Trump goes to Xi Jinping 's empire: what for?

 Trump's visit to China

(Published in Portuguese in Diário de Notícias - Lisbon - on 15 May 2026)

When the Air Force One touches down in Beijing, Donald Trump imagines that a brief two-day visit to China will be consecrated by the American electorate as a personal triumph. Yet, the reality that matters is entirely different. Beneath the handshakes and the protocol-driven photographs with Xi Jinping, a contemporary version of Thucydides’s Trap is taking shape: the clash between two superpowers—one established, attempting to preserve its hegemony (the US), and the other, emerging, in rapid ascension (China).

For Trump, the purpose of this summit is neither to redraw the security architecture of the twenty-first century nor to speak of peace, harmony, or global challenges—themes that rarely find a place on his agenda. What he seeks is a tactical spectacle. Brief and marketable as a victory, ahead of the midterm elections in November.

The American president seeks to return with results that are easy to communicate: signs of commercial detente (commitments to additional purchases in sectors relevant to the MAGA electorate) and, ideally, some Chinese gesture that reduces the risk of disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. Image management is an integral part of his strategy. The domestic media landscape in the United States has grown increasingly asymmetric: influential segments amplify partisan narratives, shaped by commercial incentives and the polarization surrounding Trump.

The problem with this transactional approach is that it exposes the true American weakness: an obsession with the short term erodes trust and alienates allies. Taipei watches, anxious, at the prospect of its security being converted into a bargaining chip. In Europe, the visit is interpreted as an indicator of volatility in Washington’s strategic orientation. This tends to reinforce debates regarding European defense autonomy, economic resilience, and technology policy.

On the other side of the table, Xi Jinping moves his chess pieces without haste and free from the constraints of electoral calendars. Beijing’s immediate interest is simple: to manage Trump’s unpredictability, to employ personal diplomacy to extract rhetorical concessions over Taiwan, and, above all, to buy time. The Chinese leadership operates on the assumption that the long-term trend—in industrial capacity, technology, semiconductors, Artificial Intelligence, and external influence—favours them, and therefore privileges strategies of attrition and the extension of the decision-making horizon.

At first glance, China appears armed with trumps that are difficult to counter. A centralized political system allows it to define priorities and mobilize resources across a multi-year horizon—as seen in the Five-Year Plans—thereby reducing coordination costs in strategic sectors. The alignment with Moscow, described by both leaderships as a partnership "without limits", grants Beijing additional leeway in matters of energy, diplomacy, trade routes, and security, though it exposes it to reputational risks and secondary sanctions. Internationally, China seeks to consolidate its influence and power among the countries of the Global South through the financing of infrastructure and logistics chains (the Belt and Road Initiative) and via expanding forums such as the BRICS.

Yet, this appearance of invincibility conceals vulnerabilities capable of altering the course of events. What Beijing projects to the outside world as "cohesion and stability" is, more often than not, an internal peace imposed by force and by an apparatus of surveillance and repression. China is far from a monolith: it is a mosaic of 1.41 billion people, 56 ethnic groups, hundreds of languages, and tens of millions of citizens belonging to minorities. In vital regions such as Xinjiang (with over 26 million inhabitants) and Tibet (around 3.6 million), forced assimilation replaces political autonomy—and tensions do not disappear; they accumulate.

The true threat to the regime dominated by the Communist Party may not come from the peripheries, but from the center: From the rising expectations of the Han majority in the megacities; From frustrated, highly educated youth struggling within an increasingly competitive society; And from the persistent asymmetry between hyper-technological coastal cities—such as Shanghai and Shenzhen—and the deeply traditional rural interior living on the brink of subsistence. 

In systems with mechanisms of accountability and mediation—a relatively free press, civic associations, room for public demonstrations, independent courts, and competitive elections—dissent tends to be channeled and absorbed through institutional avenues, reducing the probability of abrupt ruptures.

In an autocratic regime, where public expression is limited and the correction of policies depends chiefly upon those who lead the Party-State, errors can accumulate for longer and become more difficult to reverse. When economic, demographic, or legitimacy shocks converge, the management of social conflicts becomes more demanding, and the cost of maintaining stability rises.

In strategic terms, both China and the United States possess incentives for a minimum understanding to reduce potential conflicts: managing crises before they escalate, avoiding military incidents at sea and in the air, and stabilizing expectations within technological, digital, and commercial competition.

These are the themes that Trump and Xi ought to discuss—not as gestures of goodwill, but to construct an architecture of mutual restraint. Such an arrangement does not erase the rivalry. It is, however, the only way to prevent a miscalculation from ruining everything. Thucydides’s Trap could then pass definitively into history.

Reflecting about the United Nations: today and the future

Navigating the Thucydides Trap: The Pragmatic Rebirth of Global Governance

The current discourse surrounding the post-1945 global order often falls into a trap of fatalism. It is true that reading the present institutional reconfiguration as a mere "evolutionary phase" without acknowledging the raw geopolitical realities can seem like academic escapism. We are indeed caught in the gravitational pull of the Thucydides Trap—navigating the perilous structural collision between a ruling hegemon (the United States) fighting to maintain its primacy, and a rising challenger (China) determined to reshape the global architecture.

However, to declare the multilateral system "dead" or to view this transition solely through the lens of catastrophic collapse is to miss the profound, pragmatic evolution taking place. The global order is not being crushed; it is being stress-tested and forced to shed its utopian illusions in favour of a much more resilient, realistic, and decentralized architecture.

Here is why the new geopolitical game offers a genuine pathway to stability and a renewed, albeit different, form of global cooperation:

1. The P5 Monopoly: From "Gridlock" to the Architecture of Mutual Containment.

 Critics rightly point out that the Permanent Five (P5) of the UN Security Council act as a cartel, and that true, egalitarian reform of the veto system is highly unlikely. However, in the context of the Thucydides Trap, the veto is not a fatal flaw—it is a vital safety valve.

The UN was never designed to be a world parliament; it was designed to prevent World War III. The fact that the US, China, and Russia possess veto power ensures that the system cannot be used to cross their existential red lines, thereby preventing direct kinetic conflict. What critics call "terminal gridlock" is, in reality, the operationalization of mutual deterrence. This friction forces great powers to negotiate "minimum understandings" outside of maximalist rhetoric. By acknowledging that universal consensus is impossible, the P5 are inadvertently creating a realistic architecture of mutual containment, ensuring that the US-China competition remains cold, calculated, and manageable rather than explosive.

2. The UN Secretary-General: The Power of Quiet Diplomacy

 It is easy to lament the P5’s preference for a compliant "Secretary" over a crusading "General" under Article 99. But in an era of hyper-polarized superpower competition, a megaphone is often less effective than a back-channel.

As we approach the selection of a new UN Secretary-General in 2026, the need is not for a polarizing visionary who will publicly shame Washington or Beijing or Moscow —which would only accelerate institutional withdrawal—but for a master of quiet diplomacy. A pragmatic, consensus-building Secretary-General can serve as the indispensable geopolitical shock absorber. By keeping the lines of communication open when public rhetoric (whether from a Trump, Putin or a Xi) runs hot, the Secretary-General can quietly defuse localized crises and facilitate transactional compromises that keep the global machinery humming.

3. "Agile Interdependence": The Evolution of Functional Cooperation

 The era of "weaponized interdependence" is undeniably here. The dividing lines between security and functional cooperation have blurred, with semiconductors, AI, oceans, space, and rare-earth supply chains acting as the new battlefields.

Yet, there is profound cause for optimism here: the sheer cost of decoupling is acting as a modern form of deterrence. 

Complete economic bifurcation is impossible. While universal bodies like the WTO or WHO face immense pressure, functional cooperation is not dying; it is becoming more agile and modular. We are witnessing the rise of "coalitions of the willing," public-private partnerships, and issue-specific agreements. Superpowers may fight over quantum computing, but they remain functionally tethered by the undeniable need to manage climate change, stabilize global debt, and secure food supply chains. 

This "weaponized interdependence" forces a cautious pragmatism: adversaries must cooperate on planetary survival.

4. Pluralism: The Healthy Democratization of Power 

The fracturing of the globe into distinct blocs is often viewed cynically as a march toward war. However, the rise of the SCO, the expansion of BRICS, the EU and the cementing of the Quad represent a genuine, long-overdue democratization of global power.

For the first time in centuries, middle powers like India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and and other democracies have the agency to choose, balance, and demand better terms from both Washington and Beijing (Moscow is losing influence). This multipolarity introduces critical "institutional shock absorbers" into the global system. By engaging in multiple, overlapping regional forums, middle powers are actively preventing a binary, zero-sum showdown between the US and China. 

They are forcing the superpowers to compete through investment, diplomacy, and development rather than sheer military coercion.

Conclusion: A Pragmatic Renaissance 

The universal, idealistic multilateralism envisioned in 1945 is indeed transitioning, but what is replacing it is not a descent into chaos. We are moving toward a mature, transactional balance-of-power politics that acknowledges the Thucydides Trap and actively works to defuse it.

To embrace this new era is not to rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanic; it is to build a more seaworthy vessel. By accepting the limits of the P5, embracing the agility of modular cooperation, and empowering the pluralism of the Global South, we can construct a robust architecture of mutual survival. The new global order will be less poetic and more hard-nosed, but in its brutal realism lies the greatest hope for sustaining peace in the 21st century.

Who is next at the United Nations? What for?

 

An Impossible Job? The Succession of Guterres in a World Adrift

By Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor and former UN Under-Secretary-General/ SRSG

Published: 17 April 2026

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Within a few days, on the 21st and 22nd, the UN General Assembly will interrogate the vision and proposals of each candidate for the position of Secretary-General. António Guterres concludes his second and final mandate at the end of the year. Who will be his successor?

One candidate is Michelle Bachelet, who served as President of Chile twice—from 2006 to 2010 and 2014 to 2018. Bachelet can also claim significant experience within the United Nations. She held several roles and served as the High Commissioner for Human Rights until 2022. However, Human Rights is a highly sensitive field, where conflict with various offending States is frequent. Consequently, the American President and the newly inaugurated president of her own country do not view her candidacy favourably. Although she is, in my opinion, the most qualified candidate, she faces a virtually impossible challenge.

Rafael Grossi, the Argentine who has served as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency since 2019, is also in the race. Grossi gained visibility due to the crises surrounding nuclear power plants in Ukraine and Iran. His name is clearly associated with nuclear issues. He has demonstrated courage and initiative. The support of his country's president, Javier Milei—an eccentric who maintains a special relationship with Donald Trump and has moved closer to China (stating in Davos this year that China is a major trading partner)—will aid his candidacy. The problem may come from Moscow: Milei supports Ukraine, albeit with fluctuations dictated by his alignment with Washington. What impact might this position have on Grossi’s ambitions?

Rebeca Grynspan, the former Vice-President of Costa Rica (1994–1998), is also on the list of official candidates. Grynspan earned credit as one of the officials responsible for the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia regarding maritime security in the Black Sea. She is currently the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, the UN agency that seeks to promote international trade within a framework of sustainable development. She was recently in Baku for an international meeting annually promoted by the President of Azerbaijan, which gathers hundreds of figures active on the international stage. Afterwards, she travelled to Moscow, where she met with Sergey Lavrov. I am told the visit was cordial. However, Russian diplomacy is very shrewd and will only show its hand at the final moment.

Grynspan is, at the outset, the candidate with the greatest chance of success. In addition to her diplomatic qualities and her experience in the field of global economics, she hails from a country of little controversy and is a woman. Furthermore, there is an enormous political campaign in several influential circles pressuring for the election of a woman—an unprecedented feat.

Finally, we have Macky Sall, the former President of Senegal (2012–2024) and the African Union (2022–2023). In performing these roles, Sall demonstrated an ability to dialogue with the great powers independently, without geopolitical alignments. He is a moderate voice of the Global South. He faces, however, a major challenge: the geographic rotation of the Secretary-General position. According to this principle—an unwritten but decisive understanding—the next UN Secretary-General must come from the group of countries that constitute Latin America and the Caribbean. The only Secretary-General from that region was the Peruvian Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who concluded his mandate on the last day of 1991. Thus, it is almost certain that Guterres will hand over his place to a Latin American or a Caribbean—and I am convinced these national designations should be written in the feminine.

We shall see how the hearings of 21 and 22 April unfold. The delegations present at the General Assembly are preparing to raise a wide range of questions. The most delicate will certainly be those linked to the reform of the United Nations, starting with the composition and representativeness of the Security Council. Clarifications will also be sought on how each candidate intends to deal with the veto-wielding States whenever they embark on clear violations of the UN Charter and International Law. This is an all too current issue. Great powers now shamelessly violate the principles and protocols that they themselves and the international community approved over the decades. They tear up the UN Charter when it suits them and protect client-States led by war criminals.

How can each candidate respond to such questions? It will not be easy.

The political dimension of the UN is undergoing a period of accelerated weakening and marginalisation. International relations have ceased to be aligned with the search for solutions to global problems. Today, as in a past thought never to return—prior to 1945—confrontations and wars of aggression matter more than diplomacy and solidarity between peoples. What can the Secretary-General do to reverse this trend?

Put another way: is there still political space for an organisation whose mission is the maintenance of peace between peoples? The answer lies in the various capitals across the world. It is not in the building in Manhattan, in the area known as Turtle Bay. Therefore, the new Secretary-General—be it one of the four mentioned above, or a "wild card" appearing at the final hour with the blessing of the five veto-wielding members—must be a "moving turtle." A pilgrim of peace in permanent transit between capitals. Direct contact with peoples and with the most diverse leaders, including those who pretend to believe in multilateralism, diplomacy, and respect for International Law: that is the master key to the rebirth of the United Nations.

Diplomacy today: the art of deception?

The Diplomacy of Deception: War and Cynicism in the Easter Season

Victor Angelo

We enter this Judeo-Christian Easter period with a world marked by instability, prolonged violence, and a disturbing normalisation of war. From Ukraine to the Middle East, and including Iran, conflicts are accumulating that expose not only the marginalisation of traditional diplomacy but also a growing cynicism in international relations. Instead of the pursuit of peace, we are witnessing the instrumentalisation of diplomacy as a Trojan horse for force and aggression, a systematic contempt for International Law, and the accelerated erosion of the multilateral order built after 1945.

Regardless, this is one of those times of year that demands we speak even louder, and with total courage, about the importance of peace and ethics in politics and life.

In the case of Lebanon, the answer is clear: the violence and the gravest humanitarian crisis the country faces have no end in sight. Benjamin Netanyahu's government is betting on war and the destruction of the forces it classifies as enemies. His government's actions also have a very negative impact on the international image and the future of Israel—something that, it seems to me, does not receive due attention. The Israeli people are held captive by a coalition of extremist fanatics who manipulate the country's public opinion and use racism, the illusion of an ethno-religious belief, and fear as instruments to consolidate power.

Netanyahu disregards international norms and United Nations resolutions. His political decisions and the resulting military campaigns will one day be judged in the international courts based in The Hague. Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) has a moral obligation to condemn the policies of Netanyahu's government and to maintain a diplomatic distance from that regime.

This should, in fact, be the EU’s diplomatic practice when dealing with regimes that do not respect International Law. This is called soft power: a coherent position in the face of global or regional challenges, based on principles established as International Law over decades. The EU's geopolitical strength must lie in an unambiguous diplomacy, free from indecision or opportunism. To be seen by the rest of the world as a Union that follows an international policy based on convenience—in the vein of double standards—might be considered by many as political realism. But that type of realism leads to the disregard for Human Rights and to the crises currently crushing the Middle East and other parts of the world. Geopolitical realism is a historical step backwards.

The warlords practise the diplomacy of deception. It is an error to classify this practice as the diplomacy of chaos and improvisation. The politicians behind the aggressions against Ukraine, Iran, the rest of the Middle East, and other regions, pretend to be ready to negotiate. However, they follow a deliberate strategy of disruption. They know what they are doing. Diplomacy masks bellicose intent. There may be a good measure of historical ignorance and miscalculation, but the primary explanation for their decisions lies in the return to the old idea of "gunboat diplomacy" as the engine of international relations.

The war of aggression against Iran, which has political and economic consequences reaching far beyond the collapse of the Middle East, showed that traditional diplomacy—based on treaties, protocols, and predictability—has ceased to matter to leaders like Donald Trump. It has been this way since 2014 and, on a large scale, since 2022 with Vladimir Putin.

The diplomatic initiatives that pretend to be underway hide a preference for the theory of shock and confrontation, and an imperial Diktat philosophy inspired by the 19th-century world and the reality experienced until the end of the Second World War. The ruse involves keeping adversaries and allies in a climate of constant pressure and uncertainty, acting on the basis of surprise. It is not about improvising, but rather about surprising in order to attempt to dominate.

Surprise causes institutional paralysis, namely at the level of multilateral systems and diplomatic alliances. In reality, in Trump's case, it endangers the continuity of the UN's political dimension and the credibility of NATO. Within these and other multilateral institutional frameworks, trust disappears—which is the foundation of effective diplomacy—and with the loss of trust, the future of these institutions enters a phase of absolute uncertainty. I believe it is naive not to see this danger.

What should the response of European States be? Subtly clear. It must be based, concretely, on firmness and diplomatic distancing while continuing to insist on the value of alliances, which must not compromise multilateral cooperation. European leaders must also stress that it is vital to bring an end, without further delay, to the armed aggressions currently underway. Moreover, Europe needs to understand that an unpredictable international reality based on subordination to a problematic ally favours the political centrality of other States—in this case, China.

China seeks to be seen as a bulwark of stability and the sturdiest pillar of multilateralism. The big question, besides it being an authoritarian power, is whether the Chinese economy can sustain this global leadership role that is falling into its lap.

In any case, Europe cannot afford to lose out in this competition for centrality. Any imbalance that favours a superpower, even one as apparently predictable as China, contains, in the long run, a great risk of conflict.

This Easter, the message I dare to address to European leaders is summarised as follows: it is fundamental to resurrect. 

Ukraine, Iran and the European geopolitical priorities

 

Ukraine or Iran? The Frontier of European Sovereignty

By Victor Ângelo

The war launched on 28 February by the US and Israel against Iran is not merely a flashpoint of instability in the Middle East and a high-risk global disruption. It is the result of a labyrinthine decision that raises many questions. For this reason, it has become the most debated topic in various international arenas. The angles of analysis are numerous: the legality of the decision, its objectives—including Iran’s nuclear power and the essence of its regime—geopolitical, macroeconomic, and humanitarian implications, the absolute marginalisation of diplomacy and the multilateral political system, as well as issues related to American domestic politics.

For us, it is also the shock that has exposed the European Union’s strategic hesitations. While the world wonders about the future, Europe faces an undeniable truth: by allowing itself to be dragged into the Persian Gulf, it risks forgetting that the future of our continent will be decided, in large part, on the plains of Ukraine.

For Europe, supporting Ukraine is not just any foreign policy choice among others—it is an absolute priority. It concerns the defence of our territorial integrity and our values, the security of neighbouring countries seeking to join the community, and the survival of the European project itself. Russian aggression targets not only Kyiv, but above all the demolition of the entire architecture of cooperation that has sustained peace on our continent since 1945.

Ukraine’s return to a solid and just peace will reinforce the conviction that European borders remain inviolable. For Europe, to lose would herald a future of submission to Moscow or an endless dependence on a Washington that is now increasingly distant from European philosophy and political choices.

Leaving Russia aside, let us add that the EU cannot be subordinate to American zig-zags and interests. Partnership and alliance must not be synonymous with vassalage. This does not imply waiving the right to criticise or sanction autocratic regimes. Sanctions are a way to resolve disputes between states without resorting to war. What remains unacceptable are armed conflicts and military actions outside the legal framework of the United Nations.

An alarming dimension of the current conflict in the Middle East is the immediate drainage of resources that would be vital for the legitimate defence of Ukraine. Recent estimates indicate that more than 1,000 Patriot (PAC-3) interceptor missiles have already been fired against Iranian attacks since 28 February. It is a contrast in which Ukraine loses out, despite the gravity and legitimacy of its situation being incomparably superior. In four years of resistance, Ukraine has received fewer than 600 of these very same interceptor missiles.

This disparity suggests that the Trump administration markedly prioritises the regional objectives of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government over European democracies. Brussels cannot stand by in silence while the "shield" that should protect the Ukrainian air space is consumed in a strange war in the Middle East. Every resource spent in the Middle East represents a new opportunity for the Russian missiles that massacre the Ukrainian people day and night.

It is in the light of this strategic error that the recent position of the European leadership must be read. In this scenario, the message Ursula von der Leyen delivered this week to EU ambassadors is profoundly ambiguous. The speech left the impression that von der Leyen has moved closer to the ideas of Trump and Netanyahu than to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter. In the specific case of the attacks on Iran, von der Leyen echoed the arguments—the pretexts, to be more precise—repeatedly mentioned by Washington and Tel Aviv rather than International Law. She abandoned the field of neutrality and mediation, once again weakened Kaja Kallas’s more dialogue-oriented line, and left a significant portion of European observers perplexed, including important wings of the European Parliament.

Europe must be seen by the rest of the globe as a space of values and compliance with international law, of geopolitical balance, and as a defender of the multilateral system. Our strength lies there: in cooperation with the countries of the South who see in International Law the protection they require. By adopting the rhetoric of "military force," as if Europe could become an armed superpower overnight, the President of the Commission seemed to ignore that the true authority of our Union rests on the acceptance of universal values and solidarity with the different peoples of the world. As António Costa stressed after the President’s speech, the EU must defend the international order based on rules. Costa left no room for ambiguity.

I, too, do not wish to be seen as ambiguous. I am against submission, and I do not defend a policy of neutrality, because not choosing is in itself a choice, and rarely the best one. I advocate neither silence nor indifference. As Dante said more than seven centuries ago in his monumental work, the Divine Comedy: "the most pitiless flames in Hell are reserved for those who chose neutrality in times of crisis." Respect for International Law and the right to self-defence are not neutral. They are civilised ways of saying no to arbitrary decisions, the use of brute force, and attacks against human rights. It is this crystal clarity that I expect from European leaders and that the future demands of us.