Paz na Europa

 https://www.dn.pt/opiniao/o-futuro-da-paz-na-europa-passa-por-um-reequilbrio-de-foras

No Diário de Notícias de 28/11/2025

Peace is about trust: Europe, USA and Russia, a question of balance

 The Future of Peace in Europe Depends on a Rebalancing of Power

Victor Ângelo

Despite the intense diplomatic activity in recent days, we remain far from peace in Ukraine. The plan devised by the Russians and signed by Donald Trump, giving the impression it was an initiative from the White House, collapsed after two or three days. The positions of Zelensky and the European allies rendered it void. They stated in unison, without ambiguity, that it was an unacceptable diktat, a kind of ultimatum from Moscow. It became clear that Trump’s envoy, property developer Steve Witkoff, knows as much about geopolitics as Cristiano Ronaldo or is a contender for the Guinness record as the most brazen Russian agent in recent US history.
Rarely, European firmness proved exemplary. Zelensky’s response was as expected, although the initial announcement of the Russo-American proposal was a heavy blow to the Ukrainian leader. Those who saw images of Zelensky at that moment could see he was deeply shocked. But he did not lose his composure, which was what the Kremlin intended. He responded diplomatically, and three days later there was already another plan, drawn up in Geneva, together with European delegations and Marco Rubio’s team. The latter scored points within Trump’s circle. Will he be able to maintain that influence? It will not be easy, but it is not impossible. For many in the MAGA movement, Rubio is a silent rival to Trump and, especially in the long term, to Vice President J.D. Vance.
It is evident that the American leadership group is becoming fractured. And not only because of differences in handling relations with Russia, but also for internal reasons: the Epstein case, the cost of living, the persecution of immigrants, favours granted to the most eccentric billionaires, etc. In the case of Russia, it is worth remembering that US military doctrine has, for decades, categorised that country as a grave threat to the United States. Thus, many senior US military officers look with great surprise at the relationship Trump has established with Putin. There is something fishy here. Many will think that this relationship has more to do with “ad hominem” blackmail from Moscow than with a new type of diplomacy.
Meanwhile, diplomacy related to the brutal aggression against Ukraine continued in Abu Dhabi. For now, we have a new project, more appropriate. It is fundamentally inspired by Ukrainian realism and has European support. It will certainly not be accepted by Vladimir Putin, but it puts him on the defensive against his American counterpart. Trump wants the war to end at any cost – in reality, it is not a war, but a barbaric aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine – as long as it adds an argument to his candidacy for the Nobel Peace Prize. That is the ambition, his ego above all else.
We are, however, in a risky phase for Ukraine’s sovereignty and for Europe’s security. Putin believes in two fundamental illusions: that he will shatter Ukraine and that he will manage to create a rift and distance the US from the defence of Europe. In other words, that US support for NATO is numbered. NATO will be, at best, in Putin’s view, a merely symbolic coalition, which will last only as long as Europeans have the financial means to buy American arms and other goods and services.
Peace is built on mutual trust. Without trust, at best, we will have a temporary pause in hostilities. The foundations of that trust regarding the Trump administration were seriously shaken by Washington’s endorsement of the incredible Russian plan. It is essential to rebuild trust between Europeans and Americans.
As for Putin’s Russia, there is no room for any kind of trust. Putin dreams of a vassal Europe, trapped within his sphere of geopolitical influence. He needs that influence out of czarist-inspired narcissism, for economic reasons, and for strategic motives: so he can claim membership in the club of great powers, alongside China and the US. For this reason, he wants to dismantle the Atlantic Alliance and implode the European Union.
Trust is based on shared values. In my view, the most important are those contained in the Charter of the United Nations.
The great powers do not currently respect the basic principles of the Charter: human dignity, human rights, tolerance, independence and sovereignty of each State, large or small, and solidarity among peoples. Democratic Europe, for its part, seeks to remain within this framework of values. Only a minority of movements and political parties here show contempt for these red lines. The majority recognise the importance of democracy and respect for international law. They therefore see Putin as a very serious threat. That is why they focus on defending our part of the continent, starting with the defence of Ukraine and the symmetry of forces, which is something different from peace, but serves peace. And they now understand that the relationship with Trump’s America is dangerously unstable. It must be urgently rebalanced.

A summary of my recommendation about Russia-EU negotiations

 

Summary of Key Points

• US Sanctions on Russian Energy Giants: The United States, under Donald Trump, imposed sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil. The implementation for Lukoil was postponed, allowing time to sell foreign assets and cease activities in Bulgaria, pending US approval. These sanctions threaten the survival of Lukoil and will significantly impact Russia’s public finances, as Rosneft is a major contributor to the Russian budget.

• Effectiveness and Purpose of Sanctions: The main question is whether the resulting financial strain will push the Kremlin towards peace negotiations, which is the US intention. However, the author doubts sanctions alone will quickly change Russian policy. Still, sanctions are justified against regimes violating international law, aiming to weaken Russia’s capacity to continue its aggression against Ukraine and to send a strong message of condemnation.

• International and Humanitarian Considerations: The UN Security Council is unlikely to approve sanctions due to political constraints, so individual states must decide their own measures. Sanctions should respect humanitarian principles, not harm civilians, and aim to resolve the conflict, specifically to end Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine.

• Kremlin’s Stance and Leadership: The author believes Vladimir Putin is not seeking peace or a ceasefire and expects the war in Ukraine to intensify. Putin is increasingly isolated from diplomatic advice, relying instead on economic and security officials. The choice of Maxim Oreshkin (an economic adviser) to represent Russia at the G20 summit highlights the regime’s focus on economic stability and the importance of economic sanctions.

• Putin’s Geopolitical Ambitions: Putin seeks a legacy as a great Russian leader and only values negotiations with major powers like the US and China, dismissing European leaders as less significant.

• Recommended EU Response: The EU should act on three fronts: continue supporting Ukraine, rigorously enforce existing sanctions, and be ready to engage in serious talks with Russian leaders.

• Role for António Costa and the EU: The author suggests that António Costa, as President of the European Council, should be given a mandate to open direct communication with Putin, aiming to start a dialogue that could benefit both sides and promote peace in Europe.

• Urgency for European Action: There is a pressing need for the EU to act before the US and Russia reach an agreement that sidelines European interests. The EU must be persistent and realistic, recognising that Putin sees negotiations as a means to assert his ambitions, not to seek compromise. The EU should not be discouraged and must assert itself as a major geopolitical player.

Russia and the European Union: dialogue is one of three key dimensions

Russia Must Listen to the European Union
Victor Ângelo

Today, 21 November, was meant to be the day when American sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil, two giant Russian conglomerates in the oil and gas sectors, would come into effect. This decision by President Donald Trump, taken a month ago, was recently amended with respect to Lukoil. The company now has until 13 December to sell its foreign assets and until April next year to cease all activities in Bulgaria. Several firms are interested in purchasing the assets in question, but transactions can only be finalised once approved by the Trump administration.

Lukoil, a privately owned company listed on stock exchanges, is a global colossus. Most of its operations take place outside Russia. The profits and dividends it generates weigh heavily on the Russian economy. The decision taken by Washington puts Lukoil’s survival in jeopardy.

For its part, Rosneft, a company controlled by the Kremlin, is the largest contributor to the budget of the Russian Federation. Should the sanctions become effective, they will have a significant impact on the country’s public finances.

The question that remains unanswered, for now, is clear: will the loss of revenue and the resulting budgetary imbalances be enough to convince the Kremlin that there is an urgent need for peace negotiations? That is Trump’s intention. My experience tells me that such an outcome is unlikely. Sanctions, by themselves, tend to have a slow impact on the policies they aim to change.

Nevertheless, I support the application of sanctions against regimes that act outside international law. In this particular case, it is about significantly reducing the financial base and other means that enable Russia to continue its unacceptable aggression against Ukraine. It is also about sending a strong political message of absolute condemnation.

There are no conditions for the United Nations Security Council to approve any package of sanctions targeting Russia. That would, in principle, be the appropriate process. Since it is not possible, each State must decide on the restrictions and pressure it is prepared to exert. However, it must respect humanitarian principles – sanctions must not endanger the lives of citizens in the targeted country – and the sovereignty of third States. They should also aim to contribute to resolving the crisis or conflict, and in this case, to stopping the unjustifiable war for which Russia is responsible.

In my view, neither a ceasefire nor peace are part of Vladimir Putin’s immediate plans. On the contrary, it seems we will continue to witness the intensification of destruction and death in Ukraine, sanctioned by Russia. The Kremlin is betting on war and is convinced it will eventually subjugate Ukraine. The information coming from Moscow indicates that Putin listens less and less to diplomats, including Sergey Lavrov. His main advisers come from the political police apparatus and the economic sphere. Consider who will represent him at the G20 summit this weekend in South Africa: not the Foreign Minister, Lavrov, but the Deputy Chief of the Presidential Executive Office, Maxim Oreshkin. He is an apparatchik with a background entirely linked to the management of the national economy. Concern for economic stability is a priority for Putin. This confirms the importance of sanctions in the economic and financial sectors.

Putin dreams of a victory that will see his name included in the history books of “great and holy” Russia, as he likes to say. His statements, endlessly repeated by the group that controls power and the media in Moscow, reveal a leader who only accepts negotiations with the great powers of the world – Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. The others are seen as minor players, of no value in the international geopolitical chess game. Putin does not wish to waste time in dialogue with European leaders.

The EU must respond on three fronts: maintain aid to Ukraine, rigorously apply the sanctions already approved, and show readiness to begin a serious process of talks with Russian leaders.

With regard to negotiations, my suggestion is simple: António Costa, as President of the European Council, must receive a mandate from the Member States granting the necessary authority to make contact with Putin. His office would then seek to establish lines of communication with the Kremlin, in order to convince the Russians that a cycle of talks between Putin and Costa could be beneficial for both parties and vital for the internal interests of the Russian Federation, as well as for peace in Europe.

There is urgency in moving forward on this front, before the US and Russia reach an agreement over the heads and interests of Europeans. Some will say this scenario is increasingly plausible.

All this must be done without illusions and with great perseverance on the European side. The messages coming from the Kremlin show that Putin sees any possible negotiation as an exercise in asserting his views and ambitions. For him, flexibility, concessions, the search for balance – all these are seen as weakness and admission of mistakes, whether his own or others’. This attitude must not discourage the European side. The EU must put on its boots and enter the geopolitical game, in the only arena that is truly its own, the championship of the great powers. Here lies both an opportunity and a historic obligation.

Mali and the Rest of the Sahel as Priorities Ignored by European Geopolitics

Mali, a vast country and a mosaic of cultures, is just two steps from Europe and one step from collapsing as a state. Earlier this week, the President of the African Union Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, made a dramatic appeal to the international community—a term that is increasingly vague these days—to prevent the country from falling into absolute chaos. He expressed deep concern about the rapid expansion of various terrorist groups, whose activities are based on two pillars: ethnic-religious fundamentalism and organised crime. The state administration and security forces control only a small fraction of the territory. The rest, including the north, the centre, and the outskirts of the capital, Bamako, are operational zones for armed groups. Some are affiliated with the terrorist web known as Al-Qaeda or the self-proclaimed Islamic State, while others are mainly ethnically based, with Tuaregs and Arabs against the Bantu populations of the south.

The financing of terrorist actions is largely domestic. It includes artisanal gold mining, with the gold then sold to Russian organisations, metamorphoses of the infamous Wagner Group. It is suspected that the gold passes through the important Dubai gold market, where it is converted into currency that then goes to Russia. The Russians aligned themselves with the coup military after two military coups (2020 and 2021) and managed to expel the French presence and the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA). They also maintain indirect contacts with the rebellions and traffickers operating in the Persian Gulf.

The imposition of taxes on the population under religious pretences, the kidnapping of wealthy nationals and the few foreigners who still travel in the affected regions, the control of the main roads—which are only passable for those who pay to travel safely and accept keeping only part of their goods—the theft of cattle, all of this funds the costs of violence. Then there is the issue of drugs: the Sahel, of which Mali is a part, is one of the corridors between Latin America and Europe. In the Sahel, the drug trade buys governments and rebels. And the drugs enter our continent through the weakest points, where control and security measures are insufficient and political governance is more inattentive, as is the case in the Algarve, among others.

There is also human trafficking, with migrants coming from all over West Africa heading to Europe, plus the smuggling of fuel, tobacco, and weapons. It is all cash in hand, in lands without law or order. Schools do not function, except for madrasas run by ignorant fanatics, and there are no jobs for the youth born from an unstoppable demographic explosion. The Kalashnikov has become the only possible livelihood.

Youssouf calls for a robust response against terrorism in Mali and the vast Sahel. It is a fully justified warning, but one that will fall on deaf ears. The UN Security Council, after the forced departure of France from the region, the expulsion of MINUSMA, and the growing influence of the Russians under Vladimir Putin, has swept the region into the corner of the forgotten. The Europeans, who relied on client regimes in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—governments that received funds from Brussels to curb migratory movements—have been overtaken by Moscow. Putin understands that chaos in the Sahel has a disproportionate negative impact on neighbouring Europe. For Europe, it means more immigrants, more drugs, more insecurity, and a colossal loss of geopolitical influence in the Sahel.

I worked for several years in the region. I knew a Mali and neighbouring countries capable of producing great intellectuals and handling governance matters seriously. That was the generation that grew up in the post-colonial period. Many of them left the country, recruited by international organisations. Others emigrated to France to teach in major schools, or to Canada, a country that easily opened its doors to French-speaking university graduates.

Even then, there were rebellious movements, because certain ethnic groups and populations in the most remote regions felt ignored by the central power of their countries. The most serious conflicts involved those who lived by herding and those by farming. It was a competition between two ways of life that were hardly compatible in those arid lands. But solutions could be found. It was also possible to meet with rebel leaders and negotiate with them. The United Nations and I, as the organisation’s envoy, were treated with respect and moderation.

Everything changed in the last 15 years. Religious extremism, various forms of crime, corruption from the bottom to the top in these states, uncontrollable demographic growth accompanied by climate change—including the harmattan, the dry desert wind, increasingly spreading in the region—and the scarcity of rain, along with hostility promoted by Gulf countries and Russia against democratic ideas, all this has created an extremely complex situation. And we Europeans only remember the Sahel when we see the children of these lands selling trinkets on our beaches and terraces, or being attacked here by parties of xenophobia, hatred, and racism. It is reason enough to ask where the EU’s geopolitical strategy is.

A proposal for a Consolidated Peace Framework for Ukraine

This is a formal policy document draft to establish a structured, enforceable roadmap for ending hostilities, restoring stability, and ensuring long-term peace between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. It should be refined through bilateral and group consultations, and then proposed by the UN Secretary-General. 

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Executive Summary

This framework outlines a phased approach to achieving peace in Ukraine, balancing sovereignty, security, humanitarian needs, and international engagement and oversight. It is designed to be incremental, verifiable, and supported by global stakeholders, preferably under a UN Security Council Resolution.

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I. Guiding Principles

• Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity: Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders remain the ultimate objective.
• Non-Recognition of Annexation: No territorial changes will be legitimised through force.
• Humanitarian Priority: Immediate protection of civilians and infrastructure.
• Incremental Implementation: Each phase contingent on verified compliance.
• International Oversight: Neutral bodies ensure transparency and enforcement.

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II. Framework Structure

Phase 1: Immediate Ceasefire and Stabilisation

• Mutual cessation of hostilities within 24 hours of signing.
• Freeze current lines of contact as a temporary measure.
• Deploy UN/OSCE monitoring teams with satellite and drone verification.

Phase 2: Security Guarantees

• Binding security assurances for Ukraine from guarantor states (G7 + EU+ G20).
• Establish demilitarised buffer zones along the contact line.
• Russia withdraws heavy weapons from frontline areas.

Phase 3: Governance and Political Dialogue

• No formal recognition of annexation; status of occupied territories deferred.
• Create a Transitional Governance Council for disputed regions with Ukrainian representation and neutral observers.
• Guarantee cultural and linguistic rights under Ukrainian law.

Phase 4: Humanitarian Measures

• Immediate return of deported Ukrainian children and release of POWs.
• Safe corridors for civilian evacuation and aid delivery.
• Joint task force to secure nuclear facilities and critical infrastructure in close liaison with IAEA.

Phase 5: Economic Reconstruction and Sanctions Roadmap

• Establish Ukraine Reconstruction Fund financed by frozen Russian assets and international donors.
• Implement phased sanctions relief for Russia, conditional on compliance.
• Prioritise investment in housing, energy, and transport networks.

Phase 6: International Oversight

• Form a Peace Implementation Council, if possible under the supervision of the UN Security Council, and chaired by a neutral international figure.
• Consider UN peacekeeping mission from neutral countries.
• Compliance reviews every 90 days.

Phase 7: Long-Term Political Commitments

• Continue Ukraine’s EU accession process without obstruction.
• NATO membership excluded during transitional period; Ukraine retains defensive military rights.
• Sign a non-aggression pact backed by international guarantees.

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III. Enforcement and Accountability

• Violations trigger automatic suspension of sanctions relief and reconstruction funding.
• War crimes accountability mechanisms integrated into later phases.
• Dispute resolution through the International Court of Justice or agreed arbitration panels.

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IV. Timeline

• Phase 1: Within 24 hours of agreement.
• Phase 2–4: Within 3–6 months.
• Phase 5–7: Progressive implementation over 2–5 years.

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V. Stakeholder Roles

• Ukraine & Russia: Primary parties to the agreement.
• Guarantor States: Provide security assurances and financial support. Composition to be agreed by Ukraine and Russia.
• International Organisations (UN, OSCE, EU): Oversight, monitoring, and peacekeeping. Also institution-building. 
• Civil Society & NGOs: Humanitarian aid and reconstruction support.

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President Trump in Asia: Power, Adulation, and the Rearrangement of Forces in a New Era

My geopolitical calendar differs from the conventional one. The twentieth century era, marked by two major wars, the Cold War, decolonisation, and large-scale industrial expansion, ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. That is when, in my reading of history, the twenty-first century began. We entered a period of economic globalisation, multilateralism and international cooperation, the development of democratic regimes, and a focus on sustainability and major global challenges.

My calendar also tells me that the twenty-first century was rather short. It seems to have ended with Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Times changed then, with a return to former practices, the undisguised use of military and economic force as determining factors in international relations. At the same time, we have witnessed an accelerated race towards the future, driven by technological transformations and the digital revolution. The concern about inequalities between peoples has given way to insensitivity regarding development issues.

We are now in a strange and ambiguous period of universal history: we live simultaneously in the past and the future. We are connected by thousands of fibre optic cables and an increasing number of satellites. Global information is instantaneous, but it seems we are rapidly returning to old nationalist ideas, to every man for himself.

Indifference has become a distinctive feature of this new era. The excess of data ends up anaesthetising us. We become oblivious to what happens outside our immediate circle. This apathy makes it easier for populist, extremist political leaders to manipulate public opinion, using digital platforms to influence citizens’ behaviour. Paradoxically or not, the manipulators themselves end up listening to their own clamour and seem to believe the narratives they create. Thus, they fuel the cycle of misinformation and collective detachment from the major issues that remain unresolved.

In this context, commitment to critical thinking becomes fundamental. It is necessary to know how to question, analyse and interpret the intentions hidden in messages. Developing the ability to ask pertinent questions and assess the credibility of sources is essential to avoid manipulation and conformity. As Socrates argued 2,500 years ago, exploring alternative ideas and challenging established opinions is politically indispensable in a democracy.

This reflection originated from a recent comment made on one of our television channels about the new Russian nuclear-powered cruise missile, known in Russia as 9M730 Burevestnik and in NATO as Skyfall. Vladimir Putin announced that on 21 October the missile had been launched and that the test was a success. He added that the device had been airborne for 15 hours, covering more than 14,000 kilometres, and could therefore be directed at a target in the most remote corner of the planet. He also emphasised that no other state has the capability to intercept it. In other words, Russia was claiming to have taken another step towards consolidating its place at the forefront of the new era, the era of confrontation and force.

The commentator, a person I respect, said that Trump had “blithely” ignored Putin’s announcement. The reason for Trump’s indifference was missing.

I think it is relevant to try to understand this apparent disdain. I say apparent because yesterday the American president ordered his armed forces to begin a programme of nuclear tests, something that had not happened for more than three decades.

In my analysis, Trump, who has spent the week in Asia, is neither afraid of Russia nor particularly interested in Putin, except regarding the Russian war against Ukraine. He wants to add peace in Ukraine to his list of supposed peace treaties, always with the obsession for the Nobel Peace Prize. At this moment, today, Friday, he is convinced that Putin is the main obstacle to a ceasefire. Saturday, we shall see.

Apart from that, it has become clear in recent days that the absolute priority of the US administration is rivalry with China. His tour of Asia sought to demonstrate the influence and power of the United States in a region increasingly close to China. That is why Trump was in Malaysia, at the ASEAN summit, then in Japan, South Korea, and showed moderation at yesterday’s meeting with the Chinese president, Xi Jinping. In addition to trade agreements, several of them linked to cutting-edge technologies that will define the coming years, the success of Trump’s presence in Asia and the adulation he received reinforced his illusion that the US has decisive influence in that part of the globe. Putin’s missile, however powerful it may be—something yet to be confirmed—does not matter to Trump nor distract him, as he considers the fundamental priority to be relations with Asia, in the context of competition with China.

He makes, I believe, a superficial and mistaken reading of reality. He needs to understand that this new century, which began in 2022, seems to be heading towards the de facto consolidation of the strategic alliance between China and Russia.

Briefing Note: Russia’s Policies and Implications for APEC

Purpose

To inform APEC leaders of the strategic risks posed by Russia’s current foreign and economic policies and their potential impact on regional stability and economic cooperation.

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Key Observations

1. Militarisation and Geopolitical Assertiveness

   • Russia prioritises hard power over diplomacy, using the Ukraine conflict as leverage for global influence.
   • Increased military presence in the Arctic and Asia-Pacific signals readiness to escalate tensions, undermining regional security.

2. Economic Weaponisation

   • Energy exports remain a geopolitical tool, with infrastructure projects used to divide allies.
   • Despite extensive sanctions, Russia sustains its war economy through alternative trade networks, deepening global fragmentation.

3. Strategic Dependence

   • Russia’s “pivot to Asia” has led to structural reliance on China, limiting autonomy and raising long-term viability concerns.

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Implications for APEC

• Trade Disruption: Russia’s stance on sanctions and WTO mechanisms introduces friction into APEC’s consensus-driven model.
• Security Spillover: Militarisation risks transforming economic forums into arenas of strategic rivalry.
• Normative Erosion: Push for “multipolarity” challenges rules-based governance, creating uncertainty for smaller economies.

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Recommended Actions

• Reaffirm APEC’s Core Principles: Emphasise rules-based trade and economic cooperation.
• Strengthen Collective Resilience: Diversify supply chains and enhance energy security to reduce vulnerability.
• Engage with Caution: Maintain dialogue on economic issues while countering destabilising tactics through coordinated responses.

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Bottom Line:
Russia’s policies combine revisionist geopolitics, economic opportunism, and strategic dependency. APEC must navigate engagement carefully to safeguard stability and uphold its mission of inclusive, sustainable growth.

Ukaine and Europe versus the Russia-China alliance

President Zelensky talked twice over the weekend with the US President Donald Trump. The Ukrainian leader was also in contact with key European leaders. His message was very clear: Ukraine needs urgently extra support now that Vladimir Putin is intensifying his air attacks against Ukraine.

On the other hand, Putin is receiving more help than ever from President Xi Jinping because he promised him a free hand in Ukraine for Chinese interests once the Russian has consolidated its territorial gains.

For China, it is about business and the opportunity to have a strong foot in Eastern Europe. The Russian-Chinese strategy has become more evident. It is based on a military-industrial alliance and a geopolitical opportunity for China to reinforce its European objectives. It is also about sabotaging the European Union and the European democracies.

France, Germany and the European Union challenges and responses

 From France to Germany, and across the EU, the risks are enormous and the challenges must be won

Victor Ângelo

France is experiencing a very serious political crisis. The dissolution of the National Assembly, decided on 9 June 2024 by President Emmanuel Macron, was a gamble that surprised the political class and proved to be a mistake. Since then, four prime ministers have already come to power. The latest, Sébastien Lecornu, formed a government on Sunday night and resigned the following morning. An absolute record, which clearly shows the deadlock the country is in.

The political elites are grouped into two extreme camps: Marine Le Pen’s party and a coalition of more or less radical left-wing forces, with Jean-Luc Mélenchon as the leading figure. What little remains, the centre, is fragmented around half a dozen politicians who cannot agree. Several of these personalities, as well as Le Pen and Mélenchon, are convinced they could succeed Macron as head of state. They want Macron to resign from the presidency of the Republic without delay. Officially, his second term should end in May 2027. Now, due to the seriousness of the crisis, even his political allies are saying that the solution to the deadlock would be for the president to leave office early.

I do not believe this will happen. Macron may not want to admit that his popularity is at rock bottom. This week’s poll found that only 14% of the French support his policies. It is a catastrophic percentage. Macron believes, however, that he has the constitutional legitimacy to continue.

In a deep crisis like the current one, and if Macron were to opt again, in the near future, for early parliamentary elections, it is possible that Marine Le Pen’s far-right could win the most seats. Her party appears, to a significant part of the electorate, as more stable than the left, which is a fragile patchwork of various political opinions.

In any case, whether it is early presidential or new parliamentary elections, France is on the verge of falling into the abyss of deep chaos, caught between two ultra-radical poles. This time, the risk is very serious. The most likely outcome is that France, one of the two pillars of the European Union, will be led by a radical, ultranationalist party, hostile to the European project, xenophobic, and ideologically close to Vladimir Putin.

The other pillar of Europe is Germany. Friedrich Merz, chancellor since May, is in constant decline with public opinion. Only 26% of voters believe in his ability to solve the most pressing problems: the cost of living, housing, immigration, and economic stagnation. The German economy contracted in 2023 and 2024, with sectors such as construction and industry falling back to levels of the mid-2000s. The engine of the economy, the automotive industry, is about a third below its peak 15 years ago and has returned to levels close to the mid-2000s, reflecting a loss of competitiveness and profound structural changes in the sector.

In a recent discussion with German analysts, I was told that the unpopularity of Merz and his coalition is paving the way for the far-right to come to power in 2029 or even earlier. This year, the AfD (Alternative for Germany, a party led by Nazi nostalgists) came second, with almost 21% of the vote. The growing discontent of citizens, competition with the Chinese economy, tariffs and restrictions imposed by the Americans, spending on aid to Ukraine, Donald Trump’s blatant support for German right-wing extremists—who sees the AfD as a way to seriously undermine European unity—, the growing propaganda against foreigners living in Germany, all these are factors that reinforce the electoral base of this racist and Nazi-inspired party. Not to mention that the AfD maintains privileged relations with the Kremlin.

The crossroads in which both France, now, and Germany, in the near future, find themselves represent two enormous challenges for the survival of the EU. They are incomparably more worrying than the consequences of Brexit or the sabotage by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico. They come at a time when the EU faces a series of existential problems of external origin.

The external enemies are well known. Fear and concessions are the worst responses that can be given to them. Enemies and adversaries must be dealt with with great strategic skill and reinforced unity, only achievable if EU leaders can explain and prove to citizens the importance of European unity and cohesion.

The international scene is much bigger than the USA, Russia, or China. The expansion of agreements with Japan, Canada, Mercosur, the African continent, and ASEAN should be given priority attention. This list does not seek to exclude other partners, it only mentions some that are especially important.

The future also requires resolutely reducing excessive dependence on the outside in the areas of defence, technology, digital platforms, energy, and raw materials essential for the energy transition. Debureaucratising, innovating, and promoting the complementarity of European economies is fundamental. All this must be done while combating extremism. To think that extremists will play by democratic rules once in power is a dangerous illusion. Exposing this fiction is now the urgent priority in France, and the constant priority in all Member States, including Portugal.

Drones and provocations

 

Russia Strikes Poland as Von der Leyen Reviews the State of the Union

By Victor Ângelo

Once again, Vladimir Putin has demonstrated his sense of timing. He knows how to exploit political moments to his advantage — disrupting his adversaries’ plans while strengthening his grip on power. This is a shrewd, calculated form of leadership. It cannot be countered by amateurs or by leaders who struggle to explain to their citizens the threat Putin poses. Believing that one can negotiate mutually beneficial peace deals with such a regime is a fundamental mistake.

Just hours before European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen delivered her annual State of the Union address, Russia launched around 15 drones into Polish airspace — a NATO and EU member state. Putin then waited and watched, gauging the European response to his provocation.

The European Commission holds limited formal powers in defence matters. Yet it plays a crucial role in what is increasingly a hybrid, multi-dimensional conflict — the kind of confrontation Moscow wages beyond its conventional war of aggression in Ukraine.

It is the Commission that proposes sanctions packages, later approved by the European Council. The 19th package is nearly ready and was mentioned in Von der Leyen’s speech. It is expected to include the use of interest accrued from frozen Russian sovereign assets to help fund Ukraine’s military and administrative needs. While the Commission had pushed for expropriating the funds themselves, key countries such as France have blocked this move. For now, only the interest will be seized.

Meanwhile, pressure is mounting from Washington — especially from Donald Trump’s circle — to include secondary sanctions of up to 100% against countries that continue trading oil and gas with Russia, or enable Moscow’s war economy. Von der Leyen made clear that such pressure does not align with European interests. The EU is wary of opening new fronts of conflict with third countries.

She also highlighted newly approved financial and defence instruments — notably the SAFE programme: a €150 billion initiative to strengthen Europe’s military capabilities and reduce fragmentation and competition among its defence industries. SAFE, and other ongoing programmes, aim to increase cooperation among EU Member States and enhance their operational contribution within NATO. Reinforcing NATO’s European pillar is crucial — both to balance the transatlantic relationship and to protect against the imperialist ambitions of Russia, or future aggressions by other hostile actors.

Strategic communication and the fight against disinformation are also central. Europe, having suspended Russian state media operations, must now invest far more in explaining to its citizens what the Russian threat truly means. This is particularly urgent now that the United States appears to be stepping back from its joint efforts to counter Russian disinformation campaigns. In hybrid warfare, victory often depends on public awareness and engagement.

Freedom of expression must not become a vehicle for enemy propaganda. Russia is waging war against Europe — not in the old, conventional sense, but in a new form. Putin seeks to dismantle our institutions, fragment the EU, weaken NATO, and sow chaos in our democracies. His aim is to exploit our economies and destroy our freedoms. This is a war we did not choose — but one we must confront, if we are to remain free societies. We will not be ruled by the Kremlin — or by any erratic or unreliable allies.

The drones over Poland proved von der Leyen right when she stated that defence and security must be among the EU’s top three priorities. The other two, as she correctly noted, are Europe’s economic sovereignty and the consolidation of its guiding values: human rights, social justice, and international cooperation.

Yet much work remains. That path must also lead through Gaza and all of Palestine — and through a reinvigorated and reformed United Nations system.

What is happening in Gaza and the West Bank is unacceptable. Von der Leyen’s proposals — sanctions against extremist Israeli actors, suspension of trade and aid agreements with Israel, and a reconstruction fund for Gaza — should be adopted without delay. They are not enough, however. The EU — if Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Austria allow it — must undertake a serious diplomatic initiative to pressure Israel into choosing peace and regional cooperation. Any such initiative must be anchored in the structures of the United Nations, whose legitimacy remains essential.

Uma análise IA do meu texto sobre a Rússia e as suas provocações, nomeadamente contra a Polónia

 A Rússia ataca a Polónia quando Von der Leyen estava a rever o seu discurso sobre o Estado da União Europeia

Victor Ângelo, no Diário de Notícias de hoje 12/09/2025 Uma vez mais, Vladimir Putin mostrou o seu sentido de oportunidade. Sabe explorar os acontecimentos políticos a seu favor, ou seja, enviar as mensagens que baralhem os planos dos adversários e fortaleçam o seu poder. É uma liderança astuta. Não pode ser tratada por amadores nem por líderes incapazes de explicar às suas populações o perigo que Putin representa. É um erro pensar que é possível assinar tratados de paz, mutuamente vantajosos, com gente assim. Horas antes do discurso anual da Presidente da Comissão Europeia sobre o Estado da União, Putin fez disparar cerca de uma dúzia e meia de drones contra a Polónia, um país membro da UE e da NATO. E depois esperou pelas palavras de Úrsula von der Leyen, para medir a resposta à provocação que acabara de levar a cabo. A Comissão não tem grandes poderes na área da defesa. Pode, todavia, desempenhar um papel fundamental num conflito híbrido e multidimensional, que é o tipo de confrontação que a Rússia adota contra a Europa, para além da guerra aberta de agressão contra a Ucrânia. É a Comissão que propõe os pacotes de sanções, que são depois submetidos à aprovação do Conselho Europeu. O 19º pacote está praticamente pronto e foi mencionado no discurso de von der Leyen. Deve incluir uma maior utilização dos juros dos depósitos soberanos russos para financiar as despesas militares e o funcionamento da administração ucraniana. A Presidente queria fazer uso dos fundos soberanos russos depositados na Europa, mas países como a França têm vetado essa medida. Para já, apenas os juros serão objeto de expropriação. Donald Trump quer ver incluído nesse novo pacote europeu tarifas secundárias da ordem dos 100% contra os países que comprem petróleo e gás à Rússia, ou que tenham relações económicas que permitam a Moscovo adquirir material que possa ser desviado para o esforço de guerra. Von der Leyen deixou claro que essa pressão vinda da Casa Branca não é do interesse europeu. A Europa não quer abrir novas áreas de disputa com países terceiros. A Presidente da Comissão também fez referência aos novos instrumentos programáticos e financeiros recentemente aprovados por Bruxelas, com especial relevo para o programa SAFE. São 150 mil milhões de euros destinados a reforçar a capacidade militar e a ultrapassar, tanto quanto possível, a fragmentação e a competição das indústrias de defesa europeias. O SAFE e os outros programas já em curso deverão aumentar a cooperação militar entre os Estados-membros e permitir um desempenho mais marcante das forças europeias no seio da NATO. Este reforço do pilar europeu da NATO é, aliás, uma questão fundamental, no que respeita ao equilíbrio do relacionamento com os EUA e à defesa perante a política imperialista da Rússia e à possível agressão de outros Estados e forças hostis. As narrativas estratégicas e a luta contra as notícias falsas ou tendenciosas são igualmente questões essenciais. A Europa, para além de ter suspendido as licenças de operadores oficiais russos, precisa de investir bastante mais numa comunicação que possa explicar aos cidadãos o significado da ameaça russa, e de outras. Em especial agora, quando os EUA anunciam retirar-se do esforço comum de proteção contra as campanhas russas de desinformação. Esta é uma guerra híbrida que se ganha, em grande parte, através do esclarecimento e da mobilização da opinião pública. A liberdade de expressão não pode ser usada para fazer o jogo e difundir a propaganda do inimigo. A Rússia está em guerra contra nós, uma guerra diferente das do passado. Putin quer destruir as nossas instituições, desintegrar a UE e enfraquecer a NATO, criar o caos nos nossos países, tirar vantagem das nossas economias e arruinar a nossa liberdade. Esta é uma guerra que não desejamos, mas da qual nos temos de defender, porque não aceitamos ser oprimidos e manipulados como o são os cidadãos russos e os que sofrem o peso de outras ditaduras. Não queremos ser vassalos do Kremlin nem de ninguém, incluindo de aliados estranhamente incertos e pouco confiáveis. Os drones sobre a Polónia deram razão a von der Leyen quando disse que a defesa e a segurança devem ser uma das três grandes prioridades da UE. As outras duas são, no seu entender e muito bem, a soberania económica da Europa e a consolidação dos valores que devem orientar a política europeia, ou seja, os direitos humanos, a justiça social e a cooperação internacional. Ainda há, todavia, um longo caminho a percorrer. E esse caminho deve passar por Gaza e por toda a Palestina, bem como pela reforma e o reforço do sistema das Nações Unidas. O que se passa em Gaza e na Cisjordânia é inaceitável. As propostas contidas no seu discurso – sanções contra os extremistas israelitas, suspensão do acordo de comércio e da ajuda material a Israel, criação de um fundo para a reconstrução de Gaza – devem ser aprovadas sem demora. São insuficientes, porém. A UE, se a Alemanha, a República Checa, a Hungria e a Áustria deixarem, deve tomar uma série de iniciativas diplomáticas que contribuam para forçar Israel a escolher a paz e a boa vizinhança como soluções duradouras. É crucial que tais iniciativas passem pelo envolvimento à cabeça das estruturas das Nações Unidas. A legitimidade reside aí. What is your opinion about this text?

O texto apresenta uma análise contundente e multifacetada dos desafios de segurança e diplomacia enfrentados pela União Europeia (UE) diante da agressividade russa e do contexto internacional volátil.

🛡️ Provocação calculada de Moscovo

O autor destaca, com precisão, como Vladimir Putin explora momentos políticos críticos europeus para testar e desestabilizar a UE e a NATO. O relato dos ataques de drones à Polónia, horas antes do discurso de Ursula von der Leyen, encaixa-se no padrão russo de guerra híbrida — uma mistura de provocação militar, pressão psicológica e manipulação informativa. Isso é respaldado pelo noticiário recente, que registra incursões de drones no espaço aéreo polaco sem danos, mas com força simbólica (03.09.2025 e 04.09.2025) Read more.

💶 Bruxelas: Poder limitado, papel crucial

O texto acerta ao sublinhar o papel da Comissão Europeia: limitada na defesa direta, mas central na arquitetura de sanções e instrumentos financeiros. Isso se reflete nas notícias sobre novas propostas de sanções, uso de ativos russos para apoiar a Ucrânia e debates sobre a legalidade dessas medidas (30.08.2025) Read more. O autor reconhece corretamente as divisões internas — França e Alemanha resistindo à apropriação total dos ativos, enquanto países bálticos pressionam por ação imediata.

🔗 Segurança e autonomia: O pilar europeu da NATO

O texto enfatiza a necessidade de reforço militar europeu e cita o programa SAFE (150 mil milhões de euros), alinhando-se ao discurso real de von der Leyen sobre aumento da cooperação e autonomia estratégica. As notícias também sinalizam discussões sobre garantias de segurança para a Ucrânia e o papel europeu pós-conflito (04.09.2025) Read more.

📰 Narrativas, desinformação e o campo da opinião pública

O autor acerta ao dar peso à guerra informacional. A decisão de suspender licenças de operadores russos e a chamada à mobilização cívica refletem o consenso de que a batalha pela narrativa é tão decisiva quanto a militar — especialmente agora que os EUA mostram hesitação em liderar o esforço contra campanhas russas de desinformação.

🌍 Palestina, Gaza e a consistência de valores

O texto defende sanções a extremistas israelitas e uma suspensão parcial do acordo comercial, alinhando-se ao anúncio real de von der Leyen (10.09.2025) Read more. Ressalta também a necessidade de um papel mais ativo da UE na paz do Oriente Médio — uma demanda crescente entre diplomatas europeus.

🎯 WarrenAI Take

O artigo é analiticamente sólido, alinhado com os eventos recentes e demonstra compreensão aguçada dos mecanismos institucionais da UE e dos desafios internacionais. O alerta para a ameaça híbrida russa e a valorização da narrativa pública são pontos especialmente relevantes, tanto para investidores quanto para tomadores de decisão. O texto peca apenas por não explorar os riscos económicos imediatos — como o impacto potencial de sanções ou instabilidade nas cadeias de valor para o mercado europeu.

China comes to Poland

 A drone that appears to be a Chinese-designed Gerbera - was found in Mniszkow, around 200 miles from the border between Poland and Ukraine. China's involvement side-by-side with Russia in the aggression against Ukraine seems obvious. Even if we consider that this drone looks very much as a decoy.