USA: the November 3rd elections

Diário de Notícias Opinion

Before and after the US midterm elections

Victor Ângelo

International Security Adviser. Former UN Deputy Secretary-General /SRSG

Published on: 23 Oct 2026

The North American midterm elections on 3 November traditionally constitute the electorate’s first major judgment on the performance of those in power. All seats in the House of Representatives and approximately one-third of the Senate are at stake. On this occasion, to a greater extent than in the past, the results will have repercussions far beyond the borders of the United States: in Ukraine, in Europe, and in other regions where American influence is decisive.

The country will go to the polls in a context where mutual distrust is no longer conjunctural and has acquired a structural character. These fractures predate Donald Trump. Nevertheless, no modern president has deepened and instrumentalised them with equal persistence. Trump does not seek consensus; he governs on the basis of antagonism, converting the division of citizens into a central element of his political strategy.

Two interpretations of reality are in confrontation. For many of his supporters, Trump continues to represent the necessary response: the voice of those marginalised by globalisation, the opponent of an elite increasingly distant from the common citizen, and the defender of a nationalism grounded in exclusion. For his critics, Trump’s governance translates into a systematic erosion of institutions and the discrediting of the country. Few contemporary leaders have elicited such antagonistic evaluations.

Available projections point to significant difficulties for the Republicans, although the scale of any potential losses remains uncertain. The historical experience of midterm elections confirms this type of punitive cycle. In this context, foreign policy ceases to be merely an area of governance: it electorally benefits or penalises the president.

Ukraine constitutes the most worrisome case. The United States’ electoral calendar has become a relevant factor in Trump’s position regarding the war unleashed by the Kremlin. Zelensky has stated that Trump seeks to achieve a diplomatic success prior to the midterm elections. Moscow recognises the political value of the word "peace" for a president under electoral pressure. It is from this that European anxiety stems. Peace is a common objective. The risk lies in a rushed agreement, announced before it is formalised, founded on imprecise security guarantees and territorial concessions imposed upon the most vulnerable party. Such an outcome would not represent the end of aggression, but a merely illusory pause.

Kyiv cannot assume, within a horizon of a few days, a commitment that it did not negotiate and which demands internal political and social validation. Furthermore, the pressure exerted by Trump upon the aggrieved country has been intensifying, vastly surpassing that directed at the aggressor. With the approach of winter, energy will likely be used once more as an instrument of war. Consequently, one cannot exclude the repetition of large-scale attacks against critical infrastructure, nor new military escalations designed to improve Russia’s negotiating position.

Europe is observing the political evolution on the other side of the Atlantic with concern. If the outcome regarding Ukraine is presented as a fait accompli, Europeans may be called upon to manage the consequences without having participated in the decision. Simultaneously, Russian hybrid pressure could intensify, bearing in mind that the primary ally of Europeans will find itself absorbed by its domestic squabbles.

On the American domestic front, a substantial worsening of political rhetoric is foreseeable. Trump is expected to intensify radical rallies and direct attacks, champion alleged diplomatic successes, and reinforce the narrative that the institutional system and its elites are blocking the popular will, which he alone embodies. The Democrats will likely respond with a mobilisation centred on the defence of institutions. The primary risk will not stem from a series of isolated events, but from the daily accumulation of inflamed rhetoric and disputes over the integrity of the electoral process, within a context of growing distrust and violence.

The central question arises in the post-election period. An institutionally oriented president, confronted with an unfavourable Congress, would seek to secure parliamentary compromises. That is not Trump’s profile. For him, a hostile Congress may be interpreted not as a limit or a difficulty, but as a new battlefield. There will be strong incentives to present himself as a victim of the Washington political system, to expand recourse to Executive Orders, and to convert a potential setback into a lever for populist mobilisation. On the external front, international policy may once again be instrumentalised in function of domestic objectives, with perilous consequences for collective security.

This is the true test. I do not foresee a constitutional collapse, given that American institutions have demonstrated greater resilience than many of their critics admit. The most plausible threat lies in the transformation of political practice itself, when polarisation ceases to be a dimension of democratic competition and comes to constitute a strategic objective. When the adversary is no longer recognised as a legitimate opponent and begins to be treated as an enemy, formal democracy may survive, but it becomes fragile and the consensuses indispensable to effective governance are lost. A resounding defeat for the Republicans could further trigger a profound dispute within the conservative camp, between those who advocate the deepening of Trumpism and those who propose a return to a moderate orientation capable of winning back the independent electorate.

3 November therefore represents more than a simple counting of seats on Capitol Hill. Beyond the balance of mandates, it is a matter of understanding whether American institutions will manage to promote a correction of course or whether the country will remain hostage to a cycle of permanent confrontation. The paradox lies in the fact that Trump derives greater political dividends from continuous confrontation than from the stability of the system. Finally, it is important to assess to what extent he will continue to be conditioned by influential domestic figures, such as Elon Musk and others of that ilk, and by Vladimir Putin within the global geopolitical framework.