The Straits and the competition between USA and China

 

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Hormuz, Malacca, and the Straits of Power

By Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published: 30 April 2026

There are places on maps that, in times of peace, seem like mere details—curiosities. Yet, when rivalry between great powers intensifies, these details become strategic. The Straits of Malacca and Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb (the Red Sea), and the Indian Ocean routes are now at the heart of global politics: it is through these passages that the economy flows—and it is there that Washington and Beijing test the limits of their competition.

American foreign policy has revealed an emerging pattern: an increasing focus on so-called ‘choke points’—the maritime passages through which energy, commodities, and influence circulate. Control over these points projects both force and deterrence. Consider Hormuz. The figures speak for themselves: the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that, by 2025, over 20 million barrels per day will have transited the strait—approximately a quarter of the world’s maritime oil trade.

For the United States, a robust presence in these corridors is not merely about maritime security; it is also a means of protecting its vital interests in the event of a severe crisis.

This is why the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ remains a strategic obsession for Beijing. China depends heavily on maritime routes that traverse this narrow, congested corridor, which is difficult to replace without colossal costs—precisely the type of vulnerability any state seeks to reduce when anticipating a prolonged period of competition.

The Strait of Malacca, though exceedingly long, is only a few kilometres wide at its narrowest point. From an energy perspective, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) classifies Malacca as a vital choke point: in the first half of 2025, an estimated 23 million barrels of oil per day will have transited the strait. It is this volume—and the immense difficulty of diverting shipping to more expensive alternatives through more treacherous seas south of Indonesia (the Sunda and Lombok waters)—that makes Malacca a national security priority for China and several Asian states.

And it is not merely energy. It is also the container ships, carrying every conceivable type of cargo, and the infrastructure of telecommunications. The Strait of Malacca is a critical corridor for digital connectivity, possessing a high density of subsea cables that link Asia to a significant portion of the globe.

In this context, the agreements and joint exercises between the United States and Indonesia gain a special significance. For Washington, Indonesia is crucial because it sits at the hinge between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, and its territory defines one side of the strait. For Jakarta, cooperation with the US is useful: it bolsters capabilities, signals autonomy, and helps manage frictions with China—including recurring incidents in border waters—without abandoning its tradition of non-alignment.

The Chinese response to all of this has been simultaneously maritime and continental.

The growth of the Chinese Navy—now the world’s largest by number of vessels—follows a simple logic: if trade is conducted primarily by sea, then national security must also be sea-based. Hence the investment in the naval sector, in the capacity to operate further from its shores, and in port partnerships that, even when presented as commercial, may have military utility in crisis scenarios.

The ‘New Silk Road’ reinforces this strategy: it multiplies connections with the outside world. Projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, logistical links through Myanmar, and the pursuit of navigation through the Arctic in coordination with Russia seek to create exits that circumvent Malacca and reduce exposure to the control of rival powers. Furthermore, on the technological level, Chinese dominance in critical segments of certain value chains—for example, in the processing and refining of rare earths, where it remains globally dominant—functions as an instrument of leverage to prevent extreme situations and the risk of shocks.

The result is a rivalry that leaves less and less room for naivety—and which turns the straits into the strongholds of the geopolitical chessboard.

There is, however, a global legal framework worth recalling: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the principle of freedom of navigation. This framework regulates transit through straits used for international navigation and limits arbitrary interference. Rules do not eliminate rivalry, but they increase the political, economic, and reputational costs when restrictions lack acceptable justification.

Summit diplomacy, however theatrical it may seem, matters. The White House has signalled that Donald Trump is slated to visit Beijing in mid-May to meet with Xi Jinping. The meeting will not change geography, but it may help clarify ‘red lines’ and reduce the risk of misunderstandings in an environment where the temptation to ‘test’ the other to the limit is constant. Trump’s trip serves as a test: not of the end of competition, but of the will to define its boundaries. In an interdependent world, the stability of routes is a common interest—even when the rivalry is structural.

If Washington and Beijing transform the straits—and commercial interdependencies—into instruments of permanent pressure, international relations will enter a far more dangerous phase: that of generalised insecurity. In such a scenario, the concern with deterrence becomes a daily occurrence. A miscalculation will, inevitably, be more likely and certainly catastrophic.

Donald Trump: what is next concerning war and peace in Iran?

 

Iran: Trump’s "Peace Plan" as a Prelude to War

By Victor Ângelo

In my reading, President Donald Trump’s current momentum is fueled by three core ambitions: to make himself and his close associates as wealthy as possible; to exercise and maintain absolute power urbi et orbi; and to secure a definitive place in history. The aggression against Iran, like his other maneuvers, is designed with these goals in sight. However, from Trump’s perspective, this must be resolved without delay to allow for a pivot toward Cuba—we know what that implies—before the U.S. midterm elections in November. For this reason, he presented a 15-point peace proposal this week. Should Iran capitulate and accept it in its entirety, Washington could contentedly close this chapter and move immediately to the Cuban question.

However, the Trump plan appears to lack both a future and the necessary equilibrium. According to the most credible public information sources, Tehran views this 15-point list as a set of unacceptable demands. They amount to an indisputable surrender, leaving no room for negotiation or an honorable exit. By demanding the near-total denuclearization of its enemy, an end to support for allied regional groups, limits on the production and range of its offensive and defensive missiles, and the delivery of all highly enriched uranium to the UN’s specialized nuclear agency (IAEA), the U.S. aims purely to satisfy Israeli objectives and reduce Iran’s strategic defense capabilities and external alliances to zero.

These are existential matters for the regime. Notably, Trump’s proposal does not touch upon the nature of the regime itself, which would presumably continue its brutal violation of the human rights of its citizens. Democracy and freedom are, once again, absent from Trump’s list of priorities.

The only mechanism of compensation for Washington’s demands would be the lifting of sanctions and their related automatic triggers. Yet, this would not be a full concession. Technological embargos, directly or indirectly related to military dimensions, would persist. Such blockades would only deepen the fragility of Iran’s defenses, not just against Israel, but also in the face of Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The U.S. will not abandon the region. On the contrary, they are expected to soon have, at least, roughly 60,000 elite troops stationed in the bases and on the ships surrounding Iran. History teaches us—as I had the opportunity to learn across various theaters of crisis—that sanctions cause pain and hardship, but they are endurable, especially in a country as vast as Iran with heavyweight friends in the international community. In contrast, large-scale disarmament offers no security guarantees. To accept disarmament would be, in Iran's case, a potentially fatal error. Furthermore, demanding total submission without offering an honorable way out to the weaker party—Iran—ignores the reality of statecraft and opens the door to reinforced alliances with the enemies of the West. It is, for instance, a gift offered to the superpowers controlling the BRICS.

The so-called peace plan is equally unappealing to Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. He wants more. The Israeli Prime Minister seeks a different type of political leadership in Tehran, one ready to accept de facto Israeli prominence in the Middle East. Above all, he wants certainty that nuclear infrastructures have been physically destroyed, that the missile program has been reduced to the scale of a rifle factory, and that Iranian support for hostile armed groups in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine is entirely annihilated.

Trump’s proposal provides no role for the UN Security Council. In other words, to end a war started outside the law, this peace plan remains outside the framework and practice of International Law. The demand that the estimated 450 kilograms of enriched uranium held by Iran be placed under IAEA custody is a decoy. It requires a logistical capacity and a legal mandate that the UN Agency does not currently possess. The Agency is a technical institution for verification and reporting; it must not hold a political function, as politics is the exclusive competence of the Security Council.

From Tehran’s perspective, this plan cannot be approved. They have already made this clear. 

Niccolò Machiavelli reminds us, five centuries on, that a lopsided peace plan not based on mutual concessions can rapidly transform into a new source of war. This is what the UN Secretary-General implied this week, emphasizing with grave concern that the war in the Middle East is spinning out of control. Simultaneously, he appointed my former colleague Jean Arnault as his Personal Representative to build bridges between the conflicting parties. I would have done this much sooner, following the June 22, 2025, bombings of Iranian nuclear plants. However, I would not have appointed a Frenchman or any other Westerner, despite my great esteem for Arnault. The West is seen as an echo of Trump and Netanyahu. It is seen as partial.

Looking ahead, I unfortunately foresee a worsening of the crisis: a sharp military escalation. A resumption of air and naval strikes against Iran, ground incursions by American special forces, and a volatile situation in the countries bordering the Persian Gulf and Lebanon—not to mention the highly negative impact on the global economy. This is to say nothing of the strengthened hand given to Russia to continue its bombardment of Ukraine. 

In listing the indicators of a possible military escalation, I view April with deep concern. We have no more than three or four weeks to find a true alternative for peace.

The international crises

World War III? No, a Crisis of Impunity

Victor Ângelo

It is an exaggeration to claim that the Third World War has already begun. It is evident that the combined attack by the US and Israel against Iran has profoundly aggravated an already complicated international landscape. This occurred following other very serious violations of the UN Charter, namely the genocide in Gaza, the violence against Palestinians in the West Bank and the populations of Southern Lebanon, and, closer to home, the massive and illegal invasion of Ukraine by a superpower holding a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

However, the sum of all these conflicts does not mean the world is on the brink of a global war. What is happening in the Middle East does not share the same nature or direct links as the situation in Ukraine. The crises in Sudan or Myanmar also arise from distinct contexts.

The common thread between these different conflicts is the use of force to resolve political issues—in other words, the practice of illegality in the face of International Law. In the specific case of the bombing of Iran, for example, the Israeli-American decision is indisputably illegal, as noted by European political leaders and others, as well as by the majority of experts in International Law. Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu have ignited a situation of enormous tension in the Middle East, with a very grave and multidimensional impact.

This decision, which ignores the prohibition on the use of force without Security Council authorisation, has also generated significant humanitarian consequences for a large portion of the region's population, particularly in Iran and Lebanon, but also in Israel, the State of Palestine, and almost all Gulf countries. Yet, the drama created by Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu cannot be viewed as a global confrontation. It is a complex but circumscribed conflict. It does not directly concern the defence of Europe. It may, indirectly, jeopardise the stability and security of our continent. It does not, however, resolve the problems of the Middle East.

I repeat that the real problem lies in the lack of respect for international norms. Certain governments are convinced that, at this moment in history, what matters are missiles and other weapons. These are people who deliberately associate "might" with "right". They systematically confuse military strength with political legitimacy. Leaders of this type, in extreme cases, should be taken to the International Criminal Court in The Hague—where some already have a cell reserved—to answer for their actions.

For now, it is vital to emphasise that the present and the future demand a climate of peace, justice, equality, and sustainability. The multilateral system, developed over decades, exists for this purpose. The responsibility of States consists fundamentally in the improvement, expansion, and consolidation of this system. The leader who could aspire to the Nobel Peace Prize would be the one who succeeds in revitalising, modernising, and enforcing respect for the multilateral system.

At the heart of the system is the United Nations Security Council. As I have mentioned in previous texts, Portugal is a candidate for one of the two seats reserved for Western Europe in 2027-2028. Portugal is running alongside Germany and Austria. A television channel asked me this week if our country has any chance in this competition or if it will be the country left out. My answer could only be positive. We have a diplomatic machine that works and an international posture that goes far beyond our membership of the EU. Our power of influence within the EU serves, among other functions, to remind other Union Member States that the EU must be seen by the community of nations as a defender of the values and rules of international diplomacy.

Jean Monnet, one of the founders of the EU, always insisted on supranationalism as a means of guaranteeing peace between States. Following his thought, a divided world would be a world on the path to self-destruction. Our campaign for the Security Council must keep this guiding principle in mind and fight for complementarity between the various regions of the globe.

The Council is now deeply divided. Portugal must insist on a Security Council that seeks to establish consensus. To do this, it must prepare a list of priority issues, starting with the most consensual, and build alliances around them. This list must include strengthening interventions in the areas of Human Rights, development, the environment, and climate, as well as those related to peace missions.

In the latter case, it is important to keep three dimensions in mind:

1. The success of a peace mission has a huge impact on the UN's reputation;

2. Missions must aim to uphold a peace agreement between parties and not act as a mere "screen" hiding imbalances and preferences;

3. Mission mandates must be clear and sharply focused on the essentials, avoiding the trend of the last two decades to include a multitude of objectives, which end up turning missions into a kind of "Christmas Tree", covered in lights. Brilliant to look at, but impossible to achieve results.

Certain issues are especially difficult but cannot be ignored: it is necessary to review the Right of Veto and increase the number of seats on the Security Council to make it more representative of the 193 States that make up the United Nations. These two matters are exceptionally difficult to achieve. They will always meet opposition from those who currently hold the veto power. However, they cannot be ignored by the Portuguese campaign. We must have the courage to seize the moment and place them as central themes of our vision.

No to realpolitik, yes to principles and the International Law

 

Geopolitical Realism: When Might Prevails Over International Law

By Victor Ângelo

I regret having to repeat myself, but criticising the theory of geopolitical realism (realpolitik) does not constitute an exercise in naive idealism. On the contrary, it is a matter of recalling three fundamental dimensions of the relations between States. First, that peace must be the foundational principle of the international order. Second, that the United Nations Charter — even if it lacks updating regarding representation and the functioning of the Security Council — must be scrupulously respected. Third, that the power of military force cannot, and must not, prevail over the force of International Law. The world is not a boxing ring, nor a gladiatorial arena, where the strongest invariably wins.

The central error of so-called "political realism" lies in reducing the State to the role of the sole actor, ignoring democratic practices. Institutions, citizens' associations, economic agents, the media, and intellectuals are devalued or instrumentalised as mere pawns of power. Oppositions are diminished in their rights, despite being normal alternatives in a democracy. In reality, this alleged realism, which is nothing more than a form of political reductionism, opens the doors to absolute and arbitrary power, even in apparently consolidated democracies.

When leaders view the world solely through the lever of force and military aggression, they live anchored in other times; their mental roots are buried in the past. They place themselves outside the law and call it pragmatism. They ignore — or pretend to ignore — that there is a "before" and an "after" 1945, and that the world has changed radically since the end of the Cold War. When they speak of "negotiations", they are actually referring to the submission of the weak to the will of the strong. In the 19th century, such a practice was termed an "ultimatum". Today, it is presented under the cloak of a dense "geopolitical fog". This lack of visibility allows for a game played without clear rules. Diplomacy is captured to buy time, sow confusion — both among adversaries and domestic public opinion — and prepare, in the shadows, the logistics of war. Can we trust such leaders, today or tomorrow?

The war against Iran reminds us that it is imperative and urgent to insist on international ethics and human rights. When brute force becomes the primary criterion, no one is truly safe — not even the most powerful. If human rights are despised, fear becomes the only acceptable truth and the dominant social rule. George Orwell's "Newspeak" is, disturbingly, beginning to be imposed as a linguistic norm when, in certain European capitals, people speak of unusual characters now appearing at the front of the stage.

What is happening today in the Middle East underscores a constant reality: during and at the end of bad decisions and despotism, there is always a vast number of human beings paying the bill. This reality leads me to contend that the only sovereignty that truly counts is that which is based on the protection of life and human dignity. Everything else belongs to the tragic comedy of power, to absurd megalomaniacal ambitions, and to indifference towards people and the world itself. Are we witnessing the definitive decline of humanist concerns?

It is urgent to bring this theme to the table of the Security Council. Portuguese diplomacy, committed to obtaining a seat on the Council for the 2027-2028 biennium, must adopt this vision as its own banner: the banner of peace, dialogue, and tolerance, with humanity above all else. By doing so, Portugal will align itself with the majority of Member States and with the very essence of the UN. We will not be mere passive spectators of the current nihilism and unilateralism, but an active voice capable of proclaiming that great challenges demand collective and multilateral responses.

Our participation in NATO has an objective of peace and does not prevent the building of bridges with regional organisations in Latin America, Africa, or Asia. At a time when some powers are distancing themselves from the UN, or seeking to subordinate and capture it, Portuguese diplomacy can serve as another pillar — in coordination with other States — in building consensus, defending International Law, and supporting institutions of common interest. For example, the international courts based in The Hague and the bodies of the United Nations system, which are vital for billions of people and for the planet.

In June, the General Assembly will vote on the composition of the Council for the next two years. The Portuguese campaign takes place in a demanding and quite delicate context. Our greatest asset must be the intransigent promotion of peace through the reinforcement of the political role of the UN. This is the message that the world wants — and most needs — to hear with clarity.

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Contextual Post-Script (March 6, 2026)

As I review this translation, the events of this week add a sharp layer of irony to the text's call for "institutional ethics" and its critique of "transactional realism":

• The Merz-Trump Dialogue: Just three days ago, on March 3rd, Chancellor Friedrich Merz met with President Trump at the White House. While Trump pushed his "energy dominance" agenda, Merz was forced to navigate the exact "geopolitical fog" you describe. He specifically cited the war in Iran as a disaster for energy prices, urging a swift conclusion to protect German industry.

• The Rosneft "Carve-out": In a classic example of the "transactionalism" you critique, the US Treasury just yesterday (March 5th) lifted sanctions on Rosneft Deutschland. This was the result of intense lobbying by Merz to ensure Germany could continue refining oil through its state-controlled (but Russian-owned) assets. It confirms your fear: the "ideals" of sanctions are being traded for the "pragmatism" of industrial survival.

• The "Empty Shell" Reality: While the UN General Assembly watches from the sidelines, the "Coalition of the Willing" (led by Merz, Macron, and Starmer) met virtually this week to discuss troop deployments to Ukraine if Trump's peace deal fails. The "rescue mission" you envisioned is being led by heads of state, while the UN remains the "passive spectator" you warned against.