The EU and its neighbours, starting with Belarus

A Europe beyond barbed wire

Victor Angelo

 

The confrontation taking place on the border between Belarus and Poland is worrying, but it cannot be analysed in black and white. It is a complex crisis that raises a whole series of questions. We are facing humanitarian, migratory, security, geopolitical and ethical problems, in other words, a constellation of challenges that need to be debated calmly, frankly, and thoroughly.

In the background, we have two major problems. The first is about democracy. The second focuses on extreme poverty in a world that is profoundly unequal, and that conflicts, pandemics and climate change are making even more uneven and fractured.

But first, you have to think about the people who are now trapped in the no-man's-land between the Polish barbed wire and the truncheons of the Belarusian special units. It is not known how many thousands there are - estimates are not reliable. It is known, however, that they include fragile people, many of them children, who are hungry and cold and suffer constant humiliation and violence. They are also permanent targets for false news that Belarusian agents constantly circulate in order to keep the migrants' illusions alive.

Alexander Lukashenko, the master of Belarus, is clearly taking advantage of the misery of certain peoples. But our side cannot remain indifferent to the suffering of those who have allowed themselves to be manipulated, people who live in such complicated contexts that any promise, however unrealistic it may be, always brings a thread of hope. And that throws masses of people into the minefields of illegal migration.

The border with Belarus separates the European area from an autocratic regime, in which anything that can keep the dictator in power is done. Lukashenko is our most immediate concern today, but he is not the only case in the neighbourhood. If we look around and focus on who represents the closest potential or real threat, we have a bouquet that also includes the leaders of Russia and Turkey. I do not want to add some Moroccan politicians to this list, but I would recommend not losing sight of this North African neighbour of ours, who has already shown that he knows how to use mass migration as a political weapon.

It is true that there are also those within the EU who are destabilising European integration. But that is a matter for another reflection.

Let us now talk about democracy. The EU needs to formulate a doctrine that defines how it should relate to non-democratic neighbours, especially when situations of open hostility arise, as is now the case. In the current framework, one gets the feeling that democracies tend to lose out to outlaw states. It is therefore necessary to clearly establish what the appropriate response should be to aggressions of a hybrid nature, carried out at the tangent of the red line of armed conflicts between States, without, however, crossing it. A first step should be a firm and unequivocal response. This includes the adoption of sanctions in a swifter, multi-faceted and more character-focused manner. Another means will be to make greater use of the multilateral system. This will allow actions like the one Lukashenko ordered at the expense of the despair of the Iraqi Kurds, the Syrians and other peoples of the Middle East to be included on the international agenda,

As for the disparities that exist between a rich Europe and a whole series of poor countries, the pull effect is inevitable. Mass migration from South to North will be one of the most striking phenomena of this and the following decades. The EU cannot pretend it does not see the trend. It is unacceptable to leave a matter of such importance to the discretion of individual member states. The issue must be dealt with jointly. And the subject must become one of the main lines of debate at the Conference on the Future of Europe. It is also time to tell the citizens that this conference is taking place and get them involved.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 19 November 2021)

Lukashenko flies low and will crash

Lukashenko in choppy flight

Victor Angelo

 

For some states, the repression of dissidents knows neither limits nor borders. Anything goes when someone is considered an enemy of the regime. Even when he or she lives abroad, convinced that it is safer. One may not be, however, if one is considered a target for the criminals who control power in the home country. Some dictatorships have an awfully long repressive arm. They have no qualms about operating on foreign soil and conducting murders, kidnappings, or making frivolous or unsubstantiated accusations in order to force Interpol to issue international arrest and repatriation notices. In other cases, they brutally intimidate family members who have remained in the country, with the aim of silencing the opponent in other latitudes.

The atrocious execution in Istanbul of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 was the most visible case in recent times. But it is not only Saudi Arabia that violates international law in this way. In a recently published report, the reputable NGO Freedom House took inventory of individual cases of transnational repression and the regimes that practice it, with total disregard for the sovereignty of other states and the norms of political asylum and refugee protection. In addition to the Saudis, the list includes China, Iran, Rwanda, Russia and Turkey. It would be easy, unfortunately, to add a few others. North Korea, for example, which organized the assassination of Kim Jong-un's half-brother at Kuala Lumpur airport in 2017. And as of this week, we have to include Lukashenko's Belarus.

The Belarusian dictator, who is not cleared of the well-founded suspicion of having rigged the August 2020 presidential elections in his favor, is afraid of his population and of those who lead the opposition against his regime. Therefore, it follows the old methods of dictatorships, that is, it represses the street demonstrations with all brutality, creates a generalized situation of fear, and decapitates the organizational summit, the leadership that is capable of making the popular masses move. Lukashenko, who has been in power since 1994, did not go to KGB school like his protector Vladimir Putin, but that does not stop him from acting in "special operations" mode.

That is what he did, by forcibly and cunningly diverting the Ryanair commercial flight from Athens to the Lithuanian capital. The interception violated all international standards related to civil aviation safety. It was also a serious affront to the European Union because it was an air link between two Schengen capitals, and a total disregard for political asylum rules. But it allowed him to kidnap and put out of action an important activist in the fight for democracy in Belarus, the young journalist Roman Protasevich.

The political costs of this criminal act are high. The European Council was expeditious and unanimous in its condemnation and response. The airspace Lukashenko controls is no longer on the route for European flights - and not only that, as several Asian airlines have followed suit - and the national airline of Belarus will have to suspend its connections with destinations within the EU. Moreover, the economic sanctions will be extended.

Some will say that these kinds of penalties have little effect on a country that depends primarily on its relations with Russia. They also add that such measures will increase Lukashenko's political subordination to the Kremlin. It is hard not to recognize the merit of these remarks. Experience shows that sanctions against third countries do not lead to major political transformations, except when they directly hit the ruling clique and the sectors vital for the country's economic survival. It is not yet known which will be the new personalities and which activities will be added to the existing sanctions list. But in these matters, the symbolic dimension is equally important. The political and diplomatic isolation of Alexander Lukashenko, and his people, must be made very clear. It serves as a lever. It is up to the Belarusian democratic opposition to do the rest. 

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published yesterday in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

EU sanctions on Belarus

The European Union has prepared a list of about 40 Belarusian personalities close to Alexander Lukashenko – his name is not in the list – that would be subject to sanctions. The list should be approved this coming week. I will comment further on it as soon as I have seen it and the kind of sanctions that it includes. However, an initial reflection can be made right now. Sanctions are a straightforward way out. The experience has shown that the type of measures adopted ends up by having little impact on the situation. They do not lead to real change. And, in all truth, they hide the lack of political will to undertake a more proactive approach. In this case, I have not yet seen a single proposal that I can say “that’s a concrete way of helping the Belarusian people to solve the impasse”. The EU is not showing enough creative thinking.

Lukashenko must go

The people of Belarus had never occupied the centre of our European attention. For us, in the European Union, they were just a small nation at the outer periphery of our political space. We knew nothing about them. Now, they are at the centre of our admiration. They have shown, since the fraudulent early August elections, to be a very valiant people. They have been on the streets almost every day, to tell the dictator that enough is enough and that he should go. Men and women, lots of folks, some older people as well, everyone is ready to face the police repression because they want to be heard. This is no revolution pushed from outside the country. This is a genuine popular movement. I think that sooner the dictator will have to yield. The popular dislike is too obvious for him and his small group of supporters to be able to ignore it. And he cannot count of Vladimir Putin’s help. If this one comes to help – I hope he will not – he will get rid of him in any case. Putin knows that Lukashenko is politically finished.

Dealing with Vladimir Putin's regime

This is an AI translation of my opinion column of today, published in Lisbon by Diário de Notícias, a national newspaper

 

Beyond poison

Victor Angelo

 

The European Union's political relationship with the Russian Federation remains very nebulous and tense. It exploded again this week after the German announcement that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a chemical composition, banned by international law, but available in the Russian state arsenal.

Apart from Navalny, the impasse in Belarus, the renewed US pressure against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the recent statements by Sweden on military threats in the Baltic Sea, the arrest of a senior French officer accused of collaborating with Russian espionage, all reminded us in recent days that defining a European policy towards Vladimir Putin's regime is an urgent and complex matter. It must go beyond the current package of economic sanctions, which was approved following the invasion of Crimea in 2014. These sanctions, now in force until 2021, mainly concern financial transactions and the export of material that can be used in oil production and exploration or in military areas. They are strictly linked to the evolution of Russian intervention in Ukraine, including the Crimea, and not to the broader question of how to face and deal with today's Russia.

I recognize that the issue has been much discussed and remains on the agenda. Josep Borrell, in recently launching a process of reflection on security and defence, which he named "Strategic Compass", had this issue in mind. The problem is that Russia is viewed differently by the distinct EU member countries. In the Baltics or Poland, it is considered as the great external threat. This opinion fades as we move towards the Atlantic and move away from the East and the traumas of Soviet times.

The debate has revived with Vladimir Putin's return to the presidency in 2012. In the previous two years, in NATO and in the European institutions there was still some hope for a constructive and cooperative relationship between the two parties. Russian general officers were even invited at that time to participate in high-level operational command exercises of the Atlantic Alliance. There were also other attempts to define a new neighbourhood policy. I speak from my own experience. In one of them, in which I participated as a facilitator on a Swiss initiative, it became clear that Russian nationalist pride had been irresponsibly mistreated in the years following the end of the Cold War, and that Vladimir Putin's agenda would be to restore the country's international presence and present the bill to the West. A revanchist project.

The crisis in Ukraine and the subsequent annexation of the Crimea were part of the settlement. Since then, relations have entered a zigzagging phase, with a growing tendency for political and diplomatic confrontation. It became clear that Vladimir Putin wanted to undermine the EU from within, through selective diplomacy and actions of disinformation, propaganda and support for far-right political parties, as long as they had the disintegration of the European project as their flag. The illusion of a "restoration" of cooperation was a short-lived sun. But not everyone wants to see reality that way. Bulgaria, Czechia, as well as Greece and Hungary have, within the EU, a relatively favourable attitude towards the positions of the Kremlin. Others will be, to a certain extent, neutral and available for détente, as will be the case in Portugal. 

The definition of a common policy requires a clear and shared understanding of Vladimir Putin's intentions, of his strategic and personal interests. It begins by understanding that Russia is different from China. China is a competitor, in many areas, and needs an adequate competitive response. Russia under Putin is a hostile state and should be treated as such. No one wants to clash with a powerful and bellicose neighbour. But to ignore it would be a mistake. That is why it must be repeatedly reminded what rules and values must be respected, as well as limit interaction to a minimum, and personally sanction the country's main leaders. It is necessary to show the European population, and above all the Russian, that we consider their leaders to behave badly, in light of democratic practices and international law.

 

Europe meets on Belarus

The leaders of the European Union met today to discuss the situation in Belarus. They agreed that the presidential elections of 9 August were not credible and therefore the results announced by the country’s electoral authorities cannot be accepted. That is a good statement. But it is not enough. The leaders should have called for new elections to be held as soon as possible. They put a lot of emphasis on dialogue between the dictator and the opposition. That dialogue should be about the electoral process to be followed when organising new elections.

The leaders have also expressed support to the possible role the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) could play in Belarus. I found it a bit strange as we all know that this Vienna-based entity is in a crisis mode. All its key leadership positions are filled by officers-in-charge. They have no political clout to facilitate any dialogue in Belarus.

In the end, the most important thing the EU can do is to send a clear message to Alexander Lukashenko that his legitimacy is not recognised and personal responsibility for human rights violations will not be forgotten. Dictators love strong messages. Brussels must realise it.

Lukashenko is on his way out

 My crystal ball is out of order. Therefore, I cannot see what is next in Belarus. But I have looked at the pictures of the crowds that came to the streets every day since the election last Sunday. I have all seen the reports about today’s rally against the dictator, the fraudster Alexander Lukashenko. I concluded that he keeps losing ground, including within his administration and the police forces. People have shown a tremendous amount of courage. They are determined to get him out of power. He has lost the support of the factory workers, which he thought would keep their loyalty towards the regime and his person. He thinks he can count on the police and the army, plus the support coming from Russia. He might be wrong. My reading is that his position is very fragile. Any intervention coming from Putin’s side will make things worse. And Putin knows that as well.