Mali and the Rest of the Sahel as Priorities Ignored by European Geopolitics

Mali, a vast country and a mosaic of cultures, is just two steps from Europe and one step from collapsing as a state. Earlier this week, the President of the African Union Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, made a dramatic appeal to the international community—a term that is increasingly vague these days—to prevent the country from falling into absolute chaos. He expressed deep concern about the rapid expansion of various terrorist groups, whose activities are based on two pillars: ethnic-religious fundamentalism and organised crime. The state administration and security forces control only a small fraction of the territory. The rest, including the north, the centre, and the outskirts of the capital, Bamako, are operational zones for armed groups. Some are affiliated with the terrorist web known as Al-Qaeda or the self-proclaimed Islamic State, while others are mainly ethnically based, with Tuaregs and Arabs against the Bantu populations of the south.

The financing of terrorist actions is largely domestic. It includes artisanal gold mining, with the gold then sold to Russian organisations, metamorphoses of the infamous Wagner Group. It is suspected that the gold passes through the important Dubai gold market, where it is converted into currency that then goes to Russia. The Russians aligned themselves with the coup military after two military coups (2020 and 2021) and managed to expel the French presence and the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA). They also maintain indirect contacts with the rebellions and traffickers operating in the Persian Gulf.

The imposition of taxes on the population under religious pretences, the kidnapping of wealthy nationals and the few foreigners who still travel in the affected regions, the control of the main roads—which are only passable for those who pay to travel safely and accept keeping only part of their goods—the theft of cattle, all of this funds the costs of violence. Then there is the issue of drugs: the Sahel, of which Mali is a part, is one of the corridors between Latin America and Europe. In the Sahel, the drug trade buys governments and rebels. And the drugs enter our continent through the weakest points, where control and security measures are insufficient and political governance is more inattentive, as is the case in the Algarve, among others.

There is also human trafficking, with migrants coming from all over West Africa heading to Europe, plus the smuggling of fuel, tobacco, and weapons. It is all cash in hand, in lands without law or order. Schools do not function, except for madrasas run by ignorant fanatics, and there are no jobs for the youth born from an unstoppable demographic explosion. The Kalashnikov has become the only possible livelihood.

Youssouf calls for a robust response against terrorism in Mali and the vast Sahel. It is a fully justified warning, but one that will fall on deaf ears. The UN Security Council, after the forced departure of France from the region, the expulsion of MINUSMA, and the growing influence of the Russians under Vladimir Putin, has swept the region into the corner of the forgotten. The Europeans, who relied on client regimes in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—governments that received funds from Brussels to curb migratory movements—have been overtaken by Moscow. Putin understands that chaos in the Sahel has a disproportionate negative impact on neighbouring Europe. For Europe, it means more immigrants, more drugs, more insecurity, and a colossal loss of geopolitical influence in the Sahel.

I worked for several years in the region. I knew a Mali and neighbouring countries capable of producing great intellectuals and handling governance matters seriously. That was the generation that grew up in the post-colonial period. Many of them left the country, recruited by international organisations. Others emigrated to France to teach in major schools, or to Canada, a country that easily opened its doors to French-speaking university graduates.

Even then, there were rebellious movements, because certain ethnic groups and populations in the most remote regions felt ignored by the central power of their countries. The most serious conflicts involved those who lived by herding and those by farming. It was a competition between two ways of life that were hardly compatible in those arid lands. But solutions could be found. It was also possible to meet with rebel leaders and negotiate with them. The United Nations and I, as the organisation’s envoy, were treated with respect and moderation.

Everything changed in the last 15 years. Religious extremism, various forms of crime, corruption from the bottom to the top in these states, uncontrollable demographic growth accompanied by climate change—including the harmattan, the dry desert wind, increasingly spreading in the region—and the scarcity of rain, along with hostility promoted by Gulf countries and Russia against democratic ideas, all this has created an extremely complex situation. And we Europeans only remember the Sahel when we see the children of these lands selling trinkets on our beaches and terraces, or being attacked here by parties of xenophobia, hatred, and racism. It is reason enough to ask where the EU’s geopolitical strategy is.

France, Germany and the European Union challenges and responses

 From France to Germany, and across the EU, the risks are enormous and the challenges must be won

Victor Ângelo

France is experiencing a very serious political crisis. The dissolution of the National Assembly, decided on 9 June 2024 by President Emmanuel Macron, was a gamble that surprised the political class and proved to be a mistake. Since then, four prime ministers have already come to power. The latest, Sébastien Lecornu, formed a government on Sunday night and resigned the following morning. An absolute record, which clearly shows the deadlock the country is in.

The political elites are grouped into two extreme camps: Marine Le Pen’s party and a coalition of more or less radical left-wing forces, with Jean-Luc Mélenchon as the leading figure. What little remains, the centre, is fragmented around half a dozen politicians who cannot agree. Several of these personalities, as well as Le Pen and Mélenchon, are convinced they could succeed Macron as head of state. They want Macron to resign from the presidency of the Republic without delay. Officially, his second term should end in May 2027. Now, due to the seriousness of the crisis, even his political allies are saying that the solution to the deadlock would be for the president to leave office early.

I do not believe this will happen. Macron may not want to admit that his popularity is at rock bottom. This week’s poll found that only 14% of the French support his policies. It is a catastrophic percentage. Macron believes, however, that he has the constitutional legitimacy to continue.

In a deep crisis like the current one, and if Macron were to opt again, in the near future, for early parliamentary elections, it is possible that Marine Le Pen’s far-right could win the most seats. Her party appears, to a significant part of the electorate, as more stable than the left, which is a fragile patchwork of various political opinions.

In any case, whether it is early presidential or new parliamentary elections, France is on the verge of falling into the abyss of deep chaos, caught between two ultra-radical poles. This time, the risk is very serious. The most likely outcome is that France, one of the two pillars of the European Union, will be led by a radical, ultranationalist party, hostile to the European project, xenophobic, and ideologically close to Vladimir Putin.

The other pillar of Europe is Germany. Friedrich Merz, chancellor since May, is in constant decline with public opinion. Only 26% of voters believe in his ability to solve the most pressing problems: the cost of living, housing, immigration, and economic stagnation. The German economy contracted in 2023 and 2024, with sectors such as construction and industry falling back to levels of the mid-2000s. The engine of the economy, the automotive industry, is about a third below its peak 15 years ago and has returned to levels close to the mid-2000s, reflecting a loss of competitiveness and profound structural changes in the sector.

In a recent discussion with German analysts, I was told that the unpopularity of Merz and his coalition is paving the way for the far-right to come to power in 2029 or even earlier. This year, the AfD (Alternative for Germany, a party led by Nazi nostalgists) came second, with almost 21% of the vote. The growing discontent of citizens, competition with the Chinese economy, tariffs and restrictions imposed by the Americans, spending on aid to Ukraine, Donald Trump’s blatant support for German right-wing extremists—who sees the AfD as a way to seriously undermine European unity—, the growing propaganda against foreigners living in Germany, all these are factors that reinforce the electoral base of this racist and Nazi-inspired party. Not to mention that the AfD maintains privileged relations with the Kremlin.

The crossroads in which both France, now, and Germany, in the near future, find themselves represent two enormous challenges for the survival of the EU. They are incomparably more worrying than the consequences of Brexit or the sabotage by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico. They come at a time when the EU faces a series of existential problems of external origin.

The external enemies are well known. Fear and concessions are the worst responses that can be given to them. Enemies and adversaries must be dealt with with great strategic skill and reinforced unity, only achievable if EU leaders can explain and prove to citizens the importance of European unity and cohesion.

The international scene is much bigger than the USA, Russia, or China. The expansion of agreements with Japan, Canada, Mercosur, the African continent, and ASEAN should be given priority attention. This list does not seek to exclude other partners, it only mentions some that are especially important.

The future also requires resolutely reducing excessive dependence on the outside in the areas of defence, technology, digital platforms, energy, and raw materials essential for the energy transition. Debureaucratising, innovating, and promoting the complementarity of European economies is fundamental. All this must be done while combating extremism. To think that extremists will play by democratic rules once in power is a dangerous illusion. Exposing this fiction is now the urgent priority in France, and the constant priority in all Member States, including Portugal.

A new EU leadership team

The challenge the EU leaders have in front of them is to make the right decisions regarding the key positions in Brussels and at the European Central Bank. The period ahead of us is most critical for the European Union. The only real choice we have is to consolidate the project. To make it stronger and better understood by the citizens, that’s what it means. Sensible people understand why we need a more united Europe. They know what is going on in some big countries and how those countries can be a major threat to us, if we do not have a collective response.

EU is big enough to be able to weather the storm we see in the horizon. It must count on itself. At the same time, it should look for alliances and balances of interests, with a clear and consistent policy line. That includes stronger relations with Canada, in the Americas, with key African countries, with India and Japan, among others.

But above all, it must win the support of the European citizens.

European politics are changing fast, both in terms of the issues and the actors. The heads of State and government cannot ignore those changes. When selecting the new institutional heads, they must take that into account. We need people that have the courage to face the new issues, know how to communicate, project confidence and empathy, and represent the different regions of our Continent.

Let’s hope the right decisions will be taken.

EU, Canada, Brexit and Trade Negotiations

The trade agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada, signed today in Brussels, took seven years to negotiate. This is a long time. However, we should note that there was good will on both sides and not too many marked differences in terms of the underlining economic philosophies. But trade agreements touch many details, they are complicated, slow processes. This is especially true for the EU because the European Commission has to keep all the member states on board as the discussions progress. That’s far from being easy and it is actually becoming even more difficult as we look ahead and take into consideration the current state of the Union.

In the circumstances, and following the Brexit decision, it seems rather improbable to reach an agreement with the UK within a two-year time frame, as required by the EU treaty. We might find ourselves confronted with never-ending ping-pong. Unless both sides are reasonable in their demands and state very clearly what they want to achieve as part of a mutually beneficial compromise. The discussions call for a wise, constructive approach. But the politicians, of either side, are rarely up to that task. They see it as a fight and then everyone loses.