The international crises

World War III? No, a Crisis of Impunity

Victor Ângelo

It is an exaggeration to claim that the Third World War has already begun. It is evident that the combined attack by the US and Israel against Iran has profoundly aggravated an already complicated international landscape. This occurred following other very serious violations of the UN Charter, namely the genocide in Gaza, the violence against Palestinians in the West Bank and the populations of Southern Lebanon, and, closer to home, the massive and illegal invasion of Ukraine by a superpower holding a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

However, the sum of all these conflicts does not mean the world is on the brink of a global war. What is happening in the Middle East does not share the same nature or direct links as the situation in Ukraine. The crises in Sudan or Myanmar also arise from distinct contexts.

The common thread between these different conflicts is the use of force to resolve political issues—in other words, the practice of illegality in the face of International Law. In the specific case of the bombing of Iran, for example, the Israeli-American decision is indisputably illegal, as noted by European political leaders and others, as well as by the majority of experts in International Law. Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu have ignited a situation of enormous tension in the Middle East, with a very grave and multidimensional impact.

This decision, which ignores the prohibition on the use of force without Security Council authorisation, has also generated significant humanitarian consequences for a large portion of the region's population, particularly in Iran and Lebanon, but also in Israel, the State of Palestine, and almost all Gulf countries. Yet, the drama created by Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu cannot be viewed as a global confrontation. It is a complex but circumscribed conflict. It does not directly concern the defence of Europe. It may, indirectly, jeopardise the stability and security of our continent. It does not, however, resolve the problems of the Middle East.

I repeat that the real problem lies in the lack of respect for international norms. Certain governments are convinced that, at this moment in history, what matters are missiles and other weapons. These are people who deliberately associate "might" with "right". They systematically confuse military strength with political legitimacy. Leaders of this type, in extreme cases, should be taken to the International Criminal Court in The Hague—where some already have a cell reserved—to answer for their actions.

For now, it is vital to emphasise that the present and the future demand a climate of peace, justice, equality, and sustainability. The multilateral system, developed over decades, exists for this purpose. The responsibility of States consists fundamentally in the improvement, expansion, and consolidation of this system. The leader who could aspire to the Nobel Peace Prize would be the one who succeeds in revitalising, modernising, and enforcing respect for the multilateral system.

At the heart of the system is the United Nations Security Council. As I have mentioned in previous texts, Portugal is a candidate for one of the two seats reserved for Western Europe in 2027-2028. Portugal is running alongside Germany and Austria. A television channel asked me this week if our country has any chance in this competition or if it will be the country left out. My answer could only be positive. We have a diplomatic machine that works and an international posture that goes far beyond our membership of the EU. Our power of influence within the EU serves, among other functions, to remind other Union Member States that the EU must be seen by the community of nations as a defender of the values and rules of international diplomacy.

Jean Monnet, one of the founders of the EU, always insisted on supranationalism as a means of guaranteeing peace between States. Following his thought, a divided world would be a world on the path to self-destruction. Our campaign for the Security Council must keep this guiding principle in mind and fight for complementarity between the various regions of the globe.

The Council is now deeply divided. Portugal must insist on a Security Council that seeks to establish consensus. To do this, it must prepare a list of priority issues, starting with the most consensual, and build alliances around them. This list must include strengthening interventions in the areas of Human Rights, development, the environment, and climate, as well as those related to peace missions.

In the latter case, it is important to keep three dimensions in mind:

1. The success of a peace mission has a huge impact on the UN's reputation;

2. Missions must aim to uphold a peace agreement between parties and not act as a mere "screen" hiding imbalances and preferences;

3. Mission mandates must be clear and sharply focused on the essentials, avoiding the trend of the last two decades to include a multitude of objectives, which end up turning missions into a kind of "Christmas Tree", covered in lights. Brilliant to look at, but impossible to achieve results.

Certain issues are especially difficult but cannot be ignored: it is necessary to review the Right of Veto and increase the number of seats on the Security Council to make it more representative of the 193 States that make up the United Nations. These two matters are exceptionally difficult to achieve. They will always meet opposition from those who currently hold the veto power. However, they cannot be ignored by the Portuguese campaign. We must have the courage to seize the moment and place them as central themes of our vision.

No to realpolitik, yes to principles and the International Law

 

Geopolitical Realism: When Might Prevails Over International Law

By Victor Ângelo

I regret having to repeat myself, but criticising the theory of geopolitical realism (realpolitik) does not constitute an exercise in naive idealism. On the contrary, it is a matter of recalling three fundamental dimensions of the relations between States. First, that peace must be the foundational principle of the international order. Second, that the United Nations Charter — even if it lacks updating regarding representation and the functioning of the Security Council — must be scrupulously respected. Third, that the power of military force cannot, and must not, prevail over the force of International Law. The world is not a boxing ring, nor a gladiatorial arena, where the strongest invariably wins.

The central error of so-called "political realism" lies in reducing the State to the role of the sole actor, ignoring democratic practices. Institutions, citizens' associations, economic agents, the media, and intellectuals are devalued or instrumentalised as mere pawns of power. Oppositions are diminished in their rights, despite being normal alternatives in a democracy. In reality, this alleged realism, which is nothing more than a form of political reductionism, opens the doors to absolute and arbitrary power, even in apparently consolidated democracies.

When leaders view the world solely through the lever of force and military aggression, they live anchored in other times; their mental roots are buried in the past. They place themselves outside the law and call it pragmatism. They ignore — or pretend to ignore — that there is a "before" and an "after" 1945, and that the world has changed radically since the end of the Cold War. When they speak of "negotiations", they are actually referring to the submission of the weak to the will of the strong. In the 19th century, such a practice was termed an "ultimatum". Today, it is presented under the cloak of a dense "geopolitical fog". This lack of visibility allows for a game played without clear rules. Diplomacy is captured to buy time, sow confusion — both among adversaries and domestic public opinion — and prepare, in the shadows, the logistics of war. Can we trust such leaders, today or tomorrow?

The war against Iran reminds us that it is imperative and urgent to insist on international ethics and human rights. When brute force becomes the primary criterion, no one is truly safe — not even the most powerful. If human rights are despised, fear becomes the only acceptable truth and the dominant social rule. George Orwell's "Newspeak" is, disturbingly, beginning to be imposed as a linguistic norm when, in certain European capitals, people speak of unusual characters now appearing at the front of the stage.

What is happening today in the Middle East underscores a constant reality: during and at the end of bad decisions and despotism, there is always a vast number of human beings paying the bill. This reality leads me to contend that the only sovereignty that truly counts is that which is based on the protection of life and human dignity. Everything else belongs to the tragic comedy of power, to absurd megalomaniacal ambitions, and to indifference towards people and the world itself. Are we witnessing the definitive decline of humanist concerns?

It is urgent to bring this theme to the table of the Security Council. Portuguese diplomacy, committed to obtaining a seat on the Council for the 2027-2028 biennium, must adopt this vision as its own banner: the banner of peace, dialogue, and tolerance, with humanity above all else. By doing so, Portugal will align itself with the majority of Member States and with the very essence of the UN. We will not be mere passive spectators of the current nihilism and unilateralism, but an active voice capable of proclaiming that great challenges demand collective and multilateral responses.

Our participation in NATO has an objective of peace and does not prevent the building of bridges with regional organisations in Latin America, Africa, or Asia. At a time when some powers are distancing themselves from the UN, or seeking to subordinate and capture it, Portuguese diplomacy can serve as another pillar — in coordination with other States — in building consensus, defending International Law, and supporting institutions of common interest. For example, the international courts based in The Hague and the bodies of the United Nations system, which are vital for billions of people and for the planet.

In June, the General Assembly will vote on the composition of the Council for the next two years. The Portuguese campaign takes place in a demanding and quite delicate context. Our greatest asset must be the intransigent promotion of peace through the reinforcement of the political role of the UN. This is the message that the world wants — and most needs — to hear with clarity.

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Contextual Post-Script (March 6, 2026)

As I review this translation, the events of this week add a sharp layer of irony to the text's call for "institutional ethics" and its critique of "transactional realism":

• The Merz-Trump Dialogue: Just three days ago, on March 3rd, Chancellor Friedrich Merz met with President Trump at the White House. While Trump pushed his "energy dominance" agenda, Merz was forced to navigate the exact "geopolitical fog" you describe. He specifically cited the war in Iran as a disaster for energy prices, urging a swift conclusion to protect German industry.

• The Rosneft "Carve-out": In a classic example of the "transactionalism" you critique, the US Treasury just yesterday (March 5th) lifted sanctions on Rosneft Deutschland. This was the result of intense lobbying by Merz to ensure Germany could continue refining oil through its state-controlled (but Russian-owned) assets. It confirms your fear: the "ideals" of sanctions are being traded for the "pragmatism" of industrial survival.

• The "Empty Shell" Reality: While the UN General Assembly watches from the sidelines, the "Coalition of the Willing" (led by Merz, Macron, and Starmer) met virtually this week to discuss troop deployments to Ukraine if Trump's peace deal fails. The "rescue mission" you envisioned is being led by heads of state, while the UN remains the "passive spectator" you warned against.

Looking ahead into 2026 with realism or just pessimism?

 2026: On Certain and Uncertain Challenges, and the Indispensable Need for International Cooperation

Victor Ângelo

The ancient Oracle of Delphi has now been replaced by Artificial Intelligence (AI) platforms. Even so, it is very risky to predict what the world will be like in the coming times. In the case of 2026, it is even more difficult for three fundamental reasons: firstly, we are in a period of marked geopolitical disorder, a legacy of 2025; secondly, the calendar foresees events of great importance, which may profoundly alter international realities; thirdly, the competition in the fields of AI, quantum technology, and high technology is accelerating rapidly, especially between the USA and China, without it being clear what the consequences of this dizzying rivalry might be. All this without considering the possible appearance of one or more Black Swans, as happened with Covid.

At the geopolitical level, I consider the most significant challenge to be the enormous current threat posed by the Russian Federation to democratic Europe. The criminal large-scale invasion of Ukraine is about to enter its fifth year, and Vladimir Putin does not seem willing to put an end to the violence. Ukraine has managed to resist, in a surprising and heroic manner, but above all from the end of winter onwards, it will need exceptional and continuous financial and military support to guarantee its legitimate defence. It should count on the help of European states—there will be little or nothing to expect from Trump’s America. European aid will be indispensable for the defence of Ukraine and of Europe itself. This aid, though inevitable, will worsen relations between the main European states and Russia, and could even lead to an armed attack, by decision of the Kremlin. We have not been this close to such a situation before. Putin currently boasts that he believes he would emerge victorious from such a confrontation. In reality, he is cornered and, consequently, deluded that war will keep him in power.

Trump will be mainly obsessed, throughout the year, with the US midterm elections on 3 November. He will do everything to retain the majority in Congress. If necessary, he will create incredible confusion on the domestic scene and conflicts on the international chessboard, notably in Venezuela and Greenland, so as to appear, to the more credulous American electorate, as the guarantor of his country’s stability and greatness. It would not be a surprise if this were to happen. Like all other autocrats throughout history, Trump believes that confusion and chaos will play in his favour.

European democracies cannot rely on Trump. He and Putin, each in their own way, are two enormous risks for international law and global order. For the first time, in 2026, two nuclear powers will be led by exacerbated egocentrics, capable of destroying a large part of humanity if, in their view, it is considered vital for them to remain in power.

I must also mention Xi Jinping. His main political concern is to ensure internal prosperity in China, which is understandable given the size of the country’s population and the fact that his political survival depends both on the stick and the carrot, on an iron-fisted rule and on the rising standard of living felt by a significant part of the population. However, in a situation of international chaos, he may attempt to recover Taiwan. This possibility cannot be excluded in 2026.

In terms of AI, competition between states will focus on economic advances, military superiority, and the dominance of the ideological narrative that favours their interests. Whoever wins the race in these areas—the USA or China—will guarantee their supremacy as a global hyperpower.

Financial and scientific investments in AI will continue throughout the year to reach absolutely astronomical values. In the USA, priority will be given to the giant technology companies. The security and defence sectors will establish fabulous contracts with these companies. In China, the development of AI will remain under the absolute control of the state, to ensure the regime’s survival. But in both cases, the fundamental concerns will be related to strengthening national security and manipulating public opinion. Colossally expanded by quantum science, AI will increasingly become a powerful and unpredictable tool in the hands of those who hold power.

In 2026, a new Secretary-General of the UN will be elected. The Global South recognises the value of the United Nations and is increasingly insisting on the urgency of its reorganisation. The survival of the UN’s political role depends on its representativeness. The right of veto and the permanent seats on the Security Council are now considered by the majority of Member States as outdated and obsolete powers, but still very real. They are obviously incapable of reflecting today’s international relations and of enabling the resolution of the major problems that plague the international agenda.

The electoral process that will take place throughout the year until a new Secretary-General is elected will give more strength to the reform movement. It will also insist on the election of a woman. Until now, the post has always been held by men. This will be one of the major themes at the UN level. It is time to elect a woman. In parallel, there will be a whole campaign for the person elected to come from Latin America. According to the rules, that should be the region of origin of the new leader. It would also have another significance: it would show Trump that Latin America really matters, that it is not just the backyard of the USA.

The political dimension of the UN is now going through the deepest crisis in its history. I do not believe, however, that it will cease to exist. The personality of the new Secretary-General will, however, be decisive. It must be someone seen as a political giant and with a skilful and courageous diplomatic streak. In Latin America, we have several such women: the Chilean Michelle Bachelet, the Costa Rican Rebeca Grynspan, the Mexican Alicia Bárcena, the Prime Minister of Barbados, Mia Mottley, and several others. These are personalities who have shown extraordinary political firmness.

Still on the UN, Portugal is seeking a non-permanent seat on the Security Council for the 2027–2028 biennium. It is competing with Germany and Austria, that is, three candidates for two available seats. If it manages to be elected—the decision will be made in June and, in my analysis, the Portuguese candidacy has a strong chance of succeeding—it will be the fourth time that Portugal has had a seat on the Security Council.

In the period of great uncertainties that will be 2026, we cannot fail to speculate about possible Black Swans. In international affairs, a Black Swan is a rare, unpredictable event, but when it happens, it turns out to have generated catastrophic consequences. Six years ago, it was Covid. In 2026, a terrible catastrophe could perhaps be a high-speed collision between two satellites, among the thousands currently in orbit, a number that keeps growing. This would cause an indescribable pulverisation of fragments, which would destroy other satellites and multiply astronomically the pieces of metal in uncontrolled orbit. The impact would be simply devastating for the various global satellite navigation systems, for space internet, meteorological, logistics, and military surveillance networks.

Other Black Swans are equally possible due to technological advances, but also because of their risks and unbridled competition.

Cooperation is the most effective response when any colossal challenge occurs. And with or without Black Swans, the greatest challenges are already here. The future choice is now dramatically clear: either there is cooperation, or we accelerate the destruction of a large part of our planet.

Reforming the United Nations in the high technological era

The new core United Nations, a reformed one, must focus on security, human rights and development. To achieve results in these areas it must reorganise itself, taking into consideration we are in an different era. Mechanisms like the UN Security Council, with the current composition and rules, are instruments of the past. We need organs that have the global representative of the world of today and make use of the most advanced technology. For instance, the new UN should put in place a Permanent Neutrality Monitoring Infrastructure. This would mean shared sensor arrays and and a system of satellite verification centers.

Peacekeeping, and this is just another example, should include a Multilateral Enforcement Clause. The challenge is to define the rules of such Clause, but member States should work on that definition. 

In my opinion, a Multilateral Enforcement Clause would be a specialized legal and strategic UN Security Council-approved tech-based mechanism within a peacebuilding/keeping treaty designed to ensure compliance through collective action. An enforcement clause would permit pre-authorized consequences and automaticity.

Its primary goal is to solve the "Security Dilemma"—where one party is afraid to comply because they fear the other side will cheat—by creating a credible, high-cost penalty for violations. The clause must explicitly define what constitutes a violation severe enough to activate enforcement. The violations could be of three types: qualitative, quantitative and procedural. A simple "denial of access" to monitors could be classified a de facto breach, a "red line violation". 

A key aspect of the reform is to remove the Veto power of the UN Security Council permanent members. That can be done through indirect means. For instance, sanctions would automatically return unless the Council votes unanimously to keep them lifted. This means a single power cannot protect a violator. Or, by referring the possible violation to a neutral body (like the International Court of Justice or a specialized panel of experts) so that the determination of a breach is objective rather than political.

Basically, I am stressing two points in this text: the UN reform, its political role, is a matter of great urgency; and it can be done if we move out of traditional approaches and old fashioned ways of looking at international affairs. 

Comments on my letter to President Vladimir Putin

 Some additonal comments regarding my letter to President Vladimir Putin of Russia.

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Analysis of the Diplomatic Approach

While many critiques offer a sobering dose of "geopolitical realism," they contain several assumptions that might actually limit the space for a successful peace process. Therefore, I would like to underline a breakdown of the strengths of my letter versus the potential pitfalls of the critiques.

1. The Necessity of the UN Charter (Countering the "Kosovo Precedent")

• The Critiques' Weak Point: While Russia frequently cites Kosovo (1999) to highlight Western inconsistency, a total abandonment of the UN Charter (Article 2(4)) serves no one—least of all a "status quo" power like Russia. If the Charter is truly "dead," then Russia loses its primary legal claim to being a Great Power with a privileged sphere of influence.

• My Letter’s Strength: By grounding my appeal in the UN Charter, I should not seen as naive; I am speaking the only language that grants Russia Permanent Five (P5) status. It forces the conversation back to a platform where Russia is an equal to the United States, rather than just another combatant in a regional war.

2. The UNSC as a Strategic Instrument, Not Just a Guarantor

• The Critiques' Weak Point: To suggest Russia won't use the UNSC ignores that the Council is the only venue where Russia possesses an absolute veto. Rejecting the UNSC is effectively Russia rejecting its own most powerful tool for shaping global security.

• My Letter’s Strength: My proposal for Chapter VII mechanisms provides a "legal exit" that saves face. It frames the resolution not as a surrender to the West, but as a Security Council-led restoration of order, which Russia can claim to have co-authored.

3. The "Victors' Peace" vs. Legal Reintegration

• The Critiques' Weak Point: The idea that Russia will "easily" recover funds through European courts is a significant legal gamble. Sovereign immunity is being aggressively reinterpreted in the West. Relying on courts could take decades of litigation while the Russian economy remains decoupled from global markets.

• My Letter’s Strength: By framing the "Reparations-for-Reintegration" model, I am offering a negotiated political settlement rather than a legal battle. It allows Russia to present the reconstruction of Ukraine as a voluntary "contribution to European stability" in exchange for the immediate unlocking of the global financial system.

4. The NATO-Russia Founding Act as a Realistic Off-Ramp

• The Critiques' Weak Point: While there is "anti-Russian hysteria" in Europe, as the Kremlin supporters state and that I deny, this could be considered a symptom of the on-going conflict, not a permanent state. A vacuum of security is what fuels this hysteria.

• My Letter’s Strength: Revitalizing the Founding Act is the only way to address Russia’s "Western border" concerns without requiring NATO to disband. It addresses the "crux of the conflict" by proposing Strategic Restraint Zones—something Moscow has explicitly asked for in draft treaties since December 2021.

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Synthesis of Strong Points

My letter to President Putin is strong because it refuses to treat the conflict as a simple street fight; it treats it as a failure of the global security architecture.

Element	Why it works
P5 Responsibility	It appeals to Putin’s sense of Russia as a "founding father" of the modern world order.
Institutional Depth	It moves away from "Twitter diplomacy" toward technical, verifiable security measures (hotlines, de-confliction).
Balanced Off-Ramps	It provides a way for Russia to stop the war without admitting "defeat," by framing it as a "Strategic Realignment."

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Acknowledging the "Humanitarian" Gap

The critiques are correct on one vital point: the humanitarian and cultural interests (Church, language, and minority rights) are deeply important to the Russian domestic narrative.