Saturday, 21 November 2026

Hybrid Warfare: Europeans’ Trust in the Line of Fire

Europe prepares, above all, for conventional warfare, yet the threats are not confined to armoured divisions crossing borders or bombardments of European capitals. Bomb threats, even false ones, disrupt daily life and destabilise commercial aviation, hospitals, schools, logistics hubs, and other essential services. Drones fly over critical infrastructure, submarine cables become targets, and sabotage attempts against strategic installations follow one after another. In isolation, each incident may appear merely tactical; such an analysis, however, risks obscuring the strategic dimension of the whole.

These episodes demand a collective reading: they may form part of a systematic campaign of destabilisation. In a conventional theatre of war, as is the case in Ukraine, the primary objective is the conquest of territory. In the hybrid operations targeting the rest of Europe, the aim may be altogether different: to weaken citizens’ trust in the democratic system and in the capacity of their leaders to ensure social stability.

For decades, Europe conceived of defence primarily in military terms, counting ships, aircraft, tanks, and troop numbers. Today, hostile states and their proxies recognise that disrupting societies can be cheaper and more effective than confronting their armies. Destabilisation can exert a profound political impact at virtually no cost to the adversary.

Russia has exploited this logic. Since the onset of the all-out war against Ukraine, warnings have multiplied regarding sabotage, influence, and disinformation operations designed to undermine European political cohesion. The Iranian state acts on its own account, yet also resorts to criminal networks and intermediaries to conduct clandestine operations on the European continent. North Korea operates predominantly in the digital sphere. Although they employ distinct methods, these actors exploit the vulnerabilities of our open societies.

It would be insufficient to explain these crimes exclusively through the actions of external adversaries. It is necessary to understand the conditions that facilitate such action. Europe’s greatest vulnerability lies above all in the erosion of citizens’ trust in institutions, rather than in the flaws of computer systems or the insufficient protection of critical infrastructure. Without questioning the legitimacy of struggles against social inequalities, one must recognise that their instrumentalisation by populisms and other Trojan horses dangerously exacerbates this fragility.

This wear and tear also demands a political analysis. For far too long, many of our political elites seemed to assume that economic prosperity would suffice to guarantee the legitimacy and stability of democratic regimes. That premise has proved limited. The housing crisis, obstacles to social mobility, precarious employment, insecurity in many urban spaces, tensions associated with irregular immigration, and the perception of a growing distance between rulers and the ruled have contributed to a sense of abandonment and despair across broad swathes of European society.

Our adversaries may not have generated these difficulties, yet they have recognised strategic opportunities within them. This context helps explain why hybrid warfare operations encounter a more favourable environment today than two or three decades ago. Trust in institutions reinforces resilience against destabilisation; its erosion increases exposure to manipulation, polarisation, and disorder, as is occurring in several European Union countries.

It is in this climate that anti-system movements gain ground. It is important, however, to dispel any ambiguity: democratic contestation challenges power in order to improve the system. Questioning governments, exposing failures, demanding reforms, and challenging consensuses are legitimate expressions of civic participation and democratic vitality.

The risk of rupture arises when criticism ceases to seek reform and begins instead to promote the systematic delegitimisation of institutions. A concrete example is found in the voices attacking the legitimacy of the PSP [Portugal's Public Security Police]: the issue is not questioning its decisions or conduct, but denying the legitimacy of the institution itself. Recognising that democracy functions unsatisfactorily is different from deeming it useless or exclusively at the service of the most powerful. Similarly, denouncing the shortcomings of market economies is not equivalent to seeking the destruction of the European economic architecture. Contesting governmental decisions is legitimate; denying, on principle, the legitimacy of any decision compromises democratic debate.

It is at this point that certain contemporary radicalisms converge in their effects, despite following seemingly contradictory paths. Sectors of the far left and the far right make the systematic discrediting of democratic institutions a central pillar of their activity. When such discrediting is not accompanied by feasible solutions or clearly defined alternatives, contestation can reinforce the perception that no institution merits trust and that democratic compromise is unviable.

This environment favours Europe’s adversaries, in particular the Russian Federation. Reinforcing the notion that national and European Union institutions are incapable of resolving concrete problems can help weaken democratic cohesion and cooperation between states. Extremists do not need to propose a fairer solution: it suffices to exploit resentment, mistrust, and systemic gridlock.

The strategic reach of these episodes lies in the erosion of trust in institutions, in governments, and in the capacity of European democracies to deliver results and correct mistakes. Consequently, attacks and threats against critical infrastructure must not be assessed solely by their immediate effects. The same holds true for the false alarms that days ago caused disruption in Italian schools and, simultaneously, in four other European countries.

If trust is the strategic target, the European response requires more than strengthening defence, intelligence services, and cybersecurity. It must also address the root causes of citizens’ malaise. Democratic resilience depends as much on protection against external threats as it does on civic trust in institutions and the collective will to defend them.

Published: 13 November 2026, Diário de Notícias (Lisbon)


Ukraine: Between an Imperfect Peace and an Unjust Peace

 The meeting between Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Donald Trump in Shenzhen, on the margins of the APEC summit, has been presented as a potential turning point in the war in Ukraine. It is difficult to share that enthusiasm. The gathering excluded Ukraine, marginalised Europe, and brought together solely Russia, the aggressor, China, which sustains it, and an American administration seemingly prepared to endorse Moscow’s demands.

Peace is rarely born of solemn declarations or isolated events. It takes shape when strategic reality compels both the invader and the victim to accept compromises they previously rejected. The problem does not lie in the pursuit of peace; a serious, multilateral effort to bring the war to an end deserves encouragement. What is taking shape in meetings such as the one in Shenzhen, however, is far removed from that: it is an attempt to artificially accelerate a process that remains fundamentally flawed.

A conviction seems to have taken hold that the essential thing is to end the war tomorrow. The intention is understandable; the conclusion may prove perilous. Not all peaces are equal. Some resolve conflicts and stabilise entire regions for decades. Others are mere intervals between new wars. It is precisely this risk that is emerging today.

Russia has failed to achieve the central objectives of its invasion. It has neither toppled the government in Kyiv nor destroyed Ukraine’s political independence. It has not fragmented the country. Moreover, it appears to have reinforced the strategic cohesion of NATO and the European Union. It retains control over territories seized by force and now seeks to transform those military gains into an internationally recognised political reality. Undue haste risks legitimising at the negotiating table what the aggressor failed to achieve on the battlefield.

For the Russian population, the aggression carries a dramatically high price. The military effort continues to absorb colossal resources. The war economy is unsustainable. Human losses are mounting at a dizzying pace. Hundreds of thousands of citizens have fled the country. Dependence on China has deepened significantly. Prolonging the war will only exacerbate the myriad problems Russia faces.

The central question is not whether negotiations should take place. The real question is under what conditions and with what objectives. A genuine peace requires far more than the silencing of guns. It demands credible security guarantees, robust verification mechanisms, and solid political commitments. Without these elements, any understanding runs the risk of becoming a mere armistice.

It is in this context that one of the greatest political risks of the moment arises.

Donald Trump wants a peace deal without further delay. An understanding presented as the end of the war would allow him to claim the status of a leader capable of resolving what others could not. From a political standpoint, the American president’s ambition is plain for all to see. From a strategic standpoint, it could prove profoundly reckless.

Within this logic, the quality and sustainability of agreements become secondary. The objective ceases to be the construction of a robust peace and becomes instead the production of a politically marketable outcome. Peace is reduced to a photograph, an announcement, a deadline met.

China observes this entire process behind a mask of calculated prudence that barely conceals its resolute support for Russia. Beijing seeks to project itself as a responsible and indispensable power. Above all, it has no interest in breaking with Moscow, nor in jeopardising its economic relations with Europe.

Europe, too, faces a decisive test. The war in Ukraine is the greatest challenge to the European security architecture since the end of the Cold War. Its consequences will mark the continent for decades. Consequently, a solution designed without European participation is unlikely to yield lasting stability—not merely because Europeans bear a substantial share of the costs of the war, but because the very organisation of the continent’s security is at stake.

The exclusion of Europe is not merely a diplomatic slight. It would signify accepting that fundamental questions concerning the security of hundreds of millions of people can be decided by an informal directorate of great powers. European history knows that logic well: it is the logic of spheres of influence and balances imposed by the strongest.

Ukraine stands today at the centre of this challenge. It is possible that a wholly just peace is already beyond reach. Destroyed cities will not be rebuilt by diplomacy. The dead will not return. The trauma will endure for generations. All of this calls for a new paradigm.

There is a fundamental difference between an imperfect peace and an unjust peace. An imperfect peace accepts the constraints of reality without abandoning essential principles. An unjust peace converts brute force into supposedly legitimate right. While the former seeks an equilibrium, the latter sows the seeds of tomorrow’s conflicts.

Ukraine’s sovereignty must remain the cornerstone of any serious agreement. Without credible security guarantees and without the consent of the Ukrainians themselves, any settlement will be nothing more than a precarious armistice.

The decisive question is not whether this war must end—the Russian invasion should never have begun. The true question is what kind of Europe will remain when it does. A peace imposed on the aggressor’s terms, negotiated on the margins of Ukraine and Europe and presented as a diplomatic triumph, may generate favourable headlines and momentary applause. It will, nevertheless, be unacceptable, for it will enshrine the notion that force remains a legitimate instrument for altering borders and imposing unjust interests.

Peace requires compromise. Yet there is a line that cannot be crossed without historical consequences. When aggression is rewarded, a conflict is not brought to a close; the path is cleared for the next one.

Published: 20 November 2026, Diário de Notícias (Lisbon)

Monday, 26 October 2026

USA: the November 3rd elections

Diário de Notícias Opinion


Before and after the US midterm elections

Victor Ângelo

International Security Adviser.
Former UN Deputy Secretary-General /SRSG
Published on: 23 Oct 2026


The North American midterm elections on 3 November traditionally constitute the electorate’s first major judgment on the performance of those in power. All seats in the House of Representatives and approximately one-third of the Senate are at stake. On this occasion, to a greater extent than in the past, the results will have repercussions far beyond the borders of the United States: in Ukraine, in Europe, and in other regions where American influence is decisive.

The country will go to the polls in a context where mutual distrust is no longer conjunctural and has acquired a structural character. These fractures predate Donald Trump. Nevertheless, no modern president has deepened and instrumentalised them with equal persistence. Trump does not seek consensus; he governs on the basis of antagonism, converting the division of citizens into a central element of his political strategy.

Two interpretations of reality are in confrontation. For many of his supporters, Trump continues to represent the necessary response: the voice of those marginalised by globalisation, the opponent of an elite increasingly distant from the common citizen, and the defender of a nationalism grounded in exclusion. For his critics, Trump’s governance translates into a systematic erosion of institutions and the discrediting of the country. Few contemporary leaders have elicited such antagonistic evaluations.

Available projections point to significant difficulties for the Republicans, although the scale of any potential losses remains uncertain. The historical experience of midterm elections confirms this type of punitive cycle. In this context, foreign policy ceases to be merely an area of governance: it electorally benefits or penalises the president.

Ukraine constitutes the most worrisome case. The United States’ electoral calendar has become a relevant factor in Trump’s position regarding the war unleashed by the Kremlin. Zelensky has stated that Trump seeks to achieve a diplomatic success prior to the midterm elections. Moscow recognises the political value of the word "peace" for a president under electoral pressure. It is from this that European anxiety stems. Peace is a common objective. The risk lies in a rushed agreement, announced before it is formalised, founded on imprecise security guarantees and territorial concessions imposed upon the most vulnerable party. Such an outcome would not represent the end of aggression, but a merely illusory pause.

Kyiv cannot assume, within a horizon of a few days, a commitment that it did not negotiate and which demands internal political and social validation. Furthermore, the pressure exerted by Trump upon the aggrieved country has been intensifying, vastly surpassing that directed at the aggressor. With the approach of winter, energy will likely be used once more as an instrument of war. Consequently, one cannot exclude the repetition of large-scale attacks against critical infrastructure, nor new military escalations designed to improve Russia’s negotiating position.

Europe is observing the political evolution on the other side of the Atlantic with concern. If the outcome regarding Ukraine is presented as a fait accompli, Europeans may be called upon to manage the consequences without having participated in the decision. Simultaneously, Russian hybrid pressure could intensify, bearing in mind that the primary ally of Europeans will find itself absorbed by its domestic squabbles.

On the American domestic front, a substantial worsening of political rhetoric is foreseeable. Trump is expected to intensify radical rallies and direct attacks, champion alleged diplomatic successes, and reinforce the narrative that the institutional system and its elites are blocking the popular will, which he alone embodies. The Democrats will likely respond with a mobilisation centred on the defence of institutions. The primary risk will not stem from a series of isolated events, but from the daily accumulation of inflamed rhetoric and disputes over the integrity of the electoral process, within a context of growing distrust and violence.

The central question arises in the post-election period. An institutionally oriented president, confronted with an unfavourable Congress, would seek to secure parliamentary compromises. That is not Trump’s profile. For him, a hostile Congress may be interpreted not as a limit or a difficulty, but as a new battlefield. There will be strong incentives to present himself as a victim of the Washington political system, to expand recourse to Executive Orders, and to convert a potential setback into a lever for populist mobilisation. On the external front, international policy may once again be instrumentalised in function of domestic objectives, with perilous consequences for collective security.

This is the true test. I do not foresee a constitutional collapse, given that American institutions have demonstrated greater resilience than many of their critics admit. The most plausible threat lies in the transformation of political practice itself, when polarisation ceases to be a dimension of democratic competition and comes to constitute a strategic objective. When the adversary is no longer recognised as a legitimate opponent and begins to be treated as an enemy, formal democracy may survive, but it becomes fragile and the consensuses indispensable to effective governance are lost. A resounding defeat for the Republicans could further trigger a profound dispute within the conservative camp, between those who advocate the deepening of Trumpism and those who propose a return to a moderate orientation capable of winning back the independent electorate.

3 November therefore represents more than a simple counting of seats on Capitol Hill. Beyond the balance of mandates, it is a matter of understanding whether American institutions will manage to promote a correction of course or whether the country will remain hostage to a cycle of permanent confrontation. The paradox lies in the fact that Trump derives greater political dividends from continuous confrontation than from the stability of the system. Finally, it is important to assess to what extent he will continue to be conditioned by influential domestic figures, such as Elon Musk and others of that ilk, and by Vladimir Putin within the global geopolitical framework.