Mali and the Rest of the Sahel as Priorities Ignored by European Geopolitics

Mali, a vast country and a mosaic of cultures, is just two steps from Europe and one step from collapsing as a state. Earlier this week, the President of the African Union Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, made a dramatic appeal to the international community—a term that is increasingly vague these days—to prevent the country from falling into absolute chaos. He expressed deep concern about the rapid expansion of various terrorist groups, whose activities are based on two pillars: ethnic-religious fundamentalism and organised crime. The state administration and security forces control only a small fraction of the territory. The rest, including the north, the centre, and the outskirts of the capital, Bamako, are operational zones for armed groups. Some are affiliated with the terrorist web known as Al-Qaeda or the self-proclaimed Islamic State, while others are mainly ethnically based, with Tuaregs and Arabs against the Bantu populations of the south.

The financing of terrorist actions is largely domestic. It includes artisanal gold mining, with the gold then sold to Russian organisations, metamorphoses of the infamous Wagner Group. It is suspected that the gold passes through the important Dubai gold market, where it is converted into currency that then goes to Russia. The Russians aligned themselves with the coup military after two military coups (2020 and 2021) and managed to expel the French presence and the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA). They also maintain indirect contacts with the rebellions and traffickers operating in the Persian Gulf.

The imposition of taxes on the population under religious pretences, the kidnapping of wealthy nationals and the few foreigners who still travel in the affected regions, the control of the main roads—which are only passable for those who pay to travel safely and accept keeping only part of their goods—the theft of cattle, all of this funds the costs of violence. Then there is the issue of drugs: the Sahel, of which Mali is a part, is one of the corridors between Latin America and Europe. In the Sahel, the drug trade buys governments and rebels. And the drugs enter our continent through the weakest points, where control and security measures are insufficient and political governance is more inattentive, as is the case in the Algarve, among others.

There is also human trafficking, with migrants coming from all over West Africa heading to Europe, plus the smuggling of fuel, tobacco, and weapons. It is all cash in hand, in lands without law or order. Schools do not function, except for madrasas run by ignorant fanatics, and there are no jobs for the youth born from an unstoppable demographic explosion. The Kalashnikov has become the only possible livelihood.

Youssouf calls for a robust response against terrorism in Mali and the vast Sahel. It is a fully justified warning, but one that will fall on deaf ears. The UN Security Council, after the forced departure of France from the region, the expulsion of MINUSMA, and the growing influence of the Russians under Vladimir Putin, has swept the region into the corner of the forgotten. The Europeans, who relied on client regimes in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—governments that received funds from Brussels to curb migratory movements—have been overtaken by Moscow. Putin understands that chaos in the Sahel has a disproportionate negative impact on neighbouring Europe. For Europe, it means more immigrants, more drugs, more insecurity, and a colossal loss of geopolitical influence in the Sahel.

I worked for several years in the region. I knew a Mali and neighbouring countries capable of producing great intellectuals and handling governance matters seriously. That was the generation that grew up in the post-colonial period. Many of them left the country, recruited by international organisations. Others emigrated to France to teach in major schools, or to Canada, a country that easily opened its doors to French-speaking university graduates.

Even then, there were rebellious movements, because certain ethnic groups and populations in the most remote regions felt ignored by the central power of their countries. The most serious conflicts involved those who lived by herding and those by farming. It was a competition between two ways of life that were hardly compatible in those arid lands. But solutions could be found. It was also possible to meet with rebel leaders and negotiate with them. The United Nations and I, as the organisation’s envoy, were treated with respect and moderation.

Everything changed in the last 15 years. Religious extremism, various forms of crime, corruption from the bottom to the top in these states, uncontrollable demographic growth accompanied by climate change—including the harmattan, the dry desert wind, increasingly spreading in the region—and the scarcity of rain, along with hostility promoted by Gulf countries and Russia against democratic ideas, all this has created an extremely complex situation. And we Europeans only remember the Sahel when we see the children of these lands selling trinkets on our beaches and terraces, or being attacked here by parties of xenophobia, hatred, and racism. It is reason enough to ask where the EU’s geopolitical strategy is.

Discussing security and governance in the Sahel

In the Sahel, a lot of military and little politics

Victor Angelo

 

The call came from Bamako. On the other end of the line was a former colleague, now back home after a brilliant career in the United Nations. The essence of his conversation was against the massive presence of foreign troops in his country. There are more and more of them, both in the framework of the UN mission - known by the acronym MINUSMA - and due to calls by France. Contrary to recent statements by Emmanuel Macron, who said that the war against terrorism in the Sahel was being won, my friend told me about the deterioration of the situation in Mali and in neighbouring countries. In other words, there are more military personnel but, paradoxically, less security.

Let us look at the latest statistics from the International Organization for Migration. They count about 1.7 million displaced persons due to instability and armed actions in this part of the Sahel, especially in the tri-border area between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso - a region known as Liptako. It is estimated, on the other hand, that about seven thousand lives were lost in the last twelve months due to acts of terrorism and counterterrorist prevention and response operations. These are figures well above the average of previous years. What is more, a recent United Nations investigation shows that war crimes and atrocities have been committed in Mali since 2013. The report, which in addition to pointing the finger at terrorists calls into question the armed forces of certain states, has fallen into a deep hole in the Security Council and awaits debate at the Greek calends. 

Liptako is a vast territory, with an area where Portugal could fit three times over. The Fulas, as nomadic herdsmen and itinerant traders in long caravans, have traditionally shared these dry, harsh expanses with other ethnic groups. But ways of life have changed. Accelerated population growth in recent decades, coupled with enormous pressure from cattle rearing - a multiplication of herds -, increasingly irregular and scarce rainfall due to climate change, poverty and the absence of effective state administration have contributed to a widespread environment of social instability, rebellion and conflict. The rush for gold, which began to be exploited intensively on an artisanal basis some twenty years ago, has also attracted new waves of violence. This is the framework in which various armed gangs move and operate under the confused banners of the terrorist network of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) or, further north, on the way to the border with Algeria, the people affiliated to Al-Qaeda. Religious fanaticism serves as an excuse or muddles along with banditry. For many young people, the Kalashnikov has replaced the shepherd's stick or the farmer's hoe in a context that is becoming progressively more arid, unpredictable, and dangerous. Someone from the region told me that joining an armed group is for many an act of self-protection.

There is a huge problem here that fundamentally requires two types of approach: one will be political and the other will be to combat desertification and poverty. I will mention only the political part, which requires the inclusion of all, without discrimination on ethnic grounds. It also means publicly showing a firm hand against corruption, in military institutions and state administrations. Inclusion and probity are two fundamental issues, which must be resolved by national elites.

 The European partners have closed their eyes and pretended not to see these problems. For example, they have been training officers in the Malian armed forces for years, knowing fully well that these officers have kept a tribal mentality and systematically divert resources intended for the country's stabilisation effort to their own advantage. We need to change the way we act in the Sahel. Dialogue with the countries in the region must be respectful. The future that is at stake is theirs, independently of the external dimensions. We cannot take the direction of the process away from them. Being more papist than the Pope in other people's land is a practice that must be put away once and for all, in a drawer of the past. But it must be a frank dialogue.

 

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

 

Boko Haram in Paris

Today´s summit on Boko Haram, convened at the Elysée Palace by President François Hollande, should be seen as a constructive initiative. 

The concrete results in terms of fighting the Nigerian terrorist group might be very tiny. But it had some other advantages.

 It kept the pressure on the President of Nigeria. President Goodluck Jonathan must take the issue with a greater degree of seriousness. 

It also showed that the countries in the region – particularly Cameroon and Chad – must be fully engaged and cooperate among themselves. This is lacking. Especially as it concerns Cameroon. North Cameroon – an area I know relatively well – is a forgotten region, when seen from the capital Yaoundé. This has to change. The Cameroonians have to increase their police and armed forces presence in the North. They have also to be prepared to cooperate with Nigeria and Chad. 

The summit has also emphasized that the problem requires international cooperation if it is to be tackled without further delay. France can certainly play a role on the French-speaking side of the region. The UK has to be more involved on the Nigerian side. And French and British intelligence services have to work hand in hand on the ground and be willing to treat the African counterparts as equals.

All this is a bit of an ambition. Not easy to achieve. But it has to be said. And the pressure has to go on.

We will see what progress will be reported as accomplished when the ministers meet for a follow-up conference next month in the UK. 

Nairobi's drama

Nairobi is a major international hub and a reference city in East Africa. The UN has a very large presence there, including the world headquarters of the UN Environment Programme. In addition, there are many embassies there, a significant number of transnational firms and a dynamic private sector. For many tourists that visit that part of Africa, Nairobi is the entry and exit point. The national carrier, Kenyan Airlines, has become one of the most efficient in Africa. They bring people to Nairobi from many corners of Africa and fly them out to Europe and Asia.

Furthermore, the political situation, which had been so traumatizing in the elections five years ago, has evolved in the right direction. This year’s presidential race was a peaceful exercise in democracy. Notwithstanding the ethnicity dimension that is very present in the society, stability has regained the place it used to occupy.

The Kenyan Armed Forces have been a key player in the fight for peace and normalcy in Somalia. They have inflicted heavy pressure on the radicals over there and managed, with other African troops, to get the worst of them, Al-Shabab, out of the Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu.

Apparently it is this extremist and highly violent group, which is also closely linked to Al-Qaeda, that is responsible for the drama that has befallen over Nairobi since yesterday.  They came to kill and to remind all of us that radicalism and violence are key enemies of democracy and very serious threats to economic and political stability. 

Syria's impact in Europe

The Belgian political leadership sees with great concern a number of young men volunteering to fight side by side with the rebel groups in Syria. They are Belgian nationals with an immigrant background. They come from Muslim families that migrated to Belgium one or two generations ago. Their parents might be mosque-going people but are not extremists. The younger fellows, many of them in their early twenties, make contact with radical groups through informal clubs, sports associations, coffee shops and internet sites. As they feel relatively disconnected from the Belgian way of life and society they are fertile ground for the radical seeds to grow.

The authorities are trying to address the problem. But these informal networks of tiny cells are very difficult to spot and monitor. It is even difficult to have a realistic estimate of the numbers involved. But it is certainly a big issue, if one takes into account the political and security attention the matter is getting these days.