Reflecting about the new international rules: business and might

The New International Order: Business and Brute Force

By Victor Ângelo

I have many doubts about the footballing abilities—and others—of President Donald Trump, especially now that he has started the New Year with two own goals.

The first own goal was the intervention in Venezuela. It resulted in the deterioration of his country’s international image and handed points on a silver platter to Russia and China.

The UN Security Council meeting revealed the gravity of the American adventure in Venezuela. The Secretary-General, who out of prudence did not attend the meeting in person, had a statement read out which underlined that Venezuela’s sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity had been violated. In that communication, he referred to the US military operation as a “dangerous precedent”, which seemed strange to several governments and analysts, considering that the history of the Latin American region is littered with similar interventions—Harvard University historians have inventoried more than forty extraconstitutional ruptures organised with the support or at the instigation of Washington. The most famous occurred in 1973, when President Salvador Allende of Chile was assassinated thanks to the organisational skills of the CIA.

The great difference between the military intervention of a few days ago and previous ones lies in President Trump’s admission that the current one aimed at the usurpation of the oil resources of the attacked country. Past interferences were presented with another level of subtlety, without direct references to expropriations or looting.

I note an additional point regarding Guterres’ communication. Many at the United Nations compared the statement he made following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 with this one now, carried out by the USA. Guterres condemned Russia directly and was himself present at the Security Council meeting for that purpose. He addressed Vladimir Putin unambiguously, in the name of peace and political ethics. In the case of the USA, he used only generic arguments about the international order and the violation of the Charter, without mentioning Trump’s name. Let this be noted, and let it serve as an invitation to reflection.

The first own goal was favourable to the Russian Federation and China. The repeated references in Washington to the theory of spheres of influence made it more difficult to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Someone circulating in the corridors of the Kremlin sent me a provocative message, albeit with some wit and a touch of diplomacy in the style learned from old Soviet manuals. It said they were sure I would condemn, in this week’s chronicle, the unjustified aggression against the Venezuelan power and demand that the European Union impose sanctions against the mastermind of the kidnappings. A Putin's faithful joker. One might say that the Russian leaders feel happy and content with what happened in Venezuela.

As for China, which was in fact the most indirectly targeted country—Washington does not want China to gain a presence in the area of influence that the Americans consider their own—there was a kind of validation of its claims regarding Taiwan. This does not mean that Beijing is thinking of launching a military operation against Taipei in the very near future. China knows that such an offensive, should it happen, would carry high costs. But it has now received an indication from the Trump Administration that it can increase political-military pressure on the island. And use more bellicose language, which is indeed happening this week after a Taiwanese MP proposed an amendment to the “Act Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area”, a law adopted by Taipei in 1992. According to the proposal, the statute would be renamed the “Act on Relations between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China”. The new name and content are seen by Beijing as yet another attempt to separate the two parts and promote Taiwan's independence—something that is absolutely unacceptable to the Chinese leadership.

The second own goal resulted from statements by Trump and those around him, such as Stephen Miller—a hawk who serves as the White House Deputy Chief of Staff—regarding Greenland. Trump is preparing to annex Greenland, which is a territory of the European space through its connection to Denmark. The reason invoked—to create a security barrier against Russia and China—makes no sense. The USA has a military base in Greenland and can count on full Danish cooperation. It should be noted that during the Cold War, the base housed around 10,000 American military personnel. Now, it has around 150. This evolution does not reveal great geopolitical fears on the part of the USA. Not forgetting that there are several treaties between the USA and Denmark that recognise Danish sovereignty regarding Greenland.

Trump has his eyes fixed on the territory’s natural riches, on the maritime corridors that climate change will make navigable the Arctic zone, on the airspace controlled by Greenland—which has enormous strategic value—and on History: he wants to see his name added to the list of presidents who augmented the American territorial area.

He should also think about the impact that the annexation will have on the future of NATO. But for him, NATO serves to buy weaponry from the American industry. And that will continue to happen for many years, whether there is NATO or not. The Europeans are captive customers. The new reality is evident: in our day, business and brute force are triumphing over diplomacy and the international order, thanks to Trump, Putin, and others alike.

Published in Portuguese language in today's edition (09/01/2026) of Diário de Notícias. 

Looking ahead into 2026 with realism or just pessimism?

 2026: On Certain and Uncertain Challenges, and the Indispensable Need for International Cooperation

Victor Ângelo

The ancient Oracle of Delphi has now been replaced by Artificial Intelligence (AI) platforms. Even so, it is very risky to predict what the world will be like in the coming times. In the case of 2026, it is even more difficult for three fundamental reasons: firstly, we are in a period of marked geopolitical disorder, a legacy of 2025; secondly, the calendar foresees events of great importance, which may profoundly alter international realities; thirdly, the competition in the fields of AI, quantum technology, and high technology is accelerating rapidly, especially between the USA and China, without it being clear what the consequences of this dizzying rivalry might be. All this without considering the possible appearance of one or more Black Swans, as happened with Covid.

At the geopolitical level, I consider the most significant challenge to be the enormous current threat posed by the Russian Federation to democratic Europe. The criminal large-scale invasion of Ukraine is about to enter its fifth year, and Vladimir Putin does not seem willing to put an end to the violence. Ukraine has managed to resist, in a surprising and heroic manner, but above all from the end of winter onwards, it will need exceptional and continuous financial and military support to guarantee its legitimate defence. It should count on the help of European states—there will be little or nothing to expect from Trump’s America. European aid will be indispensable for the defence of Ukraine and of Europe itself. This aid, though inevitable, will worsen relations between the main European states and Russia, and could even lead to an armed attack, by decision of the Kremlin. We have not been this close to such a situation before. Putin currently boasts that he believes he would emerge victorious from such a confrontation. In reality, he is cornered and, consequently, deluded that war will keep him in power.

Trump will be mainly obsessed, throughout the year, with the US midterm elections on 3 November. He will do everything to retain the majority in Congress. If necessary, he will create incredible confusion on the domestic scene and conflicts on the international chessboard, notably in Venezuela and Greenland, so as to appear, to the more credulous American electorate, as the guarantor of his country’s stability and greatness. It would not be a surprise if this were to happen. Like all other autocrats throughout history, Trump believes that confusion and chaos will play in his favour.

European democracies cannot rely on Trump. He and Putin, each in their own way, are two enormous risks for international law and global order. For the first time, in 2026, two nuclear powers will be led by exacerbated egocentrics, capable of destroying a large part of humanity if, in their view, it is considered vital for them to remain in power.

I must also mention Xi Jinping. His main political concern is to ensure internal prosperity in China, which is understandable given the size of the country’s population and the fact that his political survival depends both on the stick and the carrot, on an iron-fisted rule and on the rising standard of living felt by a significant part of the population. However, in a situation of international chaos, he may attempt to recover Taiwan. This possibility cannot be excluded in 2026.

In terms of AI, competition between states will focus on economic advances, military superiority, and the dominance of the ideological narrative that favours their interests. Whoever wins the race in these areas—the USA or China—will guarantee their supremacy as a global hyperpower.

Financial and scientific investments in AI will continue throughout the year to reach absolutely astronomical values. In the USA, priority will be given to the giant technology companies. The security and defence sectors will establish fabulous contracts with these companies. In China, the development of AI will remain under the absolute control of the state, to ensure the regime’s survival. But in both cases, the fundamental concerns will be related to strengthening national security and manipulating public opinion. Colossally expanded by quantum science, AI will increasingly become a powerful and unpredictable tool in the hands of those who hold power.

In 2026, a new Secretary-General of the UN will be elected. The Global South recognises the value of the United Nations and is increasingly insisting on the urgency of its reorganisation. The survival of the UN’s political role depends on its representativeness. The right of veto and the permanent seats on the Security Council are now considered by the majority of Member States as outdated and obsolete powers, but still very real. They are obviously incapable of reflecting today’s international relations and of enabling the resolution of the major problems that plague the international agenda.

The electoral process that will take place throughout the year until a new Secretary-General is elected will give more strength to the reform movement. It will also insist on the election of a woman. Until now, the post has always been held by men. This will be one of the major themes at the UN level. It is time to elect a woman. In parallel, there will be a whole campaign for the person elected to come from Latin America. According to the rules, that should be the region of origin of the new leader. It would also have another significance: it would show Trump that Latin America really matters, that it is not just the backyard of the USA.

The political dimension of the UN is now going through the deepest crisis in its history. I do not believe, however, that it will cease to exist. The personality of the new Secretary-General will, however, be decisive. It must be someone seen as a political giant and with a skilful and courageous diplomatic streak. In Latin America, we have several such women: the Chilean Michelle Bachelet, the Costa Rican Rebeca Grynspan, the Mexican Alicia Bárcena, the Prime Minister of Barbados, Mia Mottley, and several others. These are personalities who have shown extraordinary political firmness.

Still on the UN, Portugal is seeking a non-permanent seat on the Security Council for the 2027–2028 biennium. It is competing with Germany and Austria, that is, three candidates for two available seats. If it manages to be elected—the decision will be made in June and, in my analysis, the Portuguese candidacy has a strong chance of succeeding—it will be the fourth time that Portugal has had a seat on the Security Council.

In the period of great uncertainties that will be 2026, we cannot fail to speculate about possible Black Swans. In international affairs, a Black Swan is a rare, unpredictable event, but when it happens, it turns out to have generated catastrophic consequences. Six years ago, it was Covid. In 2026, a terrible catastrophe could perhaps be a high-speed collision between two satellites, among the thousands currently in orbit, a number that keeps growing. This would cause an indescribable pulverisation of fragments, which would destroy other satellites and multiply astronomically the pieces of metal in uncontrolled orbit. The impact would be simply devastating for the various global satellite navigation systems, for space internet, meteorological, logistics, and military surveillance networks.

Other Black Swans are equally possible due to technological advances, but also because of their risks and unbridled competition.

Cooperation is the most effective response when any colossal challenge occurs. And with or without Black Swans, the greatest challenges are already here. The future choice is now dramatically clear: either there is cooperation, or we accelerate the destruction of a large part of our planet.

Reforming the United Nations in the high technological era

The new core United Nations, a reformed one, must focus on security, human rights and development. To achieve results in these areas it must reorganise itself, taking into consideration we are in an different era. Mechanisms like the UN Security Council, with the current composition and rules, are instruments of the past. We need organs that have the global representative of the world of today and make use of the most advanced technology. For instance, the new UN should put in place a Permanent Neutrality Monitoring Infrastructure. This would mean shared sensor arrays and and a system of satellite verification centers.

Peacekeeping, and this is just another example, should include a Multilateral Enforcement Clause. The challenge is to define the rules of such Clause, but member States should work on that definition. 

In my opinion, a Multilateral Enforcement Clause would be a specialized legal and strategic UN Security Council-approved tech-based mechanism within a peacebuilding/keeping treaty designed to ensure compliance through collective action. An enforcement clause would permit pre-authorized consequences and automaticity.

Its primary goal is to solve the "Security Dilemma"—where one party is afraid to comply because they fear the other side will cheat—by creating a credible, high-cost penalty for violations. The clause must explicitly define what constitutes a violation severe enough to activate enforcement. The violations could be of three types: qualitative, quantitative and procedural. A simple "denial of access" to monitors could be classified a de facto breach, a "red line violation". 

A key aspect of the reform is to remove the Veto power of the UN Security Council permanent members. That can be done through indirect means. For instance, sanctions would automatically return unless the Council votes unanimously to keep them lifted. This means a single power cannot protect a violator. Or, by referring the possible violation to a neutral body (like the International Court of Justice or a specialized panel of experts) so that the determination of a breach is objective rather than political.

Basically, I am stressing two points in this text: the UN reform, its political role, is a matter of great urgency; and it can be done if we move out of traditional approaches and old fashioned ways of looking at international affairs. 

Mali and the Rest of the Sahel as Priorities Ignored by European Geopolitics

Mali, a vast country and a mosaic of cultures, is just two steps from Europe and one step from collapsing as a state. Earlier this week, the President of the African Union Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, made a dramatic appeal to the international community—a term that is increasingly vague these days—to prevent the country from falling into absolute chaos. He expressed deep concern about the rapid expansion of various terrorist groups, whose activities are based on two pillars: ethnic-religious fundamentalism and organised crime. The state administration and security forces control only a small fraction of the territory. The rest, including the north, the centre, and the outskirts of the capital, Bamako, are operational zones for armed groups. Some are affiliated with the terrorist web known as Al-Qaeda or the self-proclaimed Islamic State, while others are mainly ethnically based, with Tuaregs and Arabs against the Bantu populations of the south.

The financing of terrorist actions is largely domestic. It includes artisanal gold mining, with the gold then sold to Russian organisations, metamorphoses of the infamous Wagner Group. It is suspected that the gold passes through the important Dubai gold market, where it is converted into currency that then goes to Russia. The Russians aligned themselves with the coup military after two military coups (2020 and 2021) and managed to expel the French presence and the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA). They also maintain indirect contacts with the rebellions and traffickers operating in the Persian Gulf.

The imposition of taxes on the population under religious pretences, the kidnapping of wealthy nationals and the few foreigners who still travel in the affected regions, the control of the main roads—which are only passable for those who pay to travel safely and accept keeping only part of their goods—the theft of cattle, all of this funds the costs of violence. Then there is the issue of drugs: the Sahel, of which Mali is a part, is one of the corridors between Latin America and Europe. In the Sahel, the drug trade buys governments and rebels. And the drugs enter our continent through the weakest points, where control and security measures are insufficient and political governance is more inattentive, as is the case in the Algarve, among others.

There is also human trafficking, with migrants coming from all over West Africa heading to Europe, plus the smuggling of fuel, tobacco, and weapons. It is all cash in hand, in lands without law or order. Schools do not function, except for madrasas run by ignorant fanatics, and there are no jobs for the youth born from an unstoppable demographic explosion. The Kalashnikov has become the only possible livelihood.

Youssouf calls for a robust response against terrorism in Mali and the vast Sahel. It is a fully justified warning, but one that will fall on deaf ears. The UN Security Council, after the forced departure of France from the region, the expulsion of MINUSMA, and the growing influence of the Russians under Vladimir Putin, has swept the region into the corner of the forgotten. The Europeans, who relied on client regimes in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—governments that received funds from Brussels to curb migratory movements—have been overtaken by Moscow. Putin understands that chaos in the Sahel has a disproportionate negative impact on neighbouring Europe. For Europe, it means more immigrants, more drugs, more insecurity, and a colossal loss of geopolitical influence in the Sahel.

I worked for several years in the region. I knew a Mali and neighbouring countries capable of producing great intellectuals and handling governance matters seriously. That was the generation that grew up in the post-colonial period. Many of them left the country, recruited by international organisations. Others emigrated to France to teach in major schools, or to Canada, a country that easily opened its doors to French-speaking university graduates.

Even then, there were rebellious movements, because certain ethnic groups and populations in the most remote regions felt ignored by the central power of their countries. The most serious conflicts involved those who lived by herding and those by farming. It was a competition between two ways of life that were hardly compatible in those arid lands. But solutions could be found. It was also possible to meet with rebel leaders and negotiate with them. The United Nations and I, as the organisation’s envoy, were treated with respect and moderation.

Everything changed in the last 15 years. Religious extremism, various forms of crime, corruption from the bottom to the top in these states, uncontrollable demographic growth accompanied by climate change—including the harmattan, the dry desert wind, increasingly spreading in the region—and the scarcity of rain, along with hostility promoted by Gulf countries and Russia against democratic ideas, all this has created an extremely complex situation. And we Europeans only remember the Sahel when we see the children of these lands selling trinkets on our beaches and terraces, or being attacked here by parties of xenophobia, hatred, and racism. It is reason enough to ask where the EU’s geopolitical strategy is.

A proposal for a Consolidated Peace Framework for Ukraine

This is a formal policy document draft to establish a structured, enforceable roadmap for ending hostilities, restoring stability, and ensuring long-term peace between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. It should be refined through bilateral and group consultations, and then proposed by the UN Secretary-General. 

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Executive Summary

This framework outlines a phased approach to achieving peace in Ukraine, balancing sovereignty, security, humanitarian needs, and international engagement and oversight. It is designed to be incremental, verifiable, and supported by global stakeholders, preferably under a UN Security Council Resolution.

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I. Guiding Principles

• Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity: Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders remain the ultimate objective.
• Non-Recognition of Annexation: No territorial changes will be legitimised through force.
• Humanitarian Priority: Immediate protection of civilians and infrastructure.
• Incremental Implementation: Each phase contingent on verified compliance.
• International Oversight: Neutral bodies ensure transparency and enforcement.

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II. Framework Structure

Phase 1: Immediate Ceasefire and Stabilisation

• Mutual cessation of hostilities within 24 hours of signing.
• Freeze current lines of contact as a temporary measure.
• Deploy UN/OSCE monitoring teams with satellite and drone verification.

Phase 2: Security Guarantees

• Binding security assurances for Ukraine from guarantor states (G7 + EU+ G20).
• Establish demilitarised buffer zones along the contact line.
• Russia withdraws heavy weapons from frontline areas.

Phase 3: Governance and Political Dialogue

• No formal recognition of annexation; status of occupied territories deferred.
• Create a Transitional Governance Council for disputed regions with Ukrainian representation and neutral observers.
• Guarantee cultural and linguistic rights under Ukrainian law.

Phase 4: Humanitarian Measures

• Immediate return of deported Ukrainian children and release of POWs.
• Safe corridors for civilian evacuation and aid delivery.
• Joint task force to secure nuclear facilities and critical infrastructure in close liaison with IAEA.

Phase 5: Economic Reconstruction and Sanctions Roadmap

• Establish Ukraine Reconstruction Fund financed by frozen Russian assets and international donors.
• Implement phased sanctions relief for Russia, conditional on compliance.
• Prioritise investment in housing, energy, and transport networks.

Phase 6: International Oversight

• Form a Peace Implementation Council, if possible under the supervision of the UN Security Council, and chaired by a neutral international figure.
• Consider UN peacekeeping mission from neutral countries.
• Compliance reviews every 90 days.

Phase 7: Long-Term Political Commitments

• Continue Ukraine’s EU accession process without obstruction.
• NATO membership excluded during transitional period; Ukraine retains defensive military rights.
• Sign a non-aggression pact backed by international guarantees.

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III. Enforcement and Accountability

• Violations trigger automatic suspension of sanctions relief and reconstruction funding.
• War crimes accountability mechanisms integrated into later phases.
• Dispute resolution through the International Court of Justice or agreed arbitration panels.

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IV. Timeline

• Phase 1: Within 24 hours of agreement.
• Phase 2–4: Within 3–6 months.
• Phase 5–7: Progressive implementation over 2–5 years.

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V. Stakeholder Roles

• Ukraine & Russia: Primary parties to the agreement.
• Guarantor States: Provide security assurances and financial support. Composition to be agreed by Ukraine and Russia.
• International Organisations (UN, OSCE, EU): Oversight, monitoring, and peacekeeping. Also institution-building. 
• Civil Society & NGOs: Humanitarian aid and reconstruction support.

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Are you talking about the UN reform?

 The future demands political courage, strategic vision, and a UN that is respected

Victor Ângelo

Eighty years ago, on October 24, 1945, the UN Charter came into force, having been approved four months earlier in San Francisco. That is why this date in October is celebrated annually as United Nations Day.

I am referring to the political part of the organization. The specialized agencies, such as FAO, UNESCO, WHO, ILO, and all the others, emerged at different times. Each has its own history, as well as its own specific governance structures, independent of the authority of the Secretary-General (SG). Over time, special programs and funds also emerged, such as WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, and several others—a long list of acronyms. These programs and funds are headed by individuals chosen by the SG, mostly in response to pressure from some of the more powerful states. They do not belong to the same division that includes the specialized agencies.

The system is in crisis. But if the UN did not exist, it would be necessary, even in today’s confusing times, to invent it. This is a frequently repeated idea.

The United Nations exists; there is no need for any creative exercise. But President Xi Jinping, who also contributes to the marginalization of the UN and seeks to take advantage of it, now proposes an alternative system, inspired by his vision of China’s central role in the world. He had already proposed a Global Development Initiative, another on international security, and yet another called the Global Civilization Initiative. At the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, which took place less than two months ago, Xi completed the picture and proposed the missing initiative, on global governance. That is, on the principles that should regulate relations between states. When I say he completed the picture, I am referring to four fundamental pillars of the UN: development, peace, human dignity, and now, the political one.

Xi’s proposal on international governance is little more than a restatement of the content of the United Nations Charter in other words. The five basic principles he proposes for global governance are contained in the Charter. Xi refers to respect for the sovereignty of each state, including retrograde and dictatorial regimes; subordination to the rules of international law; defense of multilateralism and the role of the United Nations—something that China itself does not practice when it is inconvenient; the value of people, who should be the main concern in political matters; and the need to achieve concrete results in solving global problems. There is certainly no significant disagreement with these ideas. The Chinese initiative is basically a political maneuver.

The problem is that these principles are often ignored by several member states, starting with the great powers such as China, Russia, and the United States of America, and by states outside international law, such as North Korea or Israel.

Thus, the United Nations ceases to be the central forum for international relations, discussion, and resolution of major conflicts. The blame lies with certain member states, and in particular, with the malfunctioning and lack of representativeness of the Security Council (SC). The UN has been completely marginalized in the cases of Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, Myanmar, the end of the embargo against Cuba, and so on. However, the real problem lies with the SC: without a Council that represents the realities of the 21st century, the political UN will continue to live in the past and be doomed to decline.

The plan that President Donald Trump had adopted regarding the dramatic crisis in Gaza—a vague plan that is practically impossible to carry out in its key points—does not mention the UN or assign it any kind of responsibility. Even if it is discussed in the Security Council, which is not yet confirmed, the various points imposed by President Trump do not take into account the experience accumulated in similar situations. It is a plan that was not negotiated by the interested parties—Israel and Palestine—that is, it did not follow a fundamental procedure in peacebuilding. I fear that it will achieve little beyond the release of the remaining living hostages, the freedom of a group of prisoners held in Israel, and a temporary and insufficient humanitarian opening in the face of the absolutely basic needs of the civilians still surviving in Gaza.

The SG is trying to implement a process of organizational reform, which he called UN80. In reality, the effort is little more than a bureaucratic response to the organization’s financial crisis. Instead of insisting, day and night, that delinquent states pay their dues and mandatory contributions on time, and clearly defining what justifies the existence of the UN, the SG chose the option that goes over better with certain leaders and their finance ministries: eliminate jobs, reduce the scope and functioning of field missions, transfer services to cities where the cost of living is lower than in New York or Geneva. The refrain is “do less with fewer resources.” In fact, it should be another: “making peace and promoting human dignity require everyone’s contribution and respect for the UN’s courageous voice.” That assertion is the only one consistent with the defense of international cooperation and multilateralism. That is what I learned and applied over decades.

Is it possible to reform the United Nations and bring back its key peace role?

A few decision-makers and intellectuals think that the political UN -- read "political", I am not talking about the specialised agencies ---  is something of the XX century, that has lost its relevance and must be re-created or re-invented taking into account the world's new realities. Meaning, they think that the UN secretariat and its departments, as well as the UN Security Council, are unreformable and must be reinvented, taking into consideration the Global South, the new and the emerging superpowers, the increasing role of the regional associations of states, the power of those trillionaire individuals controlling the key social platforms, and also the expectations of the peoples in different parts of the world.

For them, global issues outside peace and security, economic inequalities and human rights, should be dealt either by the specialised agencies or by ad-hoc international conferences and their specific processes. 

Guterres writes about the dramatic financial situation of Peacekeeping missions worldwide

 

10 October 2025 | Worldwide | Secretary-General

Contingency Plan Letter to Staff Members Dear Colleagues,   I am writing to update you on the financial status of United Nations peacekeeping operations and what it means for us all.   Our peacekeeping operations are facing an extremely difficult financial situation. The current liquidity crisis is the direct result of arrears and the non-payment of assessed contributions in full and on time. Over the past few years, we have actively engaged with Member States to find solutions to this growing challenge. As a result, the United Nations General Assembly in 2019 and 2022 approved some measures that have enabled us to deal with the operational impact of late or non-payments. However, while the level of peacekeeping budgets has been steadily declining, the outstanding contributions have increased significantly, especially in recent months. At the start of this peacekeeping budget cycle on 1 July 2025, arrears amounted to US$2.066 billion. Our collections for the financial period may fall short by about US$880 million, putting a further strain on our liquidity situation.   In addition to actively engaging with Member States, we introduced measures in 2024 to restrict spending and align it with cash inflows. Thanks to these measures, and your dedication and commitment, and the generosity of troop- and police-contributing countries, we have managed to carry on. The troop- and police-contributing countries are, in effect, financing the system, waiting many months and sometimes over a year for reimbursement of their personnel and equipment costs. This is unsustainable. The margin of manoeuvre gained from earlier liquidity measures approved by the General Assembly, as well as our own spending restrictions, is now exhausted. Despite recent positive news that a sizeable amount from a major contributor will be entirely available to distribute flexibly across the peacekeeping missions and to establish a reserve for the United Nations Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH), the reality remains: the overall shortfall is grave.   In a context of deep uncertainty and a worsening cash position, I asked all peacekeeping missions funded under the peacekeeping budget to prepare contingency plans based on possible reductions of 15 to 25 per cent of their expenditures. Troop- and police-contributing countries were also informed, together with the relevant host countries. I am grateful to our missions for working hard over the past few months to prepare these different scenarios.   Based on our current financial estimates and after a careful review, I have decided to request all peacekeeping missions funded under the peacekeeping budget to implement their contingency plans for a 15 per cent reduction in expenditures, the lower of the two scenarios. These reductions will affect all areas: uniformed components, civilian personnel and operations. Separately, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) will be required to achieve a 25 per cent reduction in expenditures within the current fiscal year, reflecting unique budgetary pressures that will need to be addressed in close coordination with the African Union.   These reductions must now be achieved within the remaining nine months of the budget period. Therefore, the impact on the reduction of capacities — and thus on operations and mandated activities — will be proportionally greater. The consequences will be painful. With the exception of UNSOS, we will need to repatriate around 25 per cent of the uniformed personnel and their equipment in the coming months. Peacekeeping operations — together with the Department of Peace Operations and other relevant departments — have carefully identified the contingents and individual uniformed personnel that should be repatriated.   On 7 October 2025, I briefed the members of the United Nations Security Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries on the contingency plans. We will continue to update them on the implementation and impact on our operations.   Repatriating around 25 per cent of troops and police in the space of a few months will be a major and complex logistical exercise.   The impact on civilian, international and locally recruited staff and affiliate personnel will be significant. Some separations will be inevitable, and missions will soon need to invoke the downsizing policy to reduce their civilian staffing, in consultation with staff representative bodies. I know the impact on affected staff, personnel and their families will be enormous, and I want to acknowledge the personal toll such measures entail.   The work of identifying which contingents and individual personnel will be repatriated has been carried out with care, weighing mandate priorities, operational requirements and, above all, the safety and security of those who will remain. While our missions carry out their contingency plans to address their funding shortfalls, they will continue to implement their mandates to the extent possible under these financial circumstances. The protection of civilians, the advancement of peace processes and support to fragile communities cannot and will not be abandoned. However, given the magnitude of the problem and the challenging context in which our missions operate, it is difficult to predict the impact on the ground. We have planned for this scenario and our staff in the field and at Headquarters will continue to work with dedication and professionalism. But this is a situation that the Organization has never faced before, and the impact remains uncertain.   I want to express my deep appreciation to all peacekeeping personnel for their service and sacrifice. I deeply understand the concerns that carrying out these plans raises, and the impact it may have on missions and personnel. Unfortunately, the Organization has no choice but to move forward with the implementation, despite the difficult impact it will have. I am determined to continue advocating for peacekeeping as a collective and shared responsibility. Without the support of Member States, the Organization cannot function properly. I will continue to appeal to all Member States to pay in full and on time so that our peacekeeping operations can remain a strong and dependable instrument of the United Nations. I remain hopeful that we will be able to resolve the current liquidity crisis, and I will work tirelessly towards that end.   I want to, once again, thank you for undertaking your essential work with enormous strength and resilience under these very difficult circumstances. You have continued to serve in some of the world's most difficult and dangerous situations, not for recognition, but for the cause of peace. That spirit is the heart of this Organization. Together, I am confident that we can take on the challenges, uphold our values and create the opportunities needed to address our unstable and uncertain world.   Yours sincerely, Antonio Guterres

Thoughts and paths: a wider view of some geopolitic dimensions

Victor Angelo's public interventions address the intricate and rapidly evolving landscape of global geopolitics, underscoring the imperative for enhanced, authoritative, international mechanisms to manage crises rooted in human security, justice, and democracy. His views try to elucidate the transformation of conflict dynamics post-Cold War and the paramount importance of key values --cooperation, trust, dignity and human rights -- in global affairs.

Global Challenges Surpassing Responses: The swift and complex changes in geopolitics have created a disparity between global challenges and the capacity of existing international mechanisms to address them effectively. Leadership's Impact on Crises: Ethical and competent leadership is essential for peace and stability, with leaders acting as agents of change or contributors to conflict, highlighting the need for principled diplomacy that balances national interests and universal values. 

Centrality of Human Security: Human security, which integrates national protection with human rights, democracy, and economic opportunities, emphasizes empowerment and civic participation in crisis contexts.

Shift from State-Centric to Individual Focus: Post-Cold War conflicts have transitioned from interstate to internal, with individuals becoming central to international affairs paradigms. However, we are witnessing at the same time a return to interstate conflicts. This time they combine classical means of war with hybrid, digitally based attacks and sanctions of different nature.

Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding: Civil Society Organizations and community groups have become indispensable partners in conflict resolution, although international bodies continue to struggle with effectively engaging local and traditional authorities. Good Governance and State Fragility: Good governance, encompassing accountability, human rights, and political pluralism, as well as social progress and full respect for the nature, is crucial to preventing crises; failing states lose control of core key sovereignty functions, thereby risking instability and conflict. For the first time since 1945, developed states are also entering in a political and social downwards spiral.

United Nations' Pivotal Role: Despite criticisms, the United Nations remains the central institution for legitimizing and managing peace and security efforts, with the Security Council supposed to play a key role through resolutions and mandates. Challenges in Peacekeeping Mandates: Security Council mandates are often broad and challenging to implement, with issues such as host nation consent and mission coherence complicating peacekeeping effectiveness. Complexity of Modern Conflicts: Contemporary conflicts are asymmetric and multifaceted, necessitating coordinated multidimensional responses that consider political, military, and economic factors, including the economic drivers of conflict.

United Nations: I spent decades working inside the system

 

I’ve Worked Inside the UN. Here’s Why I Still Believe in It.

By Victor Ângelo

Every September, I find myself watching the United Nations General Assembly with a mix of hope and frustration. It’s a ritual I know well — not just from the outside, but from within. I spent years working under the UN flag, in places where diplomacy wasn’t just a word, but a lifeline.

And yet, each year, the same question resurfaces: Is the UN still relevant?

It’s tempting to say no. The speeches can feel repetitive. The Security Council often seems paralyzed. And the world, frankly, looks more chaotic than ever.

But I’ve come to believe that pessimism about the UN is not only misguided — it’s dangerous.

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🛠️ The UN Needs Help — But Not Abandonment

I won’t pretend the UN is working as it should. The Security Council, in particular, is stuck in a post-World War II time warp. Power is unevenly distributed. Vetoes are wielded like weapons. Reform is overdue.

But here’s the thing: we don’t fix global problems by walking away from global institutions.

When I was in the field — in conflict zones, post-crisis regions, places where the UN was often the only international presence — I saw what it meant to have a neutral actor, a voice for peace, a mechanism for dialogue. It wasn’t perfect. But it mattered.

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🔄 What We Can Do

If we want the UN to work better, we need to:

• Reform the Security Council to reflect today’s geopolitical realities.
• Give the UN teeth — the ability to act, not just talk.
• Support multilateralism, even when it’s slow and messy.
• Hold leaders accountable for how they use the UN stage.

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🌱 Why I Still Believe

I’ve seen the UN at its worst — bureaucratic, slow, sometimes painfully ineffective.

But I’ve also seen it at its best — bringing food to starving communities, mediating fragile peace talks, offering hope where there was none.

That’s why I believe in it. Not blindly. Not naively. But because I’ve seen what happens when it’s not there.

Pessimism is easy. It lets us disengage. But optimism — especially the kind rooted in experience — is a choice. And it’s one we need to make if we want a better world.

The English AI translation of today's opinion piece.

 

Pessimism About the UN is a Mistake

By Victor Ângelo

Following tradition, Brazil was the first state to take the floor at the opening of the high-level segment of the United Nations General Assembly this week in New York, and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's speech was one of the most notable. He spoke for 18 minutes—a little over the 15-minute rule that almost no one respects. It is worth watching the video that recorded his address.

If one had to limit his words to a couple of lines, one would say it was a firm voice representing the Global South, the countries that are defining a new power chessboard in the international order and that seek to be heard more in global institutions. Lula defended the role of the UN, the sovereignty of states within a framework that reinforces multilateral cooperation and condemns the arbitrary interventions of the strongest. He highlighted three of the fundamental issues on the global agenda: the regulation of digital platforms, to protect the most vulnerable and prevent manipulation without restricting freedom of opinion; climate change; and the fight against poverty, particularly hunger. He took a correct position regarding the tragedy in Gaza. The passage about Ukraine should be considered a serious blemish on his communication. Lula was vague and deferential to the ears of Moscow, failing to use the words invasion and aggression or refer to the conflict as he should have: an indisputable violation of the UN Charter by Russia. On this matter, Lula showed that he dances to Putin’s tune.

The second Head of State to intervene was the President of the USA. There was enormous expectation about what he would say, including about the future of the United Nations. He spoke for almost an hour on the most diverse topics, but always with his own person at the center of the monologue. In summary, one might say that Trump spoke about Trump. It was a bad speech, full of false claims and erroneous political positions, from past eras and long since defeated by historical and scientific evidence. While Lula and other leaders almost always sought to look to the future, reinforce cooperation for the joint solution of major global problems, and underline the need for UN reform, Trump challenged many of the fundamental issues for the survival of our Planet. He directly attacked the policies of many states, including old US allies, and the absence of initiative from the Secretary-General on conflict resolution. He treated the community of nations with paternalism and arrogance, and the UN as a nullity.

In reality, Trump delivered only three messages: that there is not, nor can there be, a better or wiser world leader; that he should be seen as a peace builder, deserving all honors, from the Nobel Prize upwards; and that he is the sovereign of the world's strongest country, which he believes gives him the natural right to dictate the international agenda.

But the impression that emerged from the General Assembly hall seems to be different: Trump represents a debasement of American politics, he is an embarrassment for Western democracies and, moreover, a danger to global stability, alongside some other leaders who, like him, live in the past, in a personality cult, or survive thanks to dictatorial regimes.

Emmanuel Macron and several other speakers underlined the importance of cooperation, exercised primarily through a strengthened UN capable of reflecting the current international political landscape. This reform of the United Nations must have as its first act the restructuring of the Security Council and the modernization of its rules of procedure, particularly with regard to the use of the veto. Macron mentioned a list of countries that, in his opinion, should be added to the Council's permanent members—Germany, Brazil, India, Japan, and two African states. Unfortunately, it is unthinkable that all this can happen in the near future.

The Security Council has become an arena of confrontation between the US, Russia, and China. That is primarily what it has served for since the middle of the last decade. None of these powers wants to accept a new composition that could undermine their strategic interests and geopolitical alliances. The main weakness of the UN political system lies in the current Security Council. And so we will continue. And we will simultaneously witness the division of the international scene into various groupings, some more effective than others.

This does not mean, however, that the main functions of the UN—I exclude here the specialized agencies, which have their own rules of operation, governance, and financing—are doomed to disappear. The world continues to have problems that justify the need for global cooperation, from the issue of poverty to those related to human rights, the protection of nature, climate and humanitarian challenges, the response to the accelerated growth of Artificial Intelligence, organized crime, or civil wars. Therefore, it is essential to insist on the capacity for initiative of UN leaders, starting with the Secretary-General, and on the timely payment of dues owed by each State. In other words, there is no reason for pessimism, nor is there reason to sit back and do nothing.

Published in Portuguese language in today's Diário de Notícias. 26/09/2025