Reflecting about the new international rules: business and might

The New International Order: Business and Brute Force

By Victor Ângelo

I have many doubts about the footballing abilities—and others—of President Donald Trump, especially now that he has started the New Year with two own goals.

The first own goal was the intervention in Venezuela. It resulted in the deterioration of his country’s international image and handed points on a silver platter to Russia and China.

The UN Security Council meeting revealed the gravity of the American adventure in Venezuela. The Secretary-General, who out of prudence did not attend the meeting in person, had a statement read out which underlined that Venezuela’s sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity had been violated. In that communication, he referred to the US military operation as a “dangerous precedent”, which seemed strange to several governments and analysts, considering that the history of the Latin American region is littered with similar interventions—Harvard University historians have inventoried more than forty extraconstitutional ruptures organised with the support or at the instigation of Washington. The most famous occurred in 1973, when President Salvador Allende of Chile was assassinated thanks to the organisational skills of the CIA.

The great difference between the military intervention of a few days ago and previous ones lies in President Trump’s admission that the current one aimed at the usurpation of the oil resources of the attacked country. Past interferences were presented with another level of subtlety, without direct references to expropriations or looting.

I note an additional point regarding Guterres’ communication. Many at the United Nations compared the statement he made following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 with this one now, carried out by the USA. Guterres condemned Russia directly and was himself present at the Security Council meeting for that purpose. He addressed Vladimir Putin unambiguously, in the name of peace and political ethics. In the case of the USA, he used only generic arguments about the international order and the violation of the Charter, without mentioning Trump’s name. Let this be noted, and let it serve as an invitation to reflection.

The first own goal was favourable to the Russian Federation and China. The repeated references in Washington to the theory of spheres of influence made it more difficult to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Someone circulating in the corridors of the Kremlin sent me a provocative message, albeit with some wit and a touch of diplomacy in the style learned from old Soviet manuals. It said they were sure I would condemn, in this week’s chronicle, the unjustified aggression against the Venezuelan power and demand that the European Union impose sanctions against the mastermind of the kidnappings. A Putin's faithful joker. One might say that the Russian leaders feel happy and content with what happened in Venezuela.

As for China, which was in fact the most indirectly targeted country—Washington does not want China to gain a presence in the area of influence that the Americans consider their own—there was a kind of validation of its claims regarding Taiwan. This does not mean that Beijing is thinking of launching a military operation against Taipei in the very near future. China knows that such an offensive, should it happen, would carry high costs. But it has now received an indication from the Trump Administration that it can increase political-military pressure on the island. And use more bellicose language, which is indeed happening this week after a Taiwanese MP proposed an amendment to the “Act Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area”, a law adopted by Taipei in 1992. According to the proposal, the statute would be renamed the “Act on Relations between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China”. The new name and content are seen by Beijing as yet another attempt to separate the two parts and promote Taiwan's independence—something that is absolutely unacceptable to the Chinese leadership.

The second own goal resulted from statements by Trump and those around him, such as Stephen Miller—a hawk who serves as the White House Deputy Chief of Staff—regarding Greenland. Trump is preparing to annex Greenland, which is a territory of the European space through its connection to Denmark. The reason invoked—to create a security barrier against Russia and China—makes no sense. The USA has a military base in Greenland and can count on full Danish cooperation. It should be noted that during the Cold War, the base housed around 10,000 American military personnel. Now, it has around 150. This evolution does not reveal great geopolitical fears on the part of the USA. Not forgetting that there are several treaties between the USA and Denmark that recognise Danish sovereignty regarding Greenland.

Trump has his eyes fixed on the territory’s natural riches, on the maritime corridors that climate change will make navigable the Arctic zone, on the airspace controlled by Greenland—which has enormous strategic value—and on History: he wants to see his name added to the list of presidents who augmented the American territorial area.

He should also think about the impact that the annexation will have on the future of NATO. But for him, NATO serves to buy weaponry from the American industry. And that will continue to happen for many years, whether there is NATO or not. The Europeans are captive customers. The new reality is evident: in our day, business and brute force are triumphing over diplomacy and the international order, thanks to Trump, Putin, and others alike.

Published in Portuguese language in today's edition (09/01/2026) of Diário de Notícias. 

Reflecting about 2025

Year-End Notes

Victor Ângelo

If I were asked to summarise 2025 in a single word, I would say “turbulence”. This has been a year of great unrest, and I do not know who should be awarded the top spot on the podium of dishonour: Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, Benjamin Netanyahu, or the rebel Sudanese general Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti. Other names could be added to the list, including terrorist leaders, but it is not worth discussing minor players or making the list excessively long.

The year draws to a close leaving leading geopolitical analysts deeply uneasy. Not for decades has the word war been so prevalent in the speeches of influential people. Now the word appears repeatedly, as if it were an inevitability on the near horizon. It is a disturbing way to end the year. When the conversation about war monopolises the media space and public debate, it makes us forget the role of diplomacy and international organisations, opening the door to disinformation, alienation, and hatred. Thus, war criminals—people who should be driven from power and brought to The Hague—are given a platform and credibility.

After all, what has been learned in 2025? In short, that peace, cooperation, and stability based on respect for international law are not—contrary to the illusion created since the end of the Cold War—the pillars of modern times. They ought to be the foundations of globalisation, but globalisation is not apolitical. On one side of the coin, it is positive. On the other, it creates dependencies, vulnerabilities, and brings back the discretionary use of force. Despite everything, it is fundamental to insist on the positive dimension of globalisation and to condemn without hesitation those who do not respect international norms and refuse to recognise that the future of humanity will only be prosperous if there is solidarity between peoples and peace between States. Believing that a peace agreement can be reached with people like Putin, for example, only enters the minds of ambiguous and incomprehensible actors like Steve Witkoff or well-known fifth columnists like Viktor Orbán.

Putin is a tyrant and, like all other totalitarian leaders, does not recognise the value of diplomacy or deliberation. This week, in an exchange of correspondence with a member of his circle, the gentleman tried to convince me that Putin personifies the sentiment and historical soul of the Russian people. Just as Trump is said to be the personification of the will of the majority of American citizens. I had to remind him of something he already knew: that I have met multiple dictators throughout my professional life. The last thing I would say about such people is that they represent the people to whom they belong. The inflation of their outsized egos is their primary motivation. In truth, they represent only themselves, their boundless ambition, and the opportunists who cling to them. It is all a matter of terrible leadership taken to the extreme. They do not accept peace agreements, let alone the spectre of defeat. The subjugation of those they label as enemies is the only solution they consider in their delusion. A dictator oppresses, creates a false narrative, and a system of absolute control over power. Anyone who thinks they can trust a despot is, quite simply, naive.

This must be one of the lessons of the year. Unfortunately, there are leaders who seem not to have learned it. They claim to be convinced—and want to force others to accept—that it is possible to reach an agreement with a Putin acting in good faith.

He will never agree to sign security guarantees that are actually sufficient to ensure the survival of Ukraine. He has already stated this clearly: any stabilisation force, should one ever be established, must not and cannot include European troops. At best, Putin would accept a force composed of soldiers from underdeveloped countries or, failing that, detachments from vassal regimes or those close to the Kremlin’s policies. Such a stabilisation mission would be merely symbolic, like trying to stop the wind with your hand palms. To have legitimacy and effectiveness, it should result from a genuine and sincere commitment between Ukraine and Russia, and stem from a mandate approved by the UN Security Council. None of this has any possibility of happening in the near future. France and the United Kingdom would veto any resolution that did not offer sufficient guarantees. And Ukraine could not approve a setup essentially engineered in the Kremlin.

Whether one likes it or not, the year now ending must remind us of two other dimensions: that the drawing of borders must not depend on the force of arms, and that whoever initiates aggression against another State must be held indisputably accountable for the crimes committed and the damage caused.

It is essential to remember this at a time when there is discussion in Brussels about what to do with the Russian sovereign funds already frozen in Belgium. These funds must remain withheld until the end of the conflict and until Russia’s just assumption of responsibility for what it has destroyed and for those it has injured and killed in Ukraine. Only then, during peace negotiations, should the fate of these funds be decided. They could be used, including accumulated interest, for war reparations, which would be the most appropriate conclusion. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s allied States should issue common debt intended to finance Ukrainian public spending, in the form of loans guaranteed by the frozen Russian assets, and tighten the sanctions regime against Russia and its international partners. This is, however, a temporary solution. Should the Kremlin continue to insist on prolonging the aggression, the matter must be reviewed. The non-use of Russian assets directly, for now, should be presented as a gesture in favour of peace. But one with an expiry date.

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The European Union in a rapidly changing era

 The European Union’s raft needs to reinforce its sails and recalibrate its compass

Victor Angelo

This week, the flames surrounding Federica Mogherini have provided further arguments to those seeking to destroy the forest of the European Union (EU). However, we must not forget that the EU is fundamental for the stability, security, and progress of Europe. Nor can we ignore five existential risks facing the project, which must be prioritised for resolution: political paralysis; lack of strategic autonomy; economic stagnation; the rise of demagogic movements in various European societies; and the erosion of its credibility in much of the Global South.

To address these challenges, the EU must understand two realities.

First, contrary to what certain intellectuals claim, the alliance with the United States has become extremely fragile—not just now, but for the foreseeable future. The international outlook shaped by Donald Trump, with or without him, is here to stay. Beyond “America First”, the geopolitical priorities of the new elites in power are clear and follow this order: their own hemisphere, the Indian and Pacific regions, the Middle East, the Arctic, and, last on the list, Europe.

Second, immediate and structural reforms are needed. We live in a different world—post-neocolonial, diverse, and multipolar. The United Nations, in its most political aspect, and the old Security Council, are stuck in the past. Relations with former colonies have shifted from subordination to equality and the emergence of new networks of interests. Europe must learn to operate within new frameworks of international cooperation, without illusions of neocolonial superiority.

Mario Draghi, in his September 2024 report on European competitiveness, which reads as an urgent appeal, highlights the risk of the EU’s “slow agony” if it does not invest massively in deepening the single market, banking union, digital technologies, and a cohesive and robust foreign policy, especially regarding the United States, Russia, and China. We must move away from a Europe that thinks like petty bourgeois, like would-be nouveau riche who prioritise consumption and appearance over effort and the common good. From a Europe too often led by opportunistic politicians—in Brussels and in the capitals of member states.

Draghi criticises the decline in productivity, the fragmentation of the single market that drives high-growth potential companies across the Atlantic, excessive regulatory burdens that stifle SMEs—we are a space governed by law firms and lobbyists for major private interests—and the lack of focus on clear priorities, such as innovation in advanced technologies and the link between decarbonisation and economic growth.

He also considers it essential to end the unanimity rule in several sensitive areas, such as foreign policy, defence, budgetary issues, and the accession of new members. These are some of the areas where the qualified majority principle should apply: the dual condition requiring both 65% of the population and 55% of the states. The unanimity rule is an obstacle to innovation and prevents rapid responses to geopolitical crises. The world is changing rapidly. We cannot build the future with the rules of the past.

This is also the moment to put forward an ambitious proposal for a common budget of at least 5% of European GDP, instead of the current 1%. This budget would be funded by its own taxes, not currently covered by the member states. Its purpose would be to finance research in high technology, digital, energy, convergence between member states, youth mobility within Europe, and support for initiatives that expand Europe’s geopolitical reach. These new funds could also be used to finance the ongoing mobilisation of a sufficiently broad and robust European rapid reaction military force. This would be an important step towards strategic autonomy. Without energy and military sovereignty, the EU will be nothing more than a mighty but powerless Titan, like the legendary Atlas.

The Global South, in its various forms, already defines much of today’s geopolitical map. Europe must once again become the champion of international solidarity and cooperation. Among other things, it should contribute with donations, not just loans, to help less developed countries combat climate change, organised crime and poverty. Likewise, EU states have a duty to participate in coalitions seeking to modernise the political side of the UN, especially the issue of Security Council representation. The Global South values the UN. Europe would benefit from being seen as committed to this process of renewal.

Just as the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century, the EU believes in the illusion of a certain external grandeur. Rome did not fall because of a single battle, but through slow erosion: loss of citizens’ confidence, collapse of central authority—corrupt and utterly distracted from what mattered—futile quarrels in the Senate, and growing threats from outside. We must not follow the same path.

A summary of my recommendation about Russia-EU negotiations

 

Summary of Key Points

• US Sanctions on Russian Energy Giants: The United States, under Donald Trump, imposed sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil. The implementation for Lukoil was postponed, allowing time to sell foreign assets and cease activities in Bulgaria, pending US approval. These sanctions threaten the survival of Lukoil and will significantly impact Russia’s public finances, as Rosneft is a major contributor to the Russian budget.

• Effectiveness and Purpose of Sanctions: The main question is whether the resulting financial strain will push the Kremlin towards peace negotiations, which is the US intention. However, the author doubts sanctions alone will quickly change Russian policy. Still, sanctions are justified against regimes violating international law, aiming to weaken Russia’s capacity to continue its aggression against Ukraine and to send a strong message of condemnation.

• International and Humanitarian Considerations: The UN Security Council is unlikely to approve sanctions due to political constraints, so individual states must decide their own measures. Sanctions should respect humanitarian principles, not harm civilians, and aim to resolve the conflict, specifically to end Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine.

• Kremlin’s Stance and Leadership: The author believes Vladimir Putin is not seeking peace or a ceasefire and expects the war in Ukraine to intensify. Putin is increasingly isolated from diplomatic advice, relying instead on economic and security officials. The choice of Maxim Oreshkin (an economic adviser) to represent Russia at the G20 summit highlights the regime’s focus on economic stability and the importance of economic sanctions.

• Putin’s Geopolitical Ambitions: Putin seeks a legacy as a great Russian leader and only values negotiations with major powers like the US and China, dismissing European leaders as less significant.

• Recommended EU Response: The EU should act on three fronts: continue supporting Ukraine, rigorously enforce existing sanctions, and be ready to engage in serious talks with Russian leaders.

• Role for António Costa and the EU: The author suggests that António Costa, as President of the European Council, should be given a mandate to open direct communication with Putin, aiming to start a dialogue that could benefit both sides and promote peace in Europe.

• Urgency for European Action: There is a pressing need for the EU to act before the US and Russia reach an agreement that sidelines European interests. The EU must be persistent and realistic, recognising that Putin sees negotiations as a means to assert his ambitions, not to seek compromise. The EU should not be discouraged and must assert itself as a major geopolitical player.

Mali, Sahel et l'Europe

 

1. Situation critique du Mali

• Mali est au bord de l’effondrement en tant qu’État, la majorité de son territoire étant menacée par des groupes armés, dont des organisations terroristes affiliées à Al-Qaïda, à l’État islamique, ainsi que des milices ethniques.

2. Terrorisme et criminalité organisée

• Le financement du terrorisme au Mali provient principalement de sources locales : exploitation artisanale de l’or (liée à des organisations russes qui ont pris la succession du Groupe Wagner), extorsion, enlèvements, péages routiers, vol de bétail et trafic de drogue. La région est un corridor majeur pour les drogues entre l’Amérique latine et l’Europe.

3. Crise humanitaire et sociale

• On observe un trafic généralisé de personnes, de carburant, de tabac et d’armes. Les écoles fonctionnent à peine, sauf les madrasas religieuses, et le chômage des jeunes est massif, poussant beaucoup à rejoindre des groupes armés.

4. Réponse internationale et géopolitique

• Le président de la Commission de l’Union africaine, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, appelle à une réponse internationale forte, mais l’attention mondiale fait défaut. Le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU et les puissances européennes se sont désengagés, tandis que l’influence russe s’est accrue après l’expulsion des forces françaises et de la mission de l’ONU.

5. Impact sur l’Europe

• L’instabilité au Sahel, dont le Mali, entraîne une augmentation de la migration, du trafic de drogue et de l’insécurité en Europe, ainsi qu’une perte d’influence géopolitique majeure pour l’Europe dans la région.

6. Perspective historique

• L’auteur se souvient d’une époque où le Mali et ses voisins produisaient des intellectuels et géraient mieux la gouvernance. Mais ces dernières années, l’extrémisme, la criminalité, la corruption, la pression démographique, le changement climatique et l’hostilité extérieure envers les idées démocratiques ont aggravé la situation.

7. Négligence européenne

• L’Union européenne est critiquée pour son absence de stratégie cohérente envers le Sahel, ne s’y intéressant que lorsque les conséquences (comme la migration) atteignent ses propres frontières.

A proposal for a Consolidated Peace Framework for Ukraine

This is a formal policy document draft to establish a structured, enforceable roadmap for ending hostilities, restoring stability, and ensuring long-term peace between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. It should be refined through bilateral and group consultations, and then proposed by the UN Secretary-General. 

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Executive Summary

This framework outlines a phased approach to achieving peace in Ukraine, balancing sovereignty, security, humanitarian needs, and international engagement and oversight. It is designed to be incremental, verifiable, and supported by global stakeholders, preferably under a UN Security Council Resolution.

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I. Guiding Principles

• Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity: Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders remain the ultimate objective.
• Non-Recognition of Annexation: No territorial changes will be legitimised through force.
• Humanitarian Priority: Immediate protection of civilians and infrastructure.
• Incremental Implementation: Each phase contingent on verified compliance.
• International Oversight: Neutral bodies ensure transparency and enforcement.

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II. Framework Structure

Phase 1: Immediate Ceasefire and Stabilisation

• Mutual cessation of hostilities within 24 hours of signing.
• Freeze current lines of contact as a temporary measure.
• Deploy UN/OSCE monitoring teams with satellite and drone verification.

Phase 2: Security Guarantees

• Binding security assurances for Ukraine from guarantor states (G7 + EU+ G20).
• Establish demilitarised buffer zones along the contact line.
• Russia withdraws heavy weapons from frontline areas.

Phase 3: Governance and Political Dialogue

• No formal recognition of annexation; status of occupied territories deferred.
• Create a Transitional Governance Council for disputed regions with Ukrainian representation and neutral observers.
• Guarantee cultural and linguistic rights under Ukrainian law.

Phase 4: Humanitarian Measures

• Immediate return of deported Ukrainian children and release of POWs.
• Safe corridors for civilian evacuation and aid delivery.
• Joint task force to secure nuclear facilities and critical infrastructure in close liaison with IAEA.

Phase 5: Economic Reconstruction and Sanctions Roadmap

• Establish Ukraine Reconstruction Fund financed by frozen Russian assets and international donors.
• Implement phased sanctions relief for Russia, conditional on compliance.
• Prioritise investment in housing, energy, and transport networks.

Phase 6: International Oversight

• Form a Peace Implementation Council, if possible under the supervision of the UN Security Council, and chaired by a neutral international figure.
• Consider UN peacekeeping mission from neutral countries.
• Compliance reviews every 90 days.

Phase 7: Long-Term Political Commitments

• Continue Ukraine’s EU accession process without obstruction.
• NATO membership excluded during transitional period; Ukraine retains defensive military rights.
• Sign a non-aggression pact backed by international guarantees.

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III. Enforcement and Accountability

• Violations trigger automatic suspension of sanctions relief and reconstruction funding.
• War crimes accountability mechanisms integrated into later phases.
• Dispute resolution through the International Court of Justice or agreed arbitration panels.

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IV. Timeline

• Phase 1: Within 24 hours of agreement.
• Phase 2–4: Within 3–6 months.
• Phase 5–7: Progressive implementation over 2–5 years.

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V. Stakeholder Roles

• Ukraine & Russia: Primary parties to the agreement.
• Guarantor States: Provide security assurances and financial support. Composition to be agreed by Ukraine and Russia.
• International Organisations (UN, OSCE, EU): Oversight, monitoring, and peacekeeping. Also institution-building. 
• Civil Society & NGOs: Humanitarian aid and reconstruction support.

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Europe and its weak strategy regarding the ASEAN

 From Kuala Lumpur to Brussels, the ASEAN summit shows the weakness of the European strategy towards Southeast Asia

Victor Ângelo

The European Union and its Member States have shown limited attention to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has allowed China to significantly expand its influence in the region. Other countries, such as India, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, have also strengthened their ties with ASEAN. All this contrasts with the inertia on the part of the EU—a missed opportunity for both sides and a vacuum that others skillfully fill. It also highlights yet another failure of imagination, initiative, courage, and understanding of the political game in that part of the world at the level of European external action. This scenario of European imprecision is particularly relevant in a geopolitical area that is rapidly gaining weight in international relations.

Recently, the United States has also recognized the strategic value of ASEAN. Donald Trump will be present at this year's summit, from October 26 to 28, in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia. In addition to meeting with the ten ASEAN leaders—who will become eleven, with the formal admission of Timor-Leste, an important step for the political, economic, and cultural integration of the country into the region to which it truly belongs—the American president will also have the opportunity to meet other prominent politicians, such as Narendra Modi, Li Qiang (Prime Minister of China), Sanae Takaichi (the new ultraconservative leader of Japan), Lula da Silva, and Cyril Ramaphosa.

The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, also invited Vladimir Putin, a significant gesture, although the Russian president has indicated that he will not be able to attend. Even so, Russia will be represented at a high level. Until the announcement this Wednesday of the new American sanctions, the possibility of a last-minute participation by Putin was not excluded, considering the media and political projection that this would have. Now, it is certain that Putin does not wish to meet Trump, unless the latter reverses this week's decision.

Among the European guests, the Prime Minister of Finland and Giorgia Meloni of Italy stand out, with Meloni already confirming her presence. Meloni recognizes that her visibility at international events is fundamental for consolidating her domestic policy. However, it remains uncertain who will represent the European institutions, with António Costa being one of the names mentioned in diplomatic circles. If confirmed, his presence will be mainly symbolic, since much of the power, namely the executive, resides with the European Commission, led by Ursula von der Leyen.

The European Union needs to look at ASEAN with greater realism and commitment, strengthening political and economic ties with a group of countries that together make up the third most populous region in the world (about 685 million people) and the fifth largest global economy. ASEAN is one of the engines of development of the so-called Global South and aims to play a prominent role in building a new international order. Ignoring this reality would be a strategic mistake for Europe. Historically, Europeans feel closer to Africa and Latin America, but betting on Southeast Asia is increasingly an inevitable path for the coming decades. Furthermore, competition with China, Russia, India, and the USA will be more balanced if the EU manages to establish a solid relationship with the region.

The Kuala Lumpur summit will focus on four major themes considered priorities by the Member States: economic cooperation, regional stability and security, renewable energy production (with the goal of reaching 45% by 2030), and the deepening of free trade agreements with partners such as China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand.

Significantly, the summit will not address the serious political crisis affecting Myanmar, one of ASEAN's Member States. This deliberate omission reflects the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each State, one of the Association's pillars, something that clearly contradicts the political cooperation project and obviously favors economic interests. This stance, partly inspired by China, contributes to the distancing between Europe and Southeast Asia, especially due to the indifference of some ASEAN members regarding human rights.

In this context, the messages that the European Union should convey at the Kuala Lumpur summit are clear. On the one hand, to affirm that we, Europeans, consider it mutually beneficial to deepen the full range of relations with ASEAN. On the other hand, to express our conviction that respect for citizens is the only way to guarantee peace, strengthen international cooperation, and ensure sustainable prosperity.

A Europa no momento da cimeira da ASEAN

 O meu texto de hoje no Diário de Notícias (24/10/2025)

https://www.dn.pt/opiniao/a-cimeira-da-asean-mostra-a-fraqueza-da-estratgia-europeia-face-ao-sudeste-asitico

The European Union project needs a stronger leadership

 I am deeply concerned about the geopolitical challenges facing the European Union. These include the refugee crisis, the rise of far-right political parties and Euroscepticism, and a potential "desintegration" of the bloc if common solutions are not found.

Furthermore, the EU needs to increase its defense spending and address the reasons behind public apathy and a lack of belief in the European project.

Vladmir Putin is testing NATO

 

https://www.dn.pt/opiniao/a-r%C3%BAssia-ataca-a-pol%C3%B3nia-quando-von-der-leyen-estava-a-rever-o-seu-discurso-sobre-o-estado-da-uni%C3%A3o-europeia

The text in your document, as published today in Diário de Notícia (Lisbon, 12/09/2025) provides a detailed analysis of the geopolitical situation involving Russia, the European Union, and NATO. Here are some key points:

1. Strategic Timing by Putin: The text highlights how Vladimir Putin strategically timed a drone attack on Poland just before the annual State of the Union address by Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission 1. This move is portrayed as a calculated effort to disrupt and challenge the EU and NATO 1.

2. EU's Role in Defense: The document discusses the limited but crucial role of the European Commission in defense matters, particularly in proposing sanctions and managing hybrid conflicts 1. The 19th sanctions package, which includes the use of interest from Russian sovereign deposits to fund Ukrainian military and administrative expenses, is a significant point 1.

3. Military and Financial Programs: The text mentions the SAFE program, which allocates €150 billion to enhance military capacity and cooperation among EU member states 1. This is seen as a step towards strengthening the European pillar of NATO and balancing relations with the US 1.

4. Information Warfare: The importance of combating misinformation and strategic narratives is emphasized 1. The text argues that Europe needs to invest more in communication to explain the Russian threat to its citizens, especially as the US withdraws from joint efforts against Russian disinformation campaigns 1.

5. Human Rights and International Cooperation: The document also touches on the EU's commitment to human rights, social justice, and international cooperation 1. It calls for sanctions against extremist Israeli actions and diplomatic initiatives to promote peace in Gaza and Palestine 1.

Overall, the text is well-structured and provides a comprehensive overview of the current geopolitical challenges and the EU's strategic responses. It effectively combines analysis with specific examples and proposed measures.

Is there anything specific you would like to discuss or any particular feedback you are looking for? 😊

1: From your document.