Who is next at the United Nations? What for?

 

An Impossible Job? The Succession of Guterres in a World Adrift

By Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor and former UN Under-Secretary-General/ SRSG

Published: 17 April 2026

---

Within a few days, on the 21st and 22nd, the UN General Assembly will interrogate the vision and proposals of each candidate for the position of Secretary-General. António Guterres concludes his second and final mandate at the end of the year. Who will be his successor?

One candidate is Michelle Bachelet, who served as President of Chile twice—from 2006 to 2010 and 2014 to 2018. Bachelet can also claim significant experience within the United Nations. She held several roles and served as the High Commissioner for Human Rights until 2022. However, Human Rights is a highly sensitive field, where conflict with various offending States is frequent. Consequently, the American President and the newly inaugurated president of her own country do not view her candidacy favourably. Although she is, in my opinion, the most qualified candidate, she faces a virtually impossible challenge.

Rafael Grossi, the Argentine who has served as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency since 2019, is also in the race. Grossi gained visibility due to the crises surrounding nuclear power plants in Ukraine and Iran. His name is clearly associated with nuclear issues. He has demonstrated courage and initiative. The support of his country's president, Javier Milei—an eccentric who maintains a special relationship with Donald Trump and has moved closer to China (stating in Davos this year that China is a major trading partner)—will aid his candidacy. The problem may come from Moscow: Milei supports Ukraine, albeit with fluctuations dictated by his alignment with Washington. What impact might this position have on Grossi’s ambitions?

Rebeca Grynspan, the former Vice-President of Costa Rica (1994–1998), is also on the list of official candidates. Grynspan earned credit as one of the officials responsible for the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia regarding maritime security in the Black Sea. She is currently the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, the UN agency that seeks to promote international trade within a framework of sustainable development. She was recently in Baku for an international meeting annually promoted by the President of Azerbaijan, which gathers hundreds of figures active on the international stage. Afterwards, she travelled to Moscow, where she met with Sergey Lavrov. I am told the visit was cordial. However, Russian diplomacy is very shrewd and will only show its hand at the final moment.

Grynspan is, at the outset, the candidate with the greatest chance of success. In addition to her diplomatic qualities and her experience in the field of global economics, she hails from a country of little controversy and is a woman. Furthermore, there is an enormous political campaign in several influential circles pressuring for the election of a woman—an unprecedented feat.

Finally, we have Macky Sall, the former President of Senegal (2012–2024) and the African Union (2022–2023). In performing these roles, Sall demonstrated an ability to dialogue with the great powers independently, without geopolitical alignments. He is a moderate voice of the Global South. He faces, however, a major challenge: the geographic rotation of the Secretary-General position. According to this principle—an unwritten but decisive understanding—the next UN Secretary-General must come from the group of countries that constitute Latin America and the Caribbean. The only Secretary-General from that region was the Peruvian Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who concluded his mandate on the last day of 1991. Thus, it is almost certain that Guterres will hand over his place to a Latin American or a Caribbean—and I am convinced these national designations should be written in the feminine.

We shall see how the hearings of 21 and 22 April unfold. The delegations present at the General Assembly are preparing to raise a wide range of questions. The most delicate will certainly be those linked to the reform of the United Nations, starting with the composition and representativeness of the Security Council. Clarifications will also be sought on how each candidate intends to deal with the veto-wielding States whenever they embark on clear violations of the UN Charter and International Law. This is an all too current issue. Great powers now shamelessly violate the principles and protocols that they themselves and the international community approved over the decades. They tear up the UN Charter when it suits them and protect client-States led by war criminals.

How can each candidate respond to such questions? It will not be easy.

The political dimension of the UN is undergoing a period of accelerated weakening and marginalisation. International relations have ceased to be aligned with the search for solutions to global problems. Today, as in a past thought never to return—prior to 1945—confrontations and wars of aggression matter more than diplomacy and solidarity between peoples. What can the Secretary-General do to reverse this trend?

Put another way: is there still political space for an organisation whose mission is the maintenance of peace between peoples? The answer lies in the various capitals across the world. It is not in the building in Manhattan, in the area known as Turtle Bay. Therefore, the new Secretary-General—be it one of the four mentioned above, or a "wild card" appearing at the final hour with the blessing of the five veto-wielding members—must be a "moving turtle." A pilgrim of peace in permanent transit between capitals. Direct contact with peoples and with the most diverse leaders, including those who pretend to believe in multilateralism, diplomacy, and respect for International Law: that is the master key to the rebirth of the United Nations.

Some comments regarding my text about Guterres's succession

A World Adrift: The UN’s Leadership Crisis and the Fragmentation of Global Order

The debate over António Guterres’s successor as Secretary‑General of the United Nations unfolds at a moment when the international system is experiencing its deepest crisis of coherence since the end of the Cold War. 

My column of yesterday in Diário de Notícias (1)—a sober reflection on the “impossible job” awaiting the next UN leader—captures the structural paralysis of multilateralism. Yet when juxtaposed with the rest of the day’s DN coverage, a broader picture emerges: the UN’s leadership vacuum is only one manifestation of a world in which state‑centric power politics have decisively eclipsed institutional governance.

This contrast between my institutional lens and DN’s event‑driven reporting reveals a deeper truth. The crises dominating the headlines—Middle Eastern escalation, energy insecurity, and domestic political fragmentation—are precisely the types of challenges the UN was designed to manage. Their prominence, coupled with the near‑absence of UN‑related coverage outside my column, underscores the organization’s declining relevance in shaping global outcomes.

---

The Candidates and the Constraints

My analysis of the four declared candidates—Michelle Bachelet, Rafael Grossi, Rebeca Grynspan, and Macky Sall—highlights a paradox at the heart of the UN system. Each contender brings a distinct diplomatic pedigree, yet all are constrained by the same immutable forces: the veto power of the Security Council’s permanent members, the unwritten rule of regional rotation, and the political preferences of Washington, Beijing, and Moscow.

• Bachelet, arguably the most experienced, is penalized by her human‑rights professional record—an asset in normative terms but a liability in a system where major powers increasingly reject scrutiny.
• Grossi carries the weight of nuclear diplomacy, but his candidacy is entangled in the triangular dynamics among the U.S., Russia, and Argentina’s unpredictable foreign policy under Javier Milei.
• Grynspan, whom I see as the frontrunner, benefits from geopolitical neutrality of her country of origin (Costa Rica) and gender‑representation momentum.
• Sall embodies the aspirations of the Global South but is constrained by the Latin America–Caribbean rotation expectation. It is almost impossible to have an African candidate as the winner of this year's race.

The common thread is clear: the next Secretary‑General will be selected not for their capacity to lead but for their acceptability to the powers most responsible for the UN’s paralysis.

---

A System Under Strain

While I emphasize the current institutional fragility, DN’s broader news cycle paints the operational landscape in which the next Secretary‑General must operate.

Middle East Escalation

DN’s coverage of ceasefire negotiations, U.S.–Iran mediation, and the risk of regional spillover illustrates the erosion of diplomatic norms. These crises unfold largely outside UN frameworks, with major powers preferring ad hoc coalitions and bilateral channels. The UN’s role is reactive at best, symbolic at worst.

Energy Insecurity

Reports on Europe’s jet‑fuel shortages and declining U.S. reserves highlight the geopolitical weaponization of energy. These dynamics—once central to UN‑led discussions on global economic stability—now play out in markets and national capitals, not in multilateral forums.

Domestic Political Fragmentation

DN’s focus on Portuguese political tensions, IMF warnings, and governance challenges mirrors a global trend: domestic politics increasingly dominate foreign‑policy bandwidth. As states turn inward, multilateral commitments weaken.

Together, these stories reinforce my thesis: the UN is being marginalized not by irrelevance but by the deliberate choices of states that no longer see multilateralism as a vehicle for advancing their interests.

---

The Return of Pre‑1945 Politics

My most striking argument is that the world is reverting to a pre‑1945 logic—one in which power, not principle, determines outcomes. DN’s coverage supports this view. Whether in the Middle East, energy markets, or domestic politics, the pattern is consistent: states act unilaterally, institutions react belatedly, and norms erode quietly.

The UN’s predicament is therefore structural. It is not merely that the organization lacks tools; it is that the geopolitical environment no longer rewards cooperation. The next Secretary‑General will inherit a system in which the Charter’s foundational assumptions—collective security, sovereign equality, and the primacy of law—are openly contested.

---

The Secretary‑General as “Peregrino da Paz”

My metaphor of the Secretary‑General as a “tartaruga em movimento”—a turtle in constant motion—captures the essence of the role in the current era. The next leader will need to be:

• perpetually itinerant, engaging directly with capitals rather than relying on institutional authority
• politically agile, navigating great‑power rivalries without becoming their instrument
• symbolically resilient, embodying the UN’s normative aspirations even when its operational capacity is limited

This is not the Secretary‑General envisioned in 1945. It is a diplomatic pilgrim, operating in the interstices of a fragmented order - that is what is required today. 

---

Conclusion: A Leadership Contest That Mirrors a Systemic Crisis

The juxtaposition of my column with the day’s DN coverage (2) reveals a world in which the UN’s leadership transition is both crucial and curiously peripheral. Crucial because global crises demand coordinated responses; peripheral because states increasingly bypass the very institution designed to provide them.

The next Secretary‑General will not reverse this trend alone. But the selection process—shaped by geopolitical bargaining, regional expectations, and normative pressures—will signal whether the international community still believes in the possibility of collective governance.

In that sense, the succession to Guterres is more than a personnel decision. It is a referendum on the future of multilateralism itself.

---

(1) https://www.dn.pt/opiniao-dn/um-cargo-impossvel-a-sucesso-de-guterres-num-mundo-deriva
      The English translation will be available soon.
(2) 17 April 2026

The Hungarian parliamentary elections and Viktor Orbán's ruses

Hungarian voters will decide this Sunday, 12 April, which political forces will be able to form a majority in the National Parliament and, consequently, who will be the country's future Prime Minister. The rest of Europe is anxiously awaiting the outcome of this election.

Viktor Orbán, who has led the government since 2010, is seeking his fifth consecutive term. Orbán, who plays on three boards simultaneously—Putin's Russia, Trump's America, and Brussels' Europe—has systematically exploited each of them to maximise his chances of re-election. He represents a contemporary form of political authoritarianism exercised within a formally democratic institutional framework. According to several analysts, this is one of the clearest examples of politics centred on the almost absolute power of the leader—an ancient phenomenon that is being reborn in the European space, in parallel with what is happening in other parts of the globe.

The ruses he has employed are varied. Electoral districts were redrawn to maximise the relative weight of rural votes, where his party, Fidesz, controls the electorate more easily. Conversely, the weight of urban votes, which traditionally favour the opposition, has been diluted. He abolished campaign spending limits, which disproportionately benefits the current governing party, Fidesz; according to the conclusions of various analysts, the party uses state resources as if they were its own money. This is, moreover, a recurring pattern of deliberate confusion between public resources and partisan or private interests. Various reports and analyses have noted that public funds, besides enriching those in power, are used as "ready cash" to muster support in rural areas.

Furthermore, the current government has made it easier for Hungarians living abroad—who traditionally support Orbán—to register to vote. He controls, directly or indirectly, about 90% of the media and manipulates social networks, all with the aim of spreading the message that the main opposition candidate, Péter Magyar, would be a puppet of Ursula von der Leyen and Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

The Trump administration openly supports Viktor Orbán. Vice President JD Vance, a strangely ideological and profoundly retrograde politician, was in Hungary just a few days ago. He shamelessly interfered in the electoral process of an EU country. We must have the courage to say that interference of this kind is an unacceptable act.

Vance came to support a European leader who has very special ties with Vladimir Putin. The Russian president has the destruction of the EU and NATO at the top of his political agenda. He is a politician who asserts himself as our enemy and who seriously threatens our democratic space.

Orbán is a "Trojan Horse" for Putin, as recently suggested by The Washington Post. According to this prestigious American daily, there are credible reports—endorsed by multiple European sources—that the Hungarian government keeps the Kremlin informed, in real-time, of what is discussed in high-level meetings in Brussels. For example, there are credible allegations, published by major media outlets and cited by political intelligence sources, that Hungarian officials take advantage of breaks in European Council sessions to call Sergey Lavrov to obtain direct instructions from Moscow. On the other hand, it is suspected that NATO has stopped sharing certain strategic military plans with Hungary. There are fears that Orbán's government could compromise Alliance secrets regarding the defence of Ukraine.

Donald Tusk, the Polish Prime Minister, considers Orbán and his clique a direct threat to the security of the EU and its member states. The opinion of Tusk, who served as President of the European Council and leads a country well-acquainted with the Kremlin's clandestine practices, cannot be ignored or swept under the carpet, as some politicians are wont to do.

One of the most characteristic events of Orbán and Putin's cunning way of operating involved an attempt, attributed by many to Russian secret services, to orchestrate a fake attack against a pipeline or against Orbán himself on the eve of the elections. The intention would be clear: to blame these "staged crimes" on the opposition, allegedly in the pay of Zelenskyy and foreign interests, thereby emotionally boosting the chances of victory for Orbán, the "true" defender of the fatherland.

The European parties allied with Fidesz form one of the most reactionary families in the European Parliament: the Patriots for Europe. In truth, they possess neither patriotic sentiment nor any desire to defend European values. Democracy with ethics in public life is not their concern. They do not believe in the vital importance of cohesion within the European Union and do everything to undermine it. This political family includes Marine Le Pen's Rassemblement National (France), VOX (Spain), Lega (Italy), and ultra-nationalist and xenophobic parties from Czechia, Austria, the Netherlands, and Slovakia, and even Chega from Portugal, to name but a few of the most radical. The greatest danger comes from France: if the RN were to win the 2027 presidential elections, the Patriots for Europe would be in a better position to help achieve what both the Kremlin and Donald Trump's MAGA movement so desire—to implode the European Union.

It is fundamental that the Hungarian opposition obtains a majority on Sunday. More than just an anomaly, the Orbán case exposes a persistent European fragility: the difficulty of defending democracy when its hollowed-out from within its own institutions or member states.

Diplomacy today: the art of deception?

The Diplomacy of Deception: War and Cynicism in the Easter Season

Victor Angelo

We enter this Judeo-Christian Easter period with a world marked by instability, prolonged violence, and a disturbing normalisation of war. From Ukraine to the Middle East, and including Iran, conflicts are accumulating that expose not only the marginalisation of traditional diplomacy but also a growing cynicism in international relations. Instead of the pursuit of peace, we are witnessing the instrumentalisation of diplomacy as a Trojan horse for force and aggression, a systematic contempt for International Law, and the accelerated erosion of the multilateral order built after 1945.

Regardless, this is one of those times of year that demands we speak even louder, and with total courage, about the importance of peace and ethics in politics and life.

In the case of Lebanon, the answer is clear: the violence and the gravest humanitarian crisis the country faces have no end in sight. Benjamin Netanyahu's government is betting on war and the destruction of the forces it classifies as enemies. His government's actions also have a very negative impact on the international image and the future of Israel—something that, it seems to me, does not receive due attention. The Israeli people are held captive by a coalition of extremist fanatics who manipulate the country's public opinion and use racism, the illusion of an ethno-religious belief, and fear as instruments to consolidate power.

Netanyahu disregards international norms and United Nations resolutions. His political decisions and the resulting military campaigns will one day be judged in the international courts based in The Hague. Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) has a moral obligation to condemn the policies of Netanyahu's government and to maintain a diplomatic distance from that regime.

This should, in fact, be the EU’s diplomatic practice when dealing with regimes that do not respect International Law. This is called soft power: a coherent position in the face of global or regional challenges, based on principles established as International Law over decades. The EU's geopolitical strength must lie in an unambiguous diplomacy, free from indecision or opportunism. To be seen by the rest of the world as a Union that follows an international policy based on convenience—in the vein of double standards—might be considered by many as political realism. But that type of realism leads to the disregard for Human Rights and to the crises currently crushing the Middle East and other parts of the world. Geopolitical realism is a historical step backwards.

The warlords practise the diplomacy of deception. It is an error to classify this practice as the diplomacy of chaos and improvisation. The politicians behind the aggressions against Ukraine, Iran, the rest of the Middle East, and other regions, pretend to be ready to negotiate. However, they follow a deliberate strategy of disruption. They know what they are doing. Diplomacy masks bellicose intent. There may be a good measure of historical ignorance and miscalculation, but the primary explanation for their decisions lies in the return to the old idea of "gunboat diplomacy" as the engine of international relations.

The war of aggression against Iran, which has political and economic consequences reaching far beyond the collapse of the Middle East, showed that traditional diplomacy—based on treaties, protocols, and predictability—has ceased to matter to leaders like Donald Trump. It has been this way since 2014 and, on a large scale, since 2022 with Vladimir Putin.

The diplomatic initiatives that pretend to be underway hide a preference for the theory of shock and confrontation, and an imperial Diktat philosophy inspired by the 19th-century world and the reality experienced until the end of the Second World War. The ruse involves keeping adversaries and allies in a climate of constant pressure and uncertainty, acting on the basis of surprise. It is not about improvising, but rather about surprising in order to attempt to dominate.

Surprise causes institutional paralysis, namely at the level of multilateral systems and diplomatic alliances. In reality, in Trump's case, it endangers the continuity of the UN's political dimension and the credibility of NATO. Within these and other multilateral institutional frameworks, trust disappears—which is the foundation of effective diplomacy—and with the loss of trust, the future of these institutions enters a phase of absolute uncertainty. I believe it is naive not to see this danger.

What should the response of European States be? Subtly clear. It must be based, concretely, on firmness and diplomatic distancing while continuing to insist on the value of alliances, which must not compromise multilateral cooperation. European leaders must also stress that it is vital to bring an end, without further delay, to the armed aggressions currently underway. Moreover, Europe needs to understand that an unpredictable international reality based on subordination to a problematic ally favours the political centrality of other States—in this case, China.

China seeks to be seen as a bulwark of stability and the sturdiest pillar of multilateralism. The big question, besides it being an authoritarian power, is whether the Chinese economy can sustain this global leadership role that is falling into its lap.

In any case, Europe cannot afford to lose out in this competition for centrality. Any imbalance that favours a superpower, even one as apparently predictable as China, contains, in the long run, a great risk of conflict.

This Easter, the message I dare to address to European leaders is summarised as follows: it is fundamental to resurrect. 

Donald Trump: what is next concerning war and peace in Iran?

 

Iran: Trump’s "Peace Plan" as a Prelude to War

By Victor Ângelo

In my reading, President Donald Trump’s current momentum is fueled by three core ambitions: to make himself and his close associates as wealthy as possible; to exercise and maintain absolute power urbi et orbi; and to secure a definitive place in history. The aggression against Iran, like his other maneuvers, is designed with these goals in sight. However, from Trump’s perspective, this must be resolved without delay to allow for a pivot toward Cuba—we know what that implies—before the U.S. midterm elections in November. For this reason, he presented a 15-point peace proposal this week. Should Iran capitulate and accept it in its entirety, Washington could contentedly close this chapter and move immediately to the Cuban question.

However, the Trump plan appears to lack both a future and the necessary equilibrium. According to the most credible public information sources, Tehran views this 15-point list as a set of unacceptable demands. They amount to an indisputable surrender, leaving no room for negotiation or an honorable exit. By demanding the near-total denuclearization of its enemy, an end to support for allied regional groups, limits on the production and range of its offensive and defensive missiles, and the delivery of all highly enriched uranium to the UN’s specialized nuclear agency (IAEA), the U.S. aims purely to satisfy Israeli objectives and reduce Iran’s strategic defense capabilities and external alliances to zero.

These are existential matters for the regime. Notably, Trump’s proposal does not touch upon the nature of the regime itself, which would presumably continue its brutal violation of the human rights of its citizens. Democracy and freedom are, once again, absent from Trump’s list of priorities.

The only mechanism of compensation for Washington’s demands would be the lifting of sanctions and their related automatic triggers. Yet, this would not be a full concession. Technological embargos, directly or indirectly related to military dimensions, would persist. Such blockades would only deepen the fragility of Iran’s defenses, not just against Israel, but also in the face of Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The U.S. will not abandon the region. On the contrary, they are expected to soon have, at least, roughly 60,000 elite troops stationed in the bases and on the ships surrounding Iran. History teaches us—as I had the opportunity to learn across various theaters of crisis—that sanctions cause pain and hardship, but they are endurable, especially in a country as vast as Iran with heavyweight friends in the international community. In contrast, large-scale disarmament offers no security guarantees. To accept disarmament would be, in Iran's case, a potentially fatal error. Furthermore, demanding total submission without offering an honorable way out to the weaker party—Iran—ignores the reality of statecraft and opens the door to reinforced alliances with the enemies of the West. It is, for instance, a gift offered to the superpowers controlling the BRICS.

The so-called peace plan is equally unappealing to Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. He wants more. The Israeli Prime Minister seeks a different type of political leadership in Tehran, one ready to accept de facto Israeli prominence in the Middle East. Above all, he wants certainty that nuclear infrastructures have been physically destroyed, that the missile program has been reduced to the scale of a rifle factory, and that Iranian support for hostile armed groups in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine is entirely annihilated.

Trump’s proposal provides no role for the UN Security Council. In other words, to end a war started outside the law, this peace plan remains outside the framework and practice of International Law. The demand that the estimated 450 kilograms of enriched uranium held by Iran be placed under IAEA custody is a decoy. It requires a logistical capacity and a legal mandate that the UN Agency does not currently possess. The Agency is a technical institution for verification and reporting; it must not hold a political function, as politics is the exclusive competence of the Security Council.

From Tehran’s perspective, this plan cannot be approved. They have already made this clear. 

Niccolò Machiavelli reminds us, five centuries on, that a lopsided peace plan not based on mutual concessions can rapidly transform into a new source of war. This is what the UN Secretary-General implied this week, emphasizing with grave concern that the war in the Middle East is spinning out of control. Simultaneously, he appointed my former colleague Jean Arnault as his Personal Representative to build bridges between the conflicting parties. I would have done this much sooner, following the June 22, 2025, bombings of Iranian nuclear plants. However, I would not have appointed a Frenchman or any other Westerner, despite my great esteem for Arnault. The West is seen as an echo of Trump and Netanyahu. It is seen as partial.

Looking ahead, I unfortunately foresee a worsening of the crisis: a sharp military escalation. A resumption of air and naval strikes against Iran, ground incursions by American special forces, and a volatile situation in the countries bordering the Persian Gulf and Lebanon—not to mention the highly negative impact on the global economy. This is to say nothing of the strengthened hand given to Russia to continue its bombardment of Ukraine. 

In listing the indicators of a possible military escalation, I view April with deep concern. We have no more than three or four weeks to find a true alternative for peace.