On Putin and us, the Europeans in the West

Putin has become agitated

Victor Angelo

  

Vladimir Putin is a real puzzle in the literal and figurative sense. In the face of recent and multiple popular demonstrations, he has responded with renewed violence and has again shown that in his political vision there is no room for the slightest objection. He opposed democratic aspirations with police batons and the arrest of thousands of citizens.

Experts in Russian domestic politics tell me that, for the first time, Putin does not feel at ease. He sees what is happening in Belarus and fears contagion. In addition, his opponent Alexei Navalny appears today more than ever as a real threat. The courage that Navalny showed on his return to Moscow, despite knowing that he was going to put himself in the wolf's jaws, impressed many of his compatriots. He showed determination, which is one of the main qualities required of a political leader. On the other hand, Navalny has released this week a long video showing the luxurious palace that Putin has built for his own pleasure. The report on this immense extravagance, a delirious version of Versailles in the Black Sea, is being seen by millions of citizens. Those who know these things consider the political impact of the video on Putin's image to be extraordinarily strong. If this is the case, it confirms what I have always said: to bring down the autocrat it is necessary to shake and challenge his alleged moral authority. Putin's name must be directly associated with the large-scale corruption that exists in the meanderings of the elite in which he moves. It is essential to show that the abuse of power and the lack of ethics are aimed at the satisfaction of the president's ego and personal greed.  

Putin is also a puzzle for EU leaders. After six years of European sanctions against the Russian regime, nothing has been achieved. On the contrary, the sanctions offer him a pretext to strengthen his nationalist narrative, to proclaim that the West is against Russia and that his historical role is to defend the Russian homeland and soul.

The EU's measures against autocracy and the hostility of the Kremlin are not very incisive. On Russia, Angela Merkel and other Europeans to the west of Germany have a very ambiguous approach. They do not reach the centre of power and do not touch, if only slightly, one of the main sources of revenue for their public finances, gas. The most striking example is the Nord Stream 2 project, which is almost complete. The move to the operational phase of this pipeline must be used an opportunity for political dialogue including, for example, the release of Navalny and other political prisoners, the end cyber-attacks on strategic European targets and of Kremlin’s support for German, French, Italian and other neo-fascist movements. In other words, the entry into operation of Nord Stream 2 must be linked to the re-establishment of a platform of political trust between the parties. 

Meanwhile, Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin had a first conversation. In addition to allowing for the continuation of the nuclear arms control treaty, the New Start, which had been signed in 2010 and would expire in eight days' time, the US president clearly set out his position on matters relating to Ukraine's sovereignty, espionage and cyber-attacks by the Russian services, and defence, including the protection of Washington's allies. He also stressed that Navalny should be released. This way of dealing with Putin points to the line that must be followed by Europeans. An open, clear and firm line based on continued contact with Moscow and constant reference to the values of democracy. The same values that mobilise thousands of Russian citizens, despite the cold and the repression. 

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

Dealing with Vladimir Putin's regime

This is an AI translation of my opinion column of today, published in Lisbon by Diário de Notícias, a national newspaper

 

Beyond poison

Victor Angelo

 

The European Union's political relationship with the Russian Federation remains very nebulous and tense. It exploded again this week after the German announcement that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a chemical composition, banned by international law, but available in the Russian state arsenal.

Apart from Navalny, the impasse in Belarus, the renewed US pressure against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the recent statements by Sweden on military threats in the Baltic Sea, the arrest of a senior French officer accused of collaborating with Russian espionage, all reminded us in recent days that defining a European policy towards Vladimir Putin's regime is an urgent and complex matter. It must go beyond the current package of economic sanctions, which was approved following the invasion of Crimea in 2014. These sanctions, now in force until 2021, mainly concern financial transactions and the export of material that can be used in oil production and exploration or in military areas. They are strictly linked to the evolution of Russian intervention in Ukraine, including the Crimea, and not to the broader question of how to face and deal with today's Russia.

I recognize that the issue has been much discussed and remains on the agenda. Josep Borrell, in recently launching a process of reflection on security and defence, which he named "Strategic Compass", had this issue in mind. The problem is that Russia is viewed differently by the distinct EU member countries. In the Baltics or Poland, it is considered as the great external threat. This opinion fades as we move towards the Atlantic and move away from the East and the traumas of Soviet times.

The debate has revived with Vladimir Putin's return to the presidency in 2012. In the previous two years, in NATO and in the European institutions there was still some hope for a constructive and cooperative relationship between the two parties. Russian general officers were even invited at that time to participate in high-level operational command exercises of the Atlantic Alliance. There were also other attempts to define a new neighbourhood policy. I speak from my own experience. In one of them, in which I participated as a facilitator on a Swiss initiative, it became clear that Russian nationalist pride had been irresponsibly mistreated in the years following the end of the Cold War, and that Vladimir Putin's agenda would be to restore the country's international presence and present the bill to the West. A revanchist project.

The crisis in Ukraine and the subsequent annexation of the Crimea were part of the settlement. Since then, relations have entered a zigzagging phase, with a growing tendency for political and diplomatic confrontation. It became clear that Vladimir Putin wanted to undermine the EU from within, through selective diplomacy and actions of disinformation, propaganda and support for far-right political parties, as long as they had the disintegration of the European project as their flag. The illusion of a "restoration" of cooperation was a short-lived sun. But not everyone wants to see reality that way. Bulgaria, Czechia, as well as Greece and Hungary have, within the EU, a relatively favourable attitude towards the positions of the Kremlin. Others will be, to a certain extent, neutral and available for détente, as will be the case in Portugal. 

The definition of a common policy requires a clear and shared understanding of Vladimir Putin's intentions, of his strategic and personal interests. It begins by understanding that Russia is different from China. China is a competitor, in many areas, and needs an adequate competitive response. Russia under Putin is a hostile state and should be treated as such. No one wants to clash with a powerful and bellicose neighbour. But to ignore it would be a mistake. That is why it must be repeatedly reminded what rules and values must be respected, as well as limit interaction to a minimum, and personally sanction the country's main leaders. It is necessary to show the European population, and above all the Russian, that we consider their leaders to behave badly, in light of democratic practices and international law.