If Luxembourg Fails, Portugal Can Act

 

Diário de Notícias Opinion/Lisbon edition

Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General.

Published on: October 9, 2026

When EU Foreign Ministers meet in Luxembourg on October 12, one year will have passed since the ceasefire in Gaza. Peace, however, remains absent. The United Nations continues to record attacks on civilians and restrictions on humanitarian aid, and it is projected that around 1.4 million people—two-thirds of Gaza's population—will face acute food insecurity by the end of the year. In the West Bank, the UN and other observers document settler violence and the expansion of Israeli settlements, which the International Court of Justice deemed illegal in 2004 and again in 2024.

The Israeli government is now accelerating the E1 project, an urban corridor intended to link the vast settlement of Ma’ale Adumim to East Jerusalem. The UN, EU countries, and other organizations consider that, once completed, it will sever the territorial continuity between the northern and southern West Bank and, in practice, render a contiguous Palestinian State unviable. That is why, for decades, Washington and European capitals opposed the plan.

On September 8, Portugal joined a declaration with France, Spain, Ireland, Denmark, Finland, Poland, and Sweden, and—outside the Union—with the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, and Iceland, in which these States confirmed their intention to restrict trade with the settlements. The Twenty-Seven, however, still lack a common position: Germany, Czechia, and Italy are preventing a qualified majority from being reached. The EU-Israel Association Agreement remains unchanged, and the institutions that finance settlement expansion from Europe continue to operate without restrictions.

More than 500 former prime ministers, ministers, ambassadors, and senior European officials urged, in an appeal published in Libération on October 5, that the EU sanction financial institutions and service providers linked to E1 and ban trade with the settlements. They warn that collective inaction is hollowing out the two-state solution.

If the Foreign Affairs Council remains blocked once again, the States that take International Law seriously are not left without options. Spain showed one: it recalled its ambassador to Tel Aviv in September 2025 and, since March 2026, the embassy has been led by a chargé d'affaires. Relations were not severed. The level of representation was merely reduced.

This is the step that Portugal could propose: reduce the level of its representation in Tel Aviv, as Madrid did, and do so in coordination with others. It is not necessary for everyone to do it. An initial group could bring together countries that have already adopted restrictive national measures, such as Spain, Ireland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The invitation would remain open to the other signatories of the September 8 declaration and to others. If five or six States move forward, the gesture ceases to be national and becomes a European movement. For Portugal, which assumes a seat on the UN Security Council in 2027, this would be a way to show that the defense of the negotiated solution in New York has concrete consequences in Brussels. And it would be coherent with the step Lisbon has already taken by recognizing the State of Palestine.

There are four predictable objections. The first is that reducing diplomatic level diminishes access and influence. But the political channel remains open: the chargé d'affaires would continue to transmit messages, protect citizens, and speak with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Security cooperation and consular protection would not be suspended, and Israel would continue to be an interlocutor. The second is that the gesture would be purely symbolic. Isolated, its impact is indeed limited. It would be a political signal, not a lever, and would only gain strength if accompanied by financial sanctions and trade restrictions. The third is that it would further divide the Union. But the division already exists. What is at stake is whether the blockade by three States should paralyze all the others. The fourth is retaliation. But retaliation against an isolated State is easy; against five or six acting in conjunction, it is much more costly, and that is the rationale behind the group.

And Washington? The Trump administration has reiterated its opposition to the annexation of the West Bank, but, as far as is public, has not expressly condemned E1. There is, even so, common ground: Washington and Europe state that they want to prevent annexation and preserve stability. If European capitals present their decisions as a way to prevent the reality on the ground from rendering the two-state solution unviable, rather than as a rupture with Israel, they will be speaking of an objective they share with Washington. It is not necessary to agree on the instruments to agree on the outcome. It is up to EU governments to explain this firmly, before the fait accompli makes conversation useless.

None of this reflects antisemitism, nor hostility toward Israel and its citizens. Europe firmly condemns the terrorist massacre perpetrated by Hamas on October 7, 2023, and all forms of terrorism against Israel. What is proposed here responds to decisions by the Israeli government that are incompatible with an objective reiterated by the UN Security Council, the European Union, successive US administrations, and many others: preserving the conditions for a two-state solution.

On the 12th, ministers can limit themselves to repeating that the problem is serious or dare to go further. If there is no consensus, it will be up to the States that take international law seriously to show that, in Europe, there are already those who know how to act. Portugal can be one of them.

Reflecting about the United Nations: today and the future

Navigating the Thucydides Trap: The Pragmatic Rebirth of Global Governance

The current discourse surrounding the post-1945 global order often falls into a trap of fatalism. It is true that reading the present institutional reconfiguration as a mere "evolutionary phase" without acknowledging the raw geopolitical realities can seem like academic escapism. We are indeed caught in the gravitational pull of the Thucydides Trap—navigating the perilous structural collision between a ruling hegemon (the United States) fighting to maintain its primacy, and a rising challenger (China) determined to reshape the global architecture.

However, to declare the multilateral system "dead" or to view this transition solely through the lens of catastrophic collapse is to miss the profound, pragmatic evolution taking place. The global order is not being crushed; it is being stress-tested and forced to shed its utopian illusions in favour of a much more resilient, realistic, and decentralized architecture.

Here is why the new geopolitical game offers a genuine pathway to stability and a renewed, albeit different, form of global cooperation:

1. The P5 Monopoly: From "Gridlock" to the Architecture of Mutual Containment.

 Critics rightly point out that the Permanent Five (P5) of the UN Security Council act as a cartel, and that true, egalitarian reform of the veto system is highly unlikely. However, in the context of the Thucydides Trap, the veto is not a fatal flaw—it is a vital safety valve.

The UN was never designed to be a world parliament; it was designed to prevent World War III. The fact that the US, China, and Russia possess veto power ensures that the system cannot be used to cross their existential red lines, thereby preventing direct kinetic conflict. What critics call "terminal gridlock" is, in reality, the operationalization of mutual deterrence. This friction forces great powers to negotiate "minimum understandings" outside of maximalist rhetoric. By acknowledging that universal consensus is impossible, the P5 are inadvertently creating a realistic architecture of mutual containment, ensuring that the US-China competition remains cold, calculated, and manageable rather than explosive.

2. The UN Secretary-General: The Power of Quiet Diplomacy

 It is easy to lament the P5’s preference for a compliant "Secretary" over a crusading "General" under Article 99. But in an era of hyper-polarized superpower competition, a megaphone is often less effective than a back-channel.

As we approach the selection of a new UN Secretary-General in 2026, the need is not for a polarizing visionary who will publicly shame Washington or Beijing or Moscow —which would only accelerate institutional withdrawal—but for a master of quiet diplomacy. A pragmatic, consensus-building Secretary-General can serve as the indispensable geopolitical shock absorber. By keeping the lines of communication open when public rhetoric (whether from a Trump, Putin or a Xi) runs hot, the Secretary-General can quietly defuse localized crises and facilitate transactional compromises that keep the global machinery humming.

3. "Agile Interdependence": The Evolution of Functional Cooperation

 The era of "weaponized interdependence" is undeniably here. The dividing lines between security and functional cooperation have blurred, with semiconductors, AI, oceans, space, and rare-earth supply chains acting as the new battlefields.

Yet, there is profound cause for optimism here: the sheer cost of decoupling is acting as a modern form of deterrence. 

Complete economic bifurcation is impossible. While universal bodies like the WTO or WHO face immense pressure, functional cooperation is not dying; it is becoming more agile and modular. We are witnessing the rise of "coalitions of the willing," public-private partnerships, and issue-specific agreements. Superpowers may fight over quantum computing, but they remain functionally tethered by the undeniable need to manage climate change, stabilize global debt, and secure food supply chains. 

This "weaponized interdependence" forces a cautious pragmatism: adversaries must cooperate on planetary survival.

4. Pluralism: The Healthy Democratization of Power 

The fracturing of the globe into distinct blocs is often viewed cynically as a march toward war. However, the rise of the SCO, the expansion of BRICS, the EU and the cementing of the Quad represent a genuine, long-overdue democratization of global power.

For the first time in centuries, middle powers like India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and and other democracies have the agency to choose, balance, and demand better terms from both Washington and Beijing (Moscow is losing influence). This multipolarity introduces critical "institutional shock absorbers" into the global system. By engaging in multiple, overlapping regional forums, middle powers are actively preventing a binary, zero-sum showdown between the US and China. 

They are forcing the superpowers to compete through investment, diplomacy, and development rather than sheer military coercion.

Conclusion: A Pragmatic Renaissance 

The universal, idealistic multilateralism envisioned in 1945 is indeed transitioning, but what is replacing it is not a descent into chaos. We are moving toward a mature, transactional balance-of-power politics that acknowledges the Thucydides Trap and actively works to defuse it.

To embrace this new era is not to rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanic; it is to build a more seaworthy vessel. By accepting the limits of the P5, embracing the agility of modular cooperation, and empowering the pluralism of the Global South, we can construct a robust architecture of mutual survival. The new global order will be less poetic and more hard-nosed, but in its brutal realism lies the greatest hope for sustaining peace in the 21st century.

Notes about the election of the new United Nations Secretary-General

 

The choice of the next Secretary-General could decide the UN’s fate

The Elders Foundation

38,221 followers

May 1, 2026

Dear friends,

More than two months since the US and Israel began their illegal attacks on Iran, the fallout continues to be felt globally. As peace talks continue to stall, maritime traffic remains blocked in the Strait of Hormuz, and global energy markets show no signs of stabilising. The United Nations Secretary-General might be expected to play a critical role in resolving such a conflict, yet the diminishing scope for political leadership by the UN in recent years has made this impossible.

In January, the UN will welcome a new Secretary-General. This is not a routine appointment, but one with existential implications. Who member states choose to lead the UN will play a crucial role in shaping its future. As emerging candidates come under scrutiny following their participation in online interactive dialogues last month, we must ask: what kind of leadership does the world demand at this moment?

First and foremost, the successful candidate must possess the personal qualities needed to restore the UN’s credible leadership on the world stage. They should serve as a moral anchor, with the political courage and strategic clarity required to speak truth to power. This means acting independently – not constrained by political caution or beholden to the governments they are meant to hold to account. They must have the courage to take principled positions, even when they are unpopular.

In today’s world, this may all sound rather naïve. But a UN without an empowered Secretary-General is a UN that cannot fulfil its primary purpose: to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. It is a UN that becomes increasingly irrelevant in a violent and chaotic "might is right" world.

It is for all UN member states to choose a Secretary-General, not just the permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly must make full use of its leverage in the appointment of a recommended candidate, including the prerogative to reject a recommendation.

For eight decades, the office has been held by men. The gender imbalance at the top of the UN is undeniable, but addressing it must go beyond symbolism. What is needed is a transparent, merit-based process that selects a credible, independent and globally respected leader – chosen not on gender alone.

There is no escaping the scale of the task ahead. Trygve Lie, the first UN Secretary-General, described it as ‘the most impossible job in the world’. Today, it is harder still.

As Elders, we will not intervene publicly on behalf of any individual candidate. However, we will continue to advocate for courageous leadership to address shared existential threats, and we are looking forward, as a group, to support the next Secretary-General in her work.

With thanks for your ongoing support,

Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein

My critique:

While Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein’s letter for The Elders presents itself as a clarion call for principled leadership, a severe critique reveals it to be a masterclass in "lofty impotence." It relies on a series of romanticized platitudes that ignore the brutal realpolitik of the United Nations, offering a vision that is functionally disconnected from how power is actually exercised in 2026.

Here is a my critique of the text’s core failings:

1. The Fallacy of the "Moral Anchor"

The text demands a Secretary-General (SG) who acts as a "moral anchor" with the "courage to speak truth to power."

• The Critique: This is a category error. The SG is not a secular Pope; they are the "Chief Administrative Officer" of a body composed of sovereign states. Zeid’s demand for an "independent" leader ignores the fact that any candidate who actually demonstrated the "political courage" to regularly offend the P5 (US, Russia, China, UK, France) during the selection process would be vetoed instantly. By advocating for a leader who is "not beholden to governments," The Elders are essentially advocating for a candidate who cannot be elected.

2. Strategic Naivety Regarding the P5

Zeid admits that his vision might sound "naïve," yet he proceeds to double down on that naivety.

• The Critique: The text frames the diminishing scope of UN leadership as a failure of "personal qualities." It fails to mention the structural reality: the UN’s paralysis is not a lack of SG "courage," but the result of the veto power and the active hostility of Great Powers toward multilateralism. Suggesting that a "credible leader" can simply bypass the "might is right" world through sheer force of personality is a dangerous simplification that misleads the public about where the actual bottleneck lies.

3. The Empty Threat of the General Assembly

The letter urges the General Assembly (GA) to use its "leverage" to reject a Security Council recommendation.

• The Critique: This is a hollow revolutionary posture. In the 80-year history of the UN, the GA has never rejected a Security Council nominee for SG. Why? Because the GA is not a monolith; it is composed of states that are themselves beholden to the P5 through aid, trade, and security pacts. Promoting the "prerogative to reject" without a viable strategy for how 193 disparate nations would survive the ensuing constitutional crisis is irresponsible "activism-lite."

4. Gender Symbolism vs. Reality

The text argues that addressing the gender imbalance must "go beyond symbolism" but then fails to provide any concrete mechanism for how to achieve this while maintaining a "merit-based" process.

• The Critique: By stating the leader should be "chosen not on gender alone," while simultaneously noting that the office has only been held by men, the text enters a rhetorical loop. It avoids taking a hard stand (e.g., "The next SG must be a woman") to remain "principled," yet by doing so, it effectively permits the status quo to continue under the guise of "merit," which has historically been defined by the very male-dominated governments the text claims to hold to account.

5. Institutional Paternalism

As a group of "former" leaders, The Elders occupy a position of consequence-free moralizing.

• The Critique: The letter is steeped in the paternalistic tone of retired elites. Zeid writes that The Elders will "support the next Secretary-General in her work" (notably using the feminine pronoun to signal virtue), yet they refuse to "intervene publicly on behalf of any individual." This allows the group to maintain its "moral high ground" without actually expending any political capital or taking the risk of backing a specific reformer who might actually change the system.

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The text is a diplomatic comfort blanket. It makes the reader feel that "principled leadership" is just one good appointment away, while carefully avoiding the "holy cows" of the UN Charter (like the Veto) that are the true source of the organization's existential threat. It is a document that demands everything and risks nothing.

How do you think a candidate would react to being told they must be a "moral anchor" while simultaneously needing to secure the vote of a Trump-led US or a Xi-led China?