The Space Geopolitics

Superpowers, creative billionaires, and the dispute over outer space

Victor Ângelo 

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General Published: 5 Jun 2026

Outer space is already a paramount issue in the competition between great powers. Consequently, the deserts of northwestern China, in Xinjiang and Gobi, attract very special attention. Satellite imagery reveals vast military complexes and an extensive network of many dozens, even hundreds, of rocket launch pads, bunkers, and enormous, heavily fortified structures. Built near nuclear silos—which house China’s longest-range intercontinental missiles—this infrastructure aims to guarantee an immediate retaliatory capacity should the country suffer a first strike.

This terrestrial fortress is only half the story. The bunkers excavated in the sand are intimately linked to Chinese surveillance satellites, together forming an integrated ground and space defence system. The assets concentrated in the desert depend directly on their orbital counterparts: the Huoyan-1 early-warning satellites. These "eyes of fire", capable of detecting the infrared signature of enemy missiles immediately after their launch, open a critical three-to-four-minute window, allowing the Chinese chain of command to order the firing of weapons stored in the silos before they can be destroyed.

We are in a different world from the old space race. In the late 1950s and the subsequent decade, the focus was on the national prestige and political image of the US and the USSR. The marathon of space competition has changed. Today, it is a high-speed and high-risk race.

Space is one of the great strategic priorities of the present. Much of what resides in low Earth orbit governs our daily lives: global logistics, financial synchronization, communications, disaster response, and encrypted military operations. The country that masters the technical standards, extracts the first cosmic resources, and controls the orbital infrastructure will obtain an ambivalent power over the global economy and planetary defence, capable of serving human progress as much as military hegemony and a global disaster.

The current space arena is thus a vital geopolitical dispute, marked by four distinct political approaches. Each power runs its own race.

European priorities are concentrated on the development of space infrastructure essential to ensure strategic communications, on the Galileo (GPS navigation) and Copernicus (continuous Earth observation) projects, on the tracking of orbital debris (see the reference to Kessler below), and on research regarding robotic launches. The scarcity of venture capital and fragmentation—every country for itself—are the political issues that need to be resolved.

The United States has consolidated its reliance on public-private partnerships in the aerospace sector. Through the Artemis Accords, Washington seeks to promote international norms that favour free enterprise to maintain its supremacy, leveraging the agility and efficiency of the private sector. Artemis aims to establish a sustained human and robotic presence on the Moon, testing new technologies for the extraction of water and minerals.

China views space through a deeply integrated civil-military lens. For Beijing, it is a strategic domain subject to state control. The Chinese vision constitutes an explicit challenge to US primacy. In this context, China prioritizes the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), seeking to secure a sovereign infrastructure independent of Western systems. The exploration of the lunar South Pole has become a central objective.

Russia was once a pioneering actor. Today, despite financial constraints and sanctions that limit access to technological components, the space sector continues to be treated as a priority. It retains a highly secretive character. However, it is known to invest primarily in the research and testing of destructive anti-satellite weapons, space-based intelligence, and hypersonic weaponry. This option holds considerable strategic value, both defensive and offensive.

The explosion of space business, operating on an unprecedented financial scale, is another characteristic of our era. The current US dominance is largely driven by private giants such as Jeff Bezos's Blue Origin and, most notably, Elon Musk's SpaceX. By pioneering reusable rockets, SpaceX has drastically reduced launch costs. With a capitalization that already rivals the GDP of major states, the company has rewritten the rules of orbital geopolitics.

These private companies have ceased to be mere service providers. Today, they are central geopolitical actors, wielding enormous economic weight and playing a decisive role in American defence. But, with high economic value comes severe strategic vulnerability. In any potential conflict, the temptation to blind an adversary by destroying their early-warning and communications satellites could be limitless.

An attack of this kind—or even an accidental collision between satellites in orbit—would have devastating systemic effects. There is a risk of triggering the so-called Kessler syndrome: a catastrophic chain reaction in which orbital debris collides with other satellites, generating exponentially more fragments. This would rapidly create a global crisis, with Earth's orbit saturated by high-speed debris directly impacting multiple essential systems. It would not only affect military deterrence: it could compromise the terrestrial economy and provoke a civilizational regression of incalculable consequences.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty is no longer fit for an era marked by thousands of objects in orbit—a continuously growing number—and by the development of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. The Second Space Race, which is currently underway, demands cooperation and far stricter rules—a new treaty. Space cannot be viewed merely as a competition or an extraordinary business opportunity. It is our collective survival that is at stake.

Trump goes to Xi Jinping 's empire: what for?

 Trump's visit to China

(Published in Portuguese in Diário de Notícias - Lisbon - on 15 May 2026)

When the Air Force One touches down in Beijing, Donald Trump imagines that a brief two-day visit to China will be consecrated by the American electorate as a personal triumph. Yet, the reality that matters is entirely different. Beneath the handshakes and the protocol-driven photographs with Xi Jinping, a contemporary version of Thucydides’s Trap is taking shape: the clash between two superpowers—one established, attempting to preserve its hegemony (the US), and the other, emerging, in rapid ascension (China).

For Trump, the purpose of this summit is neither to redraw the security architecture of the twenty-first century nor to speak of peace, harmony, or global challenges—themes that rarely find a place on his agenda. What he seeks is a tactical spectacle. Brief and marketable as a victory, ahead of the midterm elections in November.

The American president seeks to return with results that are easy to communicate: signs of commercial detente (commitments to additional purchases in sectors relevant to the MAGA electorate) and, ideally, some Chinese gesture that reduces the risk of disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. Image management is an integral part of his strategy. The domestic media landscape in the United States has grown increasingly asymmetric: influential segments amplify partisan narratives, shaped by commercial incentives and the polarization surrounding Trump.

The problem with this transactional approach is that it exposes the true American weakness: an obsession with the short term erodes trust and alienates allies. Taipei watches, anxious, at the prospect of its security being converted into a bargaining chip. In Europe, the visit is interpreted as an indicator of volatility in Washington’s strategic orientation. This tends to reinforce debates regarding European defense autonomy, economic resilience, and technology policy.

On the other side of the table, Xi Jinping moves his chess pieces without haste and free from the constraints of electoral calendars. Beijing’s immediate interest is simple: to manage Trump’s unpredictability, to employ personal diplomacy to extract rhetorical concessions over Taiwan, and, above all, to buy time. The Chinese leadership operates on the assumption that the long-term trend—in industrial capacity, technology, semiconductors, Artificial Intelligence, and external influence—favours them, and therefore privileges strategies of attrition and the extension of the decision-making horizon.

At first glance, China appears armed with trumps that are difficult to counter. A centralized political system allows it to define priorities and mobilize resources across a multi-year horizon—as seen in the Five-Year Plans—thereby reducing coordination costs in strategic sectors. The alignment with Moscow, described by both leaderships as a partnership "without limits", grants Beijing additional leeway in matters of energy, diplomacy, trade routes, and security, though it exposes it to reputational risks and secondary sanctions. Internationally, China seeks to consolidate its influence and power among the countries of the Global South through the financing of infrastructure and logistics chains (the Belt and Road Initiative) and via expanding forums such as the BRICS.

Yet, this appearance of invincibility conceals vulnerabilities capable of altering the course of events. What Beijing projects to the outside world as "cohesion and stability" is, more often than not, an internal peace imposed by force and by an apparatus of surveillance and repression. China is far from a monolith: it is a mosaic of 1.41 billion people, 56 ethnic groups, hundreds of languages, and tens of millions of citizens belonging to minorities. In vital regions such as Xinjiang (with over 26 million inhabitants) and Tibet (around 3.6 million), forced assimilation replaces political autonomy—and tensions do not disappear; they accumulate.

The true threat to the regime dominated by the Communist Party may not come from the peripheries, but from the center: From the rising expectations of the Han majority in the megacities; From frustrated, highly educated youth struggling within an increasingly competitive society; And from the persistent asymmetry between hyper-technological coastal cities—such as Shanghai and Shenzhen—and the deeply traditional rural interior living on the brink of subsistence. 

In systems with mechanisms of accountability and mediation—a relatively free press, civic associations, room for public demonstrations, independent courts, and competitive elections—dissent tends to be channeled and absorbed through institutional avenues, reducing the probability of abrupt ruptures.

In an autocratic regime, where public expression is limited and the correction of policies depends chiefly upon those who lead the Party-State, errors can accumulate for longer and become more difficult to reverse. When economic, demographic, or legitimacy shocks converge, the management of social conflicts becomes more demanding, and the cost of maintaining stability rises.

In strategic terms, both China and the United States possess incentives for a minimum understanding to reduce potential conflicts: managing crises before they escalate, avoiding military incidents at sea and in the air, and stabilizing expectations within technological, digital, and commercial competition.

These are the themes that Trump and Xi ought to discuss—not as gestures of goodwill, but to construct an architecture of mutual restraint. Such an arrangement does not erase the rivalry. It is, however, the only way to prevent a miscalculation from ruining everything. Thucydides’s Trap could then pass definitively into history.

Some notes about the USA-Iran conflict and political praxis

 

USA-Iran: The Escalation, the Political Game, and the Possible Way Out

Victor Ângelo

International Security Adviser. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published on: 24 Apr 2026, 01:24

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Constantly promoted by television channels and other media outlets—including digital platforms—the political spectacle functions like a fast-acting drug: it stimulates and excites, but it does not nourish; it promises a cure, but it does not treat the disease. Then, once the adrenaline subsides, the nagging question returns: where are the results? In everyday life, what remains are the exorbitant costs of fuel, healthcare, housing, and everything else, coupled with a growing sense of insecurity.

Once the effect wears off, everything remains the same—or worse. Over time, the circus ends up turning the spectator against the political actors, who fail to produce results, and against the commentators, who change their predictions as often as they change their shirts. This is politics made for the camera: the essential thing is to remain visible, at the centre of the arena.

When results fail to materialise, the strategy usually shifts: either a flurry of reforms is announced (in a "make-believe" style), or polarisation is increased and an enemy is sought to shoulder all the blame. The spectacle can mobilise crowds; it can even win elections. But it is concrete results that sustain power and, for a time, guarantee social peace.

Alternatively, to remain in power, the sinister leader attempts to destroy—or at least weaken—the institutions that sustain democratic regimes. If he is a fascist, he seeks to capture them, subjugate them, and render them entirely obedient. If he is a populist, the objective is more elementary: to reduce the capacity for oversight and scrutiny, to eliminate the checks and balances. From that point on, he rules as he pleases.

Nero, an erratic emperor, obsessively cultivated popular adulation and a cult of personality. He projected himself as a divine figure—from Apollo to the Sun—and ruled almost always in confrontation with the Senate. Trump cannot go quite so far in a system with the separation of powers and a pluralistic press. However, he has attempted to push the boundaries: minimising the role of Congress, pressuring the judiciary, attacking Democratic governors, and attempting to condition the media and social platforms. And, when convenient, he returns to the old expedient of external military operations: projecting force, dominating the news cycle, and galvanising fringes of the electorate.

Lacking results that improve the daily lives of families, he attacks the foundations of democracy and exploits nationalism: the USA is presented as the number one power on the international stage. All this is done as the electoral calendar tightens: the mid-term elections of 3 November are approaching. On that day, control of the Senate and the House of Representatives, several governorships, and other positions will be at stake. In practice, it is Donald Trump’s own power that is on the ballot. And the signs, in general, are not in his favour. Hence the urgency to contain—and, ideally, end—the escalation with Iran before it takes on a life of its own.

How will this escalation evolve, and what is the possible way out—a way out that avoids a significant electoral setback? This, I believe, is the central question, at a time when the possibility of a second round of contacts between the parties in Islamabad is once again circulating.

The answer—an agreement in Islamabad, yes or no?—does not depend on a single variable. I would summarise it as follows: Hormuz, the nuclear issue, the future of Iranian domestic politics, and, finally, the Israeli factor (with the particular weight of Netanyahu’s unacceptable hardline stance). A minimally viable understanding would have to lower the temperature in the Strait, stabilise the nuclear dossier, and create de-escalation channels that function away from the cameras and the major headlines—and not merely in communiqués for international consumption.

It would be a massive error if the authorities in Tehran concluded that it is not worth sitting down again with an American delegation. The list of Washington’s demands is known—maximalist, at the very limit of what Tehran can accept without losing domestic authority—and the Iranian position on each of these conditions is also known. Nevertheless, it is plausible that a meeting, even without formal "negotiations", could prevent a return to large-scale hostilities and allow other actors to continue the diplomatic work already underway—from China to Turkey, not forgetting Pakistan (a close ally of Beijing)—as well as in various Asian and Gulf countries.

China and Pakistan appear to be pressuring Tehran to ensure that this new round of contacts—it is too early to call them "negotiations"—happens now or in the near future.

Both sides would have something to gain from a limited agreement. For Washington, the advantage is obvious: halting an escalatory dynamic that, besides being dangerous on the ground, increases the risk of violations of International Humanitarian Law and further degrades its image in the region and Southeast Asia. And, let us be honest, the American image today is often viewed through two filters: the temptation of "muscle" and the automatic alignment with the Israeli leadership.

For Tehran, the calculation is equally clear: avoiding economic collapse and not falling into the trap of a war of reprisals against oil and natural gas installations—and against the ports of neighbouring Gulf states, where a single incident is enough to set everything ablaze.

This is a crisis that needs to be halted quickly. Under normal conditions, it would be a matter for the UN Security Council. We live, however, in a world where the great powers choose, à la carte, which precepts of International Law they take seriously.

Nevertheless, a combination of efforts of a new type—China, India, and the European Union, with a couple of countries from the South (Pakistan and Indonesia, for example)—could, in my view, make the difference where the UN is paralysed: maintaining permanent channels of contact, securing the acceptance of minimally verifiable ceasefire measures, and designing a pragmatic roadmap for Hormuz and the nuclear dossier. It is this type of diplomatic work that averts disasters. It is essential.

The international crises

World War III? No, a Crisis of Impunity

Victor Ângelo

It is an exaggeration to claim that the Third World War has already begun. It is evident that the combined attack by the US and Israel against Iran has profoundly aggravated an already complicated international landscape. This occurred following other very serious violations of the UN Charter, namely the genocide in Gaza, the violence against Palestinians in the West Bank and the populations of Southern Lebanon, and, closer to home, the massive and illegal invasion of Ukraine by a superpower holding a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

However, the sum of all these conflicts does not mean the world is on the brink of a global war. What is happening in the Middle East does not share the same nature or direct links as the situation in Ukraine. The crises in Sudan or Myanmar also arise from distinct contexts.

The common thread between these different conflicts is the use of force to resolve political issues—in other words, the practice of illegality in the face of International Law. In the specific case of the bombing of Iran, for example, the Israeli-American decision is indisputably illegal, as noted by European political leaders and others, as well as by the majority of experts in International Law. Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu have ignited a situation of enormous tension in the Middle East, with a very grave and multidimensional impact.

This decision, which ignores the prohibition on the use of force without Security Council authorisation, has also generated significant humanitarian consequences for a large portion of the region's population, particularly in Iran and Lebanon, but also in Israel, the State of Palestine, and almost all Gulf countries. Yet, the drama created by Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu cannot be viewed as a global confrontation. It is a complex but circumscribed conflict. It does not directly concern the defence of Europe. It may, indirectly, jeopardise the stability and security of our continent. It does not, however, resolve the problems of the Middle East.

I repeat that the real problem lies in the lack of respect for international norms. Certain governments are convinced that, at this moment in history, what matters are missiles and other weapons. These are people who deliberately associate "might" with "right". They systematically confuse military strength with political legitimacy. Leaders of this type, in extreme cases, should be taken to the International Criminal Court in The Hague—where some already have a cell reserved—to answer for their actions.

For now, it is vital to emphasise that the present and the future demand a climate of peace, justice, equality, and sustainability. The multilateral system, developed over decades, exists for this purpose. The responsibility of States consists fundamentally in the improvement, expansion, and consolidation of this system. The leader who could aspire to the Nobel Peace Prize would be the one who succeeds in revitalising, modernising, and enforcing respect for the multilateral system.

At the heart of the system is the United Nations Security Council. As I have mentioned in previous texts, Portugal is a candidate for one of the two seats reserved for Western Europe in 2027-2028. Portugal is running alongside Germany and Austria. A television channel asked me this week if our country has any chance in this competition or if it will be the country left out. My answer could only be positive. We have a diplomatic machine that works and an international posture that goes far beyond our membership of the EU. Our power of influence within the EU serves, among other functions, to remind other Union Member States that the EU must be seen by the community of nations as a defender of the values and rules of international diplomacy.

Jean Monnet, one of the founders of the EU, always insisted on supranationalism as a means of guaranteeing peace between States. Following his thought, a divided world would be a world on the path to self-destruction. Our campaign for the Security Council must keep this guiding principle in mind and fight for complementarity between the various regions of the globe.

The Council is now deeply divided. Portugal must insist on a Security Council that seeks to establish consensus. To do this, it must prepare a list of priority issues, starting with the most consensual, and build alliances around them. This list must include strengthening interventions in the areas of Human Rights, development, the environment, and climate, as well as those related to peace missions.

In the latter case, it is important to keep three dimensions in mind:

1. The success of a peace mission has a huge impact on the UN's reputation;

2. Missions must aim to uphold a peace agreement between parties and not act as a mere "screen" hiding imbalances and preferences;

3. Mission mandates must be clear and sharply focused on the essentials, avoiding the trend of the last two decades to include a multitude of objectives, which end up turning missions into a kind of "Christmas Tree", covered in lights. Brilliant to look at, but impossible to achieve results.

Certain issues are especially difficult but cannot be ignored: it is necessary to review the Right of Veto and increase the number of seats on the Security Council to make it more representative of the 193 States that make up the United Nations. These two matters are exceptionally difficult to achieve. They will always meet opposition from those who currently hold the veto power. However, they cannot be ignored by the Portuguese campaign. We must have the courage to seize the moment and place them as central themes of our vision.