Ukraine: what's next, after 100 days of agression?

Ukraine: looking beyond 100 days of aggression

Victor Angelo

President Zelensky has stressed that the war will only end with recourse to diplomacy. He is right. He needs to build a peace agreement with the aggressor. This will not be easy. The agreement cannot reward what has been a clear violation of international law, a succession of war crimes, destruction, and acts of pillage. This is the great dilemma, which makes any mediation process a puzzle. In this scenario, an agreement will only be possible between a position of strength and one of weakness. This is a dramatic conclusion. It leads to the search for the crushing or humiliation of the adversary. 

At the outset, one would say that prolonging hostilities is to the advantage of the stronger side. The courage and determination of the Ukrainians would not be enough to respond effectively to a prolonged offensive conducted with unbridled brutality.

It is in this context that external aid is essential. Neither the US nor the EU countries can let Vladimir Putin's Russia defeat Ukraine. If that were to happen, peace, security and democracy in Europe would be seriously undermined. Now it would be Ukraine, tomorrow it could be Poland, Lithuania, or any other country in our geopolitical space. Or we would simply continue to live side by side with a neighbour always ready to do us harm.

Thus, each bloc must assist Ukraine with the means available. On the American side, it has now been decided to provide an arsenal of advanced technology and long-range weapons. The admonitions coming from Moscow following this decision by Joe Biden found an answer in the text that the President signed this Tuesday in the New York Times: it is not about seeking a war between NATO and Russia. The aim is to enable the Ukrainians to have the means to exercise their right to self-defence.

On the European side, the package of sanctions adopted this week at the European Council should be seen in a positive light. It goes as far as the consensus allows. What is essential is that it is finalised without further delay - Hungary continues to put up obstacles - and applied at an accelerated pace.

Even more important is the agreement between the EU and the UK that makes it impossible for ships carrying Russian oil products to insure their cargoes in London and the rest of Europe. Without such insurance contracts, the big shipping lines are no longer able to operate in the service of Russian exports. Experience with Iran shows that such a measure sharply reduces oil exports. This is certainly one of the sanctions so far with the greatest impact.

As I have said several times, sanctions have fundamentally three objectives. To express political condemnation. To reduce the financial capacity that sustains the war machine. And to disconnect the Russian Federation from more developed economies, to emphasise that there is a connection between respect for international law and participation in global markets.

Sanctions should be part of a future negotiation of normalising relations. But they can only be lifted when the Kremlin is no longer seen by Europe and its allies as an unpredictable and threatening regime.

In addition to arms and sanctions, it will be necessary to continue financial support to Ukraine. This support is a potentially delicate matter at a time of relatively anaemic economic growth in Europe and when the rising cost of living is becoming a major concern. But it is the price we have to pay to maintain our stability and security. It is an effort that will last for some time. Later, when entering the negotiation phase, the mediators will have to include on the agenda the issue of war reparations and the financing of Ukraine's reconstruction.  

On this 100th day of the aggression, we are facing a very complex situation. Future scenarios, especially for the next three weeks, should include several concerns. But for now, the priority challenges are four: immediately strengthening Ukraine's defence capacity; deepening isolation and weakening Russia's public finances; maintaining unity amongst us; and continuing to insist on the diplomacy of peace.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated  3 June 2022)

China's responsibilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council

Ukraine: what are China's responsibilities as a P5?

Victor Angelo

 

Earlier this week, Olaf Scholz met by videoconference with Xi Jinping. A day later, it was Emmanuel Macron's turn. I imagine there was a prior settling of positions between the two European leaders, even though the face-to-face meeting between the two only took place a few hours after the German chancellor's virtual meeting with the Chinese president. Xi Jinping is convinced that strengthening European unity will eventually allow Europe to gain greater autonomy in relation to the USA. That is why he must have compared the statements made by Scholz and Macron to see if they are along the same lines.

The big issue, in an extensive agenda of issues to be dealt with between China and Europe, is that of the war in Ukraine. During the calls, Xi repeated phrases he had uttered before - Europe's security must be in the hands of Europeans; it is fundamental to build a new security structure in Europe that takes into account the concerns of all parties; China has acted diplomatically for peace to return to Ukraine, starting by insisting on a ceasefire and respect for the country's territorial integrity; it continues to promote multilateral solutions, because it recognises the central role of the UN; and, finally, China defends the globalisation of markets. At the outset, these declarations are positive. But what do they mean in concrete terms, when it comes to putting an end to Russian aggression against Ukraine and stopping the risks of the conflict spreading?

Scholz, Macron and the entire European leadership must go further and unambiguously confront Xi Jinping: what does China intend to do to contribute with all its political and economic weight to making Vladimir Putin's Russia cease hostilities and respect the sovereignty of its neighbour? The videoconferences need to be more demanding and explore what the grand declarations of principles mean in practice. The gravity of the international situation requires a dialogue that goes beyond make-believe.

China, beyond its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is a global power, however much that pains some Western leaders. Both realities, in New York and around the world, give China rights and responsibilities. And in the case of the violation of Ukraine's sovereignty, China has a duty to actively contribute to the return of peace and international law. It cannot use the argument that this is only a European problem and that it is therefore up to the Europeans to solve it. Nor should we insist on this line of argument.

What we are facing is a conflict that could dramatically threaten international peace and security, particularly if non-conventional weapons are used. And which already has a widespread impact on food security, supply chains, energy prices and other dimensions that lead to the impoverishment of millions, and even more so in the most economically fragile countries.

In essence, my message is that Europe needs to talk more assertively with China. Xi says it is for peace and international order, for the centrality of the United Nations. So, ask him how he translates those admirable axioms into a peace process for Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the annual summit between the EU and Japan took place yesterday in Tokyo. Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen led the European delegation. They began by pointing out that Japan is Europe's most important strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific region, which must have attracted some attention in Beijing. The intensification of sanctions against Russia was one of the central themes of the discussion. There is a convergence of views between Brussels and Tokyo on the issue. But here too it would have been strategic to discuss how to involve China. This is now one of the big questions. It is not enough to write in the final communiqué that the EU and Japan will "deepen exchanges with China", namely in the political and security fields. That is mere lip service.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 13 May 2022)