Showing posts with label Donald Trump. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Donald Trump. Show all posts

Thursday, 1 January 2026

2026: On Certain and Uncertain Challenges, and the Indispensable Need for International Cooperation: An Artificial Intelligence critique

 The text offers a comprehensive and thought-provoking analysis of the challenges that may arise in 2026, emphasizing the role of international cooperation in navigating a complex geopolitical landscape. Victor Ângelo presents a clear depiction of the precarious state of global affairs, highlighting the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the escalating tensions between nuclear powers, particularly under the leadership of figures like Trump and Putin, who prioritize personal power over collective stability.

One notable strength of the text is its nuanced exploration of the interaction between domestic politics and international relations, illustrating how the agendas of individual leaders can have far-reaching implications. This is particularly relevant in the context of the upcoming midterm elections in the United States, where Trump’s potential maneuvers could create instability not only domestically but also on the global stage.

Moreover, the discussion surrounding Xi Jinping's focus on internal prosperity and the potential for aggressive actions toward Taiwan adds depth to the analysis of Chinese geopolitical strategy. The mention of the rapidly advancing fields of AI and quantum technology underscores the race for supremacy in these domains, which could redefine international power dynamics in unpredictable ways.

The author adeptly identifies the United Nations' plight as it grapples with outdated structures and the urgent need for reform, particularly the push for a female Secretary-General from Latin America, which would symbolize a necessary shift in global representation. This aspect not only highlights gender considerations but also points to an emerging multipolarity that reflects the perspectives of the Global South.

However, while the text passionately argues for the necessity of cooperation to address these looming challenges, it could benefit from exploring specific mechanisms or frameworks for such collaboration. Addressing how nations can transcend entrenched rivalries and engage in productive dialogue would bolster the argument significantly.

Finally, the notion of Black Swans reemphasizes the unpredictability of global events and the imperative for preparedness. The potential catastrophe of a collision between satellites serves as a stark reminder of the interconnectedness of technological advancement and the risks it entails.

In summary, the text is a compelling call to recognize the critical importance of international cooperation amidst complex geopolitical challenges, though it could enhance its persuasiveness by integrating more concrete strategies for achieving such cooperation in the face of uncertainty.

Monday, 29 December 2025

Looking ahead into 2026 with realism or just pessimism?

 2026: On Certain and Uncertain Challenges, and the Indispensable Need for International Cooperation

Victor Ângelo

The ancient Oracle of Delphi has now been replaced by Artificial Intelligence (AI) platforms. Even so, it is very risky to predict what the world will be like in the coming times. In the case of 2026, it is even more difficult for three fundamental reasons: firstly, we are in a period of marked geopolitical disorder, a legacy of 2025; secondly, the calendar foresees events of great importance, which may profoundly alter international realities; thirdly, the competition in the fields of AI, quantum technology, and high technology is accelerating rapidly, especially between the USA and China, without it being clear what the consequences of this dizzying rivalry might be. All this without considering the possible appearance of one or more Black Swans, as happened with Covid.

At the geopolitical level, I consider the most significant challenge to be the enormous current threat posed by the Russian Federation to democratic Europe. The criminal large-scale invasion of Ukraine is about to enter its fifth year, and Vladimir Putin does not seem willing to put an end to the violence. Ukraine has managed to resist, in a surprising and heroic manner, but above all from the end of winter onwards, it will need exceptional and continuous financial and military support to guarantee its legitimate defence. It should count on the help of European states—there will be little or nothing to expect from Trump’s America. European aid will be indispensable for the defence of Ukraine and of Europe itself. This aid, though inevitable, will worsen relations between the main European states and Russia, and could even lead to an armed attack, by decision of the Kremlin. We have not been this close to such a situation before. Putin currently boasts that he believes he would emerge victorious from such a confrontation. In reality, he is cornered and, consequently, deluded that war will keep him in power.

Trump will be mainly obsessed, throughout the year, with the US midterm elections on 3 November. He will do everything to retain the majority in Congress. If necessary, he will create incredible confusion on the domestic scene and conflicts on the international chessboard, notably in Venezuela and Greenland, so as to appear, to the more credulous American electorate, as the guarantor of his country’s stability and greatness. It would not be a surprise if this were to happen. Like all other autocrats throughout history, Trump believes that confusion and chaos will play in his favour.

European democracies cannot rely on Trump. He and Putin, each in their own way, are two enormous risks for international law and global order. For the first time, in 2026, two nuclear powers will be led by exacerbated egocentrics, capable of destroying a large part of humanity if, in their view, it is considered vital for them to remain in power.

I must also mention Xi Jinping. His main political concern is to ensure internal prosperity in China, which is understandable given the size of the country’s population and the fact that his political survival depends both on the stick and the carrot, on an iron-fisted rule and on the rising standard of living felt by a significant part of the population. However, in a situation of international chaos, he may attempt to recover Taiwan. This possibility cannot be excluded in 2026.

In terms of AI, competition between states will focus on economic advances, military superiority, and the dominance of the ideological narrative that favours their interests. Whoever wins the race in these areas—the USA or China—will guarantee their supremacy as a global hyperpower.

Financial and scientific investments in AI will continue throughout the year to reach absolutely astronomical values. In the USA, priority will be given to the giant technology companies. The security and defence sectors will establish fabulous contracts with these companies. In China, the development of AI will remain under the absolute control of the state, to ensure the regime’s survival. But in both cases, the fundamental concerns will be related to strengthening national security and manipulating public opinion. Colossally expanded by quantum science, AI will increasingly become a powerful and unpredictable tool in the hands of those who hold power.

In 2026, a new Secretary-General of the UN will be elected. The Global South recognises the value of the United Nations and is increasingly insisting on the urgency of its reorganisation. The survival of the UN’s political role depends on its representativeness. The right of veto and the permanent seats on the Security Council are now considered by the majority of Member States as outdated and obsolete powers, but still very real. They are obviously incapable of reflecting today’s international relations and of enabling the resolution of the major problems that plague the international agenda.

The electoral process that will take place throughout the year until a new Secretary-General is elected will give more strength to the reform movement. It will also insist on the election of a woman. Until now, the post has always been held by men. This will be one of the major themes at the UN level. It is time to elect a woman. In parallel, there will be a whole campaign for the person elected to come from Latin America. According to the rules, that should be the region of origin of the new leader. It would also have another significance: it would show Trump that Latin America really matters, that it is not just the backyard of the USA.

The political dimension of the UN is now going through the deepest crisis in its history. I do not believe, however, that it will cease to exist. The personality of the new Secretary-General will, however, be decisive. It must be someone seen as a political giant and with a skilful and courageous diplomatic streak. In Latin America, we have several such women: the Chilean Michelle Bachelet, the Costa Rican Rebeca Grynspan, the Mexican Alicia Bárcena, the Prime Minister of Barbados, Mia Mottley, and several others. These are personalities who have shown extraordinary political firmness.

Still on the UN, Portugal is seeking a non-permanent seat on the Security Council for the 2027–2028 biennium. It is competing with Germany and Austria, that is, three candidates for two available seats. If it manages to be elected—the decision will be made in June and, in my analysis, the Portuguese candidacy has a strong chance of succeeding—it will be the fourth time that Portugal has had a seat on the Security Council.

In the period of great uncertainties that will be 2026, we cannot fail to speculate about possible Black Swans. In international affairs, a Black Swan is a rare, unpredictable event, but when it happens, it turns out to have generated catastrophic consequences. Six years ago, it was Covid. In 2026, a terrible catastrophe could perhaps be a high-speed collision between two satellites, among the thousands currently in orbit, a number that keeps growing. This would cause an indescribable pulverisation of fragments, which would destroy other satellites and multiply astronomically the pieces of metal in uncontrolled orbit. The impact would be simply devastating for the various global satellite navigation systems, for space internet, meteorological, logistics, and military surveillance networks.

Other Black Swans are equally possible due to technological advances, but also because of their risks and unbridled competition.

Cooperation is the most effective response when any colossal challenge occurs. And with or without Black Swans, the greatest challenges are already here. The future choice is now dramatically clear: either there is cooperation, or we accelerate the destruction of a large part of our planet.

Friday, 19 December 2025

Reflecting about 2025

Year-End Notes

Victor Ângelo

If I were asked to summarise 2025 in a single word, I would say “turbulence”. This has been a year of great unrest, and I do not know who should be awarded the top spot on the podium of dishonour: Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, Benjamin Netanyahu, or the rebel Sudanese general Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti. Other names could be added to the list, including terrorist leaders, but it is not worth discussing minor players or making the list excessively long.

The year draws to a close leaving leading geopolitical analysts deeply uneasy. Not for decades has the word war been so prevalent in the speeches of influential people. Now the word appears repeatedly, as if it were an inevitability on the near horizon. It is a disturbing way to end the year. When the conversation about war monopolises the media space and public debate, it makes us forget the role of diplomacy and international organisations, opening the door to disinformation, alienation, and hatred. Thus, war criminals—people who should be driven from power and brought to The Hague—are given a platform and credibility.

After all, what has been learned in 2025? In short, that peace, cooperation, and stability based on respect for international law are not—contrary to the illusion created since the end of the Cold War—the pillars of modern times. They ought to be the foundations of globalisation, but globalisation is not apolitical. On one side of the coin, it is positive. On the other, it creates dependencies, vulnerabilities, and brings back the discretionary use of force. Despite everything, it is fundamental to insist on the positive dimension of globalisation and to condemn without hesitation those who do not respect international norms and refuse to recognise that the future of humanity will only be prosperous if there is solidarity between peoples and peace between States. Believing that a peace agreement can be reached with people like Putin, for example, only enters the minds of ambiguous and incomprehensible actors like Steve Witkoff or well-known fifth columnists like Viktor Orbán.

Putin is a tyrant and, like all other totalitarian leaders, does not recognise the value of diplomacy or deliberation. This week, in an exchange of correspondence with a member of his circle, the gentleman tried to convince me that Putin personifies the sentiment and historical soul of the Russian people. Just as Trump is said to be the personification of the will of the majority of American citizens. I had to remind him of something he already knew: that I have met multiple dictators throughout my professional life. The last thing I would say about such people is that they represent the people to whom they belong. The inflation of their outsized egos is their primary motivation. In truth, they represent only themselves, their boundless ambition, and the opportunists who cling to them. It is all a matter of terrible leadership taken to the extreme. They do not accept peace agreements, let alone the spectre of defeat. The subjugation of those they label as enemies is the only solution they consider in their delusion. A dictator oppresses, creates a false narrative, and a system of absolute control over power. Anyone who thinks they can trust a despot is, quite simply, naive.

This must be one of the lessons of the year. Unfortunately, there are leaders who seem not to have learned it. They claim to be convinced—and want to force others to accept—that it is possible to reach an agreement with a Putin acting in good faith.

He will never agree to sign security guarantees that are actually sufficient to ensure the survival of Ukraine. He has already stated this clearly: any stabilisation force, should one ever be established, must not and cannot include European troops. At best, Putin would accept a force composed of soldiers from underdeveloped countries or, failing that, detachments from vassal regimes or those close to the Kremlin’s policies. Such a stabilisation mission would be merely symbolic, like trying to stop the wind with your hand palms. To have legitimacy and effectiveness, it should result from a genuine and sincere commitment between Ukraine and Russia, and stem from a mandate approved by the UN Security Council. None of this has any possibility of happening in the near future. France and the United Kingdom would veto any resolution that did not offer sufficient guarantees. And Ukraine could not approve a setup essentially engineered in the Kremlin.

Whether one likes it or not, the year now ending must remind us of two other dimensions: that the drawing of borders must not depend on the force of arms, and that whoever initiates aggression against another State must be held indisputably accountable for the crimes committed and the damage caused.

It is essential to remember this at a time when there is discussion in Brussels about what to do with the Russian sovereign funds already frozen in Belgium. These funds must remain withheld until the end of the conflict and until Russia’s just assumption of responsibility for what it has destroyed and for those it has injured and killed in Ukraine. Only then, during peace negotiations, should the fate of these funds be decided. They could be used, including accumulated interest, for war reparations, which would be the most appropriate conclusion. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s allied States should issue common debt intended to finance Ukrainian public spending, in the form of loans guaranteed by the frozen Russian assets, and tighten the sanctions regime against Russia and its international partners. This is, however, a temporary solution. Should the Kremlin continue to insist on prolonging the aggression, the matter must be reviewed. The non-use of Russian assets directly, for now, should be presented as a gesture in favour of peace. But one with an expiry date.



Friday, 12 December 2025

A brief comment about the new US National Security Strategy and the shared interests with Europe

 An Incomplete Reading of the New US Security Strategy

Victor Ângelo

The elites currently in control of federal power in Washington have a mistaken view of Europe. The document they have just published on the National Security Strategy (NSS) criticises most European leaders in an unacceptable and unfounded manner. Furthermore, it ignores the fact that a strong and united Europe is, among other things, a fundamental commercial and financial partner for the wellbeing and stability of both sides.

From a commercial perspective, trade with Europe in goods and services far exceeds any other bilateral relationship the US has. It focuses on technologically advanced products and sectors, which are vital for both economies and have a huge impact on their respective employment rates. Moreover, cross-investments between the two sides, made by European companies in American subsidiaries and vice versa, known as Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), contribute to a deep transatlantic economic integration. European companies are increasingly investing in various sectors of the American economy, with European figures accounting for almost half of all foreign investment in the United States. Imagine what would happen if part of that amount were diverted by Europe to other economies. In principle, I do not foresee this happening, despite the profoundly distorted, even absurd, assessment that the new strategy makes of European policy and Washington’s adoption of a whole series of other obstacles.

From a financial perspective, a significant portion of US federal debt is financed by capital markets in the EU and the United Kingdom. The American administration lives beyond its means, like many others. It constantly issues notes and government bonds to keep civil and military institutions running. The major difference compared to other states is that US debt securities are mostly acquired by foreign central banks and investment funds. They are considered an essential part of the sovereign reserves of the vast majority of states.

Japan, first and by a clear margin, and China, afterwards, are, as individual countries, the main holders of US Treasury bonds. China is closely followed by the United Kingdom. But the British portfolio, added to that of the EU, far exceeds the sum of the holdings of Japan and China.

Now imagine that the EU, by decision of the European Central Bank, naturally backed by the central banks of the eurozone, slightly reduced the purchase of new US securities and simultaneously placed a small portion of those it currently holds on the market, in order to diversify its currency reserves and strengthen the euro’s position as a global reference currency. The EU could buy more Swiss francs, British pounds, Australian dollars, currencies from Gulf countries, and Japanese yen. Such an initiative, carried out quite gradually, could not be presented as an act of hostility. It would be announced as a prudent measure to diversify risk and an essential step towards European financial autonomy. Nor should it be mentioned as a reaction to what was written in the NSS, but simply as a decision to adapt European reserves to new geopolitical realities. And also, as a process to increase the euro’s relevance on the international stage. The euro is the world’s second most important reserve currency, but its role falls short of the Union’s economic weight.

All this should be considered in light of the assertion of European interests, following the expression that is now part of everyday political life in the US: America first. By following that philosophy in Europe, each partner would look after its own advantages, but always within a complementary political framework. Europe must continue to see the US as an ally, even when it insists on the need to rethink its strategic autonomy and defend its system of values.

Regardless of what was written in the NSS, frequent conversations with President Donald Trump should be regarded as essential. I do not know whether Trump has read the new document produced by his collaborators or others. In any case, his policy is very much his own, entirely personal.

What was written above about the complementarity between American and European interests should be repeated as often as possible to the leader of the White House. The real enemy of both, especially in Europe, the North Atlantic, and the Arctic, is the regime of Vladimir Putin. That is the message, regardless of the opinion one may have of Trump. If Putin were to destroy or seize Ukraine, he would soon move on to the next phase, the devastation of other European states. Trump needs to understand that, if that were to happen, the negative impact on his own country would be enormous. The history of this brand-new era began with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It cannot end with the suffocation of our values or the rupture of the alliance between Europe and the US.

Friday, 28 November 2025

Peace is about trust: Europe, USA and Russia, a question of balance

 The Future of Peace in Europe Depends on a Rebalancing of Power

Victor Ângelo

Despite the intense diplomatic activity in recent days, we remain far from peace in Ukraine. The plan devised by the Russians and signed by Donald Trump, giving the impression it was an initiative from the White House, collapsed after two or three days. The positions of Zelensky and the European allies rendered it void. They stated in unison, without ambiguity, that it was an unacceptable diktat, a kind of ultimatum from Moscow. It became clear that Trump’s envoy, property developer Steve Witkoff, knows as much about geopolitics as Cristiano Ronaldo or is a contender for the Guinness record as the most brazen Russian agent in recent US history.
Rarely, European firmness proved exemplary. Zelensky’s response was as expected, although the initial announcement of the Russo-American proposal was a heavy blow to the Ukrainian leader. Those who saw images of Zelensky at that moment could see he was deeply shocked. But he did not lose his composure, which was what the Kremlin intended. He responded diplomatically, and three days later there was already another plan, drawn up in Geneva, together with European delegations and Marco Rubio’s team. The latter scored points within Trump’s circle. Will he be able to maintain that influence? It will not be easy, but it is not impossible. For many in the MAGA movement, Rubio is a silent rival to Trump and, especially in the long term, to Vice President J.D. Vance.
It is evident that the American leadership group is becoming fractured. And not only because of differences in handling relations with Russia, but also for internal reasons: the Epstein case, the cost of living, the persecution of immigrants, favours granted to the most eccentric billionaires, etc. In the case of Russia, it is worth remembering that US military doctrine has, for decades, categorised that country as a grave threat to the United States. Thus, many senior US military officers look with great surprise at the relationship Trump has established with Putin. There is something fishy here. Many will think that this relationship has more to do with “ad hominem” blackmail from Moscow than with a new type of diplomacy.
Meanwhile, diplomacy related to the brutal aggression against Ukraine continued in Abu Dhabi. For now, we have a new project, more appropriate. It is fundamentally inspired by Ukrainian realism and has European support. It will certainly not be accepted by Vladimir Putin, but it puts him on the defensive against his American counterpart. Trump wants the war to end at any cost – in reality, it is not a war, but a barbaric aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine – as long as it adds an argument to his candidacy for the Nobel Peace Prize. That is the ambition, his ego above all else.
We are, however, in a risky phase for Ukraine’s sovereignty and for Europe’s security. Putin believes in two fundamental illusions: that he will shatter Ukraine and that he will manage to create a rift and distance the US from the defence of Europe. In other words, that US support for NATO is numbered. NATO will be, at best, in Putin’s view, a merely symbolic coalition, which will last only as long as Europeans have the financial means to buy American arms and other goods and services.
Peace is built on mutual trust. Without trust, at best, we will have a temporary pause in hostilities. The foundations of that trust regarding the Trump administration were seriously shaken by Washington’s endorsement of the incredible Russian plan. It is essential to rebuild trust between Europeans and Americans.
As for Putin’s Russia, there is no room for any kind of trust. Putin dreams of a vassal Europe, trapped within his sphere of geopolitical influence. He needs that influence out of czarist-inspired narcissism, for economic reasons, and for strategic motives: so he can claim membership in the club of great powers, alongside China and the US. For this reason, he wants to dismantle the Atlantic Alliance and implode the European Union.
Trust is based on shared values. In my view, the most important are those contained in the Charter of the United Nations.
The great powers do not currently respect the basic principles of the Charter: human dignity, human rights, tolerance, independence and sovereignty of each State, large or small, and solidarity among peoples. Democratic Europe, for its part, seeks to remain within this framework of values. Only a minority of movements and political parties here show contempt for these red lines. The majority recognise the importance of democracy and respect for international law. They therefore see Putin as a very serious threat. That is why they focus on defending our part of the continent, starting with the defence of Ukraine and the symmetry of forces, which is something different from peace, but serves peace. And they now understand that the relationship with Trump’s America is dangerously unstable. It must be urgently rebalanced.

Friday, 7 November 2025

Como irá responder o presidente Trump às suas derrotas? --Uma análise do meu texto de 7/11/2025

Texto publicado hoje no Diário de Notícias em Lisboa.


Para avaliar a qualidade do seu texto, que é a crónica de Victor Ângelo sobre a reação de Donald Trump às derrotas eleitorais, vou analisá-lo com base nos seguintes critérios: Estrutura e Coerência, Argumentação e Força da Tese, Estilo e Linguagem e Conteúdo e Informação.

1. Estrutura e Coerência (Excelente)

O texto apresenta uma estrutura clara e muito eficaz:

  • Introdução: Apresenta a tese central (Trump não aprenderá, mas sim intensificará o estilo autocrata, justificando a derrota e culpando inimigos) e estabelece a credibilidade do autor através da sua experiência com líderes absolutistas.

  • Desenvolvimento (As Lições): O autor articula as três razões principais para as derrotas que Trump devia notar: 1) Economia/Custo de Vida; 2) Pragmatismo e Moderação (cansaço do extremismo); 3) Crescente Oposição a Trump.

  • Desenvolvimento (A Reação de Trump): Passa da análise das causas para a previsão da reação, ligando-a ao seu padrão autocrático (criação de ficções, medo e ódio).

  • Exemplos e Projeção: Usa o caso de Zohran Mamdani como prova de que a estratégia de ódio falha. Projeta, de forma concreta, as táticas futuras de Trump (sabotagem da governação, mobilização da Guarda Nacional, política externa agressiva contra os fracos).

  • Conclusão: Retoma o tom de aviso e o desafio final à coragem dos americanos e europeus.

A progressão do argumento é lógica e coerente, ligando a teoria (ditadores) à prática (Trump) e às consequências (estratégia futura).

2. Argumentação e Força da Tese (Muito Forte)

A principal força do texto reside na sua tese arrojada e bem sustentada: a resposta de Trump será previsível, seguindo o manual dos autocratas.

  • Força Analítica: A separação das razões das derrotas em três pontos (Economia, Pragmatismo, Oposição) é incisiva e baseada em tendências eleitorais sólidas.

  • Ligação Causa/Efeito: A conexão entre as "lições" (que Trump ignora) e a sua "resposta autocrata" (que ele adota) cria um poderoso contraste argumentativo.

  • Uso de Exemplos: Os exemplos de Zohran Mamdani e Sadiq Khan reforçam o argumento de que a diversidade e o pragmatismo democrático estão a vencer as táticas de polarização.

3. Estilo e Linguagem (Muito Bom)

A linguagem utilizada é culta, clara e assertiva.

  • Vocabulário: Rico e preciso (e.g., "absolutistas", "bodes expiatórios", "diabolizados", "boçais").

  • Tom: O tom é crítico e de alerta, mas mantém uma objetividade jornalística/analítica. A expressão "arriscar a coragem política suicida" é particularmente forte e bem empregada.

  • Ritmo: O texto flui bem, com frases que, embora complexas, são pontuadas de forma a manter o leitor envolvido.

4. Conteúdo e Informação (Relevante e Enriquecedor)

O texto não se limita a relatar factos, mas insere-os num contexto geopolítico e histórico mais vasto.

  • Informação Específica: Refere dados concretos (sondagem CNN/SSRS, custo de vida em NY) e exemplos eleitorais específicos (Mamdani, Khan, eleições em NJ e VA).

  • Enquadramento Histórico/Político: O enquadramento de Trump no arquétipo do líder autoritário é o que confere maior profundidade ao texto.


Resumo da Avaliação

CritérioAvaliaçãoNotas de Qualidade
EstruturaExcelenteIntrodução, desenvolvimento e conclusão bem definidos e lógicos.
ArgumentaçãoMuito ForteTese clara (Trump segue o manual autocrático), sustentada por lições eleitorais e previsões táticas.
Estilo/LinguagemMuito BomLinguagem assertiva, vocabulário culto, tom de análise/alerta.
ConteúdoForteInsere eventos específicos (eleições) numa análise política e histórica de longo alcance (autocratismo).

Em conclusão, o texto é de elevada qualidade. É uma peça de análise política sofisticada, bem escrita, bem estruturada e com uma tese central muito poderosa.