Trump goes to Xi Jinping 's empire: what for?

 Trump's visit to China

(Published in Portuguese in Diário de Notícias - Lisbon - on 15 May 2026)

When the Air Force One touches down in Beijing, Donald Trump imagines that a brief two-day visit to China will be consecrated by the American electorate as a personal triumph. Yet, the reality that matters is entirely different. Beneath the handshakes and the protocol-driven photographs with Xi Jinping, a contemporary version of Thucydides’s Trap is taking shape: the clash between two superpowers—one established, attempting to preserve its hegemony (the US), and the other, emerging, in rapid ascension (China).

For Trump, the purpose of this summit is neither to redraw the security architecture of the twenty-first century nor to speak of peace, harmony, or global challenges—themes that rarely find a place on his agenda. What he seeks is a tactical spectacle. Brief and marketable as a victory, ahead of the midterm elections in November.

The American president seeks to return with results that are easy to communicate: signs of commercial detente (commitments to additional purchases in sectors relevant to the MAGA electorate) and, ideally, some Chinese gesture that reduces the risk of disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. Image management is an integral part of his strategy. The domestic media landscape in the United States has grown increasingly asymmetric: influential segments amplify partisan narratives, shaped by commercial incentives and the polarization surrounding Trump.

The problem with this transactional approach is that it exposes the true American weakness: an obsession with the short term erodes trust and alienates allies. Taipei watches, anxious, at the prospect of its security being converted into a bargaining chip. In Europe, the visit is interpreted as an indicator of volatility in Washington’s strategic orientation. This tends to reinforce debates regarding European defense autonomy, economic resilience, and technology policy.

On the other side of the table, Xi Jinping moves his chess pieces without haste and free from the constraints of electoral calendars. Beijing’s immediate interest is simple: to manage Trump’s unpredictability, to employ personal diplomacy to extract rhetorical concessions over Taiwan, and, above all, to buy time. The Chinese leadership operates on the assumption that the long-term trend—in industrial capacity, technology, semiconductors, Artificial Intelligence, and external influence—favours them, and therefore privileges strategies of attrition and the extension of the decision-making horizon.

At first glance, China appears armed with trumps that are difficult to counter. A centralized political system allows it to define priorities and mobilize resources across a multi-year horizon—as seen in the Five-Year Plans—thereby reducing coordination costs in strategic sectors. The alignment with Moscow, described by both leaderships as a partnership "without limits", grants Beijing additional leeway in matters of energy, diplomacy, trade routes, and security, though it exposes it to reputational risks and secondary sanctions. Internationally, China seeks to consolidate its influence and power among the countries of the Global South through the financing of infrastructure and logistics chains (the Belt and Road Initiative) and via expanding forums such as the BRICS.

Yet, this appearance of invincibility conceals vulnerabilities capable of altering the course of events. What Beijing projects to the outside world as "cohesion and stability" is, more often than not, an internal peace imposed by force and by an apparatus of surveillance and repression. China is far from a monolith: it is a mosaic of 1.41 billion people, 56 ethnic groups, hundreds of languages, and tens of millions of citizens belonging to minorities. In vital regions such as Xinjiang (with over 26 million inhabitants) and Tibet (around 3.6 million), forced assimilation replaces political autonomy—and tensions do not disappear; they accumulate.

The true threat to the regime dominated by the Communist Party may not come from the peripheries, but from the center: From the rising expectations of the Han majority in the megacities; From frustrated, highly educated youth struggling within an increasingly competitive society; And from the persistent asymmetry between hyper-technological coastal cities—such as Shanghai and Shenzhen—and the deeply traditional rural interior living on the brink of subsistence. 

In systems with mechanisms of accountability and mediation—a relatively free press, civic associations, room for public demonstrations, independent courts, and competitive elections—dissent tends to be channeled and absorbed through institutional avenues, reducing the probability of abrupt ruptures.

In an autocratic regime, where public expression is limited and the correction of policies depends chiefly upon those who lead the Party-State, errors can accumulate for longer and become more difficult to reverse. When economic, demographic, or legitimacy shocks converge, the management of social conflicts becomes more demanding, and the cost of maintaining stability rises.

In strategic terms, both China and the United States possess incentives for a minimum understanding to reduce potential conflicts: managing crises before they escalate, avoiding military incidents at sea and in the air, and stabilizing expectations within technological, digital, and commercial competition.

These are the themes that Trump and Xi ought to discuss—not as gestures of goodwill, but to construct an architecture of mutual restraint. Such an arrangement does not erase the rivalry. It is, however, the only way to prevent a miscalculation from ruining everything. Thucydides’s Trap could then pass definitively into history.

Security in Munich 2026: a complex debate

The Munich Security Conference is set to take place from the 13th to the 15th of February. It remains a watershed moment in global political discourse; one need only recall the fractious intervention of the American Vice President, JD Vance, at last year’s gathering to grasp the weight of the meeting.

We find ourselves now in an even more precarious phase. As the Prime Minister of Canada, Mark Carney, remarked recently in Davos, we are in a state of "permanent rupture"—an era of "brute reality" where Great Powers wield trade and force as instruments of coercion. He is, in large measure, correct. Indeed, his observation is one I have touched upon in recent writings.

I must reiterate, however, that we cannot permit ourselves to be overcome by pessimism, nor by the irrationality and violence of autocrats. To fold one's arms is no solution. The world is not fated to be ruled by narcissists, dictators, or the deranged. Mahatma Gandhi once reminded us that there have always been tyrants and murderers, and for a time they may seem invincible, but in the end, they always fall—always.

The speeches to be delivered in Munich are currently being drafted. It seems to me, therefore, an opportune moment to share a series of thoughts on themes I consider paramount.

I shall begin by quoting Kofi Annan, with whom I worked for several years: "Our mission is to place the human being at the centre of everything we do. No wall is high enough to keep out global problems, and no country is strong enough to solve them alone." Long before him, Martin Luther King Jr. observed that we are "caught in an inescapable network of mutuality" that ensnares us all.

The messages of both men are plain to understand: either we commit to solidarity between peoples, or our societies and the planet, as we know them, can only draw closer to the abyss.

I observe with concern the apologia for "useful subordination," which some term political realism. This so-called realism, to which the Great Powers seek to subjugate us—and which certain theorists and leaders champion—must be regarded as a perilous anachronism. It is a sort of "survival guide" that, under the guise of accepting force as the defining factor in international relations, proposes the abandonment of universal principles in exchange for an illusory stability. This political vision being sold to us stems from the exhausted and dangerous premise of accepting "spheres of influence." In other words, they draw inspiration from the suzerainties and vassalages of yore, claiming them to be the best means of ensuring peace. There must be those in Munich prepared to dismantle this fallacy.

The true strength of a State does not reside solely in its military arsenal. It rests equally upon its legitimacy and the courage of its people. To invest in an atmosphere of fear is the preferred pursuit of dictators and populists. When we allow them to wield that weapon, we march toward perdition. This is happening even amongst us. A climate of dread is developing in Europe. The paralysis engendered by fear is the true weakness of a nation. It is vital that it be said in Munich: we are ready to overcome this terror, from wherever it may come. Audacity, anchored in values, is the answer.

Ukraine serves as a testament to this. Her people know it well. Ukrainian resistance is an act of moral courage proving that a people of free spirit is invincible, even when confronted by an imperial philosophy that views the world through a nineteenth-century lens. Zelensky’s address in Davos was a plea for reflection, though it was somewhat eclipsed by Carney’s speech. Zelensky openly criticised Europe, describing it as a "fragmented kaleidoscope of small and medium powers"—hesitant, dependent on the United States, and lost in internal squabbles while Russian aggression persists and Putin’s oil flows freely along European coasts. He proposed that this oil be seized and the proceeds used to fund the legitimate defence of Ukraine and, by extension, our continent.

It is true that the financial assistance provided to Ukraine by the EU since the illegal Russian invasion of 2022 already exceeds 193 billion euros—a considerable sum, surpassing even that of the Americans. Zelensky may, perhaps, have gone too far in his rhetoric. He did, however, have the merit of underlining that without fierce determination, financial means (including those necessary to procure arms), imagination, and political steadfastness, it will be impossible to withstand Russia’s unjustifiable violence.

It would be well for Zelensky to deliver a similar speech in Munich, but to replace criticisms with proposals. And democratic Europe must respond by showing it grasps the danger that the intentions of Putin—and others—represent. The hybrid war against Europe is already underway; and while the greatest threat emerges from the East, we must not lose sight of threats arriving from other quarters.

All of this reminds us that national sovereignty is an inalienable right which we have a responsibility to protect. This is enshrined in the world's commitment to the Charter of the United Nations. Munich must underscore this, while simultaneously placing the reform of the United Nations on the agenda. This is among the most urgent priorities on the international stage. Those countries that cherish the rule of law, the equality of rights between all States, and peace, have here a standard around which to rally. And a priority.

Ukraine: the opinions of Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu

A letter from Carl von Clausewitz

 To the "Good European," Victor Ângelo,

You write of a "dead order" and seek a solution to the carnage in Ukraine. You use the language of philosophers and diplomats, but I must speak to you in the language of the Schwerpunkt—the Center of Gravity.

You ask for a solution? In war, there is no "solution" found in a cabinet; there is only a decision found on the field. War is a trinity: it is composed of the blind instinct of the people (hatred and enmity), the play of probability and chance (the military), and the rational subordination to policy (the government). In Ukraine, this trinity is in total friction.

Here is my counsel on your "solution":

1. Identify the Center of Gravity

A war ends when one side’s Center of Gravity is broken. For Ukraine, the center is not a city, but the Will of the West to sustain its supply. For Russia, the center is the Stability of the Regime in Moscow. If you wish for a solution, you must stop seeking "dialogue" and start seeking the "point of collapse." To end a war, you must make the cost of continuing it exceed the value of the political object. Currently, neither side believes they have reached that point.

2. Beware the "Fog of War" and Friction

You speak of "Strategic Autonomy" and "UN80 Reform." These are beautiful maps, but the map is not the territory. Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. This is Friction. A diplomat’s pen moves easily; a battalion through the mud does not. Your "solution" must account for the fact that Vladimir Putin is operating within the "Fog"—he is betting that your "European Will" is a fragile thing that will shatter under the weight of a long, cold winter.

3. The Political Object defines the Military Aim

You mentioned that the "International Order is dead." If the political object—the restoration of that order—is truly dead, then the military aim in Ukraine has become untethered. A war without a clear political object is merely a slaughter.

• My advice: Europe must decide exactly what its "Political Object" is. Is it the total defeat of Russia (which requires a total mobilization you are not prepared for)? Or is it the survival of a sovereign Ukraine (which requires a "Limited War" strategy)? You cannot have both with the same level of investment.

4. The Defensive is the Stronger Form

You worry that Russia is "intensifying its aggression." Remember my maxim: The defensive form of war is in itself stronger than the offensive. Ukraine has proved this. But the defense has a "culminating point." If Ukraine is pushed beyond its ability to strike back, its defense will become a brittle shell. Your "European Defense Autonomy" must be the "shield of the weak" that allows the defense to remain active and lethal.

5. On the "Spirit of Dialogue"

Dialogue in the midst of a total clash of wills is merely a "breathing space" for the combatants. Do not mistake a pause for a peace. A true solution only arrives when the "diminishing force of the offensive" meets the "mounting power of the defensive" at a point where both sides realize that total victory is a mirage.

My Verdict: Do not seek "optimism," Victor. Seek the "Culminating Point." Strengthen the Ukrainian Center of Gravity until the Russian Will to Power hits a wall of reality. Only when the Kremlin realizes that the "Political Object" (the erasure of Ukraine) is costing more than the "Means" (the Russian State) will the war move from the battlefield back to the "Continuation of Politics"—the negotiating table.

Until then, arm your reason as heavily as you arm your soldiers.

Carl von Clausewitz

________________________________________

The reply from Sun Tzu

From the Pavilion of Infinite Stillness

To the General Clausewitz and the Scholar Victor Ângelo,

I have listened to the General speak of "Centers of Gravity" and "Mass." He speaks of war as a great hammer striking a cold anvil. It is a loud philosophy, full of smoke and the scent of iron. But I tell you: the peak of efficiency is to win without fighting.

General Clausewitz focuses on the Conflict; I focus on the Calculation. He seeks the "Culminating Point" of force; I seek the "Turning Point" of the spirit.

Victor, you speak of a "Dead Order." I say: In the midst of chaos, there is also opportunity. Do not mourn the old order. When the old walls crumble, the terrain is finally clear for those who know how to move.

Here is my response to the General’s advice concerning the war in the West:

1. The Strategy of the Sheathed Sword

The General says war is the continuation of politics. I say: All warfare is based on deception. If the Kremlin believes the West is weary, it will strike. If the West shows its teeth too fiercely, the Kremlin will become desperate like a cornered tiger. The "Solution" is not to break the enemy's Center of Gravity with a hammer, but to disrupt his alliances and frustrate his plans before his troops even move. The EU-Mercosur agreement you mentioned is a "Heavenly Move"—it wins a battle in the West by securing the South, without firing a single shot.

2. Know the Enemy and Know Yourself

General Clausewitz speaks of "Friction" and "Fog." I tell you: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. Putin’s strength is his perceived "Will." His weakness is his isolation from the flow of the world. Europe’s strength is its "Order." Its weakness is its hesitation. To win, Europe must make its hesitation look like "Patient Strategy" and its unity look like "Infinite Depth."

3. The Golden Bridge

The General says a war ends when one side collapses. I caution you: Do not press a desperate foe too hard. A surrounded enemy will fight with the strength of ten because he has no choice but to die. If you seek a "solution" in Ukraine, you must build a "Golden Bridge" for your enemy to retreat across. If you leave him no path to save his face, he will burn the world to save his ego. Your diplomacy must be like water: soft enough to offer an exit, but relentless enough to erode his foundation.

4. Speed and Subtlety

Clausewitz speaks of the "Defensive as the Stronger Form." I agree, but with a warning: An army prefers high ground to low, and sunny places to dark. Your "European Defense Autonomy" must not be a static wall (the Low Ground). It must be a "Sunlit Strategy"—an intelligence that sees the enemy’s move before he makes it. Use the "Indirect Way." Strengthen Ukraine not just with steel, but by making the Russian people realize that their leader is leading them into a desert while the rest of the world moves toward the oasis.

5. The Use of "Shi" (Strategic Momentum)

You gather at Davos. Do not use it for "Dialogue"—that is for the weak. Use it to build Shi (Strategic Momentum). When the momentum is high, even a round boulder will roll down a mountain with unstoppable force. If you align the Global South, the European Defense, and the Trade Agreements of the West, the "Momentum of History" will shift. At that point, the Kremlin will not "collapse" under a blow; it will simply find itself standing still while the world moves on without it.

My Verdict: General Clausewitz wants to win the war. I want to make the war impossible to continue. Victor, do not seek a "Decision" on the battlefield alone. Seek to make the enemy’s victory so expensive and his isolation so complete that his own people see his "Will to Power" as a "Will to Ruin."

Victory is not a destination; it is a change in the wind.

Sun Tzu