Saturday, 21 November 2026

Ukraine: Between an Imperfect Peace and an Unjust Peace

 The meeting between Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Donald Trump in Shenzhen, on the margins of the APEC summit, has been presented as a potential turning point in the war in Ukraine. It is difficult to share that enthusiasm. The gathering excluded Ukraine, marginalised Europe, and brought together solely Russia, the aggressor, China, which sustains it, and an American administration seemingly prepared to endorse Moscow’s demands.

Peace is rarely born of solemn declarations or isolated events. It takes shape when strategic reality compels both the invader and the victim to accept compromises they previously rejected. The problem does not lie in the pursuit of peace; a serious, multilateral effort to bring the war to an end deserves encouragement. What is taking shape in meetings such as the one in Shenzhen, however, is far removed from that: it is an attempt to artificially accelerate a process that remains fundamentally flawed.

A conviction seems to have taken hold that the essential thing is to end the war tomorrow. The intention is understandable; the conclusion may prove perilous. Not all peaces are equal. Some resolve conflicts and stabilise entire regions for decades. Others are mere intervals between new wars. It is precisely this risk that is emerging today.

Russia has failed to achieve the central objectives of its invasion. It has neither toppled the government in Kyiv nor destroyed Ukraine’s political independence. It has not fragmented the country. Moreover, it appears to have reinforced the strategic cohesion of NATO and the European Union. It retains control over territories seized by force and now seeks to transform those military gains into an internationally recognised political reality. Undue haste risks legitimising at the negotiating table what the aggressor failed to achieve on the battlefield.

For the Russian population, the aggression carries a dramatically high price. The military effort continues to absorb colossal resources. The war economy is unsustainable. Human losses are mounting at a dizzying pace. Hundreds of thousands of citizens have fled the country. Dependence on China has deepened significantly. Prolonging the war will only exacerbate the myriad problems Russia faces.

The central question is not whether negotiations should take place. The real question is under what conditions and with what objectives. A genuine peace requires far more than the silencing of guns. It demands credible security guarantees, robust verification mechanisms, and solid political commitments. Without these elements, any understanding runs the risk of becoming a mere armistice.

It is in this context that one of the greatest political risks of the moment arises.

Donald Trump wants a peace deal without further delay. An understanding presented as the end of the war would allow him to claim the status of a leader capable of resolving what others could not. From a political standpoint, the American president’s ambition is plain for all to see. From a strategic standpoint, it could prove profoundly reckless.

Within this logic, the quality and sustainability of agreements become secondary. The objective ceases to be the construction of a robust peace and becomes instead the production of a politically marketable outcome. Peace is reduced to a photograph, an announcement, a deadline met.

China observes this entire process behind a mask of calculated prudence that barely conceals its resolute support for Russia. Beijing seeks to project itself as a responsible and indispensable power. Above all, it has no interest in breaking with Moscow, nor in jeopardising its economic relations with Europe.

Europe, too, faces a decisive test. The war in Ukraine is the greatest challenge to the European security architecture since the end of the Cold War. Its consequences will mark the continent for decades. Consequently, a solution designed without European participation is unlikely to yield lasting stability—not merely because Europeans bear a substantial share of the costs of the war, but because the very organisation of the continent’s security is at stake.

The exclusion of Europe is not merely a diplomatic slight. It would signify accepting that fundamental questions concerning the security of hundreds of millions of people can be decided by an informal directorate of great powers. European history knows that logic well: it is the logic of spheres of influence and balances imposed by the strongest.

Ukraine stands today at the centre of this challenge. It is possible that a wholly just peace is already beyond reach. Destroyed cities will not be rebuilt by diplomacy. The dead will not return. The trauma will endure for generations. All of this calls for a new paradigm.

There is a fundamental difference between an imperfect peace and an unjust peace. An imperfect peace accepts the constraints of reality without abandoning essential principles. An unjust peace converts brute force into supposedly legitimate right. While the former seeks an equilibrium, the latter sows the seeds of tomorrow’s conflicts.

Ukraine’s sovereignty must remain the cornerstone of any serious agreement. Without credible security guarantees and without the consent of the Ukrainians themselves, any settlement will be nothing more than a precarious armistice.

The decisive question is not whether this war must end—the Russian invasion should never have begun. The true question is what kind of Europe will remain when it does. A peace imposed on the aggressor’s terms, negotiated on the margins of Ukraine and Europe and presented as a diplomatic triumph, may generate favourable headlines and momentary applause. It will, nevertheless, be unacceptable, for it will enshrine the notion that force remains a legitimate instrument for altering borders and imposing unjust interests.

Peace requires compromise. Yet there is a line that cannot be crossed without historical consequences. When aggression is rewarded, a conflict is not brought to a close; the path is cleared for the next one.

Published: 20 November 2026, Diário de Notícias (Lisbon)

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