Diário de Notícias Opinion/Lisbon edition
Victor Ângelo
International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General.
Published on: October 9, 2026
When EU Foreign Ministers meet in Luxembourg on October 12, one year will have passed since the ceasefire in Gaza. Peace, however, remains absent. The United Nations continues to record attacks on civilians and restrictions on humanitarian aid, and it is projected that around 1.4 million people—two-thirds of Gaza's population—will face acute food insecurity by the end of the year. In the West Bank, the UN and other observers document settler violence and the expansion of Israeli settlements, which the International Court of Justice deemed illegal in 2004 and again in 2024.
The Israeli government is now accelerating the E1 project, an urban corridor intended to link the vast settlement of Ma’ale Adumim to East Jerusalem. The UN, EU countries, and other organizations consider that, once completed, it will sever the territorial continuity between the northern and southern West Bank and, in practice, render a contiguous Palestinian State unviable. That is why, for decades, Washington and European capitals opposed the plan.
On September 8, Portugal joined a declaration with France, Spain, Ireland, Denmark, Finland, Poland, and Sweden, and—outside the Union—with the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, and Iceland, in which these States confirmed their intention to restrict trade with the settlements. The Twenty-Seven, however, still lack a common position: Germany, Czechia, and Italy are preventing a qualified majority from being reached. The EU-Israel Association Agreement remains unchanged, and the institutions that finance settlement expansion from Europe continue to operate without restrictions.
More than 500 former prime ministers, ministers, ambassadors, and senior European officials urged, in an appeal published in Libération on October 5, that the EU sanction financial institutions and service providers linked to E1 and ban trade with the settlements. They warn that collective inaction is hollowing out the two-state solution.
If the Foreign Affairs Council remains blocked once again, the States that take International Law seriously are not left without options. Spain showed one: it recalled its ambassador to Tel Aviv in September 2025 and, since March 2026, the embassy has been led by a chargé d'affaires. Relations were not severed. The level of representation was merely reduced.
This is the step that Portugal could propose: reduce the level of its representation in Tel Aviv, as Madrid did, and do so in coordination with others. It is not necessary for everyone to do it. An initial group could bring together countries that have already adopted restrictive national measures, such as Spain, Ireland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The invitation would remain open to the other signatories of the September 8 declaration and to others. If five or six States move forward, the gesture ceases to be national and becomes a European movement. For Portugal, which assumes a seat on the UN Security Council in 2027, this would be a way to show that the defense of the negotiated solution in New York has concrete consequences in Brussels. And it would be coherent with the step Lisbon has already taken by recognizing the State of Palestine.
There are four predictable objections. The first is that reducing diplomatic level diminishes access and influence. But the political channel remains open: the chargé d'affaires would continue to transmit messages, protect citizens, and speak with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Security cooperation and consular protection would not be suspended, and Israel would continue to be an interlocutor. The second is that the gesture would be purely symbolic. Isolated, its impact is indeed limited. It would be a political signal, not a lever, and would only gain strength if accompanied by financial sanctions and trade restrictions. The third is that it would further divide the Union. But the division already exists. What is at stake is whether the blockade by three States should paralyze all the others. The fourth is retaliation. But retaliation against an isolated State is easy; against five or six acting in conjunction, it is much more costly, and that is the rationale behind the group.
And Washington? The Trump administration has reiterated its opposition to the annexation of the West Bank, but, as far as is public, has not expressly condemned E1. There is, even so, common ground: Washington and Europe state that they want to prevent annexation and preserve stability. If European capitals present their decisions as a way to prevent the reality on the ground from rendering the two-state solution unviable, rather than as a rupture with Israel, they will be speaking of an objective they share with Washington. It is not necessary to agree on the instruments to agree on the outcome. It is up to EU governments to explain this firmly, before the fait accompli makes conversation useless.
None of this reflects antisemitism, nor hostility toward Israel and its citizens. Europe firmly condemns the terrorist massacre perpetrated by Hamas on October 7, 2023, and all forms of terrorism against Israel. What is proposed here responds to decisions by the Israeli government that are incompatible with an objective reiterated by the UN Security Council, the European Union, successive US administrations, and many others: preserving the conditions for a two-state solution.
On the 12th, ministers can limit themselves to repeating that the problem is serious or dare to go further. If there is no consensus, it will be up to the States that take international law seriously to show that, in Europe, there are already those who know how to act. Portugal can be one of them.
