France matters

Emmanuel Macron's New Year

Victor Angelo

With this first day of the new year, the six-month French presidency of the European Union begins. Is it the time to make vows of renewal or to expect more of the same? For Emmanuel Macron, this should be an exceptional period, in many ways. In the coming months, two of his great ambitions will be at stake: being re-elected president of the French Republic and shaping the future of the European Union. For the moment, neither is guaranteed.

The easiest to achieve will perhaps be his re-election. There may be eight candidates in the presidential race, but what counts is the passage to the second round, and then, the decisive voters’ decision. In recent years, it was taken for granted that the final would be between Macron and Marine Le Pen, a kind of repeat of what happened five years ago. And that the French would once again say no to the far-right candidate. That would make Macron's victory almost certain.

But politics, in a society as socially fragmented as France's, has its surprises. In recent months, Éric Zemmour, a television commentator with xenophobic and radical nationalist views, and who has made the fight against Muslim immigration and influence his main hobbyhorse, has upset the game. His entry into the field has reduced Marine Le Pen's chances. And although the radical right as a whole represents around 30% of the national political opinion, the current prediction is that neither Le Pen nor Zemmour will be able to make it to the second round of the presidential race. They will neutralise each other.

If it happens, that will be good news for France, but sad news for Macron. Even worse for him, however, is the emergence of Valérie Pécresse as a centre-right candidate, by choice of the Les Républicains party, a grouping of conservatives of various shades that has its roots in the Gaullism of old. Pécresse, a former minister under Nicolas Sarkozy and currently president of the region that encompasses Paris, attracts the same kind of electorate as Macron. She is a woman who has a modern, elegant, and calm image that goes over relatively well on television.

As the left does not carry any weight in France today - the socialist candidate, Anne Hidalgo, is credited by the most recent polls with only 2%-3% of voting intentions - the big contest will occur in the centre as well as in winning, in the second round, a share of voters from the ultra-right.

It is in such a context that Macron will start leading the EU. The central theme he proposes for the period of the French presidency is the strengthening of European sovereignty. In his view, this objective should be based, as a priority, on stricter border controls in the Schengen area. By emphasising this issue, he aims to kill two birds with one stone: he addresses the concerns of leaders like Viktor Orbán - with whom he recently held talks in Budapest; and he captures votes on the right, and even the extreme right, as far as the electorate in his country is concerned. These voters are against anything that might appear to be easy on migration issues.

The second dimension, he tells us, would be based on what he calls "a Europe of defence", something pointed out as the other fundamental pillar of European sovereignty. A subject often mentioned by the French president, but which remains a vague issue that divides member states. It is also based on an outdated notion of international power projection, essentially based on military force. In the European case, what may effectively counts is the vitality and modernity of its economy and the quality of its democracy, combined with a diplomacy of peace, cooperation and conflict mediation. In saying this I do not wish to belittle the function of the European armed forces. But above all they must try to refocus their strategic and operational role within NATO. It is above all there that the defence of Europe begins, consolidating, within the organisation, a wider area of decision-making autonomy for European member states.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 31 December 2021)

 

 

 

 

Europe: looking ahead

European horizons and balances

Victor Ângelo

 

We live in a time of uncertainty. The pandemic is still at the centre of all worries. The different mutations of the virus and the immensity of the vaccination campaigns show that we are far from the exit of the tunnel. And the economic, social, and psychological impacts are yet to be determined. They will certainly be huge and long term. In Europe, for the time being, we are helping ourselves to the oxygen balloons that the central bank and political expedients are making available. In reality, we are living on reputation and the pledge of the future. Meanwhile, we are lagging when compared to China or the United States. And we will receive a share of the problems of a neighbourhood – to the south and to the east – which was already poor, and which will see its future difficulties increase uncontrollably. None of this is pessimism, just an announced puzzle.

To these challenges are added the geopolitical ones. We find ourselves drawn into disputes that are not necessarily our own. The Anchorage meeting, which brought two high-level delegations – one American and one Chinese – face to face late last week, revealed that the rivalries between these countries have reached an acute stage of antagonism. For the first time, neither one side nor the other sought to disguise the degree of hostility that exists. Journalists were even invited to stay in the room to take note of the mutual accusations that were made from the very beginning. Only then did the delegations move on to the quiet and substance of the bilateral discussions.

Two issues became clear. The Chinese leadership emerged strengthened from the session of the National People's Assembly held earlier this month. It now has a much more assertive mandate, internally and externally. For example, the deputies ratified a motion that opens the possibility of military intervention in Taiwan if the island's authorities take a path that could strengthen the independence thrust. This is an incredibly significant change in language. Even more telling is the new posture toward foreign governments that criticize Beijing. China has decided to advance to the geopolitical duel without a mask and with a tactical marking.

We have entered a risky cycle that could lead to a confrontation between these powers. And the new vision that the United States is proposing for Europe, through the document NATO 2030, puts the Europeans in this conflict. What is on the table, as seen at this week's NATO ministerial meeting, is an expansion of the alliance's theatre of operations in order to legitimize Washington's geopolitical ambitions in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. These regions are far outside the areas that are of direct concern to us. What is more, an extension to the far reaches will certainly weaken European capabilities in the geographies that really matter to us, which are on Europe's immediate borders.

You may retort that China is an economic and cyber threat. But these things are solved through negotiations, through trade measures and countermeasures, through the strengthening and protection of our economies, and through increasing the capacity of our intelligence services to act. In short, they require a more cohesive Europe.

The redefinition of NATO's role is necessary. The horizon we face is quite different from the past. We should, however, ask ourselves what our priority area of defence should actually be. We also need to discuss what is the balance between a Europe looking towards a Euro-Asian future and the history of our Euro-Atlantic engagement. I see two variables here that need to be addressed. One has to do with our long-term relationship with Russia. Vladimir Putin is not eternal. Russia is part of our strategic neighbourhood, our economic complementarities, and our cultural references. The other concerns the EU's defence and security autonomy. It must be permanently reinforced, without, however, jeopardizing our historic commitments to the Atlantic Alliance. Uncertain times demand that we clearly know which balances to maintain, and which path to choose. It is a question of combining courage with vision.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

How to deal with Erdogan?

The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean is becoming very tense. Turkey is doing oil mapping at sea, in waters that are contested by a fellow NATO Member State – Greece. The oil vessel is escorted by several Turkish warships. And now France has responded to a Greek appeal and is sending navy assets to the region. This situation can easily escalate and become an open conflict. It must be dealt with by the NATO and European authorities immediately.

The truth of the matter is that Europe does not have a clear line of approach towards Turkey. Delaying the accession negotiations or approving a light package of sanctions against the regime in Ankara is not an effective policy line. A firmer position is required. The European leaders must understand that President Erdogan is a major threat to the stability of Europe. In addition, they must realise that someone of his calibre does not understand a soft approach. He knows about force and can get the message if the message is forceful.

Writing about security and democracy

 

Translation of today’s opinion piece I published in Diário de Notícias (Lisbon)

Questioning the obsession with security

Victor Angelo

The European Commission has got into the habit of producing strategies. It is a good practice, as it allows to move forward the reflection on priority themes and to draw the attention of the different governments to the need for coordination and joint actions, when appropriate. However, it is a pity that these documents are only to be known in the European District of Brussels and in certain specialised circles, and are not debated in national parliaments and by the public opinion in the various Member States.

The Commission has just outlined another, what it called the Security Union Strategy 2020-2025. It has been developed under the baton of the Vice-President for the Promotion of the European Way of Life, Margaritis Schinas, who has the task of ensuring the link between the external and internal dimensions of security. In other words, an almost impossible job, as there is no harmony of interests about foreign policy, not even regarding neighbouring Russia. Nor is there the courage to act against those states that pose a threat to Europe's internal stability, such as Turkey, among others.

The new security strategy is, above all, an exercise in enumeration. It provides an exhaustive overview of ongoing initiatives, including those concerning cybercrime and intoxication and misrepresentation campaigns from outside - without any reference to the internal actors who serve as a sounding board for these lying messages. It is all very technical, based on the intervention of police and criminal investigation bodies. It lacks the link to the Global Strategy, approved in 2016, and the Common Security and Defence Policy. It is as if the Commission is just adding another silo to the European political edifice. That is bad. It also lacks an analysis of the vulnerabilities of certain categories of citizens according to age, gender, place of residence, social and economic fragility, ethnic or cultural belonging. That is even worse. 

Anyone who is patient enough to read the document gets the impression that at the end of the reference period, the year 2025, we will have a Europe in which every step of every citizen will be recorded and can be scrutinised. It is easy to get the impression that we will then arrive at an extensively watched society, with gigantic databases storing every detail of our lives. The strategy shows, moreover, that the process has already begun and that it will be accelerated by the progress of digitisation and Artificial Intelligence. The prevention of terrorism and hybrid attacks, which may jeopardise key infrastructure, and the fight against financial crime will be three of the lines used to justify close surveillance, which seems to be inspired by the Big Brother imagined by George Orwell.

Even when it is said that the ultimate goal is the defence of the rights and freedoms of European citizens, we cannot fall into the trap of omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent security. The reason is simple. A security state is always one step away from slipping into an oppressive and manipulative state. Past examples show that political leaders easily fall into the temptation to divert security functions to ends that have nothing to do with consolidating the democratic regime and the real tranquillity of citizens.

Those who do not share this temptation are so often unable to exercise democratic oversight of security institutions. Most parliamentary oversight committees for intelligence services have reduced mandates, limited access, and unsatisfactory results. The strategy now formulated is silent on the alternatives that should be considered so that independent, non-partisan powers, outside of parliamentary disputes, can effectively curb possible security abuses.  The issue of balanced control of the potential excesses of those who observe our daily lives is, however, essential.  And this is because security obsessions are like witches. There are those who do not believe in them, but they are around, for sure! Even in European democracies!

 

Erdogan has become a major problem

I have said many times that the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is a major menace to the European interests. That includes the stability of some European countries, those with a large Turkish immigration, the unity of Europe, and the effectiveness and coherence of our military defence as a common endeavour. Now, I see my warning getting echo in a few media and governance circles. They realise the danger Erdogan represents. They should also be clear that the President megalomaniac ideas are bringing economic chaos to his own country. The man’s ambitions and his political manipulation of Islam have transformed Turkey into a repressive State and an economic mess. The louder we say it, in Brussels and in other capitals, the better for us and for the Turkish population.

On the anniversary of NATO

All along, I have listened to a good number of dinner speakers. And I have noticed that, in general, they believe that a successful speech is the one that confirms the views of the attendees. They end up by seeing themselves as “comfort speakers”, as I would call them, invited to reinforce the prevailing ideas that have already gained a seat around the table.

That has been the case, for instance, on matters related to NATO. I mention the Alliance as its leaders get together in London to celebrate its 70^th anniversary. And I recall that I have repeated at a few occasions the Organisation needs an independent view of its relevance and role. They should even listen to some “positive contrarians” – another expression I use –, people that are ready to raise some fundamental questions instead of just re-stating dogmatic or diplomatic views.

I would also like to recall another of my frequent messages to senior officers: we can only succeed if we consult, de-conflict and harmonise our respective strategic and operational interests.  

President Trump and the EU

A few of my readers have expressed some degree of surprise after reading what I wrote in my last blog about President Trump’s policy towards the EU. I basically said the President is not in favour of a strong EU. And that is a radical change of approach, because for decades his predecessors have encouraged the European countries to cooperate and strengthen the EU. Even in the case of the UK, the message coming from Washington has always been in the sense of advising London to be closer to Continental Europe.

 With President Trump, we have a new situation. First, he sees the EU as economic competition and a market that is huge but has too many barriers when it comes to some critical American exports, such as cars and farm products. But there is more to it, beyond the economic and trade issues. He thinks that the key EU leaders have an international agenda that contradicts his own and weakens it. That is the case on climate, on Iran, on Russia, on Cuba and Venezuela, on multilateralism, even on China. Not to mention the new idea of a European common defence, an idea that Emmanuel Macron personalises. On defence, President Trump follows a line that has been present in Washington for long now: the Europeans must spend more on their armies but keep them under the overall control and command of the US military. He senses that in this area the European response is becoming more independent and he does not like it at all.

August is not a good time to discuss these matters. People on both sides of the Atlantic are above all concerned with the weather and their holidays. It is however a debate that must be reopened after the rentrée in September.

NATO days

NATO is seventy years old. It remains a unique type of organisation. Including because it brings together two very distinct ways of looking at geopolitics and is based on an ambiguous relationship between the political and military spheres of power.

Today, it operates in a very different world. And it is confronted with a complete new set of challenges. In all its organisational complexity, NATO has changed quite a bit during the last ten years or so. It has tried to adapt. 

But, in my opinion, it has not deserved the attention it should from the political leaders. Most of the political statements and positions on NATO are just ready-made, repetitive and half-baked declarations. That is not very strategic.

Joint carrier or a smoke screen?

A joint aircraft carrier, as proposed yesterday by the new CDU party leader, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (Germany)? To be funded by the European Commission or by a joint pot made up of contributions coming from 27 countries? And what for, that carrier? What are the vision and the strategy, when it comes to the matter of Europe’s Defence Strategy?

EU and Defence: additional considerations

Taking into account the ongoing discussions on military budgets, I went back to the text approved at the NATO Summit of 2014, in Wales. The paragraph 5 of "The Wales Declaration on the Transatlantic Bond" is quoted below. It´s worth a careful reading of its words.

"We recognise that these steps will take the necessary effort and funding. In light of this, we agree to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets and aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows; we will direct our defence budgets as efficiently and effectively as possible; we will aim to move towards the existing NATO guideline of spending 2% of GDP on defence within a decade, with a view to fulfilling NATO capability priorities. We will display the political will to provide required capabilities and deploy forces when they are needed."

This commitment follows the recognition stated in the last sentence of the previous paragraph. I quote it as well.

"We will continue to invest in modern and deployable armed forces that can operate effectively together and at a high level of readiness to fulfil NATO's tasks, in full accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act." 

And I would underline the following points:

-             Interoperability and readiness are key dimensions in terms of greater joint effectiveness;

-            Additional defence expenditure is linked to economic growth;

-             Budget allocations should be reviewed to respond to new priorities and up-to-date military approaches and to ensure a more appropriate funding of the new roles of the armed forces as required by a new type of threats;

-            The 2% goal is a guideline and it should be gradually build up to 2014; it cannot happen in the short term;

-           The States must be willing to participate in joint operations and be perceived as able to rapidly respond to needs as they arise, taking into account the capabilities of each nation.

I also find the references to the UN Charter and to the Helsinki Final Act essential. They should be continuously recalled.  

The defence challenge

On defence matters, the EU countries have no other option but to pool resources together. That´s the future and that´s the only way to realise our own share of responsibilities. It´s time to see things from a joint perspective. We are talking about the defence of Europe, not just about the protection of country A or B within the EU. If country A is attacked tomorrow, other countries will be destabilised soon after. What is at stake is our common EU future as democracies and countries that respect the rule of law and the distinct role of the key political institutions.  

There are many inefficiencies and a good deal of overlapping expenditures in between countries. All that needs to be streamlined and approached from a complementary perspective that goes beyond the national borders and the old concept of individual sovereignty in matters of defence.

Unfortunately that´s not easy to achieve. In many parts of the European space, the armed forces are still seen from a national angle only. The challenge is to convince the citizens that that´s no longer the way forward. 

EU´s debate on security and defence

The on-going debate about the future of EU security and defence is excessively focused on the military dimensions. It is also incomplete in terms of understanding the meaning of European security and the complementarity links – and the differences as well – between both concepts. Furthermore, many of the responses that are put forward do not match the new nature of the risks and threats our Europe is confronted with. The understanding of the intents that move our adversaries and enemies is good. But the proposed set of actions are too conventional and too narrow. On the opposite side, we see the enemies playing complex hybrid packages against us. Actually, their main lines of intervention go far beyond the hard military means. They also go far beyond the traditional diplomatic adversarial politics. They are multidimensional, subtle and very often take advantage of our own internal divisions. We should not limit ourselves to military options. That would be in deep contradiction with what we have been talking about during the last six or so years in terms of a comprehensive approach to crisis management.

But there are other points that are also missing. First, the strengthening of national police services. Second, the call for greater cooperation between member States in matters of police investigation, information sharing and joint detailed analysis and interpretation of the data collected. Third, the augmenting of national intelligence resources, which are extremely limited in some of our States, including in those that have recently experienced terrorist incidents. Fourth, the sharing of information between the military and the police intelligence services.

The narrative about peace operations should be seriously improved

The questions and the debate that followed my presentation on UN peace operations – yesterday´s post was about the public address I delivered on 28 April on the subject – have once again shown the need for a greater investment on a positive narrative on peacekeeping. It was clear that even a better educated audience has a biased perception about the mandates and the role of the UN in peacekeeping and peace building. I have actually been confronted with the same situation in the exercises I do with senior officers from my part of the world. The misinformation and misunderstandings are just too many. They have, obviously, an impact on the way the European politicians see the participation of their forces in UN operations. They make it more difficult for people like me to advocate for a stronger EU commitment to military and police missions led by the UN.

There are a number of things the UN and the supporters of international solidarity should do better in the field of peace and security. For sure one of them has to do with messaging. If they cannot win the narrative they will not be able to get more support. 

Lessons from Afghanistan

This last day of 2014 marks the end of ISAF, the international military mission in Afghanistan. The coalition of combat forces, the largest alliance of states for military purposes in recent history, has been on the ground for 13 years. Throughout this very long intervention, the human and financial costs were immense. Many raise questions. Was it worth the investment, the sacrifices of so many? Was it the best approach to bring together a deeply divided country which had become a breeding nest for violent extremism and negative model of retrograde approaches to life in society? Is the current situation that is left in the hands of the national authorities sustainable? Are we safer at present?

Many thesis will be written about the international assistance to Afghanistan. But beyond the academic papers, the model applied in Afghanistan will also challenge the way we see peace enforcement, international military assistance, and the relations between key international organisations, nation building and national leadership issues. The concept of comprehensive response will also have to be revised. It should include, a few other dimensions, the regional response. Afghanistan is just the inner circle of much larger storm that includes the neighbouring countries. Any military response within the smaller circle can only be effective and sustainable if it goes beyond that circle and brings together a much wider and multifaceted political response.

Beyond these substantive and wide-ranging issues, the points today, at the end of 2014, are to remember all those who have fallen during the many years past and to wish the people of that country and its region a more peaceful 2015. They dramatically need that type of hope.

Russia is getting on our nerves

The renewed intrusion of Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine, which has been properly document during the last couple of days, has brought back a certain level of fear in Western Europe. In many circles, including in the top business spheres, the anxiety comes from the fact that Moscow´s geostrategic intentions are not clear. How far is the Kremlin ready to go? This is the question. And there is no good answer to it. When such a question cannot get a reasonable response key leaders on our side of the world get nervous. That´s where we are today.  

We should be much wiser

The international political tensions keep deepening. And they have a major negative impact of trade and investment. We seem to be going back to the international environment that prevailed for several decades after World War II. Around 1985 there was a change to a more constructive engagement. We are now going back to destructive confrontation. The weapons that are being used might belong to the economic realm. But a confrontation is spiralling process and it can therefore make use of other means, inclusive the military ones. To believe that war is something of the past is an idealistic view. Today´s events in Ukraine show that war in Europe is still seen by some as an option. The big difference with 1945 is that in today´s world the means of destruction are much greater. Can we keep that in mind? 

President Obama´s foreign policy options

President Obama´s speech at West Point on foreign policy must be read with great attention. It shows the direction the US is taking in international affairs. It is clear about the priorities for the next two or three years, but is even clearer about the new doctrinal approaches. Including on the use of force abroad.

I still have to find time to peruse it carefully.  But it´s worth to do it shortly.

In Europe we have to keep in mind that the only option we have at this time of our history is to continue the strong and close defence alliance with the US. We are far away from a EU defence reality. And with the nationalism dragons on the way back to the front of the European political scene it is even more advisable to have the American glue to keep us wisely together in matters of military nature.  

Peacekeeping and peace building in Africa

Thoughts on Peacekeeping within an African background

Victor Ângelo

1.       Introduction

On 10 April 2014 the UN Security Council approved the deployment of a peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (CAR), to be known as MINUSCA. Resolution 2149 (2014) defines MINUSCA´s contextual parameters and objectives. The starting date for the mission will be 15 September 2014.

With another five months to go, that date looks far away. This is especially the case when the serious turmoil in the CAR since late 2012 is taken into account. And this timeline becomes even more problematic when repeated warnings from senior UN staff are recalled – that the situation was out of control and it was clear that the country was sliding into genocide.

A brief comment on the timing of the resolution that has just been adopted would emphasise the absurdly slow decision-making pace of the Security Council. If the premier international body responsible for peace and security – which basically means safeguarding human life and preventing severe violations of human rights – takes such an incredibly long time to respond to a not-so-complex crisis like the one in the CAR, what can we expect from the Council in more intricate situations?

“Not much indeed”, would be tempting to answer.

However, the issue is more intricate than this reply suggests. The slow response to the situation in CAR shows that there are a number of serious problems related to UN’s peacekeeping capabilities, particularly in an African setting and in a region that is not directly linked to the strategic interests of the major global powers.

This is a very serious issue that requires urgent attention. Peacekeeping must be effective, fast-moving and people-centred. The UN remains the key player in matters of peacekeeping. In the end the security question that is so often raised is the security of the ordinary citizens, in particular the most vulnerable among them.  

There is no other international or inter-governmental institution that is in a position to play a comparable role, not even the African Union (AU), notwithstanding all of efforts the African leaders have made over the last 15 years to strengthen this kind of capacity within their regional organisation. The AU´s African Standby Force (ASF) is still work in progress, even in the East African region, where the preparatory work has gone further. At this stage, it is extremely optimistic to believe that the ASF will be fully operational in 2015, as was recently recommended, in the December 2013 assessment, which further recognised the many delays this undertaking has suffered so far.

Outside Africa, NATO has been mentioned as a possible actor in the areas of peace enforcing and peacekeeping. However, the Atlantic Alliance has no vocation to play an international peacekeeping role. It could, in some cases, be used as a rapid response solution, as an entry force. But in the current circumstances, notably after the Libyan expedition and the deep-rooted tensions with Russia on the Eastern European front, it is highly improbable to have a UN Security Council request addressed to NATO. The same is true as far as the Russia-inspired Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is concerned. CSTO countries already established a peacekeeping architecture at the end of 2010. But the force is yet to be seen on the ground. To date, no operation has been assigned to CSTO. And it is difficult to foresee this organization playing any out-of-area active role in the medium term. However, both NATO and CSTO should be included in the wider debate about the future of peacekeeping.

There should be no doubt at this stage that the way forward is to strengthen the UN´s capacity to respond. As that happens, it should not be forgotten that Africa is the continent where most peacekeeping missions are deployed. Recent missions, in South Sudan, Mali and now in CAR, have been approved in response to African challenges. In this context, as the UN should address some of its key shortcomings in peacekeeping, African leaders should also be encouraged to continue strengthening their own capacities. The goal here, in parallel to the reform of the UN apparatus, is to create an African capacity to respond to violent crises within the continent´s five Regional Economic Communities (RECs). In the foreseeable future, the RECs must be able to put together their respective Standby Forces, harmonise operational abilities and develop their regional machinery to deal with peacekeeping, peacebuilding and political transitions.

But, at this stage, it is important to focus on some of the key issues related to UN´s peacekeeping, whilst taking into account African experiences and needs. What follows are some brief observations that should be considered in terms of advocating for the urgent need to sharpen the UN´s tools.

2.       Faster deployments 

UN peacekeeping deployments take too long to materialise. This has now been a key issue for the last seven years or so. This is particularly the case in Africa, but is more generally so in non-English speaking countries.

Large scale Troop-Contributing Countries (TTCs) are overcommitted, in view of the demands coming from huge missions that are still in the field in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, Cote d´Ivoire, Liberia, South Sudan and elsewhere. Take the case of Mali, for instance. Only 55% of authorised military personnel have been deployed so far, despite the fact that the mission was established almost a year ago. Many of the troops that were fielded by the preceding African-only mission in the framework of a regional response – in this case ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States) troops plus Chadian soldiers who were already on the ground before the UN military presence – could not be re-hatted and transferred to the UN because they did not meet the standards the UN requires for its contingents.

This will certainly be the same in the CAR. The 6,000 MISCA soldiers –troops from neighbouring countries belonging to the Economic Commission of Central African States (ECCAS) – will face the same difficulties in terms of their eventual re-hatting as blue berets. For many months there will be a poorly staffed MINUSCA trying to stretch itself in order to fulfil its mandate. Most likely, when the first period of the mandate comes to an end on 30 April 2015, the number of soldiers will be well below the 10,000 that the UN Security Council resolution 2149 authorised.

The same is valid for the police component. MINUSCA should have 1,800 police personnel, most of them gendarmerie. This component is critical in a mission that basically has to respond to issues of law and order in a society in chaos. However it is unlikely that the UN will be able to mobilize the required numbers. In general, states that participate in peacekeeping operations have no spare police capacity that can be made available. This is one of the big differences between police services and military forces – availability. The number of soldiers waiting for a job is much higher. And only a handful of countries have gendarmerie services. In Africa, this is the case mainly in French-speaking countries. Very often those gendarmerie forces are not fully prepared to serve within a UN mission. Like their military counterparts, their standards of training do not meet the minimum requirements for a UN assignment.

All of this has an impact on the timely fulfilment of operations´ mandates as well as the effectiveness and the image of the UN. As they try to emerge from traumatic crises and find any opportunity to make their living, people in the host nation will see many UN military convoys arriving over a long period of time, a never-ending flow of troops and highly conspicuous equipment. They will contrast this with very low levels of security operations. Before anything else, newly arrived soldiers will be busy with their own installation, building their infrastructure. This actually can easily be exploited by those in the country that are not in favour of an international military presence. Experience has shown that heavy and slow-paced deployments can undermine the political consent, which is critical for the mission.

Any crisis that is followed by a peacekeeping deployment must be able to show quick wins. And the easiest problem to turn around in the initial phase of a deployment has to do with the security environment. It might take long to address its most critical dimensions. But it is possible to improve the popular perception related to the low intensity security threats. This is where the priority should be. It has an immediate impact on the lives of the citizens. Changes to the security situation are among the first expectations. An improved situation is a winner, it terms of gaining people´s support. But doing so requires faster deployments, troops that can hit the ground running. This is not the case today, in most of the situations.

3.       Effectiveness 

The countries providing brigades and vast numbers of police personnel are generally African (Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, etc) and South Asian (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan). They are oversubscribed in terms of UN peacekeeping commitments. Very often, however, politically they do not want to recognise this, as the international assignments are an important part of their armed forces’ expectations. Rather, they tend to make promises and accept engagements without being sure they will have the capacity to deliver on time and with the necessary standards of quality. Also, the personnel they might be able to mobilise are general purpose infantry troops and street police officers. The force enablers and multipliers as well as air and ground mobility assets are generally insufficient and sometimes inadequate for the terrain in which they have to operate. Without them, the effectiveness of a field presence is very limited or even non-existent.

Complexity calls for more focussed deployments, highly trained men and women and more specialised military personnel. Missions now require many more Special Forces and intelligence officers – both for people-based and signals information collection and analysis – than just sentinels and patrolmen. The Council is still caught up in an approach that tries to respond to generic skills, poor performance and low standards by increasing the numbers of soldiers. This way of doing business needs to change.

For sure, this is an area where developed countries must be more forthcoming. During the last two decades they have been moving away from engaging troops in UN peacekeeping operations, with one or two exceptions, like the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. It is time to see European and North American troops and police officers back in UN missions. The developed world must be a more active part of the peacekeeping equation. They must unequivocally demonstrate that global responsibility for peacekeeping is not shared out along the lines of money: those who pay for missions do not deploy and those who deploy, largely from the developing South, are paid to keep international peace. This undermines the principle of joint responsibility for world peace. It also does not take into account that the developed countries would have a greater chance to advocate for their values and interests if their soldiers could be found shoulder to shoulder with uniformed men and women coming from other regions of the world.  Moreover, richer countries have and can spare the specialised personnel so much in demand. They also have the specific, highly efficient logistics capabilities that peacekeeping operations in remote areas around the world require.  

The second move that more developed member states should make concerns training for defence and security personnel. The military training programme the EU is implementing in Mali is a good example and it should be replicated in the CAR. As it has just been decided for Mali, after a long hesitation, it must also include the gendarmerie and the police, not just the armed forces. Investing in the development of human resources and institutions is critical to help a country overcome chronic crisis. Richer nations must be much more committed to security sector reform and the development of defence, police and penal institutions in countries coming out of a deep national crisis. The capacity building packages must also include revamping justice systems –without forgetting the relevance of traditional methods of administering justice – as a means of combating impunity and contributing to national reconciliation and long-term stability.

A cautionary note though. Training national forces and reforming national defence and security institutions in a post-crisis country must be accompanied by a plan for financial sustainability. Experience has shown that African officers trained in the best US and European academies often feel a high degree of professional frustration when they return to their national army corps, because those units are underfunded. Indeed, because of lack of resources, most units are unable to go beyond a collection of “barefooted” armed men, dressed in uniforms of fortune and flea market camouflage. They have no real means to operate. They can easily become the breeding ground for the future wave of discontent and crisis, as we have seen in Mali in 2012. The issue of the financial sustainability of modern armed forces and police services in a number of African countries requires an honest debate.

4.       Strong political mandate

The effectiveness of any UN peacekeeping mission is clearly related to its political mandate. This mandate must be realistically defined.

In terms of the African-based missions, there is now a tendency to attach to mandates an array of concerns and objectives. They are certainly important but they are generally more related to long term development goals than to keeping the peace and creating the conditions for political transition and basic human security. It will be wise to strike a balance between comprehensiveness and the core objectives of peacekeeping. Focus would make the mission stronger. It would therefore increase the chances of success.

Mandates should above all aim at creating the political and security foundations on which peace building and development should rest. Actually, an area that requires greater attention, both in terms of knowledge and identification of the practical lessons learnt so far, is the one related to the connections between peacekeeping and peace building. But those links cannot be a pretext for unworkable mandates.

Next to focus, the political role of head of mission is critical for deep-rooted change, for the move from crisis to institutional, representative democracy. It is therefore indispensable to make sure the mission leadership gets the full political support of the Security Council and the relevant regional organisations (the AU, for instance, and the affected REC).

In addition, the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) must be better prepared to exercise their respective backstopping roles. For too long, the state of mind in both departments has been inspired by the arrogant attitude and detachment that comes from working at headquarters and too far away from the realities of the daily life in the field. In particular DPKO has shown, on many occasions, to lack the skills and field experience necessary to provide the right type of advice to the missions that fall under its responsibility and to serve as a permanent channel between the field and the key countries in the Security Council. The rotation of staff between headquarters and field needs to be effectively implemented.

Leadership issues are crucial in all complex situations, particularly in countries that have gone through major national upheavals. Those issues are not only about the quality of the mission leadership or the sorts of diplomatic interventions carried out by regional leaders. Leadership is fundamentally about daring to create the domestic conditions for a renewal of the national political elites in the post-crisis situation and allowing for the right type of leaders to emerge, including at the local level. New times call for new leaders grounded on accepted political practise. Leaders with legitimacy. In this context, proper electoral processes, at the presidential, national and local levels, are critical elements of an exit strategy. They call for continued support by the best technical teams available within the international peace machinery. But they should not be considered the absolute benchmarks. To complete successful elections cannot be seen as the indicator that the mission has done its job and can leave. Nonetheless, fair elections do make the transition process more sustainable and open the door for an earlier exit of the international presence.

The emphasis on national and local political leadership cannot ignore the role of civil society. A strong the civil society is essential for stability, reconciliation and democracy. Peacekeeping missions must give the example and fully accept civil society as a critical partner in the transition process. That will send a clear message to the new political elite that will emerge after the crisis. Expertise on civil society relations must be part of the mission´s skills.

5.       Reducing costs

UN peacekeeping operations are very costly endeavours. A mission like the one just approved for the CAR might require a billion US dollars a year. This is undoubtedly a lot of money. Its financing is mandatory for the UN member states once the mission has been authorised by the Council. At a time of continued cost restraint and belt tightening, governments in key capitals, those that carry the main budgetary burden for UN operations, become very hesitant when it comes to this level of expenditures. This is a basic reason why approval of the resolution on CAR was delayed. Finance ministries have the first word when it comes to deciding about new international operations. Moreover, the Council knows when a mission will begin but has no clear idea about when it will end.  

It is therefore critically important to look at ways of containing costs. Not only should the mission objectives be clearly articulated, they should also be attainable within a reasonable amount of time. It is also imperative to build the national capacity to take over as soon as possible. The ultimate responsibility for peace and security in a country rests within its national borders, with its authorities and its citizens. Financial considerations make this principle more present than ever.

A further cost related question pertains to the exit strategy of the mission, which should be incorporated from the very beginning as a primary component of the mission design. It is essential that the Security Council asks DPKO and the head of the field mission to devise a reasonably defined plan focused on the gradual but steady transfer of responsibilities to the national and sub-regional authorities as soon as it is feasible to do so. Feasible means that peace can be sustained without direct intervention by the international community. A plan that would be both a road map to guide the peace keeping mission and serve as a blueprint for its exit strategy.

6.       Moving ahead

UN peacekeeping has achieved some notable results in the past. Sierra Leone, in Africa, and East Timor in the South Pacific, are just two recent examples of major successes in the recent past. UN peacekeeping has also changed a lot for the better over the last decade. Those who saw peacekeeping in the Balkans during the 1990s and then observe today´s operations notice that the UN has come a long way in terms of integration of different dimensions and creating a balance between the military and the civilian components of missions. There is now much greater emphasis on law and order and policing, justice, local administration and conflict resolution at the community level, as well as on gender equality and human rights. The UN has also accumulated extensive experience in terms of logistics supply and sustainment, air and ground mobility and support to humanitarian emergencies. 

But times keep changing. Conflicts are increasingly about basic natural resources and survival, differences in religious practices and faith-based behaviours, terrorism, wide spread banditry and criminality, and the collapse or limitations of state administration, living vast areas ungoverned. At the same time, violent conflicts tend to have deep and complex root causes, which necessitate time to be resolved. But the attention span of the international community has become shorter. And so many of us have acquired the fever of impatience, we live at the speed of the TV screen or even the social media, shaped by the 140-character approach. We want to see results before too long, if not immediately. Protracted conflicts tend to disappear from the public eye if they become too static or nothing happens. As they lose prominence, they receive less political and financial support. Their prolonged budgetary costs become more difficult to justify.

Sixteen missions are deployed in different parts of the world, nine of them in Africa. The defence sector has also been under review in several key developed countries, prompted by the need to adapt to contemporary threats and be prepared to respond to new international settings. This is therefore the moment to reflect again about the peacekeeping challenges as it was done almost 15 years ago, when the Brahimi report was issued.  Time and circumstances make it advisable to review and update the recommendations of that important and influential report.

It is also the time for the EU and the AU to reflect, in house and in their joint consultations, on what can be reasonably done by both parties to complement the UN peacekeeping work. This is a debate that should take place without further delay. It should be linked to the next evaluation of the EU African Peace Facility (APF) and its transformation into an instrument of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. For Africa, the doubling of APF resources over the next three years, recently decided at the IV EU-Africa Summit, is encouraging and certainly appreciated. But there is a need to go beyond resources, as important as they are, and look at the substance of what really needs to be funded and how that can be integrated in a long-term strategy of greater African self-reliance. This about Africa´s capacity to sort out its own conflicts.

This debate would also benefit from the long experience the Norwegians have acquired in the implementation of their Training for Peace programme (TfP). The programme, funded by the government of Norway since 1995 and managed by African institutions, has been able to evolve over time. It is now particularly attentive to training in the areas of African civilian capacities and police personnel for peacekeeping, as well as focused on the need to support applied research. In this, the EU has a good source of inspiration when designing the new generation of training missions. Such missions should take advantage of the Malian experience – the EU Training Mission –, be civilian led and as inclusive as possible.  

The way forward should further consider the experience of coalitions of the willing and the role of small groupings of countries as suppliers of peace enforcing and peacekeeping tasks. But this is a discussion for another time. However, it cannot be brushed aside and ignored. Nor should China´s ambitions to support peace and security operations in Africa be forgotten. Here, the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, approved in 2012, is worth noting.

All this calls for a very direct question: Who is going to lead the debate on renovating peacekeeping? It must be an institution that is in a position to bring all of the stakeholders together, including the EU, for sure, but above all, the African institutions that have the responsibility for peace and security throughout the continent.

The answer seems obvious.

April 2014

Ukraine and the new defence architecture in Europe

The EU game plan for Ukraine must match Russia´s will to cooperate. That has to be made very clear to the Kremlin. If Russia´s ambition goes beyond reasonable expectations and leads to the annexation of Crimea and other parts of Ukraine, the EU has to move beyond economic and budgetary assistance and have a comprehensive approach. It is true that the EU defence policy is too short. But its member states could help Ukraine to reach a stronger partnership with the existing defence mechanism that the West has in place.

  

That is the message that needs to be put across to the Kremlin. If things on their side go too far then they can expect Ukraine to become much more integrated in the Western defence architecture. In other words, if Russia changes the balance of power in Eastern Europe, then the West will have to find a new equilibrium that would certainly include the new Ukraine. 

Back and promoting negotiated solutions to shared crises

Back from a long voyage, I recall that one of the last posts I wrote before travelling has been about Russia and NATO. That post remains so current!

But I should add that we, on our side of the world, have a biased view of Russia as well. The Russians might believe in confrontation. But we have also shown we share the same believe. We might say that everybody wins if we cooperate and dialogue. However, we love to impose sanctions on others and still think that the ultimatum is a fine diplomatic instrument. Or the best diplomatic tool is to be able to understand the strategic interests of the adversary and initiate a dialogue taking such interests as the starting point for a negotiated solution.