The Chinese hope Europe will remain peaceful

China, Russia, peace in Europe and beyond

Victor Angelo

 

Yesterday I was in contact with a well-informed Chinese source living in Beijing. The main topic of discussion was the crisis in Ukraine, a subject that has not been highlighted in the Chinese press. The media is focused on the Winter Olympics, which are being held in an exemplary manner, and on the success of Chinese athletes who were born in the USA but chose to compete under the Chinese flag. The remaining space is devoted to Taiwan and the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Quad (United States, Australia, India, and Japan), taking place today in Melbourne, and which is seen as yet another attempt by the two Anglo-Saxon countries to create an alliance hostile to China. As for Europe, the only issue that Beijing seems to be concerned about remains Lithuania, because of the opening in that country of a commercial representation with the name of Taiwan inscribed on the façade.

During my videoconference, it became clear that China does not see any advantage in a possible armed conflict in Europe. For several reasons.

Firstly, because such a confrontation would quickly spiral out of control. It would eventually take on an extraordinary dimension, far beyond the Ukrainian borders. Second, because European markets contribute significantly to the prosperity of the Chinese economy. It is crucial that they continue to function without disruption. Xi Jinping's legitimacy rests in large part on continued rapid economic growth. Third, because the conflict would severely disrupt the movement of goods by rail, given that trains from China pass through a significant part of Russian territory before reaching European destinations. Fourth, because Poland would certainly be in the front line and would therefore be deeply destabilised at a time when Chinese decision-makers have decided to consider Poland as one of the most important logistical hubs from which overland deliveries will be routed to the rest of Europe. Fifth, because Ukraine is an important trading and agricultural partner of China - 80% of the corn imported by China comes from Ukrainian fields. Sixth, because the official Beijing narrative is based on the promotion of international peace, with China at the centre of the efforts for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and as one of the new pillars of the multilateral system. 

The reason for the absence of any reference to Ukraine in the joint communiqué that came out of the recent summit between Xi and Putin has also become clearer to me. The communiqué explicitly mentions NATO, which is, after all, the strategic alibi for Putin's manoeuvres, but ignores the Ukrainian crisis. A crisis which, moreover, goes against one of the basic principles of Chinese foreign policy, namely the inviolability of national borders. The Chinese do not look favourably on the annexation of Crimea or on the presence of Russian special troops in the Ukrainian region of Donbass, who are there to support the rebel groups. And they do not want this annexation to be compared to the Taiwan problem, which is presented as an internal Chinese issue.

The alliance between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin is based on a pragmatic, non-ideological vision, on the part of the Chinese. China imports Russian oil, gas, and other raw materials as it also needs to maintain good neighbourly relations. By way of example, note that Russia is China's second largest supplier of oil and coal, and the first, in terms of electricity. A significant part of the New Silk Road passes through Russian territory. On the other hand, Beijing is fully aware that Moscow will never again become the capital of a superpower, but only of a second-rate power. The real competition is with the United States of America. And to win that competition China needs, among other things, continued economic expansion, which depends to a large extent on the prevalence of a climate of peace in Russia, the rest of Europe and beyond.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 11 February 2022)

 

 

China is firing into many directions

Today’s text, translate through AI, published in the Portuguese newspaper Diário de Notícias (printed version)

 

The fragilities of a giant

Victor Angelo

 

The economic corridors that China is building through Myanmar and Pakistan are two pillars of the New Silk Road, the gigantic ambition that President Xi Jinping formulated after coming to power in 2012. Gigantic is, in fact, an inadequate adjectivization, even minuscule, given the enormity and complexity of this ambition. Moreover, the scale of the New Silk Road has caused anxieties in many circles of geopolitical decision making in Europe, America and Asia, and explains a good part of the feeling of disapproval, of even opposition, that now exists in relation to China. In politics, as in life, unreasonable ambition ends up being a source of great conflicts.

The China-Myanmar corridor is above all an investment in pipelines - about 800 kilometres - which have already been completed and which I had the opportunity to visit about a year ago. A complementary project is currently being planned, consisting of the construction of a railroad that will follow the route of the oil and gas pipelines from the Burmese sea coast in the Gulf of Bengal to Kunming, the capital of Chinese province of Yunnan. This infrastructure is intended to facilitate China's oil imports, avoiding the long and dangerous route through the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. Oil and gas will come from the Middle East and Africa. The railway will be part of the link, which will continue by sea, between China, Mombasa and Djibouti, two ports of great strategic importance, both as points of entry into Africa and as bases for the transit of goods to Europe. Djibouti also offers an exceptional location for the protection of navigation between the East and Europe.  Chinese, Americans, French, Japanese, Indians, and others all want to have a military presence in Djibouti. China is the only power that combines in this territory defence with economic infrastructures.

Returning to the corridor that crosses Myanmar, I noticed that the large Chinese oil, gas, and public works companies have the green light from the Burmese military and Aung San Suu Kyi's civilian government. They also consider that it is up to the Myanmar authorities to deal with the fate of the communities affected by the projects. The problem is that no one has explained anything to the people or promised any compensation for expropriations and other losses. The result, for now, as I have personally seen, is the growing hostility of different Burmese communities against the Chinese. Later, the very security of the projects may be at risk.

The Pakistani corridor is presented as the flagship in the New Silk Road universe. It begins in the Chinese region of Xinjiang and ends in the Pakistani port of Gwadar in the Indian Ocean, close to the entrance to the strategic Gulf of Oman. I did not visit this Pharaonic undertaking - an investment of US$87 billion to finance roads, railroads, power plants and special economic zones. But I see that the intention is clear. China is helping Pakistan modernize communications, power generation, industrial, and port infrastructure. In return, it has direct access to the Indian Ocean and several free zones, where it can count on Pakistan's abundant and cheap labour. It also reinforces the political and military power of a key ally in its growing rivalry with India. I know that here too, as in Myanmar and other countries where the Chinese have large-scale investment, there is the problem of acquiescence or hostility of the populations. China is seen as an ally of the regime and the regime is seen as extraneous to the interests of the people. We have again the fragility mentioned above.

There are, however, those in China who are aware of these things and know that agreements with regimes of dubious legitimacy have feet of clay. Some think tanks have already begun to debate the impact of megaprojects on affected communities in Asia and Africa, as well as the disconnect that exists between political leaders in host countries, who are in favour of Chinese penetration, and the populations, who consider their politicians to be the main beneficiaries of the investments in question. I have been surprised at the frankness of certain interventions by Chinese academics. A monolithic China, yes, but with some subtlety of tone. 

 

 

Japan and the EU, on the same side

I am not sure that Friday afternoon is a good time for great political moves. At least, from the perspective of public information and support. The weekend is around the corner and the media tend to go slow. If they mention the action, it will be in a lazy line that gets lost fast. On Monday, it is already an old story. And it would have been overtaken by events happening during the weekly break.

The deal signed on Friday between the President of the European Commission and the Prime Minister of Japan seems to have fallen into this trap. Jean-Claude Juncker and Shinzo Abe put their signature of approval on an ambitious agreement that will see both sides cooperating in different parts of the developing world, including in the Balkans and other countries of Europe outside the EU, to build infrastructure and promoting digital industries. A lot of emphasis will be placed on thorough development projects, sustainability, transparency, national ownership and partnerships with the recipient countries and the appropriate multilateral organisations.

They called it a connectivity partnership between the EU and Japan. It can work, if we consider these are two of the largest economies. Together, they represent over 23 trillion US dollars of GDP, which is larger than the US ($21 trillion). And much bigger than China (USD 9.2 trillion).

The point is about politics. Both sides must make this cooperation a priority when dealing with developing nations. And they will be competing with China’s offer, the fast-moving Belt and Road Initiative. That will not be an easy competition. The Chinese leadership are deeply invested in the Initiative. To compete, the Europeans and the Japanese have no choice but to insist on projects that have the support of the populations – not just of the political leaders in the concerned countries – and are financially sound and proper. These are no technical or money matters. They are about strategic political engagements.