If Luxembourg Fails, Portugal Can Act

 

Diário de Notícias Opinion/Lisbon edition

Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General.

Published on: October 9, 2026

When EU Foreign Ministers meet in Luxembourg on October 12, one year will have passed since the ceasefire in Gaza. Peace, however, remains absent. The United Nations continues to record attacks on civilians and restrictions on humanitarian aid, and it is projected that around 1.4 million people—two-thirds of Gaza's population—will face acute food insecurity by the end of the year. In the West Bank, the UN and other observers document settler violence and the expansion of Israeli settlements, which the International Court of Justice deemed illegal in 2004 and again in 2024.

The Israeli government is now accelerating the E1 project, an urban corridor intended to link the vast settlement of Ma’ale Adumim to East Jerusalem. The UN, EU countries, and other organizations consider that, once completed, it will sever the territorial continuity between the northern and southern West Bank and, in practice, render a contiguous Palestinian State unviable. That is why, for decades, Washington and European capitals opposed the plan.

On September 8, Portugal joined a declaration with France, Spain, Ireland, Denmark, Finland, Poland, and Sweden, and—outside the Union—with the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, and Iceland, in which these States confirmed their intention to restrict trade with the settlements. The Twenty-Seven, however, still lack a common position: Germany, Czechia, and Italy are preventing a qualified majority from being reached. The EU-Israel Association Agreement remains unchanged, and the institutions that finance settlement expansion from Europe continue to operate without restrictions.

More than 500 former prime ministers, ministers, ambassadors, and senior European officials urged, in an appeal published in Libération on October 5, that the EU sanction financial institutions and service providers linked to E1 and ban trade with the settlements. They warn that collective inaction is hollowing out the two-state solution.

If the Foreign Affairs Council remains blocked once again, the States that take International Law seriously are not left without options. Spain showed one: it recalled its ambassador to Tel Aviv in September 2025 and, since March 2026, the embassy has been led by a chargé d'affaires. Relations were not severed. The level of representation was merely reduced.

This is the step that Portugal could propose: reduce the level of its representation in Tel Aviv, as Madrid did, and do so in coordination with others. It is not necessary for everyone to do it. An initial group could bring together countries that have already adopted restrictive national measures, such as Spain, Ireland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The invitation would remain open to the other signatories of the September 8 declaration and to others. If five or six States move forward, the gesture ceases to be national and becomes a European movement. For Portugal, which assumes a seat on the UN Security Council in 2027, this would be a way to show that the defense of the negotiated solution in New York has concrete consequences in Brussels. And it would be coherent with the step Lisbon has already taken by recognizing the State of Palestine.

There are four predictable objections. The first is that reducing diplomatic level diminishes access and influence. But the political channel remains open: the chargé d'affaires would continue to transmit messages, protect citizens, and speak with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Security cooperation and consular protection would not be suspended, and Israel would continue to be an interlocutor. The second is that the gesture would be purely symbolic. Isolated, its impact is indeed limited. It would be a political signal, not a lever, and would only gain strength if accompanied by financial sanctions and trade restrictions. The third is that it would further divide the Union. But the division already exists. What is at stake is whether the blockade by three States should paralyze all the others. The fourth is retaliation. But retaliation against an isolated State is easy; against five or six acting in conjunction, it is much more costly, and that is the rationale behind the group.

And Washington? The Trump administration has reiterated its opposition to the annexation of the West Bank, but, as far as is public, has not expressly condemned E1. There is, even so, common ground: Washington and Europe state that they want to prevent annexation and preserve stability. If European capitals present their decisions as a way to prevent the reality on the ground from rendering the two-state solution unviable, rather than as a rupture with Israel, they will be speaking of an objective they share with Washington. It is not necessary to agree on the instruments to agree on the outcome. It is up to EU governments to explain this firmly, before the fait accompli makes conversation useless.

None of this reflects antisemitism, nor hostility toward Israel and its citizens. Europe firmly condemns the terrorist massacre perpetrated by Hamas on October 7, 2023, and all forms of terrorism against Israel. What is proposed here responds to decisions by the Israeli government that are incompatible with an objective reiterated by the UN Security Council, the European Union, successive US administrations, and many others: preserving the conditions for a two-state solution.

On the 12th, ministers can limit themselves to repeating that the problem is serious or dare to go further. If there is no consensus, it will be up to the States that take international law seriously to show that, in Europe, there are already those who know how to act. Portugal can be one of them.

The King of Jordan and Portugal’s Test in the Security Council

 Diário de Notícias 
 Opinion 

Victor Ângelo
International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published on: 02 Oct 2026

Portuguese foreign policy has a habit of waiting. It waits for Washington, Brussels, Paris, or Berlin to decide what is to be praised, what is to be condemned, and what is to be passed over in silence. In September 2025, by recognizing the State of Palestine, Lisbon demonstrated that it can decide on its own. This now remains to be confirmed. King Abdullah II’s speech at the 81st United Nations General Assembly on 22 September 2026 provides the occasion.

Diplomacy prefers ambiguity. The King rejected it. For decades, the King stated, the international community has managed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict rather than resolving it, treating every violation as temporary until the temporary became permanent, and the permanent was converted into policy. For him, Gaza and the West Bank are two fronts of a single Israeli strategy: making a Palestinian State unviable. In Gaza, the destruction aims to erase Palestinian life. In the West Bank, settlements, land appropriation, demolitions, and expulsions have become a political objective.

He recalled that the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative remains valid: normalization in exchange for peace and a Palestinian State. He denounced the use of humanitarian aid as an instrument of pressure, and warned that the weakening of multilateral institutions threatens the security of all. Inaction, he said, is a choice, because there are sanctions, asset freezes, and diplomatic isolation, which have already been applied in other cases. He pointed to Israel's "expansionist appetite" and cited Syria as a warning: repeated incursions and faits accomplis, including around vital water resources.

The essence of the speech is rooted in international law. The forced transfer of populations is prohibited by the Fourth Geneva Convention and constitutes a war crime under the Rome Statute. The acquisition of foreign territory by force violates the United Nations Charter. Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016) declared the settlements to have no legal validity. In July 2024, the International Court of Justice concluded that the Israeli presence in the occupied territories is illegal, and that States must refrain from supporting it. The Security Council enshrined the two-state solution in 2002.

Portugal does not possess the colonial past in the Middle East of the great powers. It has centuries of contact with Islam, in its language, tilework, and toponymy, alongside longstanding relations with the Islamic cultures of Africa, the Indian Ocean, and Asia. It can serve as a bridge, provided it does so with States that respect international law. Moreover, Portugal has a direct interest: the stability of the Mediterranean has a decisive bearing on migration, energy, and the security of Europe's southern flank.

Jordan is a stable interlocutor, hosts a vast population of Palestinian refugees, and acts as the custodian of the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem. It is not a democracy, and nobody needs to pretend that it is. In foreign policy, however, it meets the criteria of the rule of law and multilateralism better than some habitual partners.

Consistency will be put to the test when Portugal takes its seat on the Security Council in 2027 and 2028. Two years of votes, declarations, and abstentions will be placed on record. It will fall to the Government to conduct foreign policy. The Council of State, the consultative body to the President of the Republic, must be called upon to offer its opinion on the broad outlines of Portuguese participation in the most sensitive matters. In the Assembly of the Republic, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Portuguese Communities will scrutinize the positions adopted, ensuring that the mandate on the Security Council is not reduced to an uncritical alignment with other governments.

For now, I propose three gestures, in ascending order of demand.

The first is to invite King Abdullah II for an official visit in the coming months. The last visit to Lisbon by the Jordanian monarchy was in March 2009. The invitation is the prerogative of the President of the Republic, in consultation with the Government. Made now, upon entering the Security Council, it signals to the world whom Portugal wishes to speak with, and what it considers to be a priority. In May, Minister Paulo Rangel told his Jordanian counterpart that the two countries share a very similar political vision. An invitation to the King would lend this convergence the seal of the State.

The second is to propose that Jordan join the CPLP (Community of Portuguese Language Countries) as an associate observer, a status already held by Qatar. The decision rests with the Community, but the initiative can originate in Lisbon. A prominent Arab State would connect the CPLP to the Islamic world, within a Lusophone sphere that includes relevant Muslim communities, such as those in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

The third is to move the two-state solution from rhetoric to action. In Brussels, Portugal must advocate for effective conditionalities against those who render it unviable in reality. In European practice, the word sanction remains a taboo when the recipient is Israel: the Union affirms a principle on paper and tolerates its opposite on the ground, even when faced with a Head of Government sought by the International Criminal Court. In New York, Portugal must keep the issue on the agenda and vote according to the law, not according to a bloc reflex.

Jordan has limitations, regime interests, and dependencies, and no serious analysis ignores them. Yet, a speech that names the facts, invokes the precise legal instruments, and links Palestine to regional security provides Portugal with an anchor that Western ambiguity has ceased to offer.

If Portugal limits itself to being a predictable vote, aligned by reflex and silent out of convenience, the recognition of 2025 will remain an isolated episode. The King recalled that attention is a geopolitical resource, and that the world chooses where to focus it. Whoever is to sit on the Security Council for two years cannot pretend not to have heard the speech.