Dealing with Vladimir Putin's regime

This is an AI translation of my opinion column of today, published in Lisbon by Diário de Notícias, a national newspaper

 

Beyond poison

Victor Angelo

 

The European Union's political relationship with the Russian Federation remains very nebulous and tense. It exploded again this week after the German announcement that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a chemical composition, banned by international law, but available in the Russian state arsenal.

Apart from Navalny, the impasse in Belarus, the renewed US pressure against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the recent statements by Sweden on military threats in the Baltic Sea, the arrest of a senior French officer accused of collaborating with Russian espionage, all reminded us in recent days that defining a European policy towards Vladimir Putin's regime is an urgent and complex matter. It must go beyond the current package of economic sanctions, which was approved following the invasion of Crimea in 2014. These sanctions, now in force until 2021, mainly concern financial transactions and the export of material that can be used in oil production and exploration or in military areas. They are strictly linked to the evolution of Russian intervention in Ukraine, including the Crimea, and not to the broader question of how to face and deal with today's Russia.

I recognize that the issue has been much discussed and remains on the agenda. Josep Borrell, in recently launching a process of reflection on security and defence, which he named "Strategic Compass", had this issue in mind. The problem is that Russia is viewed differently by the distinct EU member countries. In the Baltics or Poland, it is considered as the great external threat. This opinion fades as we move towards the Atlantic and move away from the East and the traumas of Soviet times.

The debate has revived with Vladimir Putin's return to the presidency in 2012. In the previous two years, in NATO and in the European institutions there was still some hope for a constructive and cooperative relationship between the two parties. Russian general officers were even invited at that time to participate in high-level operational command exercises of the Atlantic Alliance. There were also other attempts to define a new neighbourhood policy. I speak from my own experience. In one of them, in which I participated as a facilitator on a Swiss initiative, it became clear that Russian nationalist pride had been irresponsibly mistreated in the years following the end of the Cold War, and that Vladimir Putin's agenda would be to restore the country's international presence and present the bill to the West. A revanchist project.

The crisis in Ukraine and the subsequent annexation of the Crimea were part of the settlement. Since then, relations have entered a zigzagging phase, with a growing tendency for political and diplomatic confrontation. It became clear that Vladimir Putin wanted to undermine the EU from within, through selective diplomacy and actions of disinformation, propaganda and support for far-right political parties, as long as they had the disintegration of the European project as their flag. The illusion of a "restoration" of cooperation was a short-lived sun. But not everyone wants to see reality that way. Bulgaria, Czechia, as well as Greece and Hungary have, within the EU, a relatively favourable attitude towards the positions of the Kremlin. Others will be, to a certain extent, neutral and available for détente, as will be the case in Portugal. 

The definition of a common policy requires a clear and shared understanding of Vladimir Putin's intentions, of his strategic and personal interests. It begins by understanding that Russia is different from China. China is a competitor, in many areas, and needs an adequate competitive response. Russia under Putin is a hostile state and should be treated as such. No one wants to clash with a powerful and bellicose neighbour. But to ignore it would be a mistake. That is why it must be repeatedly reminded what rules and values must be respected, as well as limit interaction to a minimum, and personally sanction the country's main leaders. It is necessary to show the European population, and above all the Russian, that we consider their leaders to behave badly, in light of democratic practices and international law.

 

Bringing the bullies together

When I scrutinise the foreign policies of permanent members of the UN Security Council I find no real differences, when it comes to the pursuit of their national interests. Each one of the five States is ready and willing to make use of force and go beyond the diplomatic conventions, tread into illegality, when its leaders think that the country´s national interests are at play. That´s particularly true for each country´s area of influence and strategic importance. It´s the case with China in the South China Sea, with Russia in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, the US in Syria and Iran, the UK in West Africa and the Gulf Cooperation countries in the Persian shores, and with France in the Sahel Region of Africa.

The strategic options of these powerful countries take the primacy over the workings of the UN or other international organisations. It´s a fact, as well, that some of them do it more often than others. But when necessary, they will go for it. Norms and international law are to be respected as long as they do not collide with the views, ambitions and vital interests of the big five.

The primary role of the UN Secretary-General and other international voices, as well as the leaders of some key States such as India or Japan or South Africa, is to constantly recall the international norms and obligations. But it is also to look for points of equilibrium among the interests of the permanent members. Their critical geopolitical interests are known. The challenge is to negotiate taking them into account.

One veto

The UN Security Council is certainly in need of deep reform to reflect today´s world. But, for the time being, it is the ultimate platform where matters of peace and security can be decided. It is therefore of critical importance, even when decisions are not taken because of one or more vetoes. For instance, when all the members of the Council vote for a resolution and one of the five permanent sitters casts a negative vote, this veto has a tremendous political meaning. Particularly if the resolution was trying to address an issue of directly related to the international behaviour of the vetoing country. By saying no that country is just showing to be on the wrong side of the international community´s wisdom. 

Moving away from Russia may gain speed

President Putin believes he will be in a stronger position after the Crimean referendum on Sunday. He knows that the result will be favourable to those who advocate the integration of the Peninsula in the Russian Federation. This is not a very difficult guess as many of those who oppose it will be intimidated and will stay away of the polling stations. But he is wrong to believe this will strength his hand. This will give additional weight to all those in the West that keep saying we shouldn´t cooperate and trust the current Kremlin leadership. And these people will push for less dependency of Russia´s natural resources and markets. For less economic links as well. They will stress that alternatives do exist. And that will be a strong trend in the next few years.