Mali, a vast country and a mosaic of cultures, is just two steps from Europe and one step from collapsing as a state. Earlier this week, the President of the African Union Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, made a dramatic appeal to the international community—a term that is increasingly vague these days—to prevent the country from falling into absolute chaos. He expressed deep concern about the rapid expansion of various terrorist groups, whose activities are based on two pillars: ethnic-religious fundamentalism and organised crime. The state administration and security forces control only a small fraction of the territory. The rest, including the north, the centre, and the outskirts of the capital, Bamako, are operational zones for armed groups. Some are affiliated with the terrorist web known as Al-Qaeda or the self-proclaimed Islamic State, while others are mainly ethnically based, with Tuaregs and Arabs against the Bantu populations of the south.
The financing of terrorist actions is largely domestic. It includes artisanal gold mining, with the gold then sold to Russian organisations, metamorphoses of the infamous Wagner Group. It is suspected that the gold passes through the important Dubai gold market, where it is converted into currency that then goes to Russia. The Russians aligned themselves with the coup military after two military coups (2020 and 2021) and managed to expel the French presence and the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA). They also maintain indirect contacts with the rebellions and traffickers operating in the Persian Gulf.
The imposition of taxes on the population under religious pretences, the kidnapping of wealthy nationals and the few foreigners who still travel in the affected regions, the control of the main roads—which are only passable for those who pay to travel safely and accept keeping only part of their goods—the theft of cattle, all of this funds the costs of violence. Then there is the issue of drugs: the Sahel, of which Mali is a part, is one of the corridors between Latin America and Europe. In the Sahel, the drug trade buys governments and rebels. And the drugs enter our continent through the weakest points, where control and security measures are insufficient and political governance is more inattentive, as is the case in the Algarve, among others.
There is also human trafficking, with migrants coming from all over West Africa heading to Europe, plus the smuggling of fuel, tobacco, and weapons. It is all cash in hand, in lands without law or order. Schools do not function, except for madrasas run by ignorant fanatics, and there are no jobs for the youth born from an unstoppable demographic explosion. The Kalashnikov has become the only possible livelihood.
Youssouf calls for a robust response against terrorism in Mali and the vast Sahel. It is a fully justified warning, but one that will fall on deaf ears. The UN Security Council, after the forced departure of France from the region, the expulsion of MINUSMA, and the growing influence of the Russians under Vladimir Putin, has swept the region into the corner of the forgotten. The Europeans, who relied on client regimes in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—governments that received funds from Brussels to curb migratory movements—have been overtaken by Moscow. Putin understands that chaos in the Sahel has a disproportionate negative impact on neighbouring Europe. For Europe, it means more immigrants, more drugs, more insecurity, and a colossal loss of geopolitical influence in the Sahel.
I worked for several years in the region. I knew a Mali and neighbouring countries capable of producing great intellectuals and handling governance matters seriously. That was the generation that grew up in the post-colonial period. Many of them left the country, recruited by international organisations. Others emigrated to France to teach in major schools, or to Canada, a country that easily opened its doors to French-speaking university graduates.
Even then, there were rebellious movements, because certain ethnic groups and populations in the most remote regions felt ignored by the central power of their countries. The most serious conflicts involved those who lived by herding and those by farming. It was a competition between two ways of life that were hardly compatible in those arid lands. But solutions could be found. It was also possible to meet with rebel leaders and negotiate with them. The United Nations and I, as the organisation’s envoy, were treated with respect and moderation.
Everything changed in the last 15 years. Religious extremism, various forms of crime, corruption from the bottom to the top in these states, uncontrollable demographic growth accompanied by climate change—including the harmattan, the dry desert wind, increasingly spreading in the region—and the scarcity of rain, along with hostility promoted by Gulf countries and Russia against democratic ideas, all this has created an extremely complex situation. And we Europeans only remember the Sahel when we see the children of these lands selling trinkets on our beaches and terraces, or being attacked here by parties of xenophobia, hatred, and racism. It is reason enough to ask where the EU’s geopolitical strategy is.
