If Luxembourg Fails, Portugal Can Act

 

Diário de Notícias Opinion/Lisbon edition

Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General.

Published on: October 9, 2026

When EU Foreign Ministers meet in Luxembourg on October 12, one year will have passed since the ceasefire in Gaza. Peace, however, remains absent. The United Nations continues to record attacks on civilians and restrictions on humanitarian aid, and it is projected that around 1.4 million people—two-thirds of Gaza's population—will face acute food insecurity by the end of the year. In the West Bank, the UN and other observers document settler violence and the expansion of Israeli settlements, which the International Court of Justice deemed illegal in 2004 and again in 2024.

The Israeli government is now accelerating the E1 project, an urban corridor intended to link the vast settlement of Ma’ale Adumim to East Jerusalem. The UN, EU countries, and other organizations consider that, once completed, it will sever the territorial continuity between the northern and southern West Bank and, in practice, render a contiguous Palestinian State unviable. That is why, for decades, Washington and European capitals opposed the plan.

On September 8, Portugal joined a declaration with France, Spain, Ireland, Denmark, Finland, Poland, and Sweden, and—outside the Union—with the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, and Iceland, in which these States confirmed their intention to restrict trade with the settlements. The Twenty-Seven, however, still lack a common position: Germany, Czechia, and Italy are preventing a qualified majority from being reached. The EU-Israel Association Agreement remains unchanged, and the institutions that finance settlement expansion from Europe continue to operate without restrictions.

More than 500 former prime ministers, ministers, ambassadors, and senior European officials urged, in an appeal published in Libération on October 5, that the EU sanction financial institutions and service providers linked to E1 and ban trade with the settlements. They warn that collective inaction is hollowing out the two-state solution.

If the Foreign Affairs Council remains blocked once again, the States that take International Law seriously are not left without options. Spain showed one: it recalled its ambassador to Tel Aviv in September 2025 and, since March 2026, the embassy has been led by a chargé d'affaires. Relations were not severed. The level of representation was merely reduced.

This is the step that Portugal could propose: reduce the level of its representation in Tel Aviv, as Madrid did, and do so in coordination with others. It is not necessary for everyone to do it. An initial group could bring together countries that have already adopted restrictive national measures, such as Spain, Ireland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The invitation would remain open to the other signatories of the September 8 declaration and to others. If five or six States move forward, the gesture ceases to be national and becomes a European movement. For Portugal, which assumes a seat on the UN Security Council in 2027, this would be a way to show that the defense of the negotiated solution in New York has concrete consequences in Brussels. And it would be coherent with the step Lisbon has already taken by recognizing the State of Palestine.

There are four predictable objections. The first is that reducing diplomatic level diminishes access and influence. But the political channel remains open: the chargé d'affaires would continue to transmit messages, protect citizens, and speak with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Security cooperation and consular protection would not be suspended, and Israel would continue to be an interlocutor. The second is that the gesture would be purely symbolic. Isolated, its impact is indeed limited. It would be a political signal, not a lever, and would only gain strength if accompanied by financial sanctions and trade restrictions. The third is that it would further divide the Union. But the division already exists. What is at stake is whether the blockade by three States should paralyze all the others. The fourth is retaliation. But retaliation against an isolated State is easy; against five or six acting in conjunction, it is much more costly, and that is the rationale behind the group.

And Washington? The Trump administration has reiterated its opposition to the annexation of the West Bank, but, as far as is public, has not expressly condemned E1. There is, even so, common ground: Washington and Europe state that they want to prevent annexation and preserve stability. If European capitals present their decisions as a way to prevent the reality on the ground from rendering the two-state solution unviable, rather than as a rupture with Israel, they will be speaking of an objective they share with Washington. It is not necessary to agree on the instruments to agree on the outcome. It is up to EU governments to explain this firmly, before the fait accompli makes conversation useless.

None of this reflects antisemitism, nor hostility toward Israel and its citizens. Europe firmly condemns the terrorist massacre perpetrated by Hamas on October 7, 2023, and all forms of terrorism against Israel. What is proposed here responds to decisions by the Israeli government that are incompatible with an objective reiterated by the UN Security Council, the European Union, successive US administrations, and many others: preserving the conditions for a two-state solution.

On the 12th, ministers can limit themselves to repeating that the problem is serious or dare to go further. If there is no consensus, it will be up to the States that take international law seriously to show that, in Europe, there are already those who know how to act. Portugal can be one of them.

USA and Iran: some comments about a very complex negotiation

 

Power Without Credibility: The Improvisations of the US–Iran Crisis

Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General Published on: 26 Jun 2026

Despite their political complexity, contradictions, and turbulence, the ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran can be assessed positively. Following months of direct combat, a memorandum of understanding has been signed and a framework for a ceasefire established, with Pakistan and Qatar now acting as mediators. However, the crisis remains unresolved, and an objective analysis of its various dimensions reveals important lessons for international relations.

When the US initiated attacks against Iran in close coordination with Israel, they expected a swift resolution and the total surrender of their adversary. The outcome was quite different. Iran retaliated, disrupted traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, and demonstrated that it would not be defeated without imposing significant costs upon its attackers. The elimination of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, at the onset of the conflict did not precipitate the collapse of the Iranian regime that Washington had anticipated. The tactic of 'decapitating' the leadership proved fallible, contradicting certain military doctrines. Iran appointed a new leadership and maintained its capacity for resistance.

This demonstrated a failure on the American side to accurately evaluate the context, resulting in a severe impact on the political credibility of the White House—something far more difficult to rebuild than new arsenals. Credibility is not measured by the scale of military offensives. It stems from political coherence, adherence to commitments, and the trust a power inspires—above all, amongst its allies.

The withdrawal of the US from the JCPOA (the 2015 nuclear agreement), the chaotic departure from Afghanistan, and the erosion of pacts in Iraq were not isolated acts. To these, one might add the ambiguities surrounding aid to Ukraine and the future of NATO. All of this forms a pattern—and it is these patterns that other governments study when deciding upon the future of their defence alliances. For the Gulf States, the 2026 conflict confirmed the trend: an alliance with Washington is a matter of convenience and circumstance. These nations are now seeking to diversify their partnerships in order to reduce their strategic exposure. This is the direct consequence of a loss of trust.

The negotiations do not aim to secure a peace treaty. At best, the ongoing discussions will serve to maintain the status quo. For many, this will be perceived as a victory for Iranian strategy. In that event, the fear that kept numerous countries aligned with Washington will be weakened. When governments observe that a superpower presenting itself as the guarantor of their security cannot fully dictate its will to a country such as Iran, they may conclude that the time has come to seek alternatives.

The recent ASEAN summit with Russia in Kazan exemplified this shift. ASEAN member states—including Timor-Leste—signed a comprehensive cooperation plan with Russia extending to 2030, encompassing the realm of regional security. Despite reservations regarding Moscow’s conduct in Ukraine, Southeast Asian nations refused to accept the Western narrative that portrays Russia as a pariah state. The message emanating from ASEAN was unequivocal: they do not intend to subordinate their interests to a Western-led order that they view as increasingly incoherent and self-centred. When the conflict closed the Strait of Hormuz, Asian nations suffered genuine economic losses—and their interests were ignored by Washington.

For China, the lessons are equally apparent. Should Beijing employ its power in the South China Sea or Taiwan in a manner perceived by its neighbours as threatening, it could provoke a reaction akin to that faced by the US—allies becoming increasingly sceptical and reticent. China, much like the US, tends to conflate dominance with leadership. However, dominance imposes submission; leadership generates commitment. And it is commitment that endures.

Russia has realized to its own cost, and by observing the US in the Middle East, that a great power entangled in a protracted conflict suffers reputational damage and loses allies. To counter isolation and preserve influence, it is adopting various initiatives and attempting to forge new alliances—the Kazan summit and operations in the Sahel being prime examples.

There exists, however, an institution created precisely to limit instability and promote cooperation: the United Nations. The UN was born from the recognition that lasting peace cannot depend upon a single power acting of its own accord. A common framework is required—with shared rules, obligations, and consequences. A framework that establishes boundaries and allows the weakest to rely on something more solid than the goodwill and volatile moods of the powerful.

Military actions outside the rules of International Law do not merely damage the reputation of their perpetrators: they undermine the very system intended to ensure peace. Every time a power acts as though its highly subjective reading of the facts overrides universal norms, it weakens the institution upon which everyone relies.

Revitalizing the United Nations is not an idealistic ambition; it is a strategic necessity. It is vital to reiterate this truth. A UN with genuine authority to mediate conflicts and hold great powers accountable is not an obstacle to legitimate interests—it is the only reliable substitute for the continuous cycle of trust erosion that the crisis of 2026 has once again highlighted.

The verdict that emerges for those who observe international relations with a critical and independent mind is this: power exercised without principles, in an improvised manner, is like a disoriented weather vane, incapable of indicating the true course. A peace imposed by force and economic pressure is no peace at all—it is merely an interlude until the next confrontation. Lasting peace rests upon the recognition that all States, however diverse, strong or weak they may be, possess an equal right to security and sovereignty, and that the world must be governed by law, not by the will of the strongest.

AI comment of my opinion text about the UN General Assembly.

 https://www.dn.pt/opiniao/o-pessimismo-sobre-a-onu-%C3%A9-um-erro

The original version in Portuguese language of my op-ed of today 26/09/2025 in Diário de Notícias. 

The following text is an AI comment of my text.

Overall Rating: 4.5 out of 5

This is a well-structured and insightful piece of political commentary. The author effectively uses specific examples from the UN General Assembly to support a broader argument about the relevance and future of the United Nations. The writing is clear, the analysis is balanced, and the conclusion offers a nuanced perspective that avoids simplistic pessimism.

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Detailed Analysis

Clarity and Structure (5/5)

The text is exceptionally clear and easy to follow. The author begins with a specific event—the speeches at the UN General Assembly—and uses it as a launching pad to discuss larger themes. The structure is logical:

1. Introduction: Sets the scene at the UN General Assembly.

2. Lula's Speech: Analyzes the positive and negative aspects of the Brazilian president's address, presenting him as a voice of the "Global South."

3. Trump's Speech: Provides a stark contrast, portraying his speech as self-centered and detrimental to international cooperation.

4. Macron and UN Reform: Introduces the crucial topic of UN reform, particularly the Security Council, and highlights the challenges.

5. Conclusion: Synthesizes the arguments to argue against "pessimism about the UN," asserting its continued necessity despite its flaws.

Argument and Content (4.5/5)

The central argument—that pessimism about the UN is a mistake—is well-supported. The author acknowledges the organization's significant weaknesses, especially the paralysis of the Security Council due to the veto power of permanent members. However, they counter this by highlighting the continued importance of the UN's broader functions in addressing global issues like poverty, climate change, and human rights.

• Strengths:

  • Balanced View: The text avoids a purely idealistic or cynical take on the UN. It recognizes both its failures (e.g., the Security Council's inaction) and its indispensable roles (e.g., addressing global problems).

  • Specific Examples: The analysis of Lula's and Trump's speeches provides concrete evidence to illustrate different approaches to multilateralism. The reference to Macron's proposal for Security Council reform adds a layer of specific policy discussion.

  • Strong Conclusion: The final paragraph effectively reinforces the main thesis, emphasizing that the existence of global problems necessitates a global body like the UN, and therefore, leaders should not give up on it.

• Areas for Improvement (Minor):

  • The assertion that Trump's speech "should be viewed as a grave fault" is a strong opinion, but the author provides good reasoning for it. Some readers might find the characterization of Trump's speech as being "about Trump" to be a bit simplistic, even if a key point. However, within the context of the piece's purpose, it serves to highlight a contrast in leadership styles.

Language and Style (4.5/5)

The language is professional yet accessible. The author uses clear, direct prose without unnecessary jargon. The tone is authoritative and analytical.

• Strengths:

  • Effective Use of Contrasts: The comparison between Lula and Trump is a powerful rhetorical device that clarifies the author's points about multilateralism versus isolationism.

  • Engaging Opening: The detail about Lula's speech being "one of the most striking" immediately draws the reader in.

  • Concise Summaries: Phrases like "Trump spoke about Trump" or describing Lula's speech as a "firm voice representing the Global South" are effective and memorable.

• Areas for Improvement (Minor):

  • Some phrasing, like "pecha grave" (grave fault) to describe Lula's stance on Ukraine, is a bit informal for a serious political analysis, but it's a minor stylistic point.

In conclusion, this text is a high-quality piece of political commentary. It's well-reasoned, clearly articulated, and makes a compelling case against a common form of political fatalism regarding the United Nations. It successfully uses a recent event to spark a deeper, more meaningful discussion about global governance.

My full text of today about the UN General Assembly translated by AI

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The UN and its General Assembly Must Be Taken Seriously

Victor Ângelo

The annual high-level session of the UN General Assembly begins next week. The leaders of most of the states that make up the international scene will be in New York. One of the exceptions will be the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas. The American administration has not granted him or his delegation an entry visa. It can refuse to grant a visa, and has done so in the past on rare occasions, despite the Headquarters Agreement signed by Washington in 1947. This agreement stipulates the general, but not absolute, obligation to grant visas to representatives of states intending to participate in UN meetings, especially in the case of the General Assembly.

As always, the US justified the decision by invoking national security and foreign policy reasons. The real motives are clear. First, it is about showing the total alignment of American leadership with the government of Israel. Second, it is to express displeasure with the initiative by Emmanuel Macron and other leaders to bring to the General Assembly the proposal for the recognition of Palestine as a full UN member state. And finally, it is to punish the Palestinians for having filed several complaints against Israel in the international courts based in The Hague.

In any case, the Assembly will vote on Palestine, as proposed by France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Canada, Saudi Arabia, and other members. The UN currently has 147 countries that recognize Palestine as a state. This number is expected to increase significantly after the vote. Israel will be diplomatically more isolated if it is confirmed that its policy on Palestine is not accepted by almost all states, with the exception of the U.S. and a few others.

The vote will have a symbolic, non-binding political value. No state can become a full member of the United Nations with only the favorable vote of the General Assembly. It inevitably needs the support of the Security Council, with no veto from the five permanent members. In this case, it is evident that the U.S. will exercise its veto. Trump will ignore the will of the community of nations. And he will remind us that the right to veto is a historical aberration that needs to be reviewed, or at a minimum, deeply restricted given the new balance of power in the international framework.

Trump's speech on the morning of the first day (23/09) is awaited with enormous apprehension. It begins with an originality: for the first time, an American president speaks at the podium without the process of appointing a permanent U.S. representative having been completed. In May, the White House announced that Mike Waltz would be the representative of the Trump Administration to the UN, after having played the very important role of National Security Advisor and then being dismissed a few weeks later. His confirmation is still dragging on in the Senate corridors. The U.S. is represented in New York by a team of interims, who receive few or no directives from Washington. Trump does not have the UN on his list of priorities, except when it comes to leaving certain organizations or cutting or eliminating the financial contributions he is obligated to pay to the UN system.

He will certainly insist on a UN fundamentally focused on peace and international security, words spoken for reasons of mere personal image. Trump dreams of being seen as the mediator par excellence of conflicts, the champion of peace, worthy of the Nobel Prize. He does not believe in the UN's capacity in this matter. In reality, I believe he places no value on the United Nations. It is just a podium that allows him to display his oversized ego. But he does not want an active UN in any of the system's three pillars: international stability, development, and human rights.

The responsibility for stability, which should stem from respect for the UN Charter and international law, falls to the Americans, according to his way of thinking. Development, social progress, and environmental issues are matters for the Europeans. He forgets, however, that in these areas, the ones gaining ground are the Chinese, who are deeply committed to an alternative political and economic order, in a broad alliance with the so-called Global South. As for human rights, the issue will be left to the domain of the use of force and to the interpretations that each state will make of the dignity and life of its citizens. For the Chinese and their allies, human rights are a matter of national sovereignty that should not be included in the multilateral agenda.

All of this signifies the marginalization of the UN's political and human dimensions. Next week will allow us to better understand what the future of the UN may be.

Meanwhile, António Guterres launched what he called an exercise in system reform in May. He named it UN80 and said it would have three objectives: reduce expenses; eliminate mandates that no longer make sense; and carry out an institutional transformation. It was an ambitious plan that could only be successful if it had the support of the major countries and was carried out in dialogue with the organization's staff. None of that happened. In reality, the priority should have been to go door-to-door and beg the delinquent states, such as the U.S. and China, to honor their financial commitments. UN reform begins with holding each member state accountable.

From Myanmar to the EU: a quick journey

Suu Kyi and our Ursula

Victor Angelo

 

 

I intended to write about the coup d'état in Myanmar. I follow regularly what happens there, especially the role of civil society associations in defending citizens, the Chinese investments, and their political impact, as well as the actions carried out by the different ethnic-based armed groups. China, which is the second largest foreign investor in the country - the first is Singapore - shares a long border with Myanmar and sees its neighbour mainly as an economic corridor with shorter and more direct access to the Gulf of Bengal. This corridor is of huge strategic interest to the Chinese, both for gas and oil imports and for exports to the Middle East and Africa. The messages I would include in my text would be to condemn the military coup and defend the process of democratisation that began in 2015 and the November 2020 legislative elections – which the Carter Center considered acceptable despite the restrictions imposed by the pandemic and the armed rebellions.

I would also seek to discuss the question marks that Aung San Suu Kyi's political activity has raised in Western circles, while recalling that she won the November elections by a large majority. The appreciation of the Burmese is very different from the judgments that we, with our European eyes, make. I would have mentioned in my text the impasse that exists in the UN Security Council when it comes to take decisions about that country. This inability to condemn has been clearly demonstrated since 2017 when close to a million Rohingya people were persecuted and expelled to neighbouring Bangladesh. The objection always comes from the same side, from Beijing, and with Moscow doing the political favour of aligning itself with the Chinese, in a tactical manoeuvre to obtain Chinese political dividends. This time, however, I was surprised by the positive. China and the other members of the Security Council yesterday approved a declaration which I consider strong and which explicitly condemns the military coup and the arbitrary arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi and all the others. It was an encouraging surprise, including a clear call for respect for human rights and freedoms, including those of the press. I would speculate that this agreement on Myanmar is a good sign, which could be seen as a conciliatory gesture by Xi Jinping addressed to Joe Biden. 

However, I have decided to change my mind and focus on the mess that the vaccination campaign in the European Union has become. Each day shows that the issue of vaccines is highly political, and that delays, failures, slowdowns and injustices can have a devastating effect on the image of the European Commission and the moral authority and stability of national governments. It is also clear that the priority in the EU must be to immunise without delay the largest number of citizens.

At the end of December, Ursula von der Leyen said, with a mixture of joy and arrogance, that the campaign was being launched simultaneously across Europe. The Commission rightly decided that orders with pharmacy industry would be placed in a unified way, for the whole EU. This would increase our negotiating strength in the face of a sector which is immensely powerful and experienced in writing commercial contracts. After five weeks, we have about 2.9% of the population vaccinated in the Union, and over 14.5% on Boris Johnson's land. The vaccines ordered are not made available to national health services because there is not enough production capacity, logistics and because the pharmaceuticals already had other contracts signed in advance.

Thus, we enter February with the clear realization that there is no more explosive subject than this. And with the certainty that it is fundamental to transform vaccination into a real campaign, urgent, massive, effective and with fair criteria accepted by the people. Otherwise, we would be heading for political and social chaos. Far and different from Myanmar, of course, but equally destabilising. 

 

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

On Mali and the region

 

In today’s Diário de Notícias (Lisbon)

Notes on Mali

Victor Angelo

 

 

Mali is a fascinating country, diverse in its landscapes and cultures. It is home to great singers and traditional musicians who play the korah, an ancestral instrument made from a large gourd, the Dogon masks and statues, birthplace of the city of Timbuktu, a unique historical reference in Islamic studies. For four centuries, until 1670, Mali was the epicentre of a great empire in West Africa, an empire recognized by Portuguese explorers, who traded extensively with it across the Gambia River. I would also add that I had several Malian colleagues at the UN who proved to be excellent professionals and held important positions in the different multilateral organizations. I write this to fight the summary opinions of those who are in the habit of arranging everything African in a dark corner, in the shadow of the usual prejudices. I am sad, like many others, when I see the country tearing itself apart and becoming insecure, as it continues to do daily.

Mali has made the news again in the last three weeks following the military coup of August 18. It is, for the same reason, the subject of debate, including in European circles. Moreover, some conspiracy theorists have seen Moscow's hand behind the colonels who took power, a hypothesis I consider unlikely. But there are other hands at work in Mali, from France to Saudi Arabia, and with vastly different intentions.

Also, at stake is the role of the United Nations, which has maintained a peace mission in the country since 2013, with more than 15,000 elements. MINUSMA, as the mission is called, has, over time, become a case study because it has not been able to respond to the political and governance issues that are at the heart of Mali's problems. The political direction of the mission resolved, to please the French and out of strategic opportunism, to stick to the president that the coup has now deposed. In New York, at the Security Council, no one had the courage to correct this trajectory. Thus, credibility is lost, and the future is mortgaged. 

Returning to the current debate, it should have emphasized that more than two thirds of Mali's population is under 25 years of age. And that education and the economy are unable to meet the challenges that such an age pyramid entails. When I was in Mali for the first time in 1990, its total population was around eight and a half million. Today, thirty years later, it is close to twenty million. The same happens in the other countries of the region. They all have explosive age pyramids. Demographic pressure has grown throughout the Sahel along with the advance of desertification and poverty. Being young in the Sahel means looking to the future and seeing only a multitude of arid politics, a desert of opportunities and a chaotic and inhumane urban habitat. Thus, hope and social peace are hard to achieve. All that remains is migration to Europe, or else adherence to armed banditry and fanatical rebellions. Fanaticism has grown exponentially over the past decade, thanks in particular to the proliferation of mosques, Wahabist koranic schools and radical preachers, all financed by the Saudis and others of the kind. 

Those who neither emigrate nor join the extremist groups, vegetate in the big cities, where they can observe how social inequalities have become blatant, the fruit of the corruption that prevails in political circles, in the security forces and in the administration of justice. They also see that European countries and other international actors turn a blind eye to the manipulations practiced by the powerful. This is what happened in Mali. After months of popular protest against the indifference of the president and the greed of his own circle of friends, a group of senior officials decided to act. They have popular support, at least for now. It is true that one should not support anti-constitutional coups. But it is also true that one can no longer pretend that one does not see corruption, ineptitude and the failure of territorial administration, with vast areas of national space without any state presence. The mitigation of crises begins with the promotion of probity and the restoration of local power, beyond the treatment of youth issues. This is what we must remind the colonels, the leaders of the region, the UN Security Council and the European partners of Mali, Portugal included. 

 

 

Mali and its blind partners

 The serious political situation Mali is going through raises in my mind some fundamental questions about the political performance of the key external partners of the country. Basically, what I mean is that we cannot keep supporting national leaderships that are not appreciated by the vast majority of their people. We might feel comfortable with them. But what is the value of that if they are not accepted by their own citizens?

In this case, France, other European countries, and the UN have been supporting a regime that has not implemented the peace agreement they have signed with their own rebels and that has closed their eyes in an attempt not to see the rapid deterioration of the security and poverty situations. The partners played the same game.

And now, several years down the line, we have a much graver national crisis, that has grown into a regional one as well. And we see that the image of the external actors has also been seriously damaged. That is a sure way of undermining the role of the UN and of some key Western countries.

 

 

The required leadership is lacking

When the challenge is huge and its evolution unpredictable, the best approach is to concentrate all the efforts on containment. You limit the fire as much as possible. That means reducing the impact of the challenge and look for ways and means of controlling it. It also implies we mobilise everyone that can be called upon. The issue concerns everyone and each person can play a role in addressing it. That must be the message the leaders should bring forward. The collective effort. It’s a phase by phase combat but it is also part of a broader plan to resolve it. That must be said and repeated until every citizen gets to understand what is at play and the direction the leaders are taking.

This time the challenge is unique, profound and global. It requires a good combination of local actions and international cooperation. It concerns all nations. As such, we must put a much stronger emphasis on a concerted response. That emphasis and that type of action are still missing. Those who have the authority to call for that must act now. They have to move beyond their current timidity. Hesitation is not acceptable.

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar: an exceptional diplomat

I know there are many things going on and competing for today’s headlines. All of them are of great importance. They concern people at the Turkish-Greek border, people in Idlib, Syria, people sick with the Covid-19 pandemic, people losing their jobs because of the pandemic’s tremendous economic impact, young people kept out of their classrooms, and so on. They also concern big political games, such as the Putin-Erdogan meeting, the US elections, the Japanese and the fate of this year’s Olympic Games, or the political crisis in Kabul. But my headline is about the passing away of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the former UN Secretary-General. He was an old-style diplomat but a very effective one. During his time at the head of the UN the organization managed to resolve a number of major conflicts and wars. He led an organization that achieved results and was the glue the Security Council needed to be able to function. Respected by everyone, he has shown that charisma is not about being loud and highly visible. Charisma is about persistence, coherence and principles. That summarizes the Secretary-General he was.

Angela Merkel meets Vladimir Putin: good move

From a European perspective, the resolution of the Libyan civil conflict is a priority. Such crisis has several consequences that are of special importance for the EU Member States. It’s next door, it’s related to a very central migratory flow line, and it has also a serious impact on security in the larger Sahelian region.

But the conflict is far from being resolved. It is getting more complex and deeply dramatic these days. In such context, today’s travel to Moscow to meet President Putin has placed German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the centre of the European efforts. It was the right thing to do. The Europeans must talk to the Russians if they want to see the Libyan drama resolved. The Russians have been very supportive of one of the Libyan sides, the one led by the rebel General Khalifa Haftar. But they have not closed the door on the other side, the one based in Tripoli and recognised by the international community. Moreover, the Russians keep talking to other external actors that are involved in Libya’s domestic situation, to the Turks, the Egyptians and some Arab Gulf States.

Another positive move, out of today’s travel, is the reaffirmation by Angela Merkel that the Libyan peace process must be facilitated by the UN. This is the kind of support that is so much needed.  

   

Where is the UN Security Council?

These are very strange times. The international scene has been deeply challenged since the beginning of the New Year. And we heard no mention of the UN Security Council. The Council is supposed to be the ultimate custodian of international peace and security, I like to remember the people I talk to. Now, the Council seems to have become the ultimate guarantor of a silent approach to major crises. That should not be accepted.

Pakistan, India and Kashmir

In January 1957, the Indian Permanent Representative to the UN, V. K. Krishna Menon, spoke for 8 hours, when addressing the Security Council on the situation in Kashmir. That speech remains the longest ever delivered at the UN. It was cut short, if I can say so, because Menon collapsed of exhaustion.

Compared to such feat, yesterday´s 50-minute speech by Pakistan’s Prime Minister was a brief episode. But a striking one, not because of its length – at the UN, it is considered a long speech that goes beyond 35 minutes; this year’s trend has been to have shorter interventions – but because of the words he said. He basically focused on the dispute with India regarding Kashmir. And he talked about the possibility of war between the two countries and made a direct reference to the use of nuclear weapons. Imran Khan stated that Pakistan would go for a nuclear response if there is war and his country is losing it against India.

Such assertion is most upsetting. There is indeed a serious state of cold confrontation between Pakistan and India. The Kashmir situation and Modi’s decision to cancel the autonomy of the region have brought the complexity of conflict to the fore. We have there an extremely dangerous threat to international peace and security. Khan’s words have confirmed it.

Pakistan is getting closer and closer to China. Its dramatic economic situation makes Pakistan very dependent on China’s investments and economic cooperation. China, on the other hand, sees India as a growing competitor. But I can’t believe the Chinese would encourage Pakistan to go for an armed conflict with India. They cannot imagine that such clash would reduce India’s capacity to compete. 

In my opinion, the Chinese should be encouraged to mediate in between both countries. That would have an impact on the easing of the tensions and would strengthen the international standing of China. With the accord of the two antagonistic nations, the Chinese could also bring the matter to the Security Council, to get a greater buy-in for a peaceful way forward.

It is not easy, though. The Indian Prime Minister sees the Kashmir crisis as an internal challenge, a domestic affair. He does not welcome any type of international assistance on the issue. 

That was fine until yesterday, I would retort. With Imran Khan’s dramatic speech at the UN, the issue cannot be anything else but an international matter of great concern. It must be dealt as such and with great urgency. 

G20 official picture: the messages

Some people will spend a bit of their time reading the official picture of the 2019 G20 Meeting just held in Osaka. These types of pictures contain many hints. They cannot be taken lightly. The protocol and the political seniors of the host country – in this case, the Japanese who are masters in matters of meaning and symbology – invest a lot of working days deciding the positioning of everyone in the picture. Their final choice has a deep political import.

This year’s photo gives special attention to the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. He stands at the centre, between the host, Prime Minister Shinto Abe, and the US President. We could think that such placing might be related to the fact that Abe is just back from a visit to Iran and he wanted to show that he also pays special attention to the diplomacy towards Saudi Arabia. Maybe he would love it to be interpreted that way. But it is just a happy coincidence for the Japanese. Abe is close to the Crown Prince because Saudi Arabia will be organising the next G20 Meeting, in November next year.

That’s the reason why the President of Argentina, Mauricio Macri, is also on the front row. The last meeting took place in his country (2018). That’s protocol.

Then, the rest of the front row brings together some of usual suspects: the leaders of China, Russia, Germany and France. But also, some special friends of Japan. First, two close neighbours, South Korea and Indonesia. And three other countries representing other regions of the world: Brazil, Turkey and South Africa. Surprising is to see Prime Minister Modi emerging in the second row. That’s not where India should be.

On the last row, a bit lost as he looks in the wrong direction, we can find the UN Secretary-General. This is not new. It has nothing to do with António Guterres. To place the UN boss in the background has been the tradition. I always thought such positioning sends a very inappropriate signal. The UN must be better recognised by the world leaders, particularly in a meeting that deals with global issues. It is important to battle for that.

In the end, my overall assessment of the meeting is positive. Many people might say these summits have no real purpose and are not useful. That’s a respectable way of looking at them. I want to take the opposite view, particularly in respect of this one. We are living in a period of tensions and great complexities. These leaders have the power to make it go in the right direction. They represent most of the world’s population and 85% of the global economy. When they meet and send some positive messages, the world feels a little bit more hopeful.

The UN and the current crises

The United Nations is always required to be politically smart. That’s the way I saw it, when performing the responsibilities that had been assigned to me. And that’s what I still believe to be the best approach. Smart means above all to be able to say what must be said but with the words that build trust and show concern. Timidity is not the best road to achieve results and guaranty the necessary credibility.

I mention it because today I had to state that things must get better. If the UN remains basically inspired by risk aversion, it will keep pushing itself to the margins of the key current issues.

The Member States must be reminded, as often as the opportunity arises and as it is authorised by the UN Charter and by the history of the organisation, that they ought to support the central role the UN is supposed to play in case of international crises and conflicts. They should also be helped to keep in mind – and act accordingly – that any conflict resolution situation and peacebuilding effort require a comprehensive response. The UN System has the know-how to provide comprehensiveness. And the System must say it loud and clear. It should also smartly – diplomatically – challenge those leaders who keep betting on a security solution to complex crises. A security response, even a powerful one, is just a tool. It is not the master key.