USA and Iran, a very serious conflict: what's next?

A Profoundly Perilous and Complex Confrontation: The USA and Iran

Victor Ângelo

Are we on the precipice of an armed conflict between Iran and the United States? This remains one of the pre-eminent questions of our days. The answer is neither simple nor definitive. Indeed, the risk may be considered imminent. However, the costs for both parties—and for the world at large—would be so catastrophic that it is both necessary and urgent to reach an accommodation.

Mediation ought to be undertaken by regional states or the more influential members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation—some closer to the Sunni interpretation of Islam, others to the Shia practice—provided they are acceptable to both Washington and Tehran. Ideally, the responsibility would have been vested in the UN or India. Regrettably, neither the UN Secretary-General nor the Prime Minister of India possesses sufficient credibility in this instance. Narendra Modi squandered his political capital regarding the Middle East the moment he chose to anchor his domestic power in the marginalisation of India’s Muslim citizens. He is an autocrat who plays the ethnic card and resorts to populism to retain his grip on power.

As for António Guterres, he carries no weight in Washington and is perceived in Tehran as an outsider—a Westerner approaching the twilight of his tenure. He is regarded as a Secretary-General for humanitarian causes and little else. For many, he lacks the political stature and the requisite "vigour" for conflict resolution. The fact remains that Guterres has been plagued by misfortune. Enduring two Trump administrations, each more deleterious than the last, is a singular stroke of ill luck.

The reality is that we are witnessing a formidable military escalation in the Persian Gulf, one of the world’s most sensitive regions. This escalation could trigger an open war at any moment. This is a dispute of immense complexity. The nuclear carrier USS Abraham Lincoln is currently in the Persian Gulf, accompanied by its strike group, bristling with hundreds of Tomahawk missiles and supported by elite fighter jets, satellites, and surveillance drones that monitor every movement within Iran and its territorial waters. Furthermore, the US maintains tens of thousands of personnel across five bases in the region. They also conduct constant policing of the Strait of Hormuz—a vital artery for oil supplies, primarily to China, but also to India. Should either the US or Iran open a front in this transit zone, they would impede, or at the very least disrupt, the daily passage of approximately 20% of the world’s trade in oil and liquefied natural gas. The economic fallout of such a confrontation would be dramatic, both for the region and for the economies of China and numerous other nations.

Few stand to benefit from such a crisis. It is, however, difficult to believe that a deployment of American forces of such formidable proportions has merely deterrent objectives, regardless of protestations to the contrary.

On the Iranian side, military capacity is significantly inferior to that of the Americans. Currently, following the setbacks of its allies in Lebanon (Hezbollah), Syria, Yemen, and Gaza, its strategic strength rests primarily on three pillars: its vast and diversified ballistic arsenal, the mass production of drones, and the ability to sever navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb—the maritime bottleneck connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and, by extension, the Indian Ocean. Bab el-Mandeb is a vital route through which a significant portion of global trade traditionally flows.

In truth, when considering Iran, one must account for a fourth pillar: the religious fanaticism and the ferocious dictatorship that underpin Iranian political power. It was this volatile mixture of fanaticism and disregard for human life that formed the backbone of the barbaric repression against the populace last month, resulting in an incalculable number of victims. The conclusion is simple: by the standards of modern humanism, the Ayatollahs’ regime resides in a world of five centuries ago—the heart of the Dark Ages. It cannot be countenanced in this day and age, however much one respects national sovereignty or the internal politics of a state. This is a message Guterres ought to convey to Xi Jinping, reminding him that the sovereignty of any state begins with respect for the dignity and human rights of its citizens.

Xi Jinping might, indeed, begin by revisiting the principles adopted by Deng Xiaoping following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. Deng was the architect of "socialism with Chinese characteristics"—the leader who modernised China, liberalised the economy beyond state control, invited foreign investment, and ended the agriculture of famine. Xi Jinping, however, wagers primarily on absolute power, reminiscent of the Maoist era, coupled with unbridled economic capitalism and a personal brand of rivalry and competition against the US. He is above all preoccupied with Chinese supremacy in military, technological, economic, and geopolitical spheres. Consequently, he errs by aligning himself with powers that view geopolitics through an archaic lens—notably Iran and Russia, another staunch ally of the theocratic dictatorship in Tehran. Xi views the future as a zero-sum rivalry between his nation and the United States, proving that he regards global challenges and international solidarity merely as pawns in China’s international geopolitical gambit.

If Iran can only rely on allies of such a kind, the answer to my initial question must be: let there be resolve, extensive diplomacy, and an absolute respect for citizens and for peace.

Europe and its autonomy

Europe Must Depart the Labyrinth and Establish its Autonomy

by Victor Ângelo

Europe can no longer afford the luxury of hesitation upon the international stage—most especially now, as the global landscape increasingly resembles a field of forces set upon a collision course. For too long, we have permitted our strategic vision to be held captive by two obsessions: a credulous subordination to the patronage of the United States, and a lingering dread of a destructive avalanche from the Russian quarter. In both instances, Europe has suffered a diminishment of its sovereignty and its standing. Our paramount duty is to reclaim them.

We exist today amidst hostilites emanating from various quarters. It is imperative that we confront them. The external strength and the reputation of the European Union are but a direct reflection of our internal cohesion. In these times, it is essential to accord respect to others, to advocate for equilibrium, and yet, at once, to project power. Internal cohesion is, therefore, in my judgment, the foremost concern.

To achieve this, we must bolster European complementarity through decisive measures: firstly, by the harmonisation of our principal policy dimensions, thereby ensuring that internal fragmentation is not exploited by external competition; secondly, by fortifying our democratic resilience against disinformation, establishing an effective protocol to counter hybrid threats and the falsehoods intended to fracture our societies; and thirdly, by massive investment in integrated infrastructures—both in energy and the digital realm—to ensure that no Member State remains a vulnerable target for the blackmail of third parties.

A Europe that is not solid at its core can never truly be sovereign at its frontiers, nor can it exert significant geopolitical influence. This necessitates the strengthening of our common identity—whilst respecting our cultural and national diversities—and the active engagement of our citizens and their representative institutions.

By "sovereign independence," we do not imply a defensive isolationism, but rather the capacity to assert and defend our strategic interests. We speak of a multidimensional sovereignty: energetic, technological, cultural, political, and military. To be sovereign is to ensure that the decrees of Brussels and elsewhere reflect our common priorities, and that our partners are chosen upon the basis of reciprocity, never of submission.

We must not overlook China, which occupies the very heart of the super-powers. Our relationship with China demands a realism unburdened by naivety. Our course must be charted in Brussels. The objective is the reduction of risk, though without a rupture, protecting strategic sectors and ensuring that relations are governed by mutually accepted rules.

Simultaneously, sovereignty is won by engaging with all. It is imperative that Europe, as a singular whole, speaks with Moscow as much as it does with others. To maintain open channels with the Kremlin is not a demonstration of weakness, but a realist acknowledgement of our geographic circumstance. A productive dialogue with the Kremlin is, at present, well-nigh impossible. To Don Quixote, it would be akin to inviting a serpent to one’s table and naming it diplomacy. Nevertheless, I believe that democratic Europe, in its entirety, must attempt a dialogue. Russia, under its current leadership, has been transformed into an ill neighbour; it inspires no confidence—rather the reverse—yet it dwells at our very doorstep. The first step must be to demonstrate to Moscow that the prolongation of its aggression against Ukraine leads to the ruin of all, Russia most of all. Sun Tzu, in his celebrated work The Art of War, observed that "there is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare." When victory is not swift and decisive, the wisest course for the aggressor is withdrawal.

Within this new architecture, NATO must transcend its one-way dependency. Aligning with the vision that Mark Rutte has brought to the Alliance at the commencement of his tenure, Europe must strive to construct a European pillar of defence that is operationally autonomous. As the Secretary-General has reiterated: "European security cannot continue to be an imported commodity." To reform NATO is to ensure that Europe assumes primary responsibility for the stability of our own continent.

In the wake of Davos 2026 and the forthcoming Munich Conference, and within the process of the United Nations' reorganisation (UN80), Europe must assert itself as the architect of a reinvigorated and effective multilateralism. The message must be plain and direct: we must restore trust between States. In the reform of the UN—which is now more urgent than ever—Europe must lead the transition toward a system that reflects contemporary reality, advocating for an expanded Security Council wherein the voice of the Global South and regional powers is institutionalised, and the power of veto ceases to be an instrument of paralysis.

This effort toward multilateral reform is currently imperilled by transactional and exclusionary proposals, such as the extraordinary "Board of Peace" suggested by the United States administration. This proposal, which seeks to replace collective diplomacy with a directory at the service of the personal interests of Donald J. Trump, constitutes an unacceptable ambition. By attempting to circumvent international institutions, the "Board of Peace" seeks to impose a mercantilist order, founded upon a vast ego and a nineteenth-century concept of empire that disregards the rights and sovereignty of States. In a word, it is an aberration.

The stability and geopolitical influence of Europe shall not spring from arms alone, nor from the modernity of our economies. They shall result, also, from our capacity to stand shoulder to shoulder at every level with those who wish to subjugate us, from the moral force we bring to the defence of universal values, and from the bridges we choose to build with democratic regimes across every region of the globe.

Reflecting about the new international rules: business and might

The New International Order: Business and Brute Force

By Victor Ângelo

I have many doubts about the footballing abilities—and others—of President Donald Trump, especially now that he has started the New Year with two own goals.

The first own goal was the intervention in Venezuela. It resulted in the deterioration of his country’s international image and handed points on a silver platter to Russia and China.

The UN Security Council meeting revealed the gravity of the American adventure in Venezuela. The Secretary-General, who out of prudence did not attend the meeting in person, had a statement read out which underlined that Venezuela’s sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity had been violated. In that communication, he referred to the US military operation as a “dangerous precedent”, which seemed strange to several governments and analysts, considering that the history of the Latin American region is littered with similar interventions—Harvard University historians have inventoried more than forty extraconstitutional ruptures organised with the support or at the instigation of Washington. The most famous occurred in 1973, when President Salvador Allende of Chile was assassinated thanks to the organisational skills of the CIA.

The great difference between the military intervention of a few days ago and previous ones lies in President Trump’s admission that the current one aimed at the usurpation of the oil resources of the attacked country. Past interferences were presented with another level of subtlety, without direct references to expropriations or looting.

I note an additional point regarding Guterres’ communication. Many at the United Nations compared the statement he made following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 with this one now, carried out by the USA. Guterres condemned Russia directly and was himself present at the Security Council meeting for that purpose. He addressed Vladimir Putin unambiguously, in the name of peace and political ethics. In the case of the USA, he used only generic arguments about the international order and the violation of the Charter, without mentioning Trump’s name. Let this be noted, and let it serve as an invitation to reflection.

The first own goal was favourable to the Russian Federation and China. The repeated references in Washington to the theory of spheres of influence made it more difficult to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Someone circulating in the corridors of the Kremlin sent me a provocative message, albeit with some wit and a touch of diplomacy in the style learned from old Soviet manuals. It said they were sure I would condemn, in this week’s chronicle, the unjustified aggression against the Venezuelan power and demand that the European Union impose sanctions against the mastermind of the kidnappings. A Putin's faithful joker. One might say that the Russian leaders feel happy and content with what happened in Venezuela.

As for China, which was in fact the most indirectly targeted country—Washington does not want China to gain a presence in the area of influence that the Americans consider their own—there was a kind of validation of its claims regarding Taiwan. This does not mean that Beijing is thinking of launching a military operation against Taipei in the very near future. China knows that such an offensive, should it happen, would carry high costs. But it has now received an indication from the Trump Administration that it can increase political-military pressure on the island. And use more bellicose language, which is indeed happening this week after a Taiwanese MP proposed an amendment to the “Act Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area”, a law adopted by Taipei in 1992. According to the proposal, the statute would be renamed the “Act on Relations between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China”. The new name and content are seen by Beijing as yet another attempt to separate the two parts and promote Taiwan's independence—something that is absolutely unacceptable to the Chinese leadership.

The second own goal resulted from statements by Trump and those around him, such as Stephen Miller—a hawk who serves as the White House Deputy Chief of Staff—regarding Greenland. Trump is preparing to annex Greenland, which is a territory of the European space through its connection to Denmark. The reason invoked—to create a security barrier against Russia and China—makes no sense. The USA has a military base in Greenland and can count on full Danish cooperation. It should be noted that during the Cold War, the base housed around 10,000 American military personnel. Now, it has around 150. This evolution does not reveal great geopolitical fears on the part of the USA. Not forgetting that there are several treaties between the USA and Denmark that recognise Danish sovereignty regarding Greenland.

Trump has his eyes fixed on the territory’s natural riches, on the maritime corridors that climate change will make navigable the Arctic zone, on the airspace controlled by Greenland—which has enormous strategic value—and on History: he wants to see his name added to the list of presidents who augmented the American territorial area.

He should also think about the impact that the annexation will have on the future of NATO. But for him, NATO serves to buy weaponry from the American industry. And that will continue to happen for many years, whether there is NATO or not. The Europeans are captive customers. The new reality is evident: in our day, business and brute force are triumphing over diplomacy and the international order, thanks to Trump, Putin, and others alike.

Published in Portuguese language in today's edition (09/01/2026) of Diário de Notícias. 

Looking ahead into 2026 with realism or just pessimism?

 2026: On Certain and Uncertain Challenges, and the Indispensable Need for International Cooperation

Victor Ângelo

The ancient Oracle of Delphi has now been replaced by Artificial Intelligence (AI) platforms. Even so, it is very risky to predict what the world will be like in the coming times. In the case of 2026, it is even more difficult for three fundamental reasons: firstly, we are in a period of marked geopolitical disorder, a legacy of 2025; secondly, the calendar foresees events of great importance, which may profoundly alter international realities; thirdly, the competition in the fields of AI, quantum technology, and high technology is accelerating rapidly, especially between the USA and China, without it being clear what the consequences of this dizzying rivalry might be. All this without considering the possible appearance of one or more Black Swans, as happened with Covid.

At the geopolitical level, I consider the most significant challenge to be the enormous current threat posed by the Russian Federation to democratic Europe. The criminal large-scale invasion of Ukraine is about to enter its fifth year, and Vladimir Putin does not seem willing to put an end to the violence. Ukraine has managed to resist, in a surprising and heroic manner, but above all from the end of winter onwards, it will need exceptional and continuous financial and military support to guarantee its legitimate defence. It should count on the help of European states—there will be little or nothing to expect from Trump’s America. European aid will be indispensable for the defence of Ukraine and of Europe itself. This aid, though inevitable, will worsen relations between the main European states and Russia, and could even lead to an armed attack, by decision of the Kremlin. We have not been this close to such a situation before. Putin currently boasts that he believes he would emerge victorious from such a confrontation. In reality, he is cornered and, consequently, deluded that war will keep him in power.

Trump will be mainly obsessed, throughout the year, with the US midterm elections on 3 November. He will do everything to retain the majority in Congress. If necessary, he will create incredible confusion on the domestic scene and conflicts on the international chessboard, notably in Venezuela and Greenland, so as to appear, to the more credulous American electorate, as the guarantor of his country’s stability and greatness. It would not be a surprise if this were to happen. Like all other autocrats throughout history, Trump believes that confusion and chaos will play in his favour.

European democracies cannot rely on Trump. He and Putin, each in their own way, are two enormous risks for international law and global order. For the first time, in 2026, two nuclear powers will be led by exacerbated egocentrics, capable of destroying a large part of humanity if, in their view, it is considered vital for them to remain in power.

I must also mention Xi Jinping. His main political concern is to ensure internal prosperity in China, which is understandable given the size of the country’s population and the fact that his political survival depends both on the stick and the carrot, on an iron-fisted rule and on the rising standard of living felt by a significant part of the population. However, in a situation of international chaos, he may attempt to recover Taiwan. This possibility cannot be excluded in 2026.

In terms of AI, competition between states will focus on economic advances, military superiority, and the dominance of the ideological narrative that favours their interests. Whoever wins the race in these areas—the USA or China—will guarantee their supremacy as a global hyperpower.

Financial and scientific investments in AI will continue throughout the year to reach absolutely astronomical values. In the USA, priority will be given to the giant technology companies. The security and defence sectors will establish fabulous contracts with these companies. In China, the development of AI will remain under the absolute control of the state, to ensure the regime’s survival. But in both cases, the fundamental concerns will be related to strengthening national security and manipulating public opinion. Colossally expanded by quantum science, AI will increasingly become a powerful and unpredictable tool in the hands of those who hold power.

In 2026, a new Secretary-General of the UN will be elected. The Global South recognises the value of the United Nations and is increasingly insisting on the urgency of its reorganisation. The survival of the UN’s political role depends on its representativeness. The right of veto and the permanent seats on the Security Council are now considered by the majority of Member States as outdated and obsolete powers, but still very real. They are obviously incapable of reflecting today’s international relations and of enabling the resolution of the major problems that plague the international agenda.

The electoral process that will take place throughout the year until a new Secretary-General is elected will give more strength to the reform movement. It will also insist on the election of a woman. Until now, the post has always been held by men. This will be one of the major themes at the UN level. It is time to elect a woman. In parallel, there will be a whole campaign for the person elected to come from Latin America. According to the rules, that should be the region of origin of the new leader. It would also have another significance: it would show Trump that Latin America really matters, that it is not just the backyard of the USA.

The political dimension of the UN is now going through the deepest crisis in its history. I do not believe, however, that it will cease to exist. The personality of the new Secretary-General will, however, be decisive. It must be someone seen as a political giant and with a skilful and courageous diplomatic streak. In Latin America, we have several such women: the Chilean Michelle Bachelet, the Costa Rican Rebeca Grynspan, the Mexican Alicia Bárcena, the Prime Minister of Barbados, Mia Mottley, and several others. These are personalities who have shown extraordinary political firmness.

Still on the UN, Portugal is seeking a non-permanent seat on the Security Council for the 2027–2028 biennium. It is competing with Germany and Austria, that is, three candidates for two available seats. If it manages to be elected—the decision will be made in June and, in my analysis, the Portuguese candidacy has a strong chance of succeeding—it will be the fourth time that Portugal has had a seat on the Security Council.

In the period of great uncertainties that will be 2026, we cannot fail to speculate about possible Black Swans. In international affairs, a Black Swan is a rare, unpredictable event, but when it happens, it turns out to have generated catastrophic consequences. Six years ago, it was Covid. In 2026, a terrible catastrophe could perhaps be a high-speed collision between two satellites, among the thousands currently in orbit, a number that keeps growing. This would cause an indescribable pulverisation of fragments, which would destroy other satellites and multiply astronomically the pieces of metal in uncontrolled orbit. The impact would be simply devastating for the various global satellite navigation systems, for space internet, meteorological, logistics, and military surveillance networks.

Other Black Swans are equally possible due to technological advances, but also because of their risks and unbridled competition.

Cooperation is the most effective response when any colossal challenge occurs. And with or without Black Swans, the greatest challenges are already here. The future choice is now dramatically clear: either there is cooperation, or we accelerate the destruction of a large part of our planet.

Donald Trump's visit to Japan

Today's Trump’s return to Tokyo signals more than a diplomatic courtesy—it’s a calculated move to reassert U.S. influence in Asia amid rising regional uncertainty. It aims at showing American power and leadership in East Asia. 

His meeting with Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi underscores a push for a tougher stance on trade and security, likely aimed at countering China’s growing clout. While billed as alliance-strengthening, Trump's visit shows we are in a new era of transactional geopolitics, where economic leverage and strategic posturing dominate the narrative. As Trump emphasised, “the U.S.–Japan partnership must be stronger than ever to ensure stability and fairness in the region”—a clear nod to both security and trade dominance.

Briefing Note: Russia’s Policies and Implications for APEC

Purpose

To inform APEC leaders of the strategic risks posed by Russia’s current foreign and economic policies and their potential impact on regional stability and economic cooperation.

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Key Observations

1. Militarisation and Geopolitical Assertiveness

   • Russia prioritises hard power over diplomacy, using the Ukraine conflict as leverage for global influence.
   • Increased military presence in the Arctic and Asia-Pacific signals readiness to escalate tensions, undermining regional security.

2. Economic Weaponisation

   • Energy exports remain a geopolitical tool, with infrastructure projects used to divide allies.
   • Despite extensive sanctions, Russia sustains its war economy through alternative trade networks, deepening global fragmentation.

3. Strategic Dependence

   • Russia’s “pivot to Asia” has led to structural reliance on China, limiting autonomy and raising long-term viability concerns.

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Implications for APEC

• Trade Disruption: Russia’s stance on sanctions and WTO mechanisms introduces friction into APEC’s consensus-driven model.
• Security Spillover: Militarisation risks transforming economic forums into arenas of strategic rivalry.
• Normative Erosion: Push for “multipolarity” challenges rules-based governance, creating uncertainty for smaller economies.

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Recommended Actions

• Reaffirm APEC’s Core Principles: Emphasise rules-based trade and economic cooperation.
• Strengthen Collective Resilience: Diversify supply chains and enhance energy security to reduce vulnerability.
• Engage with Caution: Maintain dialogue on economic issues while countering destabilising tactics through coordinated responses.

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Bottom Line:
Russia’s policies combine revisionist geopolitics, economic opportunism, and strategic dependency. APEC must navigate engagement carefully to safeguard stability and uphold its mission of inclusive, sustainable growth.

Europe and its weak strategy regarding the ASEAN

 From Kuala Lumpur to Brussels, the ASEAN summit shows the weakness of the European strategy towards Southeast Asia

Victor Ângelo

The European Union and its Member States have shown limited attention to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has allowed China to significantly expand its influence in the region. Other countries, such as India, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, have also strengthened their ties with ASEAN. All this contrasts with the inertia on the part of the EU—a missed opportunity for both sides and a vacuum that others skillfully fill. It also highlights yet another failure of imagination, initiative, courage, and understanding of the political game in that part of the world at the level of European external action. This scenario of European imprecision is particularly relevant in a geopolitical area that is rapidly gaining weight in international relations.

Recently, the United States has also recognized the strategic value of ASEAN. Donald Trump will be present at this year's summit, from October 26 to 28, in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia. In addition to meeting with the ten ASEAN leaders—who will become eleven, with the formal admission of Timor-Leste, an important step for the political, economic, and cultural integration of the country into the region to which it truly belongs—the American president will also have the opportunity to meet other prominent politicians, such as Narendra Modi, Li Qiang (Prime Minister of China), Sanae Takaichi (the new ultraconservative leader of Japan), Lula da Silva, and Cyril Ramaphosa.

The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, also invited Vladimir Putin, a significant gesture, although the Russian president has indicated that he will not be able to attend. Even so, Russia will be represented at a high level. Until the announcement this Wednesday of the new American sanctions, the possibility of a last-minute participation by Putin was not excluded, considering the media and political projection that this would have. Now, it is certain that Putin does not wish to meet Trump, unless the latter reverses this week's decision.

Among the European guests, the Prime Minister of Finland and Giorgia Meloni of Italy stand out, with Meloni already confirming her presence. Meloni recognizes that her visibility at international events is fundamental for consolidating her domestic policy. However, it remains uncertain who will represent the European institutions, with António Costa being one of the names mentioned in diplomatic circles. If confirmed, his presence will be mainly symbolic, since much of the power, namely the executive, resides with the European Commission, led by Ursula von der Leyen.

The European Union needs to look at ASEAN with greater realism and commitment, strengthening political and economic ties with a group of countries that together make up the third most populous region in the world (about 685 million people) and the fifth largest global economy. ASEAN is one of the engines of development of the so-called Global South and aims to play a prominent role in building a new international order. Ignoring this reality would be a strategic mistake for Europe. Historically, Europeans feel closer to Africa and Latin America, but betting on Southeast Asia is increasingly an inevitable path for the coming decades. Furthermore, competition with China, Russia, India, and the USA will be more balanced if the EU manages to establish a solid relationship with the region.

The Kuala Lumpur summit will focus on four major themes considered priorities by the Member States: economic cooperation, regional stability and security, renewable energy production (with the goal of reaching 45% by 2030), and the deepening of free trade agreements with partners such as China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand.

Significantly, the summit will not address the serious political crisis affecting Myanmar, one of ASEAN's Member States. This deliberate omission reflects the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each State, one of the Association's pillars, something that clearly contradicts the political cooperation project and obviously favors economic interests. This stance, partly inspired by China, contributes to the distancing between Europe and Southeast Asia, especially due to the indifference of some ASEAN members regarding human rights.

In this context, the messages that the European Union should convey at the Kuala Lumpur summit are clear. On the one hand, to affirm that we, Europeans, consider it mutually beneficial to deepen the full range of relations with ASEAN. On the other hand, to express our conviction that respect for citizens is the only way to guarantee peace, strengthen international cooperation, and ensure sustainable prosperity.

A Europa no momento da cimeira da ASEAN

 O meu texto de hoje no Diário de Notícias (24/10/2025)

https://www.dn.pt/opiniao/a-cimeira-da-asean-mostra-a-fraqueza-da-estratgia-europeia-face-ao-sudeste-asitico

Are you talking about the UN reform?

 The future demands political courage, strategic vision, and a UN that is respected

Victor Ângelo

Eighty years ago, on October 24, 1945, the UN Charter came into force, having been approved four months earlier in San Francisco. That is why this date in October is celebrated annually as United Nations Day.

I am referring to the political part of the organization. The specialized agencies, such as FAO, UNESCO, WHO, ILO, and all the others, emerged at different times. Each has its own history, as well as its own specific governance structures, independent of the authority of the Secretary-General (SG). Over time, special programs and funds also emerged, such as WFP, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, and several others—a long list of acronyms. These programs and funds are headed by individuals chosen by the SG, mostly in response to pressure from some of the more powerful states. They do not belong to the same division that includes the specialized agencies.

The system is in crisis. But if the UN did not exist, it would be necessary, even in today’s confusing times, to invent it. This is a frequently repeated idea.

The United Nations exists; there is no need for any creative exercise. But President Xi Jinping, who also contributes to the marginalization of the UN and seeks to take advantage of it, now proposes an alternative system, inspired by his vision of China’s central role in the world. He had already proposed a Global Development Initiative, another on international security, and yet another called the Global Civilization Initiative. At the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, which took place less than two months ago, Xi completed the picture and proposed the missing initiative, on global governance. That is, on the principles that should regulate relations between states. When I say he completed the picture, I am referring to four fundamental pillars of the UN: development, peace, human dignity, and now, the political one.

Xi’s proposal on international governance is little more than a restatement of the content of the United Nations Charter in other words. The five basic principles he proposes for global governance are contained in the Charter. Xi refers to respect for the sovereignty of each state, including retrograde and dictatorial regimes; subordination to the rules of international law; defense of multilateralism and the role of the United Nations—something that China itself does not practice when it is inconvenient; the value of people, who should be the main concern in political matters; and the need to achieve concrete results in solving global problems. There is certainly no significant disagreement with these ideas. The Chinese initiative is basically a political maneuver.

The problem is that these principles are often ignored by several member states, starting with the great powers such as China, Russia, and the United States of America, and by states outside international law, such as North Korea or Israel.

Thus, the United Nations ceases to be the central forum for international relations, discussion, and resolution of major conflicts. The blame lies with certain member states, and in particular, with the malfunctioning and lack of representativeness of the Security Council (SC). The UN has been completely marginalized in the cases of Ukraine, Gaza, Sudan, Myanmar, the end of the embargo against Cuba, and so on. However, the real problem lies with the SC: without a Council that represents the realities of the 21st century, the political UN will continue to live in the past and be doomed to decline.

The plan that President Donald Trump had adopted regarding the dramatic crisis in Gaza—a vague plan that is practically impossible to carry out in its key points—does not mention the UN or assign it any kind of responsibility. Even if it is discussed in the Security Council, which is not yet confirmed, the various points imposed by President Trump do not take into account the experience accumulated in similar situations. It is a plan that was not negotiated by the interested parties—Israel and Palestine—that is, it did not follow a fundamental procedure in peacebuilding. I fear that it will achieve little beyond the release of the remaining living hostages, the freedom of a group of prisoners held in Israel, and a temporary and insufficient humanitarian opening in the face of the absolutely basic needs of the civilians still surviving in Gaza.

The SG is trying to implement a process of organizational reform, which he called UN80. In reality, the effort is little more than a bureaucratic response to the organization’s financial crisis. Instead of insisting, day and night, that delinquent states pay their dues and mandatory contributions on time, and clearly defining what justifies the existence of the UN, the SG chose the option that goes over better with certain leaders and their finance ministries: eliminate jobs, reduce the scope and functioning of field missions, transfer services to cities where the cost of living is lower than in New York or Geneva. The refrain is “do less with fewer resources.” In fact, it should be another: “making peace and promoting human dignity require everyone’s contribution and respect for the UN’s courageous voice.” That assertion is the only one consistent with the defense of international cooperation and multilateralism. That is what I learned and applied over decades.

Ukaine and Europe versus the Russia-China alliance

President Zelensky talked twice over the weekend with the US President Donald Trump. The Ukrainian leader was also in contact with key European leaders. His message was very clear: Ukraine needs urgently extra support now that Vladimir Putin is intensifying his air attacks against Ukraine.

On the other hand, Putin is receiving more help than ever from President Xi Jinping because he promised him a free hand in Ukraine for Chinese interests once the Russian has consolidated its territorial gains.

For China, it is about business and the opportunity to have a strong foot in Eastern Europe. The Russian-Chinese strategy has become more evident. It is based on a military-industrial alliance and a geopolitical opportunity for China to reinforce its European objectives. It is also about sabotaging the European Union and the European democracies.