Mali is not Afghanistan

Containing the Islamist threat as Gaddafi’s ghost casts shadow in the Sahel

By Victor Angelo and Marc de Bernis

France finds itself relatively isolated in its intervention in Mali. While its European partners and the U.S. government have expressed support to the French operation aimed at preventing armed Islamic groups from seizing power, this has not translated into concrete co-operation, except for token logistical assistance.

One reason for the reluctance of France's western allies to engage on the ground is the fear that Mali could become an inextricable quagmire comparable to Afghanistan. This perception is wrong. Superficial comparisons lead to procrastination which could result in the escalation of a threat that could have been contained. 

Mali, like Afghanistan, is a developing country whose population is mainly Muslim. The similarity stops here. From a military and operational point of view, the Mali context is much less favourable to jihadists than Afghanistan. The various Islamists groups involved in northern Mali include no more than a few thousand fighters – with estimates of less than 3,000 – who operate within a vast but sparsely populated territory, home to less than two million people. In this desert and flat area – except for a mountainous zone in the north-west, the Adrar des Ifoghas – it is very difficult to hide, including within the local population, thus movements are easily spotted. Jihadist enclaves can be easily identified through intelligence which renders them  extremely vulnerable to air strikes. More importantly, there is no Pakistan equivalent that lies adjacent to Mali to offer safe haven to militants. The Taliban would never have been able to establish their power over Afghanistan and to resist NATO forces without the refuge offered to them next door, in Pakistan. Jihadists in Mali have no access to an external sanctuary or base to train their fighters. Certainly not in Algeria, Niger or Mauritania. Not even in the more fractured Libya.

From a cultural and religious standpoint, the region is dominated by the Tuaregs who co-exist with a mix of other ethnic groups, including Maures, Songhai and Peuls. The Muslim population follows a moderate and peaceful interpretation of Islam, in harmony with the ancestral traditions of Africa. Religious practice is not a primary characteristic of the Tuareg lifestyle. Even if a tiny fraction may be lured into a more extremist form of Islam, as advocated by Salafist groups, with impressionable young men falling prey to the proselytism of jihadist recruiters, it is unlikely that the cultural landscape would allow for the development of a strong extremist movement comparable to that of the Taliban. Recent events have shown the Malian population to unanimously reject the Sharia law as imposed by the Islamist groups in areas under their control.

In economic and political terms, Mali is fragile but not a failed state. Despite of its limited resources, the country, which is among the world’s poorest, has managed to democratise. The real problem lies in the lack of good governance which has led northern Mali to become a smuggling corridor between Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe for all forms of trafficking – in drugs, arms, tobacco, and people. However, the country’s economy is not dependant on illegal commodities, contrary to the case of Afghanistan, which is plagued by the narcotics trade.

The crisis in Mali is related to the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Libya. Many Tuareg men had been employed by Gaddafi as militias. Having lost their jobs, these fighters had returned to the Sahel, particularly to northern Mali, to establish an alliance with various Islamic movements inspired by Al Qaeda. The recent break-up of this coalition demonstrates the incompatibility between the Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which is deeply rooted in the region’s history, and Islamist terrorists. The latter have no legitimacy within the population and no means to control the territory on a sustainable basis, both economically and militarily. As such they can be eliminated through concerted and determined international action in co-operation with the states of the region, including Algeria. At the same time, long term solutions require a renewed dialogue between the Tuareg MNLA and the different Sahelian governments. This should start now, as military operations progress. Meanwhile, the international community should review the delivery of development assistance to the Sahel to achieve a more targeted approach to state capacity-building and poverty alleviation. Particular attention should be given to the urban youth, as their engagement is key to curb militancy and violent uprising.

(721 words)

Victor Angelo was a former UN Under-Secretary-General and the UNSG’s Special Representative for the Central African Republic and Chad.

Marc de Bernis was a former UN Development Programme’s Resident Representative in Algeria and Niger.