Russia and Democratic Europe

DN Opinion

The Russian siege and Europe's response

Victor Ângelo
International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

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Published on: 25 Sep 2026, Diário de Notícias, Lisboa, Portugal
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The recent Duma elections were well staged. They confirmed the internal control exercised by the regime, the decision to continue the illegal war against Ukraine, and Vladimir Putin's structural policy against Europe, which has gradually evolved from occasional provocations to a strategy of persistent and calculated pressure.

Moscow operates on several complementary fronts: sabotage, cyberattacks, electronic signal jamming, the instrumentalization of migrants, propaganda, military intimidation, and support for extremist and pro-Russian political forces. The purpose is not to immediately destroy Western capabilities—not for lack of will, but through strategic calculation. In reality, it is about testing and exposing the political frailties of democratic Europe, with actions surgically below the threshold of NATO's Article 5. The authorship of these actions is systematically denied, exploiting the inherent slowness of democracies in gathering evidence and making decisions. Putin is an expert at transforming political doubt into an instrument of equivocation and at fostering fractures among allied nations.

This pressure materializes on coordinated fronts that many insist on treating as isolated incidents. From Kaliningrad and other unidentified locations, satellite navigation disruptions are already a recurrent issue, affecting aviation and maritime navigation across a vast swath between Poland and Scandinavia. In terms of sabotage, the damage to submarine telecommunication cables in the Baltic Sea since 2024 is now compounded by the threat in the Arctic, where a Russian military unit has reportedly studied ways to disable the region's cables. On the land borders, the migratory instrument orchestrated via Belarus has adapted: in response to the physical barriers erected in Poland, the pressure has shifted towards Lithuania and Latvia through new tactics.

Often treated in isolation by certain political sectors and parts of public opinion, the war of aggression against Ukraine is not a parallel conflict: it is the most brutal manifestation of this very same strategy. There are those who still fail to grasp this connection, viewing support for Kyiv as a mere gesture of solidarity or an obligation that is difficult to justify—a tragic misreading. While on the rest of the continent Moscow operates in the grey zone to avoid collective retaliation, in Ukraine it resorts to direct military force to achieve the same end: to subjugate democracies and unilaterally redraw European security. Support for Ukraine must therefore be unequivocally integrated into the broader framework of defending democratic Europe. Ukraine is our first trench.

Europe's vulnerability, however, is predominantly political and internal. The Kremlin finds Trojan horses within the very heart of the European system: certain extremist parties and movements. Whether through submission, ideological convergence, or financing, or through anti-Americanism or xenophobic repudiation of European integration, these forces ultimately serve Moscow's objectives. By normalizing the Russian narrative, attacking NATO, hindering aid to Kyiv, and sowing scepticism towards European institutions, these extremes amplify the hybrid war.

The European response is dangerously asymmetrical. On the eastern and Nordic flank, the response to the threat is already State doctrine: Finland has integrated hybrid analysis into its comprehensive defence, Estonia is investing in digital resilience, and Warsaw and Vilnius are preparing for escalation scenarios. In Western and Southern Europe, the awakening has been delayed. Although there are shifts in perception and policy in Berlin, Paris, London, Rome, and even Brussels, the response remains too slow, bureaucratic, and fragmented.

This delay reveals a certain incomprehension of the autocratic vision of the regime led by Vladimir Putin. The risk encompasses all of Europe outside the Russian orbit, from the Ukrainian front and the Baltic region to the North Atlantic. Anyone in Lisbon or other European capitals who deems Russia to be distant and their country safe from hybrid attacks demonstrates an embarrassingly naive attitude. In a multidimensional war, traditional geography is no longer a shield. To underestimate this reach is to directly imperil Portuguese critical infrastructure—most notably the Atlantic submarine cables, ports, airports, and energy networks. It is to forget that these connections, if sabotaged, will affect not only our country but a significant part of the West.

This vulnerability is currently exacerbated by the uncertainty surrounding the American commitment. The political distance between Europe and the US continues to widen. They are two perspectives seemingly in the process of divorce. The announced review of the US posture in Europe, involving troop reductions and greater conventional responsibility for allies, has its justifications and will ultimately strengthen European autonomy, but it requires a realistic timetable. The Kremlin is well aware of Western deterrence's reliance on the credibility of its guarantor, and it exploits any hesitation to intensify the pressure.

Russia takes advantage of our difficulty in operating within this intermediate zone between peace and war. It no longer limits itself to testing our degree of tolerance; the signals it sends us should be a cause for concern. It will most likely not act against our part of Europe in the same way it has in Ukraine since 2014, with the occupation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas, and since 2022, with the full-scale invasion. Putin recognizes that an attack on a NATO member could trigger the collective response provisioned in Article 5 and that clandestine actions, including false-flag operations, complicate the unequivocal attribution of responsibility. His political leadership prefers clandestine actions, typical of secret services, agencies in which Putin places a higher degree of trust than in the armed forces. The time has thus come for democratic Europe to abandon its old naivety, grow up, and take its rightful place at the table of international relations: Diplomacy and Defence.

The 81st UN General Assembly: my views

 DN Opinion

UN: Restoring trust and driving transformation

Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published on: 18 Sep 2026, 02:10

The 81st United Nations General Assembly officially opened on 8 September. Its high-level segment, which gathers heads of state and government in New York between 22 and 28 September, takes place under the theme Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation: a UN that delivers results for all. For an organization in crisis, albeit irreplaceable, the decisive test lies not in the vigour of its theme, but in the ability to translate current geopolitics into concrete decisions. At a time when the selection of António Guterres's successor is underway, the speeches should focus on three priorities, each measured by facts, not intentions: promoting peace, establishing multilateral governance of Artificial Intelligence, and placing human development back at the centre of international security.

The first priority is peace. The figures belie the narrative of normalization. In Gaza, the October 2025 ceasefire agreement provided for the entry of 600 aid lorries per day. We are very far from that figure. A substantial part of the little that does enter is commercial cargo rather than humanitarian aid channelled by the agencies. It is this gap between what was agreed and what is executed, not the existence of the ceasefire itself, that defines daily civilian suffering.

In South Sudan, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights documented, over a 17-day period in March, more than 160 civilians killed and approximately 99 water wells destroyed or poisoned. In Sudan—a distinct conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces—the number of civilians killed since 2023 exceeds 59,000, with 14 million displaced and 33.7 million people in need of urgent assistance.

In the Russian aggression against Ukraine, in the Eastern Congo, in the Sahel, and in Myanmar, the patterns repeat themselves: high civilian mortality, mass displacement, and the denial of humanitarian access as an instrument of war.

The UN will not stop these wars from New York. But it can emerge from the high-level segment with a measurable commitment: to allocate a fixed percentage of the budget for special political missions and peacekeeping to the protection of civilians and the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. A peace process that fails to protect women and children from sexual violence, forced displacement, and starvation is not peace; it is hypocrisy.

The second priority stems from a remarkable convergence: within a few days in September, five voices that rarely agree expressed the same concern regarding Artificial Intelligence. On 12 September, Dario Amodei of Anthropic published the essay We Must Pace the Frontier—roughly 3,800 words—advocating a deliberate slowing of the pace of development in AI capabilities; Sam Altman of OpenAI endorsed the core of the appeal hours later, and Elon Musk did the same.

Steve Bannon and Bernie Sanders—opposite extremes of the American political spectrum—joined former Anthropic researcher Jacob Coxon in a Declaration for Pro-Human AI. King Charles III gathered executives from Nvidia, Google DeepMind, OpenAI, and Anthropic yesterday, 17 September, to ask them to adhere to common principles. And Pope Leo XIV, in the encyclical Magnifica Humanitas, released on 25 May, criticized the logic of the ongoing military, economic, and cognitive competition.

China has already responded institutionally: in July, it created WAICO (World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization), an intergovernmental AI cooperation organization that, as I have argued elsewhere, targets the Global South, but simultaneously functions as a Chinese instrument for defining technical standards and technological decoupling from the United States.

It is precisely because WAICO already exists, with its own architecture and interests, that the General Assembly cannot limit itself to "taking note": it must work to bring together the scattered forums—WAICO included—into a common multilateral framework, converting voluntary principles into verifiable commitments, with an independent review mechanism similar to what the American laboratories have just proposed among themselves.

The third priority should have dominated the headlines when the figures were revealed, but it was ignored: the UNDP Human Development Report, published in 2025, recorded the smallest increase in the Human Development Index (HDI) since 1990. The gap between low-HDI and very high-HDI countries widened for the fourth consecutive year, reversing a decades-long trend. The contrast is revealing: between 1990 and 2023, the Asia-Pacific region increased its HDI by more than 50%; the majority of low-HDI countries saw no equivalent growth. According to the then-UNDP Administrator, if the stagnation of recent years becomes "the new normal", the world could fall decades short of the development projected for 2030.

This is not abstract statistics. It is one of the fuels for the other crises. Persistent poverty feeds migration routes; territories without a functional state or economic prospects are where armed groups recruit most easily, leading to the expansion of banditry and terrorism.

Treating development, migration, and security as separate agendas is the mistake that produced this regression. The General Assembly must recognize that financing development means financing international security.

These three priorities share the same logic: peace without the effective protection of people is a precarious truce; Artificial Intelligence without binding multilateral governance is a race with neither rules nor a referee; and development is not a parallel agenda, but the foundation of common security. Trust is not restored with speeches at the New York podium. It is recovered when States show that solidarity exists.

The NATO Summit and the defence of the European geopolitical space

 Europe 2030: Anticipating the Unthinkable and Guaranteeing Peace

Victor Ângelo 

International Security Advisor. 

Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published on: 10 Jul 2026

The NATO Summit in Ankara has made it impossible to continue ignoring the possibility of a Russian aggression against the European space by the end of the decade. It has become a strategic hypothesis that demands preparation, deterrence, and political will. Europe faces a concrete threat and must build a genuine, coordinated, and maximally autonomous Defence capability. Ankara also confirmed a second self-evident truth: the support of the United States, whilst indispensable, can no longer be treated as an automatic guarantee.

European States must correct an error of judgement: interpreting Moscow as if the Kremlin calculated its actions according to a rational economic logic of costs and benefits. This is not the case. Its strategic vision is shaped by other forces: regime survival, historical resentment towards the West, an obsession with a lost sphere of influence, and the need to project strength to prevent any perception of weakness.

That is why the continuation and intensification of the Russian war against Ukraine increase the European risk. This crisis, triggered by the Kremlin, must end without further delay. As Kyiv demonstrates the capacity to strike critical infrastructure within Russia, the vulnerability of Vladimir Putin's power becomes more visible. These attacks erode an autocracy centred on a single face, whose authority depends on internal repression and the appearance of external invincibility. The greater danger is that the Kremlin, should it feel backed into a corner, might seek to regain the initiative through an escalation against NATO countries, pressuring the West to yield and attempting to force Ukraine into capitulation.

This threat would not be a massive territorial invasion in the image of the wars of the 20th century. The technological context has changed the nature of aggression and reduced the time available for decision-making. The risk may arise from surgical, localized operations of great political impact. Russia possesses missile systems, including hypersonics, capable of striking infrastructure in Western Europe in a matter of minutes. Under a logic of controlled escalation, a precision strike against a port, a power station, a communications hub, or a military base would not necessarily mean the onset of a total war. It could suffice to paralyse the Alliance's political decision-making. Every missile would also be a coercive message.

In parallel, the aggression could take the form of rapid operations in vulnerable points: Svalbard, in northern Norway, essential for monitoring the Arctic; Gotland, in Sweden, decisive for controlling the Baltic Sea; or the Suwałki Gap, between Poland and Lithuania, squeezed between Kaliningrad and Belarus. A lightning occupation, albeit limited in space and time, would have a clear objective: to sever access, create faits accomplis, and force NATO to choose between responding, negotiating, or hesitating.

The target would be allied cohesion. If Russia were to advance and NATO were to hesitate, Article 5 would not disappear from paper, but it would lose political substance. The Alliance would continue to exist; however, it would be left with diminished credibility. And an alliance that no longer intimidates the aggressor approaches the old Chinese image, taken up by Mao, of a paper tiger.

The transition to a sort of “NATO 3.0”, in which Europe will have to assume a much greater share of its own Defence, creates a period of critical vulnerability. The summit made it clear that Europe cannot organize its security on the assumption of a constant, predictable, and politically unconditional American presence.

Furthermore: any American insistence on territorial claims or control over Greenland – a topic once again stirred up by Donald Trump in Ankara – would introduce severe tension into the heart of the Alliance. Moscow would tend to interpret a transatlantic fracture of this nature as an opportunity to test NATO's solidity, exploit divisions, and accelerate its operations in the grey zone.

In my preceding article – “NATO and the trap of red lines”, of 3 July 2026 – I emphasized that one of the most dangerous responses would be to announce “red lines”. Linear thinking fails in the face of hybrid warfare and the manoeuvres that take place in the twilight of the grey zone. By proclaiming absolute ultimatums, the Alliance would risk being pushed into an escalation it does not desire or, worse still, exposing its hesitations. What is required is strategic ambiguity: genuine military capabilities, demonstrable readiness, and response options sufficiently unpredictable to render the adversary's calculations more difficult. Europe must invest in a coordinated manner in its Armed Forces and, simultaneously, preserve the language and practice of peace.

Recognizing that Russian aggression is a real possibility on the 2030 horizon is not alarmism. It is strategic prudence. European rearmament should not be presented as a march towards confrontation, but as a condition for avoiding it. When one's neighbour is a power that transforms history into imperial claims and force into a diplomatic argument, peace comes at a high price. But the price of unpreparedness would be incomparably higher. It is this that must be explained to citizens, without euphemisms or useless dramatizations.

Deterrence and defence do not substitute diplomacy; they lend it weight. A fragile Europe may suggest the opening of a dialogue, but it will hardly be heard. A strong, coherent, and autonomous Europe can propose to Moscow a credible, sustained negotiation, oriented towards stability. Dialogue with Russia will always be sterile if conducted from a position of dependence, division, or fear.

Preparing for the unthinkable does not mean desiring war. It means preventing others from considering it advantageous. To guarantee peace – and this remains the paramount objective –, Europe must be ready to respond to scenarios that until recently seemed inconceivable. Peace depends on the credibility of our resolve.

Singapore could be the right place for a mediation between Russia and Ukraine

 The Russian war against Ukraine requires mediation beyond the Euro‑Atlantic framework

Victor Ângelo

Volodymyr Zelensky’s long open letter to Vladimir Putin on 4 June was not a conventional diplomatic initiative. It was another move in a hybrid war with no end in sight. By publicly calling for a ceasefire at the precise moment when Russia’s economic elite and figures from the Global South were meeting in St Petersburg, the Ukrainian president’s primary aim was not to persuade the Kremlin — and it was revealing that he published the letter before delivering it to its addressee, a gesture openly criticised by Putin’s inner circle. Zelensky sought to exploit visible tensions within the Russian system and to remind the international community that Kyiv continues to take the initiative while Moscow remains mired in a devastating war of attrition.

As a political gesture, Zelensky scored points. He again showed that Putin is more concerned with protecting his image and person than with the fate of his people. But wars on this scale do not end because an aggressor suddenly rediscovers the virtues of moderation. They end when military pressure, economic hardship and political isolation reduce the benefits of escalation and compel serious negotiation. The question is not whether Zelensky’s letter was timely. The question is how to turn pressure and stalemate into a mediation process that is not merely a delaying tactic.

In theory, that mediatory role belongs to the United Nations, which in practice has little or no capacity to alter the political calculations of a permanent member of the Security Council.

The alternatives display equally evident limits. Geneva, one of the locations proposed by Zelensky, has its neutrality challenged by Moscow because of Switzerland’s alignment with EU positions. Gulf states are preoccupied with the crises now besetting the Middle East. Turkey — whose mediation capacities were demonstrated in the Istanbul process of March 2022, when negotiations came closest to a result before collapsing — is a NATO member, a geopolitical space the conflict has already outgrown. India has strategic weight but lacks impartiality. New Delhi has consistently shown greater interest in preserving strategic ambiguity than in applying real pressure on Moscow, not least because it has significantly increased imports of Russian oil and purchases of military equipment and components for the development of its civil nuclear energy sector.

A credible host must satisfy four criteria simultaneously. First, political acceptability: it must be accepted, above all, by Moscow and Kyiv, and have political credibility in Washington and Beijing.

Second, legal latitude: the decisions of the International Criminal Court (ICC) cannot be ignored. The host country must provide a clear legal basis to receive senior Russian representatives without undermining the accountability framework the ICC defends.

Third, technical competence: extraordinarily complex issues are at stake — sanctions, frozen assets, security guarantees, reconstruction financing, energy corridors. Peace processes do not fail for want of rhetoric; they fail because guarantees are vague and violations go unsanctioned.

Fourth, structural discretion: public negotiations are fruitless. A host that cannot protect the confidentiality of working sessions will render the process impossible before it begins.

In light of these criteria, I look to Singapore and judge that it deserves more attention than it has received — but the argument requires precision, not mere faith. The country possesses a rare set of institutional conditions that make it a plausible — if not obvious — candidate to coordinate an international mediation.

Indeed, in terms of political acceptability, Singapore simultaneously maintains a strategic partnership with the United States and counts China as its largest trading partner, with decades of functional relations that include discreet channels of communication between Beijing and Western actors. This dual interdependence reveals a substantial capacity to act as a credible interlocutor.

Regarding the ICC, Singapore is not a State party to the Rome Statute. It could also suspend its own sanctions on Russia as an incentive to participate, without compromising the broader architecture of Western sanctions. And it could negotiate with Moscow to be removed from the Kremlin’s list of “hostile countries”. A process of this kind would require concessions that may at first seem unimaginable, but perhaps are not. Curiously, Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lawrence Wong, will visit the Russian city of Kazan next week as part of a Russia–ASEAN summit and will meet Vladimir Putin.

Singapore is one of the world’s major financial and international arbitration centres, with institutional capacity to deal with the most complex aspects of any peace process. Its record also shows it can manage confidentiality, logistics and security for high‑risk events — with exemplary diplomatic professionalism.

Just as Paris, Oslo or Doha became venues for diplomatic processes that transcended their geographic scale, the effectiveness of mediation often depends more on the conditions a host can offer than on its military or geopolitical weight. Singapore would remove the process from the fraught Euro‑Atlantic frame and rewrite it within a genuinely multilateral context.

Intellectual honesty requires recognising the limits. No country can force Russia to negotiate. Mediation will only begin when the Kremlin concludes that prolonging the aggression has become politically and economically unsustainable, and a military disaster. That moment may not be near. But it will come, and it is important to have a prepared and competent diplomatic architecture to initiate mediation.

Singapore would still have to accept the role. Washington, Beijing and other capitals should discuss the option and discreetly sound out the country’s political willingness, as well as the receptivity of Moscow and Kyiv. This mediation, when it occurs, must be handled with great circumspection and originality.

(Published in Portuguese in Diário de Notícias on 12/06/2026)

Donald Trump: what is next concerning war and peace in Iran?

 

Iran: Trump’s "Peace Plan" as a Prelude to War

By Victor Ângelo

In my reading, President Donald Trump’s current momentum is fueled by three core ambitions: to make himself and his close associates as wealthy as possible; to exercise and maintain absolute power urbi et orbi; and to secure a definitive place in history. The aggression against Iran, like his other maneuvers, is designed with these goals in sight. However, from Trump’s perspective, this must be resolved without delay to allow for a pivot toward Cuba—we know what that implies—before the U.S. midterm elections in November. For this reason, he presented a 15-point peace proposal this week. Should Iran capitulate and accept it in its entirety, Washington could contentedly close this chapter and move immediately to the Cuban question.

However, the Trump plan appears to lack both a future and the necessary equilibrium. According to the most credible public information sources, Tehran views this 15-point list as a set of unacceptable demands. They amount to an indisputable surrender, leaving no room for negotiation or an honorable exit. By demanding the near-total denuclearization of its enemy, an end to support for allied regional groups, limits on the production and range of its offensive and defensive missiles, and the delivery of all highly enriched uranium to the UN’s specialized nuclear agency (IAEA), the U.S. aims purely to satisfy Israeli objectives and reduce Iran’s strategic defense capabilities and external alliances to zero.

These are existential matters for the regime. Notably, Trump’s proposal does not touch upon the nature of the regime itself, which would presumably continue its brutal violation of the human rights of its citizens. Democracy and freedom are, once again, absent from Trump’s list of priorities.

The only mechanism of compensation for Washington’s demands would be the lifting of sanctions and their related automatic triggers. Yet, this would not be a full concession. Technological embargos, directly or indirectly related to military dimensions, would persist. Such blockades would only deepen the fragility of Iran’s defenses, not just against Israel, but also in the face of Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The U.S. will not abandon the region. On the contrary, they are expected to soon have, at least, roughly 60,000 elite troops stationed in the bases and on the ships surrounding Iran. History teaches us—as I had the opportunity to learn across various theaters of crisis—that sanctions cause pain and hardship, but they are endurable, especially in a country as vast as Iran with heavyweight friends in the international community. In contrast, large-scale disarmament offers no security guarantees. To accept disarmament would be, in Iran's case, a potentially fatal error. Furthermore, demanding total submission without offering an honorable way out to the weaker party—Iran—ignores the reality of statecraft and opens the door to reinforced alliances with the enemies of the West. It is, for instance, a gift offered to the superpowers controlling the BRICS.

The so-called peace plan is equally unappealing to Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. He wants more. The Israeli Prime Minister seeks a different type of political leadership in Tehran, one ready to accept de facto Israeli prominence in the Middle East. Above all, he wants certainty that nuclear infrastructures have been physically destroyed, that the missile program has been reduced to the scale of a rifle factory, and that Iranian support for hostile armed groups in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine is entirely annihilated.

Trump’s proposal provides no role for the UN Security Council. In other words, to end a war started outside the law, this peace plan remains outside the framework and practice of International Law. The demand that the estimated 450 kilograms of enriched uranium held by Iran be placed under IAEA custody is a decoy. It requires a logistical capacity and a legal mandate that the UN Agency does not currently possess. The Agency is a technical institution for verification and reporting; it must not hold a political function, as politics is the exclusive competence of the Security Council.

From Tehran’s perspective, this plan cannot be approved. They have already made this clear. 

Niccolò Machiavelli reminds us, five centuries on, that a lopsided peace plan not based on mutual concessions can rapidly transform into a new source of war. This is what the UN Secretary-General implied this week, emphasizing with grave concern that the war in the Middle East is spinning out of control. Simultaneously, he appointed my former colleague Jean Arnault as his Personal Representative to build bridges between the conflicting parties. I would have done this much sooner, following the June 22, 2025, bombings of Iranian nuclear plants. However, I would not have appointed a Frenchman or any other Westerner, despite my great esteem for Arnault. The West is seen as an echo of Trump and Netanyahu. It is seen as partial.

Looking ahead, I unfortunately foresee a worsening of the crisis: a sharp military escalation. A resumption of air and naval strikes against Iran, ground incursions by American special forces, and a volatile situation in the countries bordering the Persian Gulf and Lebanon—not to mention the highly negative impact on the global economy. This is to say nothing of the strengthened hand given to Russia to continue its bombardment of Ukraine. 

In listing the indicators of a possible military escalation, I view April with deep concern. We have no more than three or four weeks to find a true alternative for peace.

Today's Iran: and tomorrow?

 

The Rubicon is Crossed: From the "Farsa" of Geneva to the Fire of the Gulf

Victor Ângelo
International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

 

When I wrote in these pages yesterday that the clock for an intervention in Iran was measured in "hours or days," I did so with the heavy heart of someone who has spent several years trying to prevent precisely this kind of diplomatic bankruptcy. Today, as the first reports of explosions in Isfahan and near the Strait of Hormuz confirm that the "Sentinel’s Wrath" (or whatever branding the White House chooses for this tragedy) is underway, the "Cantinflas" theatre has officially closed. The masks are off, and the stage is now set for a conflict of unpredictable proportions. 

The collapse of the Geneva talks—which I previously described as a "farsa"—was the final signal. Sending real estate investors to discuss nuclear enrichment with a millenary power was not an act of naivety; it was a deliberate provocation designed to fail. Their message was an ultimatum. 

By presenting the Iranians with an ultimatum disguised as a "deal," Washington ensured that the path to war was paved with a veneer of "having tried diplomacy." As I warned, it was a crass error to underestimate the pride of Tehran, but perhaps the greater error was believing that this administration ever intended for those talks to succeed. 

The immediate implications are now twofold. First, we face the inevitable economic blowback. The Strait of Hormuz is not just a geographical feature; it is the jugular vein of the global energy market. Any Iranian retaliation there—which their doctrine of "asymmetric response" practically guarantees and it is now closed—will send oil prices into a spiral that will make the inflationary crises of 2025 look like a minor market correction. The "triunfalismo" of the White House may soon be dampened by the reality of ten-dollar-a-gallon petrol. 

Second, we are witnessing the final decapitation of the Rules-Based Order. By bypassing the UN Security Council and ignoring the "patient persistence" that Gorbachev, Reagan and Kofi Annan once championed, the superpowers have effectively declared that International Law is a relic of a dead century. We have entered the era of "Transactional War," where the strongest decides the "deal," and the weakest pays the price in blood and sovereignty. 

The regime in Tehran is now at its most dangerous. While it is true that many Iranians yearn for an end to the theocratic dictatorship, history teaches us that foreign bombs rarely foster internal revolution; they more often unify a nation under the flag of "divine protection." 

We are no longer debating whether a "deal" is possible. We are now in a race to see if the world can contain a fire that was started by people who believe the globe can be managed like a luxury hotel chain. Churchill believed in the power of summits; today, we are left only with the power of the bunker.

Does the Board of Peace has wings?

 

Geopolitical Notes: The International Order and Contemporary Charades

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The Board of Peace: What is its Future?

By Victor Ângelo

Yesterday, the inaugural meeting of the Peace Council took place in Washington—a surreal initiative championed by Donald Trump. At the time of writing, the details of the ceremony have not yet been made public. I know only that no country from sub-Saharan Africa was invited, and that the G7 nations, alongside India, Brazil, the majority of Latin America, and other pre-eminent global actors, were summarily ignored. Peace, in Mr Trump’s conception, is forged by seating at the same table—as members with full rights—Viktor Orbán (the EU leader who enjoys special consideration from the current American administration, as Marco Rubio explicitly stated this week), Alexander Lukashenko, the illegitimate president of Belarus, and Javier Milei, the eccentric head of the Argentine state.

Given the peculiar nature of this project, I was prepared to suggest that Don Quixote de La Mancha—an illustrious knight with an egregious record of tilting at windmills—should likewise join the new organisation’s Executive Committee. He would bring a certain equilibrium to a group that includes, among others, Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner; Steve Witkoff, a great admirer of Vladimir Putin; and Tony Blair, a politician who never misses an opportunity to earn a few pence by advising leaders whose reputations require a marketing fillip in the eyes of international public opinion. But, Don Quixote would not be invited, perhaps for want of sponsorship from the Heritage Foundation—authors of Project 2025, which largely underpins the current White House policy. Nor, it seems, did he secure the patronage of Benjamin Netanyahu or the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, the famous Mohammed bin Salman, both of whom are distinguished figures associated with this new Peace Board.

Curiously, Ajay Banga, the President of the World Bank, holds a permanent seat within the Board’s inner sanctum—the Executive Committee. Conversely, António Guterres, the UN Secretary-General, is nowhere to be found. The recent proclamations emanating from Washington regarding the relative importance of the UN system are merely platitudes intended to pacify the international community.

Despite denials from Trump’s subordinates, the Board of Peace represents a significant step towards attempting to dismantle the United Nations Security Council. Washington recognises that the Security Council has reached an intractable impasse. There is no prospect of reform and, furthermore, it grants immense power to China and other veto-wielding nations. Mr Trump considers all of this contrary to American interests and, above all, to the global influence of his own "extraordinary and genial" persona.

The concept of a Peace Council was originally approved on 17 November 2025 by the UN Security Council (Resolution 2803), with a mandate strictly limited to seeking a solution for the tragedy in Gaza. It was intended as a temporary, transitional administration tasked with coordinating the reconstruction of Gaza and commanding an international stabilisation force.

The body inaugurated yesterday is something quite different; it flouts the terms of Resolution 2803 and assumes a supposedly universal mandate. It is an abuse of power and yet another act of sabotage against the credibility of the UN and its central organ, the Security Council. Every political leader who declined Trump’s invitation, including Pope Leo XIV, grasped and disapproved of the American president’s true intentions.

The agenda of this Board of Peace shall be dictated by Donald Trump, now and forevermore. It will possess a significant real estate component. "Trumpian peace" will adopt a more corporate definition: the submission of the weak to the strong. Reconstruction will primarily signify the proliferation of luxury condominiums.

Had Don Quixote, or a knight of similar virtuous nobility, been admitted, he would have insisted on including situations such as the one currently unfolding in Cuba. International observers consider the country to be facing a grave socio-economic and humanitarian crisis. The Western media—with the exception of a few newspapers —has opted for silence regarding this crisis, which results from the escalation of political confrontation imposed by the Trump Administration. The primary instrument of pressure is an almost total blockade, in effect since late January, on Cuba’s access to foreign fuel. This decision has paralysed essential basic services: healthcare, water, food, electricity, waste management, and transport. As in other similar situations I have witnessed, it is the common citizens who are reduced to absolute destitution. Political leaders and those with relatives abroad invariably find alternative solutions. Thus, the crisis sharpens for the poorest, and the anticipated popular uprising fails to materialise.

These blockades are an unacceptable political gamble, reminiscent of the sieges of castles and boroughs in the Middle Ages. Such actions are prohibited by modern international law, as they constitute indiscriminate punishment with a collective impact. UN human rights experts categorise this energy siege as a "grave violation of international law" and an act of "extreme economic coercion" that threatens to lead to genocide through the deprivation of the means of subsistence.

As was remarked recently in Davos and Munich, we have returned to the rules of yesteryear—to the law of the cannon.

Fortunately, Ukraine continues to remind us of the philosophy of Sun Tzu, a vision I repeat whenever the opportunity arises: in the face of a war of aggression, peace is achieved through moral courage and strategic imagination in the legitimate defence of the aggrieved. I see no one among the guests at yesterday’s "beija-mão" (ceremonial hand-kissing) who possessed the audacity to remind Donald Trump of this truth.