Mali, Sahel et l'Europe

 

1. Situation critique du Mali

• Mali est au bord de l’effondrement en tant qu’État, la majorité de son territoire étant menacée par des groupes armés, dont des organisations terroristes affiliées à Al-Qaïda, à l’État islamique, ainsi que des milices ethniques.

2. Terrorisme et criminalité organisée

• Le financement du terrorisme au Mali provient principalement de sources locales : exploitation artisanale de l’or (liée à des organisations russes qui ont pris la succession du Groupe Wagner), extorsion, enlèvements, péages routiers, vol de bétail et trafic de drogue. La région est un corridor majeur pour les drogues entre l’Amérique latine et l’Europe.

3. Crise humanitaire et sociale

• On observe un trafic généralisé de personnes, de carburant, de tabac et d’armes. Les écoles fonctionnent à peine, sauf les madrasas religieuses, et le chômage des jeunes est massif, poussant beaucoup à rejoindre des groupes armés.

4. Réponse internationale et géopolitique

• Le président de la Commission de l’Union africaine, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, appelle à une réponse internationale forte, mais l’attention mondiale fait défaut. Le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU et les puissances européennes se sont désengagés, tandis que l’influence russe s’est accrue après l’expulsion des forces françaises et de la mission de l’ONU.

5. Impact sur l’Europe

• L’instabilité au Sahel, dont le Mali, entraîne une augmentation de la migration, du trafic de drogue et de l’insécurité en Europe, ainsi qu’une perte d’influence géopolitique majeure pour l’Europe dans la région.

6. Perspective historique

• L’auteur se souvient d’une époque où le Mali et ses voisins produisaient des intellectuels et géraient mieux la gouvernance. Mais ces dernières années, l’extrémisme, la criminalité, la corruption, la pression démographique, le changement climatique et l’hostilité extérieure envers les idées démocratiques ont aggravé la situation.

7. Négligence européenne

• L’Union européenne est critiquée pour son absence de stratégie cohérente envers le Sahel, ne s’y intéressant que lorsque les conséquences (comme la migration) atteignent ses propres frontières.

Mali and the Rest of the Sahel as Priorities Ignored by European Geopolitics

Mali, a vast country and a mosaic of cultures, is just two steps from Europe and one step from collapsing as a state. Earlier this week, the President of the African Union Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, made a dramatic appeal to the international community—a term that is increasingly vague these days—to prevent the country from falling into absolute chaos. He expressed deep concern about the rapid expansion of various terrorist groups, whose activities are based on two pillars: ethnic-religious fundamentalism and organised crime. The state administration and security forces control only a small fraction of the territory. The rest, including the north, the centre, and the outskirts of the capital, Bamako, are operational zones for armed groups. Some are affiliated with the terrorist web known as Al-Qaeda or the self-proclaimed Islamic State, while others are mainly ethnically based, with Tuaregs and Arabs against the Bantu populations of the south.

The financing of terrorist actions is largely domestic. It includes artisanal gold mining, with the gold then sold to Russian organisations, metamorphoses of the infamous Wagner Group. It is suspected that the gold passes through the important Dubai gold market, where it is converted into currency that then goes to Russia. The Russians aligned themselves with the coup military after two military coups (2020 and 2021) and managed to expel the French presence and the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA). They also maintain indirect contacts with the rebellions and traffickers operating in the Persian Gulf.

The imposition of taxes on the population under religious pretences, the kidnapping of wealthy nationals and the few foreigners who still travel in the affected regions, the control of the main roads—which are only passable for those who pay to travel safely and accept keeping only part of their goods—the theft of cattle, all of this funds the costs of violence. Then there is the issue of drugs: the Sahel, of which Mali is a part, is one of the corridors between Latin America and Europe. In the Sahel, the drug trade buys governments and rebels. And the drugs enter our continent through the weakest points, where control and security measures are insufficient and political governance is more inattentive, as is the case in the Algarve, among others.

There is also human trafficking, with migrants coming from all over West Africa heading to Europe, plus the smuggling of fuel, tobacco, and weapons. It is all cash in hand, in lands without law or order. Schools do not function, except for madrasas run by ignorant fanatics, and there are no jobs for the youth born from an unstoppable demographic explosion. The Kalashnikov has become the only possible livelihood.

Youssouf calls for a robust response against terrorism in Mali and the vast Sahel. It is a fully justified warning, but one that will fall on deaf ears. The UN Security Council, after the forced departure of France from the region, the expulsion of MINUSMA, and the growing influence of the Russians under Vladimir Putin, has swept the region into the corner of the forgotten. The Europeans, who relied on client regimes in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—governments that received funds from Brussels to curb migratory movements—have been overtaken by Moscow. Putin understands that chaos in the Sahel has a disproportionate negative impact on neighbouring Europe. For Europe, it means more immigrants, more drugs, more insecurity, and a colossal loss of geopolitical influence in the Sahel.

I worked for several years in the region. I knew a Mali and neighbouring countries capable of producing great intellectuals and handling governance matters seriously. That was the generation that grew up in the post-colonial period. Many of them left the country, recruited by international organisations. Others emigrated to France to teach in major schools, or to Canada, a country that easily opened its doors to French-speaking university graduates.

Even then, there were rebellious movements, because certain ethnic groups and populations in the most remote regions felt ignored by the central power of their countries. The most serious conflicts involved those who lived by herding and those by farming. It was a competition between two ways of life that were hardly compatible in those arid lands. But solutions could be found. It was also possible to meet with rebel leaders and negotiate with them. The United Nations and I, as the organisation’s envoy, were treated with respect and moderation.

Everything changed in the last 15 years. Religious extremism, various forms of crime, corruption from the bottom to the top in these states, uncontrollable demographic growth accompanied by climate change—including the harmattan, the dry desert wind, increasingly spreading in the region—and the scarcity of rain, along with hostility promoted by Gulf countries and Russia against democratic ideas, all this has created an extremely complex situation. And we Europeans only remember the Sahel when we see the children of these lands selling trinkets on our beaches and terraces, or being attacked here by parties of xenophobia, hatred, and racism. It is reason enough to ask where the EU’s geopolitical strategy is.

Are we getting closer to a big war?

The world smells dangerously like gunpowder 

Victor Angelo

The Munich Security Conference, an annual event now celebrating its 60th edition, begins today and runs until Sunday. As has become customary, it is a high-level meeting. This time, it will feature the participation of around 50 Heads of State and Government, another hundred ministers and a good number of leaders of international organizations, academics, thinkers and journalists of international importance.

The report that serves as the basis for this year's conference makes a diagnosis of the main ongoing conflicts and, in summary, suggests two conclusions. First, geopolitical competition continues to worsen, now reaching a level of intensity and complexity unprecedented since the creation of the United Nations. Second, the reestablishment of international cooperation must be seen as an absolute priority. Only in this way will it be possible to resolve the most dangerous challenges, which in reality know no borders and have an impact that cannot be ignored. It is a positive recommendation, in a report that is, in essence, pessimistic.

When reflecting on 2024, the rapporteurs particularly draw attention to the growing risks in four regions of the globe. We are told that the international scene has more fires than firefighters, that there is an accumulation of serious crises to be resolved and an international system that is no longer respected. It's a clear question: instead of all of us winning, would we all rather lose?

One of these regions is Eastern Europe. The geopolitical vision that prevails in the Kremlin is a threat that must be taken seriously. It consists of increasing arrogance and aggressiveness, based on ancient practices of first inventing conflicts with neighbors seen as rivals, and then trying to resolve them with swordplay. My reading of this region is familiar: either Russia withdraws and recognizes the sovereignty of Ukraine, or what is now happening in that country will end up spreading to others in the region. A crisis of this kind would bring immense problems to the unity of NATO and the major countries of the Western world. In democratic contexts, these alliances are more fragile than they might seem.

In the Middle East, that's a powder keg. It is a region of great fractures, where xenophobia and the absurdity of decisions taken in the 20th century are added to cultural and religious hatred, and a multiplicity of borders that do not respect historical identities and give way to nations without homogeneity and without resources, to in addition to oil and gas.

What is conventionally called the Indo-Pacific is another problematic area. It demands increasing attention, as it could be the theater of a major conflict surrounding the issue of Taiwan and beyond. Xi Jinping has just been reappointed for the third time as leader of the single party and as President of China, for new five-year terms. At the end of these terms, he will be 74 years old and no one knows if the conditions will exist for him to be re-elected again. Now, in my opinion, Xi wants to go down in history as the leader who managed to subdue the Taiwanese rebellion. If that is indeed his ultimate ambition, it is very likely that military action against Taiwan will take place before 2027. And if Trump is in the White House, distracted by pursuing his internal adversaries, starting with the Biden family, Xi could conclude that The time has come to step forward and inscribe your name at the top of the list of heroes of communist China.

The Sahel forms the fourth region of deep insecurity. At the moment, the list of absolutely unsafe countries includes Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It must also include Sudan, which is plunged into a merciless civil war and a humanitarian crisis of unimaginable proportions. But Sudan has been excluded from media headlines in an unacceptable way. The crises in the Sahel have all the conditions to spread, as is already happening on a large scale in Nigeria and now in Senegal, due to the political confusion created by the president. In the same Senegal that had always been considered an example of stability and democracy.

Three other major themes are also discussed in this year's report: the growing disparities and economic rivalries between different blocs around the world, including with regard to what could happen with the development of the BRICS; the consequences of climate change on international relations, including migration; and the impact of the technological and digital revolution.

The report describes a world evolving in a worrying direction. And it would be even worse if the spectre that roams the corridors of Munich, silently, were re-elected in November, as no one likes to talk about evil spirits. But November is still a long way away and until then anything can happen.

A.I: translation of my opinion text published on 16 February 2024 in the Lisbon daily newspaper Diário de Notícias. 

Christmas reflection

Peace. Dignity. Equality. Planet.

Victor Angelo

 

On this Christmas Eve, it seems appropriate to recall the current motto of the United Nations: "Peace, dignity and equality on a healthy planet". It is a call for the implementation of policies that place people and nature at the centre of public interventions. It expresses well the wishes that I would like to leave here.

We live in a complex reality, full of real concerns and dangers. The UN itself appears to many to have been weakened and marginalized. In this context, it is easy to lose hope, to confuse realism with pessimism, and to fall into an attitude of every man for himself, each behind his own walls. There is also the temptation to recover the growth that the pandemic caused to be lost with economic programmes based on unsustainable recipes. In other words, without considering the long-term consequences, the excessive debt that will burden future generations, the environmental commitments, and the need to transform the way we live and how we relate to other societies, especially the less developed ones. Electoralism turns democracy into an exercise of political opportunism.

Russian demands and military manoeuvres are the most immediate threat to peace. I wrote about this last week. Since then, Putin's stated conditions - and the language used - have become even more categorical and unacceptable. And military preparations have intensified. We are two days away - 26 December - from the thirtieth anniversary of the demise of the Soviet Union. A historic moment, seen by Putin as the great tragedy of millenarian Russia.  

What are the reasons behind the present Russian escalation?

That is the big question, far beyond the old tape of the narrative about NATO's eastward expansion. The most plausible answer will be to ask heaven and earth, to get a no, and thus create a pretext to annex part of Ukraine. And, at the same time, reaffirm the determination and strength of the Kremlin.

But what is Putin's strategic objective?

Strengthening his control of domestic politics will not be a sufficient explanation, even if we recognise that there is a marked erosion of his popularity. It has been seen: last September's parliamentary elections were a massive exercise in deceit and coercion to hide the extent of popular discontent.

It could then be an attempt to paralyse NATO by dividing it, showing its weaknesses. At the same time, it will send a signal to the Baltic countries. And still, that one does not make policy in the immediate vicinity of Russia without the green light from the Kremlin. 

Whatever the intention, we must insist on peaceful coexistence in Europe. On mutual concessions. As indeed in other parts of the world. In Syria, at war for more than ten years. In Palestine, in the Sahel, in Central Africa, in Ethiopia, in Myanmar, in Yemen. Today is the day to mention again these and other places that have been so afflicted.

Dignity and equality mean respecting the basic rights of every person, as defined in the 1949 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the additional conventions and protocols. The proclamation that "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights" and have "the right to life, liberty and security of person" applies to humanity, regardless of the specific contexts of each nation.

I recognize that the vision that inspired the Universal Declaration places the individual at the centre of rights, while in certain cultures the well-being of the community is presented as having primacy. In one case and in the other, it is about people, the protection of their lives and their creativity. There are no cultural differences there.

On the planet, a little more than a month after the COP26, just a few words to share a thought of solidarity with the thousands of victims of the recent natural disasters. The floods in South Sudan, with entire regions submerged and misery transformed into despair. The typhoons in the Philippines. The tornadoes in the USA. Extreme climatic phenomena are becoming more and more overwhelming. Let us remember, in relation to this great challenge and the others, that this must be the time of rebirth.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 24 December 2021)

The Shael without Idriss Déby

New uncertainties next door in the Greater Sahel

Victor Angelo

 

In 1990, the Chadian rebel leader Idriss Déby returned to the country from Sudan. He led a column of armed men, composed mainly of fighters from his home region.  Days later he seized power in Ndjamena, with the approval of François Mitterrand. The French president knew his geopolitics. He saw Chad as the essential node for the interests, influence and security of France and its client states in that part of Africa. Therefore, it was essential that it be controlled by a strong man, consistent and friendly to France. Déby had this profile. And successive French presidents got used to turning a blind eye to systematic human rights violations, high-scale corruption, and the tribalization of power, so as not to weaken their ally in Ndjamena.

The support became even more solid when Déby decided that his troops would be, on the African side, the strong arm in the fight against the different jihadist groups that terrorize the populations of the Sahel. His military became by far the best prepared in the region. Even against Boko Haram, Chad's capability is far superior to Nigeria's. The UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has a considerable Chadian presence - 1400 troops, with a more offensive posture than most other blue helmets. In addition, Déby had just sent an additional 1200-man brigade, as part of the regional military cooperation known as G5 Sahel, to the three-border area especially targeted by terrorists - the triangle where Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso converge.

The military institutions of the countries in the region are structurally weak and kept that way by politicians, who are more afraid of possible coups than of terrorists. Of all the neighbours, only Déby, trained as an officer in France and hardened in the desert campaigns, was a true war chief. His combativeness was legendary. In 2008, a rebel faction arrived at the gates of his palace. Nicolas Sarkozy proposed that he be exfiltrated into a golden exile. Déby and other loyalists, some of them now members of the Transitional Military Council, refused, preferring to fight to the end. And they eventually defeated the assailants. Shortly afterwards, as the UN Special Representative, I discussed this crisis with Déby. I recall three points from that meeting. First, the recognition that his troops were neither organized nor equipped effectively. Second, the decision to spend a good deal of oil money on transforming his fighters into professional soldiers. Third, the decision to seek an understanding with Omar al-Bashir's Sudan, as he had already done with Gaddafi's Libya, so that neighbouring territories would not be used as bases for launching rebellions. And so it was. By late 2009, the difference was already clear. Since then, these capabilities have been consolidated. France, the United States, and other Westerners began to see Chad as the spearhead against terrorism and religious extremism. Criticism of dictatorship and nepotism have been put in the freezer.

But in these lands of instability, life takes many turns. Déby closed his cycle this week, perhaps in a similar way to the one he did thirty years ago. Only this time the rebel column was from the tribe next door, it came from Libya, and the president fell on the front line. Chad, Central Africa, the Sahel, France, and the Europeans present in the region became more fragile.

Several questions arise from the disappearance of Idriss Déby. What motivated President Macron to leave him without his usual support, when in 2019 he had sent fighters to quell a similar rebellion? Miscalculation? Who is behind this new rebellion, known as FACT (Front for Change and Concord in Chad)? What impact will the new reality have on the conflict in the Central African Republic? What to expect from the G5 Sahel and the fight against terrorism in this part of Africa? Each of these questions hides many uncertainties and concerns. The future of the poor people of Chad is the greatest of them.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

Discussing security and governance in the Sahel

In the Sahel, a lot of military and little politics

Victor Angelo

 

The call came from Bamako. On the other end of the line was a former colleague, now back home after a brilliant career in the United Nations. The essence of his conversation was against the massive presence of foreign troops in his country. There are more and more of them, both in the framework of the UN mission - known by the acronym MINUSMA - and due to calls by France. Contrary to recent statements by Emmanuel Macron, who said that the war against terrorism in the Sahel was being won, my friend told me about the deterioration of the situation in Mali and in neighbouring countries. In other words, there are more military personnel but, paradoxically, less security.

Let us look at the latest statistics from the International Organization for Migration. They count about 1.7 million displaced persons due to instability and armed actions in this part of the Sahel, especially in the tri-border area between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso - a region known as Liptako. It is estimated, on the other hand, that about seven thousand lives were lost in the last twelve months due to acts of terrorism and counterterrorist prevention and response operations. These are figures well above the average of previous years. What is more, a recent United Nations investigation shows that war crimes and atrocities have been committed in Mali since 2013. The report, which in addition to pointing the finger at terrorists calls into question the armed forces of certain states, has fallen into a deep hole in the Security Council and awaits debate at the Greek calends. 

Liptako is a vast territory, with an area where Portugal could fit three times over. The Fulas, as nomadic herdsmen and itinerant traders in long caravans, have traditionally shared these dry, harsh expanses with other ethnic groups. But ways of life have changed. Accelerated population growth in recent decades, coupled with enormous pressure from cattle rearing - a multiplication of herds -, increasingly irregular and scarce rainfall due to climate change, poverty and the absence of effective state administration have contributed to a widespread environment of social instability, rebellion and conflict. The rush for gold, which began to be exploited intensively on an artisanal basis some twenty years ago, has also attracted new waves of violence. This is the framework in which various armed gangs move and operate under the confused banners of the terrorist network of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) or, further north, on the way to the border with Algeria, the people affiliated to Al-Qaeda. Religious fanaticism serves as an excuse or muddles along with banditry. For many young people, the Kalashnikov has replaced the shepherd's stick or the farmer's hoe in a context that is becoming progressively more arid, unpredictable, and dangerous. Someone from the region told me that joining an armed group is for many an act of self-protection.

There is a huge problem here that fundamentally requires two types of approach: one will be political and the other will be to combat desertification and poverty. I will mention only the political part, which requires the inclusion of all, without discrimination on ethnic grounds. It also means publicly showing a firm hand against corruption, in military institutions and state administrations. Inclusion and probity are two fundamental issues, which must be resolved by national elites.

 The European partners have closed their eyes and pretended not to see these problems. For example, they have been training officers in the Malian armed forces for years, knowing fully well that these officers have kept a tribal mentality and systematically divert resources intended for the country's stabilisation effort to their own advantage. We need to change the way we act in the Sahel. Dialogue with the countries in the region must be respectful. The future that is at stake is theirs, independently of the external dimensions. We cannot take the direction of the process away from them. Being more papist than the Pope in other people's land is a practice that must be put away once and for all, in a drawer of the past. But it must be a frank dialogue.

 

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

 

Christmas in the Sahel

How about lunch in the Sahel?

Victor Angelo

 

A few years ago, my wife and I were invited to an unusual Christmas lunch. The invitation came from the Chad presidency and the repast site was about a hundred kilometres north of Fada, a town more than two hours' flight from Ndjamena, already in the area of transition from the Sahel to the Sahara. The plan was to fly to Fada and follow by land to one of the oases of the Mourdi Depression - a set of deep valleys with several lagoons, much in demand by the traders of the numerous camel herds in transit to Libya, where each camel ends up by being sold at meat markets.

We went there. The journey between Fada and the oasis took place in the middle of twenty-something jeeps of a company of elite troops with operational experience of the region. The open-backed pickup trucks - the famous "technicals" - advanced at high speed, in parallel, on a unique front of several hundred meters. The aim was to avoid the dust and the ambushes of lawless groups that were already wandering in those parts of the Sahel.

The set menu was sheep, stuffed with chicken and couscous, roasted in a hole dug in the sand. The animal, well-done, cleaned of ashes and sand, was placed in front of us, whole, from head to feet, staring at us, so that we, the guests, could begin the feast. The protocol was clear. No one would touch any piece of food before we had finished ours. My wife and I looked at each other, and we did not know what to do. The head of the GOE (Portuguese Police Special Operations Group), who were in charge of my personal security, pulled out a pocket folding knife, cut two pieces and we started munching. Slowly, to show appreciation for the delicacy. Two hundred eyes followed our chewing closely. When we gave the signal that we had enough, the military threw themselves at the animal and the accompanying food. They cleaned everything in the blink of an eye.

In telling all this, my intention is not to invite the reader to a similar Christmas lunch. It is a question of taking advantage of the moment to talk about the Sahel, the hunger and food insecurity that define the daily lives of its people, and the violence that is taking place in these lands. It is also a tribute to those who have little more than their personal dignity, a quality that has always defined the way of being of the people of the Sahel. But that dignity is now often violated by those who have power, whether on the side of governments, armed robbers, or terrorists. The Sahel and the adjacent Sahara are experiencing a deep security crisis, which has worsened continuously since 2012, despite a strong European military presence in the region. 

The year now ending has been the most violent. Jihadists and other armed groups, including popular militias formed by the governments that the Europeans support, will have caused over 4,250 deaths and thousands of displaced people. The most dangerous area is the three borders region between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. About half of the attacks were directed against civilian populations. In most cases, the violence, even that which wears a mantle of religious radicalism, has as its main objective to extort resources. Communities that make a living from artisanal gold mining or pastoralism, as well as those that run the trade corridors connecting the Sahel with the west coast of Africa, in Benin, Togo and Nigeria, are the most frequent targets. It is difficult to determine where looting ends and fanaticism, ethnic hatred or human rights violations begin. Terrorism is a label that defines a complex reality badly. But it is around. In 2020 we saw many confrontations between or perpetrated by two of the most important groups: the Islamic state in the Greater Sahel and the Al-Qaeda factions. And we are still hearing reports of war crimes committed by the armed forces of countries to which Europe gives military training.

The EU is preparing a new strategy for the region. It may be ready during the Portuguese presidency. To be valid, it must begin by questioning the reasons for the failure of the strategy that has been followed so far. My first indications are that it will be more of the same. It might then be a good idea to organise a lunch in a remote corner of the Sahel for some European leaders.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

On Mali and the region

 

In today’s Diário de Notícias (Lisbon)

Notes on Mali

Victor Angelo

 

 

Mali is a fascinating country, diverse in its landscapes and cultures. It is home to great singers and traditional musicians who play the korah, an ancestral instrument made from a large gourd, the Dogon masks and statues, birthplace of the city of Timbuktu, a unique historical reference in Islamic studies. For four centuries, until 1670, Mali was the epicentre of a great empire in West Africa, an empire recognized by Portuguese explorers, who traded extensively with it across the Gambia River. I would also add that I had several Malian colleagues at the UN who proved to be excellent professionals and held important positions in the different multilateral organizations. I write this to fight the summary opinions of those who are in the habit of arranging everything African in a dark corner, in the shadow of the usual prejudices. I am sad, like many others, when I see the country tearing itself apart and becoming insecure, as it continues to do daily.

Mali has made the news again in the last three weeks following the military coup of August 18. It is, for the same reason, the subject of debate, including in European circles. Moreover, some conspiracy theorists have seen Moscow's hand behind the colonels who took power, a hypothesis I consider unlikely. But there are other hands at work in Mali, from France to Saudi Arabia, and with vastly different intentions.

Also, at stake is the role of the United Nations, which has maintained a peace mission in the country since 2013, with more than 15,000 elements. MINUSMA, as the mission is called, has, over time, become a case study because it has not been able to respond to the political and governance issues that are at the heart of Mali's problems. The political direction of the mission resolved, to please the French and out of strategic opportunism, to stick to the president that the coup has now deposed. In New York, at the Security Council, no one had the courage to correct this trajectory. Thus, credibility is lost, and the future is mortgaged. 

Returning to the current debate, it should have emphasized that more than two thirds of Mali's population is under 25 years of age. And that education and the economy are unable to meet the challenges that such an age pyramid entails. When I was in Mali for the first time in 1990, its total population was around eight and a half million. Today, thirty years later, it is close to twenty million. The same happens in the other countries of the region. They all have explosive age pyramids. Demographic pressure has grown throughout the Sahel along with the advance of desertification and poverty. Being young in the Sahel means looking to the future and seeing only a multitude of arid politics, a desert of opportunities and a chaotic and inhumane urban habitat. Thus, hope and social peace are hard to achieve. All that remains is migration to Europe, or else adherence to armed banditry and fanatical rebellions. Fanaticism has grown exponentially over the past decade, thanks in particular to the proliferation of mosques, Wahabist koranic schools and radical preachers, all financed by the Saudis and others of the kind. 

Those who neither emigrate nor join the extremist groups, vegetate in the big cities, where they can observe how social inequalities have become blatant, the fruit of the corruption that prevails in political circles, in the security forces and in the administration of justice. They also see that European countries and other international actors turn a blind eye to the manipulations practiced by the powerful. This is what happened in Mali. After months of popular protest against the indifference of the president and the greed of his own circle of friends, a group of senior officials decided to act. They have popular support, at least for now. It is true that one should not support anti-constitutional coups. But it is also true that one can no longer pretend that one does not see corruption, ineptitude and the failure of territorial administration, with vast areas of national space without any state presence. The mitigation of crises begins with the promotion of probity and the restoration of local power, beyond the treatment of youth issues. This is what we must remind the colonels, the leaders of the region, the UN Security Council and the European partners of Mali, Portugal included. 

 

 

The Libyan future

 The Libyan conflict started nine years ago. It has been violent, and it destroyed most of the economy and livelihoods, as well as the State administration, which was already weak before the crisis. It also had a major impact on the region, as it contributed to increased insecurity in the Sahel. In the circumstances, the announcement this afternoon of a ceasefire, by both key players in the conflict, should be received with some degree of optimism. It came as a surprise, that is a fact. But the positive reactions expressed by Libya’s neighbours and friends, and by the Arab League, are very encouraging. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to comment on the declarations with any type of cynicism. I know it will be difficult to build peace. But the main question this evening is about building peace. How can the partners of Libya help to make sure that the ceasefire holds and that some stability and inclusiveness is created?

Mali and its blind partners

 The serious political situation Mali is going through raises in my mind some fundamental questions about the political performance of the key external partners of the country. Basically, what I mean is that we cannot keep supporting national leaderships that are not appreciated by the vast majority of their people. We might feel comfortable with them. But what is the value of that if they are not accepted by their own citizens?

In this case, France, other European countries, and the UN have been supporting a regime that has not implemented the peace agreement they have signed with their own rebels and that has closed their eyes in an attempt not to see the rapid deterioration of the security and poverty situations. The partners played the same game.

And now, several years down the line, we have a much graver national crisis, that has grown into a regional one as well. And we see that the image of the external actors has also been seriously damaged. That is a sure way of undermining the role of the UN and of some key Western countries.

 

 

Fighting for a changed approach to security in conflict zones

Following what I wrote yesterday about the national armies in some of the Sahelian countries – that their low operational capacity is one of the key problems, on top of their human rights shortcomings and other serious governance issues – I was reminded by a friend of the example of Somalia. The international community, including European resources, have been engaged in the country for a long time with little results. Billions have been spent and many lives lost. However, the terrorists are all over, including in the capital city. And the national army, that we all have trained and keep repeating is essential to solve the insecurity threats, has a fighting capacity that is estimated at 8%. That means that almost everyone in the army is not prepared to fight an asymmetric war and cannot collect the intelligence needed to crush the terrorist cells. Or, there are two fundamental dimensions of any stabilisation project. They are not enough but if they do not happen nothing else can be achieved.

That’s why I keep repeating that we must look at these matters with frankness and be clear about what is going on and what needs to change. If we fail to do it, if we keep pretending and talk niceties, we will keep investing in the sand of those vast deserts. We will be wasting resources and lives. And we will be undermining the credibility of the international institutions and other players that are operating in such contexts. Can’t we find the courage to shift our approach?

The Europeans and the Sahel: a fake dialogue

A ministerial meeting of the International Coalition for the Sahel was held on Friday, 12 June 2020 and co-chaired by Mauritania, the EU and France.

The Sahel is going through enormous challenges. Therefore, an initiative like this conference can only be considered as positive. The problem is, however, that the emphasis was basically placed on the security dimensions, without a proper discussion about the human rights issues and the poor governance that prevails in much of the region. The armed forces of the G5 Sahelian countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger – are weak, except for the Chadian ones, and have a questionable record in terms of human rights. The weaknesses are ignored by the European partners and the human rights dimensions are always absent from the debate. Besides that, there has been a proliferation of militia groups, particularly in Burkina Faso. They are supported by the national governments and the experience has shown that they have become part of the problem

The Europeans, led by the French, are not fully sincere when discussing the Sahel situation. Their dialogue with the Sahelian leaders is not frank. It is too formal, full of niceties. It does not touch the root causes of the ongoing conflicts. And without frankness, there is no way the fast deteriorating situation can be addressed. It will continue to worsen.

The Sahel and its major challenges

The poor people in the Sahelian countries are now facing three major menaces to their survival: terrorism, covid-19, and hunger. All three are growing by the day. And I was listening to reports coming from the region, I thought the people are very resilient and combative. They do not give up. But the combination of these three threats is an immense challenge. I noticed that Africa was mentioned in today’s EU summit. The European leaders know what is going on in Africa, in particular in the Sahel region. But they must take the initiative in the international fora to mobilise exceptional support for the Continent. Medical assistance and food should be prioritised. They are much easier to deal with than the security dimensions. However, security cannot be ignored. It has become a major issue.

Bamako sunset

Thanks to a friend and the digital technology, I could watch the sun setting below the horizon of Bamako, the capital of Mali. The Niger River reflected the last rays of light of the day and sent me a message of beauty, tranquillity and vastness. Not far, the image showed one the arteries of the city, as busy as it is customary on a Sunday end of the afternoon. We talked about the virus – five registered deaths so far in the country. But we know how difficult it is to record the true cause of death in a country like Mali. Fine. The important point, for me, was to learn that life goes on as usual in the city and elsewhere. The UN mission, and the embassies, are following the prevention protocols. But the ordinary Malian is focused on what keeps him busy every day: to find enough resources to buy food and other basic needs; and to worry about the security of his family and his own, especially in the central and northern regions of the country. And those concerns are there to stay. People have very little time for the virus, as they had no time for the legislative elections that took place last weekend. The turnout in Bamako was around 10%. That says a lot. And it reminds us that we might live in a global village, but some corners of that village spend their time just trying to survive, virus or no virus.

NATO and the Sahel

As we approach the door of the London NATO Summit, which opens on 3 December, we cannot ignore one of the key questions the Alliance must address: what kind of role should it play in North Africa and the Sahel?

But before answering it, the member States should recognise that such region is closely linked to some important European countries. Its security will have an impact on those countries, sooner or later. And not just on matters of illegal migrations. An expansion of terrorist groups out there will end up by spilling over to Europe.

One cannot look at North Africa and the Sahel as if they were in a far corner of the world.

South of Europe

In the Southern flank of the EU, just next door to all of us, the instability and systematic violations of people’s rights are growing by the day.

The area is a combination of several active political volcanoes. It is the situation in Libya and in most of North Africa plus the Sahel, vast area of absence of government. The Sahel was a semi-desert, now is a full-fledged governance desert. It is the deepening of the conflict between Israel and her neighbours. It is the all-out conflict in Yemen and the war crimes in Syria. Add to that, Iran and its fast deteriorating economic circumstances plus the armed competition with the vicinity and beyond, the violence in Afghanistan, the mess in Pakistan. And, of course, the crazy political line President Erdogan is following in his country.

The different components of this Southern neighbourhood are all extreme violent and with far reaching consequences. Mass movements are one of them. The complexity calls for a much better-defined EU political approach. It also requires more public attention. Leaders in Brussels and the capitals should be speaking about these matters more often and with better words. The words must be explicit, comprehensive and coherent.

Our role is to put pressure on our leaders for lines of action to be defined and the narrative to become strategic. And we should act with a strong sense of urgency.

Iran, West Africa and the info war game

We are witnessing the emergence of a new campaign against Iran that includes “information” about that country’s growing presence in West Africa, the Sahel and Sudan. It basically says that, following data available to certain security agencies – not named –, Iran is engaged in building a network of terrorist cells in those regions of Africa. Those cells would later be activated against Western interests in the countries concerned.

I have known these corners of Africa for decades. And I have several friends in positions of authority in the area, including in matters of internal security. There is indeed a serious increase of radical activities and armed groups over there. But their link with Iran seems very unlikely. Certainly, very difficult to prove. Those radicals are inspired by Sunni fundamentalism, whilst Iran is a Shiite proponent of Islam.

What I have noticed, and my friends have confirmed, is that the new radicalism in that belt of Africa is mainly supported by groups and mosques based in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, especially in Qatar, as well as in Pakistan. In addition, there is also some influence coming from Egypt.

Sudan, the people and the Western interests

Not too long ago, during my time in the Sahel Region, I met regularly with Sudanese community villagers, men and women, as well as with officials. I had also to deal with the security and humanitarian consequences of the Janjaweed militias, the armed groups doing the dirty work in Darfur at the service of Omar al-Bashir. I gained then a lot of admiration for the people of Sudan and felt deeply their aspiration for security and democracy. I also learned how strategic the Khartoum leadership could be, including the intelligence agencies and the generals.

The fall of al-Bashir, following the continued, widespread popular pressure, came to me as good news. But I also knew that the military and security establishment, including the militias, now operating as Rapid Support Forces (RSF), would not let it go too easily. And that is the situation today. More than a hundred people were killed last week in the capital by the military and the militias, many more were wounded or raped. The establishment cannot lose control. They have a heavy hand on the economy – on what remains of it, as most of the economy is in a state of collapse – and they are also afraid to be brought to justice due to past crimes they have been associated with. Therefore, it is the survival of the al-Bashir regime’s elite that is now at stake. They are ready to make al-Bashir and a few others pay the bill. But they do not want it to go beyond that.

The generals, including General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the RSF boss, are closely supported by the Saudis, the Egyptian President and the Military, and the United Arab Emirates leadership. The generals have sent Sudanese armed men to fight the Saudi-UAE war in Yemen, among other things. This is a smart alliance. It protects the Khartoum generals from pressure from the European Union and the US. For the West, the friends of our friends deserve some consideration, no doubt. That explains the relative lack of attention the Sudanese situation has generated in Brussels and other capitals. People’s rights are a beautiful thing as long as they do not interfere with Western interests in the region.

The Chinese have also strong stakes in Sudan, particularly related to the oil pipeline that crosses the country.

All this makes the Sudanese transition to democracy extremely challenging for the people of that great country.

Mali and its deep national crisis

This weekend there was another massacre in Mali. This time, the victims were ethnic Dogon villagers living in the central region of the country. It was another tit-for-tat action by another ethnic group, linked to the pastoralist way of life.

The country is moving into a deeper crisis. It all started in 2012, with jihadist radicals operating in the North. Now, it is a more complex situation that combines violence inspired on religious extremism with inter-community ferocious clashes and all types of banditry. To see it as mere Islam-inspired extremism is completely erroneous.

Confronted with such a grave situation, the international community, both through bilateral arrangements and the presence of UN and EU forces, has put most of the emphasis on military operations. A good number of military and police forces have been sent to Mali. That is, in my opinion, unbalanced as a response. It is a hammer approach to an extremely complex political situation.

The UN Security Council will be discussing Mali in the next few days. My message to the members of the Council is very simple: adopt a more political view of the conflict, not just a military-based line. Explore ways of promoting dialogue and joint projects between the ethnic groups of Mali. Have a hard look at economic development. Look at the way the national government addresses inclusiveness and good governance and be frank with the leaders. As friends, we must tell them, in diplomatic but clear words, that they ought to change the way they govern the country. It is there, in the governance area,  that we can find the beginning of a solution to a crisis that, otherwise, will continue to get worse.

Sahel and the Islamist threat

Another link on the Sahel security situation:

https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-complex-and-growing-threat-of-militant-islamist-groups-in-the-sahel/