Mali, Sahel et l'Europe

 

1. Situation critique du Mali

• Mali est au bord de l’effondrement en tant qu’État, la majorité de son territoire étant menacée par des groupes armés, dont des organisations terroristes affiliées à Al-Qaïda, à l’État islamique, ainsi que des milices ethniques.

2. Terrorisme et criminalité organisée

• Le financement du terrorisme au Mali provient principalement de sources locales : exploitation artisanale de l’or (liée à des organisations russes qui ont pris la succession du Groupe Wagner), extorsion, enlèvements, péages routiers, vol de bétail et trafic de drogue. La région est un corridor majeur pour les drogues entre l’Amérique latine et l’Europe.

3. Crise humanitaire et sociale

• On observe un trafic généralisé de personnes, de carburant, de tabac et d’armes. Les écoles fonctionnent à peine, sauf les madrasas religieuses, et le chômage des jeunes est massif, poussant beaucoup à rejoindre des groupes armés.

4. Réponse internationale et géopolitique

• Le président de la Commission de l’Union africaine, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, appelle à une réponse internationale forte, mais l’attention mondiale fait défaut. Le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU et les puissances européennes se sont désengagés, tandis que l’influence russe s’est accrue après l’expulsion des forces françaises et de la mission de l’ONU.

5. Impact sur l’Europe

• L’instabilité au Sahel, dont le Mali, entraîne une augmentation de la migration, du trafic de drogue et de l’insécurité en Europe, ainsi qu’une perte d’influence géopolitique majeure pour l’Europe dans la région.

6. Perspective historique

• L’auteur se souvient d’une époque où le Mali et ses voisins produisaient des intellectuels et géraient mieux la gouvernance. Mais ces dernières années, l’extrémisme, la criminalité, la corruption, la pression démographique, le changement climatique et l’hostilité extérieure envers les idées démocratiques ont aggravé la situation.

7. Négligence européenne

• L’Union européenne est critiquée pour son absence de stratégie cohérente envers le Sahel, ne s’y intéressant que lorsque les conséquences (comme la migration) atteignent ses propres frontières.

Mali and the Rest of the Sahel as Priorities Ignored by European Geopolitics

Mali, a vast country and a mosaic of cultures, is just two steps from Europe and one step from collapsing as a state. Earlier this week, the President of the African Union Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, made a dramatic appeal to the international community—a term that is increasingly vague these days—to prevent the country from falling into absolute chaos. He expressed deep concern about the rapid expansion of various terrorist groups, whose activities are based on two pillars: ethnic-religious fundamentalism and organised crime. The state administration and security forces control only a small fraction of the territory. The rest, including the north, the centre, and the outskirts of the capital, Bamako, are operational zones for armed groups. Some are affiliated with the terrorist web known as Al-Qaeda or the self-proclaimed Islamic State, while others are mainly ethnically based, with Tuaregs and Arabs against the Bantu populations of the south.

The financing of terrorist actions is largely domestic. It includes artisanal gold mining, with the gold then sold to Russian organisations, metamorphoses of the infamous Wagner Group. It is suspected that the gold passes through the important Dubai gold market, where it is converted into currency that then goes to Russia. The Russians aligned themselves with the coup military after two military coups (2020 and 2021) and managed to expel the French presence and the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA). They also maintain indirect contacts with the rebellions and traffickers operating in the Persian Gulf.

The imposition of taxes on the population under religious pretences, the kidnapping of wealthy nationals and the few foreigners who still travel in the affected regions, the control of the main roads—which are only passable for those who pay to travel safely and accept keeping only part of their goods—the theft of cattle, all of this funds the costs of violence. Then there is the issue of drugs: the Sahel, of which Mali is a part, is one of the corridors between Latin America and Europe. In the Sahel, the drug trade buys governments and rebels. And the drugs enter our continent through the weakest points, where control and security measures are insufficient and political governance is more inattentive, as is the case in the Algarve, among others.

There is also human trafficking, with migrants coming from all over West Africa heading to Europe, plus the smuggling of fuel, tobacco, and weapons. It is all cash in hand, in lands without law or order. Schools do not function, except for madrasas run by ignorant fanatics, and there are no jobs for the youth born from an unstoppable demographic explosion. The Kalashnikov has become the only possible livelihood.

Youssouf calls for a robust response against terrorism in Mali and the vast Sahel. It is a fully justified warning, but one that will fall on deaf ears. The UN Security Council, after the forced departure of France from the region, the expulsion of MINUSMA, and the growing influence of the Russians under Vladimir Putin, has swept the region into the corner of the forgotten. The Europeans, who relied on client regimes in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—governments that received funds from Brussels to curb migratory movements—have been overtaken by Moscow. Putin understands that chaos in the Sahel has a disproportionate negative impact on neighbouring Europe. For Europe, it means more immigrants, more drugs, more insecurity, and a colossal loss of geopolitical influence in the Sahel.

I worked for several years in the region. I knew a Mali and neighbouring countries capable of producing great intellectuals and handling governance matters seriously. That was the generation that grew up in the post-colonial period. Many of them left the country, recruited by international organisations. Others emigrated to France to teach in major schools, or to Canada, a country that easily opened its doors to French-speaking university graduates.

Even then, there were rebellious movements, because certain ethnic groups and populations in the most remote regions felt ignored by the central power of their countries. The most serious conflicts involved those who lived by herding and those by farming. It was a competition between two ways of life that were hardly compatible in those arid lands. But solutions could be found. It was also possible to meet with rebel leaders and negotiate with them. The United Nations and I, as the organisation’s envoy, were treated with respect and moderation.

Everything changed in the last 15 years. Religious extremism, various forms of crime, corruption from the bottom to the top in these states, uncontrollable demographic growth accompanied by climate change—including the harmattan, the dry desert wind, increasingly spreading in the region—and the scarcity of rain, along with hostility promoted by Gulf countries and Russia against democratic ideas, all this has created an extremely complex situation. And we Europeans only remember the Sahel when we see the children of these lands selling trinkets on our beaches and terraces, or being attacked here by parties of xenophobia, hatred, and racism. It is reason enough to ask where the EU’s geopolitical strategy is.

The Shael without Idriss Déby

New uncertainties next door in the Greater Sahel

Victor Angelo

 

In 1990, the Chadian rebel leader Idriss Déby returned to the country from Sudan. He led a column of armed men, composed mainly of fighters from his home region.  Days later he seized power in Ndjamena, with the approval of François Mitterrand. The French president knew his geopolitics. He saw Chad as the essential node for the interests, influence and security of France and its client states in that part of Africa. Therefore, it was essential that it be controlled by a strong man, consistent and friendly to France. Déby had this profile. And successive French presidents got used to turning a blind eye to systematic human rights violations, high-scale corruption, and the tribalization of power, so as not to weaken their ally in Ndjamena.

The support became even more solid when Déby decided that his troops would be, on the African side, the strong arm in the fight against the different jihadist groups that terrorize the populations of the Sahel. His military became by far the best prepared in the region. Even against Boko Haram, Chad's capability is far superior to Nigeria's. The UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has a considerable Chadian presence - 1400 troops, with a more offensive posture than most other blue helmets. In addition, Déby had just sent an additional 1200-man brigade, as part of the regional military cooperation known as G5 Sahel, to the three-border area especially targeted by terrorists - the triangle where Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso converge.

The military institutions of the countries in the region are structurally weak and kept that way by politicians, who are more afraid of possible coups than of terrorists. Of all the neighbours, only Déby, trained as an officer in France and hardened in the desert campaigns, was a true war chief. His combativeness was legendary. In 2008, a rebel faction arrived at the gates of his palace. Nicolas Sarkozy proposed that he be exfiltrated into a golden exile. Déby and other loyalists, some of them now members of the Transitional Military Council, refused, preferring to fight to the end. And they eventually defeated the assailants. Shortly afterwards, as the UN Special Representative, I discussed this crisis with Déby. I recall three points from that meeting. First, the recognition that his troops were neither organized nor equipped effectively. Second, the decision to spend a good deal of oil money on transforming his fighters into professional soldiers. Third, the decision to seek an understanding with Omar al-Bashir's Sudan, as he had already done with Gaddafi's Libya, so that neighbouring territories would not be used as bases for launching rebellions. And so it was. By late 2009, the difference was already clear. Since then, these capabilities have been consolidated. France, the United States, and other Westerners began to see Chad as the spearhead against terrorism and religious extremism. Criticism of dictatorship and nepotism have been put in the freezer.

But in these lands of instability, life takes many turns. Déby closed his cycle this week, perhaps in a similar way to the one he did thirty years ago. Only this time the rebel column was from the tribe next door, it came from Libya, and the president fell on the front line. Chad, Central Africa, the Sahel, France, and the Europeans present in the region became more fragile.

Several questions arise from the disappearance of Idriss Déby. What motivated President Macron to leave him without his usual support, when in 2019 he had sent fighters to quell a similar rebellion? Miscalculation? Who is behind this new rebellion, known as FACT (Front for Change and Concord in Chad)? What impact will the new reality have on the conflict in the Central African Republic? What to expect from the G5 Sahel and the fight against terrorism in this part of Africa? Each of these questions hides many uncertainties and concerns. The future of the poor people of Chad is the greatest of them.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

Discussing security and governance in the Sahel

In the Sahel, a lot of military and little politics

Victor Angelo

 

The call came from Bamako. On the other end of the line was a former colleague, now back home after a brilliant career in the United Nations. The essence of his conversation was against the massive presence of foreign troops in his country. There are more and more of them, both in the framework of the UN mission - known by the acronym MINUSMA - and due to calls by France. Contrary to recent statements by Emmanuel Macron, who said that the war against terrorism in the Sahel was being won, my friend told me about the deterioration of the situation in Mali and in neighbouring countries. In other words, there are more military personnel but, paradoxically, less security.

Let us look at the latest statistics from the International Organization for Migration. They count about 1.7 million displaced persons due to instability and armed actions in this part of the Sahel, especially in the tri-border area between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso - a region known as Liptako. It is estimated, on the other hand, that about seven thousand lives were lost in the last twelve months due to acts of terrorism and counterterrorist prevention and response operations. These are figures well above the average of previous years. What is more, a recent United Nations investigation shows that war crimes and atrocities have been committed in Mali since 2013. The report, which in addition to pointing the finger at terrorists calls into question the armed forces of certain states, has fallen into a deep hole in the Security Council and awaits debate at the Greek calends. 

Liptako is a vast territory, with an area where Portugal could fit three times over. The Fulas, as nomadic herdsmen and itinerant traders in long caravans, have traditionally shared these dry, harsh expanses with other ethnic groups. But ways of life have changed. Accelerated population growth in recent decades, coupled with enormous pressure from cattle rearing - a multiplication of herds -, increasingly irregular and scarce rainfall due to climate change, poverty and the absence of effective state administration have contributed to a widespread environment of social instability, rebellion and conflict. The rush for gold, which began to be exploited intensively on an artisanal basis some twenty years ago, has also attracted new waves of violence. This is the framework in which various armed gangs move and operate under the confused banners of the terrorist network of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) or, further north, on the way to the border with Algeria, the people affiliated to Al-Qaeda. Religious fanaticism serves as an excuse or muddles along with banditry. For many young people, the Kalashnikov has replaced the shepherd's stick or the farmer's hoe in a context that is becoming progressively more arid, unpredictable, and dangerous. Someone from the region told me that joining an armed group is for many an act of self-protection.

There is a huge problem here that fundamentally requires two types of approach: one will be political and the other will be to combat desertification and poverty. I will mention only the political part, which requires the inclusion of all, without discrimination on ethnic grounds. It also means publicly showing a firm hand against corruption, in military institutions and state administrations. Inclusion and probity are two fundamental issues, which must be resolved by national elites.

 The European partners have closed their eyes and pretended not to see these problems. For example, they have been training officers in the Malian armed forces for years, knowing fully well that these officers have kept a tribal mentality and systematically divert resources intended for the country's stabilisation effort to their own advantage. We need to change the way we act in the Sahel. Dialogue with the countries in the region must be respectful. The future that is at stake is theirs, independently of the external dimensions. We cannot take the direction of the process away from them. Being more papist than the Pope in other people's land is a practice that must be put away once and for all, in a drawer of the past. But it must be a frank dialogue.

 

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

 

Christmas in the Sahel

How about lunch in the Sahel?

Victor Angelo

 

A few years ago, my wife and I were invited to an unusual Christmas lunch. The invitation came from the Chad presidency and the repast site was about a hundred kilometres north of Fada, a town more than two hours' flight from Ndjamena, already in the area of transition from the Sahel to the Sahara. The plan was to fly to Fada and follow by land to one of the oases of the Mourdi Depression - a set of deep valleys with several lagoons, much in demand by the traders of the numerous camel herds in transit to Libya, where each camel ends up by being sold at meat markets.

We went there. The journey between Fada and the oasis took place in the middle of twenty-something jeeps of a company of elite troops with operational experience of the region. The open-backed pickup trucks - the famous "technicals" - advanced at high speed, in parallel, on a unique front of several hundred meters. The aim was to avoid the dust and the ambushes of lawless groups that were already wandering in those parts of the Sahel.

The set menu was sheep, stuffed with chicken and couscous, roasted in a hole dug in the sand. The animal, well-done, cleaned of ashes and sand, was placed in front of us, whole, from head to feet, staring at us, so that we, the guests, could begin the feast. The protocol was clear. No one would touch any piece of food before we had finished ours. My wife and I looked at each other, and we did not know what to do. The head of the GOE (Portuguese Police Special Operations Group), who were in charge of my personal security, pulled out a pocket folding knife, cut two pieces and we started munching. Slowly, to show appreciation for the delicacy. Two hundred eyes followed our chewing closely. When we gave the signal that we had enough, the military threw themselves at the animal and the accompanying food. They cleaned everything in the blink of an eye.

In telling all this, my intention is not to invite the reader to a similar Christmas lunch. It is a question of taking advantage of the moment to talk about the Sahel, the hunger and food insecurity that define the daily lives of its people, and the violence that is taking place in these lands. It is also a tribute to those who have little more than their personal dignity, a quality that has always defined the way of being of the people of the Sahel. But that dignity is now often violated by those who have power, whether on the side of governments, armed robbers, or terrorists. The Sahel and the adjacent Sahara are experiencing a deep security crisis, which has worsened continuously since 2012, despite a strong European military presence in the region. 

The year now ending has been the most violent. Jihadists and other armed groups, including popular militias formed by the governments that the Europeans support, will have caused over 4,250 deaths and thousands of displaced people. The most dangerous area is the three borders region between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. About half of the attacks were directed against civilian populations. In most cases, the violence, even that which wears a mantle of religious radicalism, has as its main objective to extort resources. Communities that make a living from artisanal gold mining or pastoralism, as well as those that run the trade corridors connecting the Sahel with the west coast of Africa, in Benin, Togo and Nigeria, are the most frequent targets. It is difficult to determine where looting ends and fanaticism, ethnic hatred or human rights violations begin. Terrorism is a label that defines a complex reality badly. But it is around. In 2020 we saw many confrontations between or perpetrated by two of the most important groups: the Islamic state in the Greater Sahel and the Al-Qaeda factions. And we are still hearing reports of war crimes committed by the armed forces of countries to which Europe gives military training.

The EU is preparing a new strategy for the region. It may be ready during the Portuguese presidency. To be valid, it must begin by questioning the reasons for the failure of the strategy that has been followed so far. My first indications are that it will be more of the same. It might then be a good idea to organise a lunch in a remote corner of the Sahel for some European leaders.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

On Mali and the region

 

In today’s Diário de Notícias (Lisbon)

Notes on Mali

Victor Angelo

 

 

Mali is a fascinating country, diverse in its landscapes and cultures. It is home to great singers and traditional musicians who play the korah, an ancestral instrument made from a large gourd, the Dogon masks and statues, birthplace of the city of Timbuktu, a unique historical reference in Islamic studies. For four centuries, until 1670, Mali was the epicentre of a great empire in West Africa, an empire recognized by Portuguese explorers, who traded extensively with it across the Gambia River. I would also add that I had several Malian colleagues at the UN who proved to be excellent professionals and held important positions in the different multilateral organizations. I write this to fight the summary opinions of those who are in the habit of arranging everything African in a dark corner, in the shadow of the usual prejudices. I am sad, like many others, when I see the country tearing itself apart and becoming insecure, as it continues to do daily.

Mali has made the news again in the last three weeks following the military coup of August 18. It is, for the same reason, the subject of debate, including in European circles. Moreover, some conspiracy theorists have seen Moscow's hand behind the colonels who took power, a hypothesis I consider unlikely. But there are other hands at work in Mali, from France to Saudi Arabia, and with vastly different intentions.

Also, at stake is the role of the United Nations, which has maintained a peace mission in the country since 2013, with more than 15,000 elements. MINUSMA, as the mission is called, has, over time, become a case study because it has not been able to respond to the political and governance issues that are at the heart of Mali's problems. The political direction of the mission resolved, to please the French and out of strategic opportunism, to stick to the president that the coup has now deposed. In New York, at the Security Council, no one had the courage to correct this trajectory. Thus, credibility is lost, and the future is mortgaged. 

Returning to the current debate, it should have emphasized that more than two thirds of Mali's population is under 25 years of age. And that education and the economy are unable to meet the challenges that such an age pyramid entails. When I was in Mali for the first time in 1990, its total population was around eight and a half million. Today, thirty years later, it is close to twenty million. The same happens in the other countries of the region. They all have explosive age pyramids. Demographic pressure has grown throughout the Sahel along with the advance of desertification and poverty. Being young in the Sahel means looking to the future and seeing only a multitude of arid politics, a desert of opportunities and a chaotic and inhumane urban habitat. Thus, hope and social peace are hard to achieve. All that remains is migration to Europe, or else adherence to armed banditry and fanatical rebellions. Fanaticism has grown exponentially over the past decade, thanks in particular to the proliferation of mosques, Wahabist koranic schools and radical preachers, all financed by the Saudis and others of the kind. 

Those who neither emigrate nor join the extremist groups, vegetate in the big cities, where they can observe how social inequalities have become blatant, the fruit of the corruption that prevails in political circles, in the security forces and in the administration of justice. They also see that European countries and other international actors turn a blind eye to the manipulations practiced by the powerful. This is what happened in Mali. After months of popular protest against the indifference of the president and the greed of his own circle of friends, a group of senior officials decided to act. They have popular support, at least for now. It is true that one should not support anti-constitutional coups. But it is also true that one can no longer pretend that one does not see corruption, ineptitude and the failure of territorial administration, with vast areas of national space without any state presence. The mitigation of crises begins with the promotion of probity and the restoration of local power, beyond the treatment of youth issues. This is what we must remind the colonels, the leaders of the region, the UN Security Council and the European partners of Mali, Portugal included. 

 

 

Mali and its blind partners

 The serious political situation Mali is going through raises in my mind some fundamental questions about the political performance of the key external partners of the country. Basically, what I mean is that we cannot keep supporting national leaderships that are not appreciated by the vast majority of their people. We might feel comfortable with them. But what is the value of that if they are not accepted by their own citizens?

In this case, France, other European countries, and the UN have been supporting a regime that has not implemented the peace agreement they have signed with their own rebels and that has closed their eyes in an attempt not to see the rapid deterioration of the security and poverty situations. The partners played the same game.

And now, several years down the line, we have a much graver national crisis, that has grown into a regional one as well. And we see that the image of the external actors has also been seriously damaged. That is a sure way of undermining the role of the UN and of some key Western countries.

 

 

The Europeans and the Sahel: a fake dialogue

A ministerial meeting of the International Coalition for the Sahel was held on Friday, 12 June 2020 and co-chaired by Mauritania, the EU and France.

The Sahel is going through enormous challenges. Therefore, an initiative like this conference can only be considered as positive. The problem is, however, that the emphasis was basically placed on the security dimensions, without a proper discussion about the human rights issues and the poor governance that prevails in much of the region. The armed forces of the G5 Sahelian countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger – are weak, except for the Chadian ones, and have a questionable record in terms of human rights. The weaknesses are ignored by the European partners and the human rights dimensions are always absent from the debate. Besides that, there has been a proliferation of militia groups, particularly in Burkina Faso. They are supported by the national governments and the experience has shown that they have become part of the problem

The Europeans, led by the French, are not fully sincere when discussing the Sahel situation. Their dialogue with the Sahelian leaders is not frank. It is too formal, full of niceties. It does not touch the root causes of the ongoing conflicts. And without frankness, there is no way the fast deteriorating situation can be addressed. It will continue to worsen.

Bamako sunset

Thanks to a friend and the digital technology, I could watch the sun setting below the horizon of Bamako, the capital of Mali. The Niger River reflected the last rays of light of the day and sent me a message of beauty, tranquillity and vastness. Not far, the image showed one the arteries of the city, as busy as it is customary on a Sunday end of the afternoon. We talked about the virus – five registered deaths so far in the country. But we know how difficult it is to record the true cause of death in a country like Mali. Fine. The important point, for me, was to learn that life goes on as usual in the city and elsewhere. The UN mission, and the embassies, are following the prevention protocols. But the ordinary Malian is focused on what keeps him busy every day: to find enough resources to buy food and other basic needs; and to worry about the security of his family and his own, especially in the central and northern regions of the country. And those concerns are there to stay. People have very little time for the virus, as they had no time for the legislative elections that took place last weekend. The turnout in Bamako was around 10%. That says a lot. And it reminds us that we might live in a global village, but some corners of that village spend their time just trying to survive, virus or no virus.

Mali and its deep national crisis

This weekend there was another massacre in Mali. This time, the victims were ethnic Dogon villagers living in the central region of the country. It was another tit-for-tat action by another ethnic group, linked to the pastoralist way of life.

The country is moving into a deeper crisis. It all started in 2012, with jihadist radicals operating in the North. Now, it is a more complex situation that combines violence inspired on religious extremism with inter-community ferocious clashes and all types of banditry. To see it as mere Islam-inspired extremism is completely erroneous.

Confronted with such a grave situation, the international community, both through bilateral arrangements and the presence of UN and EU forces, has put most of the emphasis on military operations. A good number of military and police forces have been sent to Mali. That is, in my opinion, unbalanced as a response. It is a hammer approach to an extremely complex political situation.

The UN Security Council will be discussing Mali in the next few days. My message to the members of the Council is very simple: adopt a more political view of the conflict, not just a military-based line. Explore ways of promoting dialogue and joint projects between the ethnic groups of Mali. Have a hard look at economic development. Look at the way the national government addresses inclusiveness and good governance and be frank with the leaders. As friends, we must tell them, in diplomatic but clear words, that they ought to change the way they govern the country. It is there, in the governance area,  that we can find the beginning of a solution to a crisis that, otherwise, will continue to get worse.

Sahel and the Islamist threat

Another link on the Sahel security situation:

https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-complex-and-growing-threat-of-militant-islamist-groups-in-the-sahel/

The Sahel is important

https://www.securityconference.de/en/media-library/munich-security-conference-2019/video/parallel-panel-discussion-security-in-the-sahel-traffick-jam/

The link will bring us to the panel discussion on the situation in the Sahel that took place today at the Munich Security Conference. 

Mali: a matter of serious concern

After a discussion this morning with a Malian friend, who is a former senior UN official, what I retained can be easily summarised in a few words: a failed political process and damaging high level corruption.

Basically, this means that unless the domestic leaders and the international community representatives address these two fundamental issues there will be no peace, stability and economic revival in the foreseeable future. And the country will remain dangerously insecure, dramatically poor and a major source of illegal immigration.

I do not think we can expect much of the current national leadership if we do not discuss the situation frankly with them. This is no time for us, the outside friends of Mali, to be ambiguous. We are required to be frank, courageous but also practice good diplomatic judgement.

Who should take the lead in the policy dialogue, as far as the international community is concerned?

Poverty, drought and neglect in the Sahel

It is with deep sadness that we have learned about the loss of another five peacekeepers deployed in Mali with the UN mission. They were killed yesterday by a group of armed men. The mission has been repeatedly targeted. This time the attack took place in the central region of the country, well outside the troubled areas of Northern Mali. It´s therefore a new development and one should be very concerned. It shows that the insecurity is now reaching other provinces. It also raises a few questions about the dissemination of extremist ideas to different parts of the Malian countryside. Endemic poverty combined with a couple of years of drought and abandonment by the central authorities make some people more attentive to the words of local preachers that have acquired their simplistic views in some faraway places in the Arab Peninsula. 

Terrorism in Ouagadougou

Another day, another terrorist attack. This time the target is an international hotel in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso. In the evening, there were a couple of explosions outside the hotel and then a group of armed men stormed the facility. At this stage it is still a developing crisis. I am afraid it will end as a very tragic event.

Burkina Faso is a good example in Africa. The country has just completed a democratic transition. Elections were disputed with fair play and the results accepted by everyone. A new President and a fresh government have just been inaugurated. All seems very promising in a country that has a very young population, well educated and where the religious and ethnic diversity has not been played by the politicians. It is a pretty tolerant and open society.

It is also next door to Mali and part of the Sahel region. These are very sensitive areas.

Tonight´s sad events in Ouagadougou are just a reminder, a very dramatic one, of the dangers that many countries are facing these days. The fight against terrorism is now one of the top priorities and does call for an international supporting mechanism. Countries like Burkina Faso need and deserve such support. 

Iraq and the great divide

The Iraqi crisis reminds us of how difficult it is to assist a country that is deeply divided along ethnic and cultural lines. The fracture line between Sunnis and Shias cuts the country in two. This is a very high risk divide. It needs to be managed with great balance. Leaders from both sides of the line have to be brought together all the time. Our role, as international community, is to encourage them to cooperate, to help them to build the platforms that bring their interests together, to underline the common ground and look into the future from there.

In many ways, the experience tells us that to intervene in countries that are at the frontier of great divides is not a very easy thing. The best solution is to stay out, as much as possible. If that is not advisable, then the international community must act in a very well informed way, with great prudence and a strong sense of the risks.

That´s true in Iraq as it is also true in Sudan, Mali or Chad, in the Balkans, or any other country that has national communities that are very different, both from a physical point of view and from a religious or cultural perspective. These are countries with a very high risk of falling into major internal conflicts. Outside interventions that are just naive and ill prepared can only accelerate the hatching of the crisis. 

An archipelago of collapsing States

There is now an “archipelago of collapse” that goes from Mali to Iraq, through Libya, Egypt and Syria. It´s like an oil slick that tends to expand South, through the Sahel and towards Central Africa, and also to keep moving to the East, to Afghanistan and Pakistan. These “archipelago of collapsing States” is about the failure of proper governance in each one of the countries concerned. But it is also, more and more, an indication that the international community, in particular the Security Council and other key international players, need to think again about their role. Their contribution to international human rights, peace, human security and stability is facing very serious challenges. It has to be thought through again. Intervention? What kind of intervention? How to prevent collapse? How to keep different communities together under the same national flag? What is the responsibility of the international community? What are the lessons learned in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere?

This is a debate that is getting more and more urgent. But who is ready to take the lead in the discussion?

Keep the eyes on the ball

The Football World Cup started today in São Paulo. The TV screens will be full of soccer news during the next few weeks. At a time when the crises in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mali, Libya, Ukraine, Iraq, Pakistan and other places keep deepening, people´s attention will be busy and focused on the ball. As they say, keep the eyes on the ball, we will take care of the rest…

Critical peace issues

I had a long discussion today about the current impact of the UN missions on peace and security. It all started with a silent crisis, Guinea-Bissau. Nobody talks about that country and the lasting disaster that has been around for so long. That is a DPA-led mission, meaning, the UN department of Political Affairs has the responsibility to guide the UN presence on the ground and report to the Security Council on a regular basis. Then, we looked at Cote d´Ivoire, where we have had a peacekeeping operation for quite some time. There is very little progress, I would say in a very diplomatic language, as far as domestic reconciliation is concerned. Next to it there is a UN peacekeeping presence in Liberia. The country has been struggling to rebuild itself, after many years of civil war and wanton destruction. There are now some serious issues of governance. Are we addressing them?

And we moved on, to the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Mali, not to mention the work of the UN missions in Libya and elsewhere. And the same question came out a number of times? Are we addressing the key issues?

The point is very simple. In all these situations, conflicts can come back, sooner or later, if we are not able to deal with the critical causes of instability. And in some cases, it is even worse. We are simply not able to help the countries to move out of the swamp. 

Be clear about your priorities

The EU and the P5 – the five permanent countries in the Security Council of the UN – took long to recognize the strategic importance of the Sahel and Mali, specifically, for international peace and security.

They finally started looking at it as a priority geopolitical zone of major importance for the stability of a very wide area, North and South of the Sahara, including the EU states.

Now, the challenge is to keep the external partners focused on the region.

This was my key message at last week´s meeting of the 5 plus 5 Initiative, which brings together the Defence Ministers from Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta with those from the Southern bank of the Mediterranean Sea, meaning Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and also Mauritania.