Russia and Democratic Europe

DN Opinion

The Russian siege and Europe's response

Victor Ângelo
International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

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Published on: 25 Sep 2026, Diário de Notícias, Lisboa, Portugal
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The recent Duma elections were well staged. They confirmed the internal control exercised by the regime, the decision to continue the illegal war against Ukraine, and Vladimir Putin's structural policy against Europe, which has gradually evolved from occasional provocations to a strategy of persistent and calculated pressure.

Moscow operates on several complementary fronts: sabotage, cyberattacks, electronic signal jamming, the instrumentalization of migrants, propaganda, military intimidation, and support for extremist and pro-Russian political forces. The purpose is not to immediately destroy Western capabilities—not for lack of will, but through strategic calculation. In reality, it is about testing and exposing the political frailties of democratic Europe, with actions surgically below the threshold of NATO's Article 5. The authorship of these actions is systematically denied, exploiting the inherent slowness of democracies in gathering evidence and making decisions. Putin is an expert at transforming political doubt into an instrument of equivocation and at fostering fractures among allied nations.

This pressure materializes on coordinated fronts that many insist on treating as isolated incidents. From Kaliningrad and other unidentified locations, satellite navigation disruptions are already a recurrent issue, affecting aviation and maritime navigation across a vast swath between Poland and Scandinavia. In terms of sabotage, the damage to submarine telecommunication cables in the Baltic Sea since 2024 is now compounded by the threat in the Arctic, where a Russian military unit has reportedly studied ways to disable the region's cables. On the land borders, the migratory instrument orchestrated via Belarus has adapted: in response to the physical barriers erected in Poland, the pressure has shifted towards Lithuania and Latvia through new tactics.

Often treated in isolation by certain political sectors and parts of public opinion, the war of aggression against Ukraine is not a parallel conflict: it is the most brutal manifestation of this very same strategy. There are those who still fail to grasp this connection, viewing support for Kyiv as a mere gesture of solidarity or an obligation that is difficult to justify—a tragic misreading. While on the rest of the continent Moscow operates in the grey zone to avoid collective retaliation, in Ukraine it resorts to direct military force to achieve the same end: to subjugate democracies and unilaterally redraw European security. Support for Ukraine must therefore be unequivocally integrated into the broader framework of defending democratic Europe. Ukraine is our first trench.

Europe's vulnerability, however, is predominantly political and internal. The Kremlin finds Trojan horses within the very heart of the European system: certain extremist parties and movements. Whether through submission, ideological convergence, or financing, or through anti-Americanism or xenophobic repudiation of European integration, these forces ultimately serve Moscow's objectives. By normalizing the Russian narrative, attacking NATO, hindering aid to Kyiv, and sowing scepticism towards European institutions, these extremes amplify the hybrid war.

The European response is dangerously asymmetrical. On the eastern and Nordic flank, the response to the threat is already State doctrine: Finland has integrated hybrid analysis into its comprehensive defence, Estonia is investing in digital resilience, and Warsaw and Vilnius are preparing for escalation scenarios. In Western and Southern Europe, the awakening has been delayed. Although there are shifts in perception and policy in Berlin, Paris, London, Rome, and even Brussels, the response remains too slow, bureaucratic, and fragmented.

This delay reveals a certain incomprehension of the autocratic vision of the regime led by Vladimir Putin. The risk encompasses all of Europe outside the Russian orbit, from the Ukrainian front and the Baltic region to the North Atlantic. Anyone in Lisbon or other European capitals who deems Russia to be distant and their country safe from hybrid attacks demonstrates an embarrassingly naive attitude. In a multidimensional war, traditional geography is no longer a shield. To underestimate this reach is to directly imperil Portuguese critical infrastructure—most notably the Atlantic submarine cables, ports, airports, and energy networks. It is to forget that these connections, if sabotaged, will affect not only our country but a significant part of the West.

This vulnerability is currently exacerbated by the uncertainty surrounding the American commitment. The political distance between Europe and the US continues to widen. They are two perspectives seemingly in the process of divorce. The announced review of the US posture in Europe, involving troop reductions and greater conventional responsibility for allies, has its justifications and will ultimately strengthen European autonomy, but it requires a realistic timetable. The Kremlin is well aware of Western deterrence's reliance on the credibility of its guarantor, and it exploits any hesitation to intensify the pressure.

Russia takes advantage of our difficulty in operating within this intermediate zone between peace and war. It no longer limits itself to testing our degree of tolerance; the signals it sends us should be a cause for concern. It will most likely not act against our part of Europe in the same way it has in Ukraine since 2014, with the occupation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas, and since 2022, with the full-scale invasion. Putin recognizes that an attack on a NATO member could trigger the collective response provisioned in Article 5 and that clandestine actions, including false-flag operations, complicate the unequivocal attribution of responsibility. His political leadership prefers clandestine actions, typical of secret services, agencies in which Putin places a higher degree of trust than in the armed forces. The time has thus come for democratic Europe to abandon its old naivety, grow up, and take its rightful place at the table of international relations: Diplomacy and Defence.

The Suwalki Gap and Lithuania's mistake

Lithuania and Borrell erred, must make amends

Victor Angelo

The European Union's High Representative for Foreign Policy Josep Borrell considers the Lithuanian decision to ban the transit through its territory of certain goods in circulation between other parts of Russia and the Russian region of Kaliningrad as correct. Borrell further clarifies that the ban only includes goods that are on the EU's sanctions list. That is, steel and other metals, construction materials, technological items and soon coal and later oil. Borrell seeks to protect Lithuania by saying that the decision of that country's government merely complies with what had been approved at European level. The ban covers about 50% of rail and road traffic between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia. It does not concern the passage of persons, which remains open, albeit with some long-standing restrictions.

While I have great respect for the Lithuanian government's determination, I see the measure as a serious mistake. And I do not agree with Borrell's and others' defence of it. The sanctions adopted by the EU do include a clear reference to the transit of goods. But what is happening in the Suwalki corridor - the 65 km long strip of land linking Kaliningrad with Belarus and then the rest of Russia - is different from the transit of goods for import or export reasons. The sanctions clearly concern Russia's foreign trade. In the case in question, it is a matter of allowing movement between two parts of the same country. The issue should therefore be seen as a matter for the Russian domestic economy and thus outside the restrictions imposed by Brussels.

Moreover, all this has a very delicate political connotation. This opens up a new front for direct confrontation between the EU and Russia. It is particularly dangerous and distracts us from the fundamental, urgent, priority concern, which is to focus all our energies on supporting Ukraine and its legitimate defence efforts. It is dangerous because it gives Russia an easy pretext to exploit for a very strong offensive against Lithuania, a member of NATO. However, Lithuania, like its two neighbours to the north, Latvia and Estonia, is very difficult to defend. Several strategic exercises, simulated at the highest level of NATO command - I had the opportunity to participate in some - have repeatedly shown the extreme fragility of any of these three countries, in the case of a hostile military intervention coming from the neighbourhood. They are small territories, without strategic depth, easy to occupy. We have thus opened a conflict at a weak point in our defence space. This is certainly not an intelligent strategic decision, let alone a wise one. Moreover, there was no need for it.

At this point it remains to be seen what kind of retaliation the Kremlin will adopt. But the partial blockade of Kaliningrad is seen in Moscow as something very serious. And that makes me quite worried. In all likelihood, Vladimir Putin will respond to this challenge on the very eve of the NATO summit, due to take place in Madrid from 28 to 30 June.

Borrell should be advised to review his position on this partial blockade without delay. There must be courage and common sense in the key countries of the European Union to say, loud and clear, that the moment demands prudence and a calm understanding of what is appropriate and a priority. It is clear that Mr Borrell and all the others are expected to unequivocally condemn Russian policy and the war of aggression against Ukraine and to speak clearly on the issues of food safety and respect for the international order. They must demonstrate European firmness, defend our interests and counteract the disinformation campaigns that Russia is carrying out in North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. But always with the concern to be seen as representatives of a Union that wants peace and respect for the rules of good neighbourliness. And which knows how to rectify its mistakes.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 24 June 2022)

Criteria to select Juncker´s successor

The discussion about the selection and approval of the next European Commission President has now openly started. Juncker is still on up to the end of next year, that´s true, but it´s also a fact that the issue of his succession will continue to occupy the minds during the next few months.

I am convinced that the tradition of selecting a former head of government or State to chair the Commission should be kept. Such an approach is fundamental to give a solid foundation of authority to the holder of that most critical job. 

In addition to that type of political experience, the candidates most be consensual enough, including in terms of enticing the support of the European Parliament. Nobody can get the job if not supported by the EP. Such requirement does not mean the successful candidate most come from the political family that gets the greater number of seats in the next parliament. It means that such candidate must be able to gain the advantage within the EP. 

Besides these two criteria - former government leadership experience and majority vote in parliament – the new President should come from a region of the EU that has been underrepresented when it comes to this type of responsibilities. That makes me think of the Nordic and the Baltic States. And, last point, the preference should go for a woman. 

Germany and NATO

Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the German Foreign Minister, is an important player in European affairs. Thus, it is always wise to listen to his public statements. Tomorrow´s edition of the Bild am Sonntag newspaper will carry an interview with him. As I get to understand it, the Minister seems critical of the current approach NATO is following on Russia. He recognises the relations with Moscow are not good at all. But he thinks that escalating NATO´s military presence in Poland and the Baltic States is not the answer.

That´s an interesting position. It is obviously contrary to the current policy options within the Alliance. Moreover, Steinmeier has been aware for a good deal of time of the ongoing exercises that NATO is implementing in Poland and in the vicinity of Russia. Why did he consider necessary wait so long before stating his views? Why are those views expressed through an interview and not in the more reserved decision-making forums that are available? What should be the reading of such a position at this stage? And a few more questions, of course.

The Baltics are in sensitive region of Europe

The Baltic region, a corner of Europe I came to gradually know after I retired from the UN and initiated my current professional interests, is a very sensitive geopolitical area. The Baltic States are now in the EU and NATO. But they have a powerful and resentful neighbour and significant Russian minorities within their borders. I have always thought they need to have a very wise relationship with that neighbour. They can achieve it and, at the same time, continue to strengthen their links with our part of Europe and with NATO. The balancing act is possible. It is actually the only option that is sensible.

What is not sensible is to post a tweet in the social media, as the Latvian Foreign Minister did yesterday, that says: “The more I follow modern RU, the more I come to conclusion that she will end up like German Reich after both WWI & WWII & it'll be too late”. Such statement shows political immaturity. It does not serve the interests of his country and the region. And if we take into account that Latvia is now chairing the EU, until the end of the semester, the tweet is unacceptable, as I see it from Brussels. 

In Riga with hope

When in Riga, as it is again the case at present, I am amazed by the elegance and good manners of its people. I can only wish they will be able to keep the society together, notwithstanding the linguistic and social divisions, and keep the economy growing.

The region might feel nervous because of the events in Ukraine. But the Baltic States are not in the same predicament as Ukraine. They are now part of the EU and NATO. They belong to a greater political space. And their geo-economic situation can be an advantage, a major trump card. They can be a strong link between the rest of the EU and Russia, once the situation goes back to normal. And I hope that will be the case one day in the coming future. 

Baltic bridges

The Baltic States are all members of NATO. That´s a big difference when their situation is compared with Ukraine´s. But there is more. They are part of the EU, including of the Schengen space, and two of them have the Euro as their currency. These are major reasons for their citizens of Russian ancestry and ethnicity to consider that they have a lot to gain if the current status quo of the Baltic countries is maintained. They would certainly feel less free and less able to move around if they were to become part of Russia.

But the Baltic leaders also have a major role to play. They should recognise the rights of the minority populations that live in their countries, including the official recognition of Russian as one of the national languages.

I have said several times to my Baltic friends that they have a lot to gain by being neighbours of Russia and part of the EU. They can be the bridge that everyone would like to see strengthened.

This is therefore no time for inappropriate rhetoric. 

Riga

It’s a delight to spend time in Riga. I am now at the end of my usual long September stay in the capital of Latvia. And I leave with a good feeling. This is a place that is forward looking, committed and full of beautiful people. They are also an example of civility and discipline. And those are two ingredients that make everyday life much easier. Even in the cold and the rain of the long days of autumn or in the freezing temperatures of very heavy winters. Even when money is short and the living get tough. But this people will make it, I am sure.