Europe prepares, above all, for conventional warfare, yet the threats are not confined to armoured divisions crossing borders or bombardments of European capitals. Bomb threats, even false ones, disrupt daily life and destabilise commercial aviation, hospitals, schools, logistics hubs, and other essential services. Drones fly over critical infrastructure, submarine cables become targets, and sabotage attempts against strategic installations follow one after another. In isolation, each incident may appear merely tactical; such an analysis, however, risks obscuring the strategic dimension of the whole.
These episodes demand a collective reading: they may form part of a systematic campaign of destabilisation. In a conventional theatre of war, as is the case in Ukraine, the primary objective is the conquest of territory. In the hybrid operations targeting the rest of Europe, the aim may be altogether different: to weaken citizens’ trust in the democratic system and in the capacity of their leaders to ensure social stability.
For decades, Europe conceived of defence primarily in military terms, counting ships, aircraft, tanks, and troop numbers. Today, hostile states and their proxies recognise that disrupting societies can be cheaper and more effective than confronting their armies. Destabilisation can exert a profound political impact at virtually no cost to the adversary.
Russia has exploited this logic. Since the onset of the all-out war against Ukraine, warnings have multiplied regarding sabotage, influence, and disinformation operations designed to undermine European political cohesion. The Iranian state acts on its own account, yet also resorts to criminal networks and intermediaries to conduct clandestine operations on the European continent. North Korea operates predominantly in the digital sphere. Although they employ distinct methods, these actors exploit the vulnerabilities of our open societies.
It would be insufficient to explain these crimes exclusively through the actions of external adversaries. It is necessary to understand the conditions that facilitate such action. Europe’s greatest vulnerability lies above all in the erosion of citizens’ trust in institutions, rather than in the flaws of computer systems or the insufficient protection of critical infrastructure. Without questioning the legitimacy of struggles against social inequalities, one must recognise that their instrumentalisation by populisms and other Trojan horses dangerously exacerbates this fragility.
This wear and tear also demands a political analysis. For far too long, many of our political elites seemed to assume that economic prosperity would suffice to guarantee the legitimacy and stability of democratic regimes. That premise has proved limited. The housing crisis, obstacles to social mobility, precarious employment, insecurity in many urban spaces, tensions associated with irregular immigration, and the perception of a growing distance between rulers and the ruled have contributed to a sense of abandonment and despair across broad swathes of European society.
Our adversaries may not have generated these difficulties, yet they have recognised strategic opportunities within them. This context helps explain why hybrid warfare operations encounter a more favourable environment today than two or three decades ago. Trust in institutions reinforces resilience against destabilisation; its erosion increases exposure to manipulation, polarisation, and disorder, as is occurring in several European Union countries.
It is in this climate that anti-system movements gain ground. It is important, however, to dispel any ambiguity: democratic contestation challenges power in order to improve the system. Questioning governments, exposing failures, demanding reforms, and challenging consensuses are legitimate expressions of civic participation and democratic vitality.
The risk of rupture arises when criticism ceases to seek reform and begins instead to promote the systematic delegitimisation of institutions. A concrete example is found in the voices attacking the legitimacy of the PSP [Portugal's Public Security Police]: the issue is not questioning its decisions or conduct, but denying the legitimacy of the institution itself. Recognising that democracy functions unsatisfactorily is different from deeming it useless or exclusively at the service of the most powerful. Similarly, denouncing the shortcomings of market economies is not equivalent to seeking the destruction of the European economic architecture. Contesting governmental decisions is legitimate; denying, on principle, the legitimacy of any decision compromises democratic debate.
It is at this point that certain contemporary radicalisms converge in their effects, despite following seemingly contradictory paths. Sectors of the far left and the far right make the systematic discrediting of democratic institutions a central pillar of their activity. When such discrediting is not accompanied by feasible solutions or clearly defined alternatives, contestation can reinforce the perception that no institution merits trust and that democratic compromise is unviable.
This environment favours Europe’s adversaries, in particular the Russian Federation. Reinforcing the notion that national and European Union institutions are incapable of resolving concrete problems can help weaken democratic cohesion and cooperation between states. Extremists do not need to propose a fairer solution: it suffices to exploit resentment, mistrust, and systemic gridlock.
The strategic reach of these episodes lies in the erosion of trust in institutions, in governments, and in the capacity of European democracies to deliver results and correct mistakes. Consequently, attacks and threats against critical infrastructure must not be assessed solely by their immediate effects. The same holds true for the false alarms that days ago caused disruption in Italian schools and, simultaneously, in four other European countries.
If trust is the strategic target, the European response requires more than strengthening defence, intelligence services, and cybersecurity. It must also address the root causes of citizens’ malaise. Democratic resilience depends as much on protection against external threats as it does on civic trust in institutions and the collective will to defend them.
Published: 13 November 2026, Diário de Notícias (Lisbon)
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