The Suwalki Gap and Lithuania's mistake

Lithuania and Borrell erred, must make amends

Victor Angelo

The European Union's High Representative for Foreign Policy Josep Borrell considers the Lithuanian decision to ban the transit through its territory of certain goods in circulation between other parts of Russia and the Russian region of Kaliningrad as correct. Borrell further clarifies that the ban only includes goods that are on the EU's sanctions list. That is, steel and other metals, construction materials, technological items and soon coal and later oil. Borrell seeks to protect Lithuania by saying that the decision of that country's government merely complies with what had been approved at European level. The ban covers about 50% of rail and road traffic between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia. It does not concern the passage of persons, which remains open, albeit with some long-standing restrictions.

While I have great respect for the Lithuanian government's determination, I see the measure as a serious mistake. And I do not agree with Borrell's and others' defence of it. The sanctions adopted by the EU do include a clear reference to the transit of goods. But what is happening in the Suwalki corridor - the 65 km long strip of land linking Kaliningrad with Belarus and then the rest of Russia - is different from the transit of goods for import or export reasons. The sanctions clearly concern Russia's foreign trade. In the case in question, it is a matter of allowing movement between two parts of the same country. The issue should therefore be seen as a matter for the Russian domestic economy and thus outside the restrictions imposed by Brussels.

Moreover, all this has a very delicate political connotation. This opens up a new front for direct confrontation between the EU and Russia. It is particularly dangerous and distracts us from the fundamental, urgent, priority concern, which is to focus all our energies on supporting Ukraine and its legitimate defence efforts. It is dangerous because it gives Russia an easy pretext to exploit for a very strong offensive against Lithuania, a member of NATO. However, Lithuania, like its two neighbours to the north, Latvia and Estonia, is very difficult to defend. Several strategic exercises, simulated at the highest level of NATO command - I had the opportunity to participate in some - have repeatedly shown the extreme fragility of any of these three countries, in the case of a hostile military intervention coming from the neighbourhood. They are small territories, without strategic depth, easy to occupy. We have thus opened a conflict at a weak point in our defence space. This is certainly not an intelligent strategic decision, let alone a wise one. Moreover, there was no need for it.

At this point it remains to be seen what kind of retaliation the Kremlin will adopt. But the partial blockade of Kaliningrad is seen in Moscow as something very serious. And that makes me quite worried. In all likelihood, Vladimir Putin will respond to this challenge on the very eve of the NATO summit, due to take place in Madrid from 28 to 30 June.

Borrell should be advised to review his position on this partial blockade without delay. There must be courage and common sense in the key countries of the European Union to say, loud and clear, that the moment demands prudence and a calm understanding of what is appropriate and a priority. It is clear that Mr Borrell and all the others are expected to unequivocally condemn Russian policy and the war of aggression against Ukraine and to speak clearly on the issues of food safety and respect for the international order. They must demonstrate European firmness, defend our interests and counteract the disinformation campaigns that Russia is carrying out in North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. But always with the concern to be seen as representatives of a Union that wants peace and respect for the rules of good neighbourliness. And which knows how to rectify its mistakes.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 24 June 2022)

Ukraine: what's next, after 100 days of agression?

Ukraine: looking beyond 100 days of aggression

Victor Angelo

President Zelensky has stressed that the war will only end with recourse to diplomacy. He is right. He needs to build a peace agreement with the aggressor. This will not be easy. The agreement cannot reward what has been a clear violation of international law, a succession of war crimes, destruction, and acts of pillage. This is the great dilemma, which makes any mediation process a puzzle. In this scenario, an agreement will only be possible between a position of strength and one of weakness. This is a dramatic conclusion. It leads to the search for the crushing or humiliation of the adversary. 

At the outset, one would say that prolonging hostilities is to the advantage of the stronger side. The courage and determination of the Ukrainians would not be enough to respond effectively to a prolonged offensive conducted with unbridled brutality.

It is in this context that external aid is essential. Neither the US nor the EU countries can let Vladimir Putin's Russia defeat Ukraine. If that were to happen, peace, security and democracy in Europe would be seriously undermined. Now it would be Ukraine, tomorrow it could be Poland, Lithuania, or any other country in our geopolitical space. Or we would simply continue to live side by side with a neighbour always ready to do us harm.

Thus, each bloc must assist Ukraine with the means available. On the American side, it has now been decided to provide an arsenal of advanced technology and long-range weapons. The admonitions coming from Moscow following this decision by Joe Biden found an answer in the text that the President signed this Tuesday in the New York Times: it is not about seeking a war between NATO and Russia. The aim is to enable the Ukrainians to have the means to exercise their right to self-defence.

On the European side, the package of sanctions adopted this week at the European Council should be seen in a positive light. It goes as far as the consensus allows. What is essential is that it is finalised without further delay - Hungary continues to put up obstacles - and applied at an accelerated pace.

Even more important is the agreement between the EU and the UK that makes it impossible for ships carrying Russian oil products to insure their cargoes in London and the rest of Europe. Without such insurance contracts, the big shipping lines are no longer able to operate in the service of Russian exports. Experience with Iran shows that such a measure sharply reduces oil exports. This is certainly one of the sanctions so far with the greatest impact.

As I have said several times, sanctions have fundamentally three objectives. To express political condemnation. To reduce the financial capacity that sustains the war machine. And to disconnect the Russian Federation from more developed economies, to emphasise that there is a connection between respect for international law and participation in global markets.

Sanctions should be part of a future negotiation of normalising relations. But they can only be lifted when the Kremlin is no longer seen by Europe and its allies as an unpredictable and threatening regime.

In addition to arms and sanctions, it will be necessary to continue financial support to Ukraine. This support is a potentially delicate matter at a time of relatively anaemic economic growth in Europe and when the rising cost of living is becoming a major concern. But it is the price we have to pay to maintain our stability and security. It is an effort that will last for some time. Later, when entering the negotiation phase, the mediators will have to include on the agenda the issue of war reparations and the financing of Ukraine's reconstruction.  

On this 100th day of the aggression, we are facing a very complex situation. Future scenarios, especially for the next three weeks, should include several concerns. But for now, the priority challenges are four: immediately strengthening Ukraine's defence capacity; deepening isolation and weakening Russia's public finances; maintaining unity amongst us; and continuing to insist on the diplomacy of peace.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated  3 June 2022)

The next boss in Brussels

The results are out, and most of the European voters decided to support the common goal of a stronger Europe. That’s great news. Everybody knows there was a lot of anxiety about a possible shift towards the extreme parties. They have gained votes but not in a significant way.  

Tomorrow the heads of State and Government will meet in Brussels to launch the consultations about the nomination of the next European Commission President. My position on this matter is clear. Jean-Claude Juncker’s successor must come from one of the leading candidates that has competed for the European Parliament. That’s the way we can show respect for the Parliament and for the voters. The heads of national States must not bring forward someone that has not campaigned. Even if that person is somebody of Michel Barnier’s calibre.

The three main contenders are Manfred Weber, the head of European People’s Party grouping, Frans Timmermans, from the Socialist group and Margrethe Vestager, from the Liberal-centre family. They all have the potential to lead the Commission. They must be given priority attention.

My preference would go for Frans Timmermans. He has shown, as Vice-President to Juncker, strong political courage and clear ideas. He has a deep executive experience as well. But that’s not enough, when it comes to horse trading among the heads of Sate and Government.

Angela Merkel will fight for her spitzenkandidat, Manfred Weber. He is not liked by Emmanuel Macron. There will certainly be another clash between Merkel and Macron.

A woman must also get a top position in Brussels. This cannot be ignored by the leaders. It could be Vestager in the Commission or the outgoing Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė, who could take Donald Tusk’s position. They are both top-notch candidates.

Baltic bridges

The Baltic States are all members of NATO. That´s a big difference when their situation is compared with Ukraine´s. But there is more. They are part of the EU, including of the Schengen space, and two of them have the Euro as their currency. These are major reasons for their citizens of Russian ancestry and ethnicity to consider that they have a lot to gain if the current status quo of the Baltic countries is maintained. They would certainly feel less free and less able to move around if they were to become part of Russia.

But the Baltic leaders also have a major role to play. They should recognise the rights of the minority populations that live in their countries, including the official recognition of Russian as one of the national languages.

I have said several times to my Baltic friends that they have a lot to gain by being neighbours of Russia and part of the EU. They can be the bridge that everyone would like to see strengthened.

This is therefore no time for inappropriate rhetoric.