shift.

Conclusion: The "Catastrophic Miscalculation"

The world is witnessing a " might-is-right" approach that rewards nuclear proliferation (North Korea) and punishes diplomatic overtures (Iran’s 14-point plan). If the United Nations remains a spectator while the "Big Three" treat the high seas and sovereign nations as personal fiefdoms, we are not just witnessing the end of an Iranian peace process; we are witnessing the final expiration of the post-WWII rules-based order. The result will not be a "great deal," but a era of deliberate, daily insecurity.