Reflecting about the United Nations: today and the future

Navigating the Thucydides Trap: The Pragmatic Rebirth of Global Governance

The current discourse surrounding the post-1945 global order often falls into a trap of fatalism. It is true that reading the present institutional reconfiguration as a mere "evolutionary phase" without acknowledging the raw geopolitical realities can seem like academic escapism. We are indeed caught in the gravitational pull of the Thucydides Trap—navigating the perilous structural collision between a ruling hegemon (the United States) fighting to maintain its primacy, and a rising challenger (China) determined to reshape the global architecture.

However, to declare the multilateral system "dead" or to view this transition solely through the lens of catastrophic collapse is to miss the profound, pragmatic evolution taking place. The global order is not being crushed; it is being stress-tested and forced to shed its utopian illusions in favour of a much more resilient, realistic, and decentralized architecture.

Here is why the new geopolitical game offers a genuine pathway to stability and a renewed, albeit different, form of global cooperation:

1. The P5 Monopoly: From "Gridlock" to the Architecture of Mutual Containment.

 Critics rightly point out that the Permanent Five (P5) of the UN Security Council act as a cartel, and that true, egalitarian reform of the veto system is highly unlikely. However, in the context of the Thucydides Trap, the veto is not a fatal flaw—it is a vital safety valve.

The UN was never designed to be a world parliament; it was designed to prevent World War III. The fact that the US, China, and Russia possess veto power ensures that the system cannot be used to cross their existential red lines, thereby preventing direct kinetic conflict. What critics call "terminal gridlock" is, in reality, the operationalization of mutual deterrence. This friction forces great powers to negotiate "minimum understandings" outside of maximalist rhetoric. By acknowledging that universal consensus is impossible, the P5 are inadvertently creating a realistic architecture of mutual containment, ensuring that the US-China competition remains cold, calculated, and manageable rather than explosive.

2. The UN Secretary-General: The Power of Quiet Diplomacy

 It is easy to lament the P5’s preference for a compliant "Secretary" over a crusading "General" under Article 99. But in an era of hyper-polarized superpower competition, a megaphone is often less effective than a back-channel.

As we approach the selection of a new UN Secretary-General in 2026, the need is not for a polarizing visionary who will publicly shame Washington or Beijing or Moscow —which would only accelerate institutional withdrawal—but for a master of quiet diplomacy. A pragmatic, consensus-building Secretary-General can serve as the indispensable geopolitical shock absorber. By keeping the lines of communication open when public rhetoric (whether from a Trump, Putin or a Xi) runs hot, the Secretary-General can quietly defuse localized crises and facilitate transactional compromises that keep the global machinery humming.

3. "Agile Interdependence": The Evolution of Functional Cooperation

 The era of "weaponized interdependence" is undeniably here. The dividing lines between security and functional cooperation have blurred, with semiconductors, AI, oceans, space, and rare-earth supply chains acting as the new battlefields.

Yet, there is profound cause for optimism here: the sheer cost of decoupling is acting as a modern form of deterrence. 

Complete economic bifurcation is impossible. While universal bodies like the WTO or WHO face immense pressure, functional cooperation is not dying; it is becoming more agile and modular. We are witnessing the rise of "coalitions of the willing," public-private partnerships, and issue-specific agreements. Superpowers may fight over quantum computing, but they remain functionally tethered by the undeniable need to manage climate change, stabilize global debt, and secure food supply chains. 

This "weaponized interdependence" forces a cautious pragmatism: adversaries must cooperate on planetary survival.

4. Pluralism: The Healthy Democratization of Power 

The fracturing of the globe into distinct blocs is often viewed cynically as a march toward war. However, the rise of the SCO, the expansion of BRICS, the EU and the cementing of the Quad represent a genuine, long-overdue democratization of global power.

For the first time in centuries, middle powers like India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and and other democracies have the agency to choose, balance, and demand better terms from both Washington and Beijing (Moscow is losing influence). This multipolarity introduces critical "institutional shock absorbers" into the global system. By engaging in multiple, overlapping regional forums, middle powers are actively preventing a binary, zero-sum showdown between the US and China. 

They are forcing the superpowers to compete through investment, diplomacy, and development rather than sheer military coercion.

Conclusion: A Pragmatic Renaissance 

The universal, idealistic multilateralism envisioned in 1945 is indeed transitioning, but what is replacing it is not a descent into chaos. We are moving toward a mature, transactional balance-of-power politics that acknowledges the Thucydides Trap and actively works to defuse it.

To embrace this new era is not to rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanic; it is to build a more seaworthy vessel. By accepting the limits of the P5, embracing the agility of modular cooperation, and empowering the pluralism of the Global South, we can construct a robust architecture of mutual survival. The new global order will be less poetic and more hard-nosed, but in its brutal realism lies the greatest hope for sustaining peace in the 21st century.

The European Defence: can the ambition become a reality in the near future?

 

European Defence: Between Urgency and Indecision

Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published on: 8 May 2026

The construction of a Common European Defence is a geopolitical imperative. With the brutal Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the issue shifted from theory to a pressing urgency. However, whilst there is much talk, the results remain meagre.

Strategic paralysis has been one of the greatest shortcomings of European leaders. Without resolute leadership, major decisions are relegated to the drawer of ambiguity. This is despite there being no insurmountable obstacle to a common defence. The deadlock lies with the political leaders—fond of fine dining, embraces, and pleasantries, but incapable of explaining with political clarity to their electorates the state of insecurity in which we currently find ourselves.

In 2026, Europe is a behemoth in military expenditure, yet it acts in an operetta where it reveals its feet of clay regarding strategic definition and operational coordination. It brings much and varied weaponry to the stage, but governments do not dance to the same tune. Each group follows a different baton. And some still believe that the grand maestro, the man who chooses the music and sets the tempo, lives in a vast white house across the ocean. An ocean that is increasingly wide and turbulent.

In 2025, the defence spending of the 27 EU member states will have reached 381 billion euros at current prices (that is, an amount exceeding 2% of the bloc's GDP), an increase of 11% compared to 2024 and around 63% when compared to 2020. This 2025 figure equates to more than double the investment made by the Russian Federation in defence. But Moscow has a single leader, which provides it with a crucial advantage in terms of unified command.

A significant portion of EU expenditure financed the acquisition of vehicles, aircraft, ships, missile systems, and other weapons and ammunition. Initiatives such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), which aim to bolster industrial innovation and interoperability among the armed forces of the various member states, already support over 100 cutting-edge technology projects. Nevertheless, the proportion of funds expended by the EU on Research and Development remains relatively modest, at just over 17 billion euros in 2025. Greater importance must be attached to innovation, technological development, target identification systems, drone prototypes, cybernetics, and space protection. These are the domains of the future, as the wars against Ukraine and Iran have demonstrated.

The question of Europe's strategic autonomy cannot bypass a fundamental inquiry: how can European participation in NATO be strengthened?

The concept of a "European pillar" within NATO is gaining increasing attention in light of the uncertainty surrounding Washington's foreign policy. In my view, the military disengagement of the US from Europe is an inevitable fact. Washington has other priorities—namely in its competition with China and the control of new strategic domains (the oceans, both surface and deep-sea; space; Artificial Intelligence; rare earth minerals; energy; new spheres of influence, particularly in Asia, etc.)—which have little or nothing to do with what Europe can offer.

Presently, Europe still relies on the US for approximately 70% of its critical capabilities (for example: missile defence, satellites, air-to-air refuelling, cutting-edge intelligence, and target identification). Transforming NATO into a predominantly European vehicle runs up against these fundamental deficiencies, as well as the lack of an autonomous nuclear deterrent (restricted to France and, with technical reliance on Washington, the United Kingdom), and the need for bilateral guarantees for the Eastern Flank. It is further hindered by the absence of a shared vision regarding threats.

There is equally another realm of divergence: should Turkey be integrated into the project of European autonomy or not? This question does not arise when dealing with the United Kingdom, but it is central in the case of Turkey.

The integration of Turkey would bring immediate military gains. It is not, however, an issue that garners unanimity among Europeans, despite Turkey possessing the second-largest armed forces in NATO, controlling vital straits, and serving as a barrier of containment between Europe and the Middle East.

When discussing potential coordination with Turkey, the issue of identity emerges as a political obstacle that is difficult to surmount. The civilizational difference generates a perception of "otherness" that impedes the mutual trust required for a stable defence alliance. A Common European Defence presupposes a community of values. The divergence between the current Turkish model of governance and European democratic standards is viewed by many as a risk to the political homogeneity of the military command. For the European electorate, the inclusion of a power with a distinct cultural matrix within sovereign decision-making structures provokes identity-based resistance that cannot be ignored.

Despite these differences, I concede that European defence requires an agreement with Turkey. It would be a partnership built gradually, as trust between the parties solidified and as democracy, respect for universal values, and the rule of law were progressively consolidated in Turkey. It would entail a pragmatic and phased approach—a selective cooperation, progressively reinforced through the execution of joint exercises, complementary logistics, border control adhering to shared criteria, and, above all, forged from common policies regarding Russia, Israel, and the Middle East.

In reality, and taken as a whole, European autonomy must result from a step-by-step process: consensus in threat analysis, economies of scale, complementarity, and the uniting of forces. Only in this way will the construction of a European Defence, the urgency of which is indisputable, be politically and technically viable.

Comparing sanctions regimes: Iran and North Korea

The prevailing strategy toward the Middle East in 2026—characterized by "maximum pressure," maritime blockades, and paternalistic threats of "punishment"—represents a catastrophic regression in international statecraft. This "predatory diplomacy" is not only ethically bankrupt but strategically illiterate, particularly when contrasted with the long-standing, paralyzed "soft approach" toward North Korea.

1. The Paternalism of "Misbehaviour": A Diplomatic Dead End

The current rhetoric reduces the complex, millennia-old "political DNA" of Iran to a juvenile dynamic. Terming the actions of a regional power as "misbehaving" is a fundamental category error that sabotages any prospect of a lasting settlement.

• The Iran Context: By treating Tehran as a wayward child rather than a sovereign adversary, Washington ignores the reality that Iranian strategic culture is rooted in a "resistance economy" and a deep-seated suspicion of Western diktats.

• The North Korea Contrast: While Iran is threatened with renewed strikes for "bad behaviour" despite its 14-point peace proposal, North Korea has built a nuclear arsenal under decades of "Strategic Patience." The global order is effectively telling Tehran: “Negotiate and we will suffocate you; arm yourself to the teeth like Pyongyang and we will eventually grant you a summit.”

2. The Myth of the "Surgical Strike" and "Elimination"

The political demand to "eliminate" a nation’s missile capacity through military force is a dangerous fantasy.

• The Iran Context: Military infrastructure in Iran is hardened, dispersed, and embedded within civilian hubs. A "strike" is never just a strike; it is a declaration of total war that would inevitably trigger asymmetric retaliation across the Strait of Hormuz—the world’s most sensitive energy artery.

• The Failure of Force: History shows that technical knowledge cannot be bombed out of existence. Strikes on the Iranian "brain trust" only accelerate the resolve to achieve the ultimate deterrent, mirroring the North Korean path where every round of pressure resulted in a more advanced missile test.

3. Economic Suffocation: Humanitarian Crime as Strategy

The current "suffocating" blockade, which prevents even medical and basic cargo from reaching civilian ports, is a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of international law.

• The Iran Context: Claiming that a blockade is "doing very well" because soldiers cannot be paid ignores the millions of civilians whose food and energy security are being held hostage for a "quick-win" deal.

• The North Korea Contrast: For years, the international community provided food aid and "Sunshine Policy" engagement to Pyongyang to avoid humanitarian collapse. Applying a total blockade to Iran while having historically subsidized North Korea’s survival exposes a glaring lack of moral consistency.

4. The Geopolitical Chessboard vs. The Oil Market

Linking peace talks to the UAE leaving OPEC or driving down oil futures exposes the true, cynical motivation of the current escalation: Resource Coercion.

• The Critique: When the US Treasury frames a blockade as a success because it might lower gas prices for Western consumers, it erodes any claim of "defending humanity." It reveals the conflict as a mercantilist war, where Iranian sovereignty is being sacrificed to manipulate the global energy market.

5. The Dangerous Erasion of the UN

Perhaps the most severe failure is the total marginalization of the UN Secretariat and the UN Charter in favour of personalized, "family-business" diplomacy.

• The Strategic Risk: By conducting negotiations through personal envoys and son-in-laws rather than the UN’s institutional framework, the current administration is building a "house of cards." Without the UN's "Blue Book" of neutral mediation and the legitimacy of the Security Council, any deal made is temporary, non-binding, and destined to collapse the moment the political winds shift.

Conclusion: The "Catastrophic Miscalculation"

The world is witnessing a " might-is-right" approach that rewards nuclear proliferation (North Korea) and punishes diplomatic overtures (Iran’s 14-point plan). If the United Nations remains a spectator while the "Big Three" treat the high seas and sovereign nations as personal fiefdoms, we are not just witnessing the end of an Iranian peace process; we are witnessing the final expiration of the post-WWII rules-based order. The result will not be a "great deal," but a era of deliberate, daily insecurity.

The High Seas Treaty

The BBNJ: The Agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction 

Formally the Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, the BBNJ is a landmark international treaty often called the High Seas Treaty. Background and Status

• Adopted: June 19, 2023, after nearly two decades of discussions and intense negotiations.
• Entered into force: January 17, 2026, after reaching the 60-ratification threshold (it has since seen broader ratification and signatures, with around 145 signatories and over 85 parties as of recent counts).
• It serves as the third implementing agreement to the 1982 UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), complementing existing frameworks for fisheries, shipping, and seabed mining without overriding them.

Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (ABNJ) cover: two-thirds of the ocean (high seas water column + the international "Area" of the seabed). These regions represent the largest habitat on Earth but have long had governance gaps, especially for biodiversity protection amid threats like overfishing, pollution, climate change, and emerging activities (e.g., deep-sea mining, bioprospecting).Core ObjectiveTo ensure the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity in ABNJ for present and future generations, through effective UNCLOS implementation and enhanced international cooperation. Four Main Pillars ("Packages")The agreement is structured around four interconnected themes:

1. Marine Genetic Resources (MGRs), Including Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits
   Regulates access to genetic material from high-seas organisms (e.g., for pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, or biotechnology) and their digital sequence information.
   Emphasizes benefit-sharing (monetary and non-monetary) to support developing states, including capacity-building and technology transfer. It promotes open access with transparency mechanisms while addressing equity.
2. Area-Based Management Tools (ABMTs), Including Marine Protected Areas (MPAs)
   Establishes a global framework for creating MPAs and other tools in the high seas.
   Decisions aim for science-based, inclusive processes (with COP approval). This is a major gap-filler, as prior high-seas protections were fragmented.
3. Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs)
   Requires parties to assess potential impacts of planned activities in ABNJ (or activities under their jurisdiction that could affect ABNJ).
   Includes thresholds for significant harm, public reporting via a Clearing-House Mechanism, and consideration of cumulative effects. It promotes a precautionary approach.
4. Capacity-Building and Transfer of Marine Technology (CB&TMT)
   Focuses on helping developing states participate effectively, with obligations for technology transfer, training, and funding to reduce inequalities in ocean science and governance.

Key Institutional and Cross-Cutting Elements

• Conference of the Parties (COP): Main decision-making body.
• Scientific and Technical Body: Provides expert advice.
• Clearing-House Mechanism: Central hub for information sharing, transparency, and benefit-sharing data.
• Secretariat: Administrative support (location under discussion — bids from Xiamen/China, Valparaíso/Chile, and Brussels/Belgium; decision expected at COP1).
• Funding Mechanism: To support implementation, especially for developing countries.
• Principles include equity, precaution, ecosystem approach, and respect for UNCLOS rights (e.g., freedom of navigation, marine scientific research).

Geopolitical Context (Relevant to Your Blog)China's bid to host the Secretariat in Xiamen highlights the treaty's strategic importance. Hosting offers influence over agenda-setting, data management, and norm interpretation — especially as China positions itself as a leader in "Global South" multilateralism while navigating its own maritime interests (e.g., fishing fleets, South China Sea claims). The choice (to be finalized at COP1) could affect perceptions of neutrality, given ongoing disputes and the treaty's emphasis on the "common heritage of mankind." Strengths and Challenges

• Strengths: Fills critical UNCLOS gaps, promotes equity, enables high-seas MPAs, and sets standards for emerging activities. It encourages coordination across sectors.
• Challenges: Implementation details (e.g., exact benefit-sharing formulas, MPA proposal/voting thresholds) will evolve at COP meetings. It respects existing bodies (e.g., no direct override of fisheries or mining regimes), which can limit ambition. Enforcement relies on state compliance and cooperation.

The BBNJ Agreement represents a significant step toward treating the high seas as a shared global commons rather than a lawless frontier. Its success will depend on rapid ratification, robust COP decisions, and actual funding/technology flows. For deeper reading, the official UN text and High Seas Alliance briefings are excellent resources.