Notes about the election of the new United Nations Secretary-General

 

The choice of the next Secretary-General could decide the UN’s fate

The Elders Foundation

38,221 followers

May 1, 2026

Dear friends,

More than two months since the US and Israel began their illegal attacks on Iran, the fallout continues to be felt globally. As peace talks continue to stall, maritime traffic remains blocked in the Strait of Hormuz, and global energy markets show no signs of stabilising. The United Nations Secretary-General might be expected to play a critical role in resolving such a conflict, yet the diminishing scope for political leadership by the UN in recent years has made this impossible.

In January, the UN will welcome a new Secretary-General. This is not a routine appointment, but one with existential implications. Who member states choose to lead the UN will play a crucial role in shaping its future. As emerging candidates come under scrutiny following their participation in online interactive dialogues last month, we must ask: what kind of leadership does the world demand at this moment?

First and foremost, the successful candidate must possess the personal qualities needed to restore the UN’s credible leadership on the world stage. They should serve as a moral anchor, with the political courage and strategic clarity required to speak truth to power. This means acting independently – not constrained by political caution or beholden to the governments they are meant to hold to account. They must have the courage to take principled positions, even when they are unpopular.

In today’s world, this may all sound rather naïve. But a UN without an empowered Secretary-General is a UN that cannot fulfil its primary purpose: to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. It is a UN that becomes increasingly irrelevant in a violent and chaotic "might is right" world.

It is for all UN member states to choose a Secretary-General, not just the permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly must make full use of its leverage in the appointment of a recommended candidate, including the prerogative to reject a recommendation.

For eight decades, the office has been held by men. The gender imbalance at the top of the UN is undeniable, but addressing it must go beyond symbolism. What is needed is a transparent, merit-based process that selects a credible, independent and globally respected leader – chosen not on gender alone.

There is no escaping the scale of the task ahead. Trygve Lie, the first UN Secretary-General, described it as ‘the most impossible job in the world’. Today, it is harder still.

As Elders, we will not intervene publicly on behalf of any individual candidate. However, we will continue to advocate for courageous leadership to address shared existential threats, and we are looking forward, as a group, to support the next Secretary-General in her work.

With thanks for your ongoing support,

Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein

My critique:

While Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein’s letter for The Elders presents itself as a clarion call for principled leadership, a severe critique reveals it to be a masterclass in "lofty impotence." It relies on a series of romanticized platitudes that ignore the brutal realpolitik of the United Nations, offering a vision that is functionally disconnected from how power is actually exercised in 2026.

Here is a my critique of the text’s core failings:

1. The Fallacy of the "Moral Anchor"

The text demands a Secretary-General (SG) who acts as a "moral anchor" with the "courage to speak truth to power."

• The Critique: This is a category error. The SG is not a secular Pope; they are the "Chief Administrative Officer" of a body composed of sovereign states. Zeid’s demand for an "independent" leader ignores the fact that any candidate who actually demonstrated the "political courage" to regularly offend the P5 (US, Russia, China, UK, France) during the selection process would be vetoed instantly. By advocating for a leader who is "not beholden to governments," The Elders are essentially advocating for a candidate who cannot be elected.

2. Strategic Naivety Regarding the P5

Zeid admits that his vision might sound "naïve," yet he proceeds to double down on that naivety.

• The Critique: The text frames the diminishing scope of UN leadership as a failure of "personal qualities." It fails to mention the structural reality: the UN’s paralysis is not a lack of SG "courage," but the result of the veto power and the active hostility of Great Powers toward multilateralism. Suggesting that a "credible leader" can simply bypass the "might is right" world through sheer force of personality is a dangerous simplification that misleads the public about where the actual bottleneck lies.

3. The Empty Threat of the General Assembly

The letter urges the General Assembly (GA) to use its "leverage" to reject a Security Council recommendation.

• The Critique: This is a hollow revolutionary posture. In the 80-year history of the UN, the GA has never rejected a Security Council nominee for SG. Why? Because the GA is not a monolith; it is composed of states that are themselves beholden to the P5 through aid, trade, and security pacts. Promoting the "prerogative to reject" without a viable strategy for how 193 disparate nations would survive the ensuing constitutional crisis is irresponsible "activism-lite."

4. Gender Symbolism vs. Reality

The text argues that addressing the gender imbalance must "go beyond symbolism" but then fails to provide any concrete mechanism for how to achieve this while maintaining a "merit-based" process.

• The Critique: By stating the leader should be "chosen not on gender alone," while simultaneously noting that the office has only been held by men, the text enters a rhetorical loop. It avoids taking a hard stand (e.g., "The next SG must be a woman") to remain "principled," yet by doing so, it effectively permits the status quo to continue under the guise of "merit," which has historically been defined by the very male-dominated governments the text claims to hold to account.

5. Institutional Paternalism

As a group of "former" leaders, The Elders occupy a position of consequence-free moralizing.

• The Critique: The letter is steeped in the paternalistic tone of retired elites. Zeid writes that The Elders will "support the next Secretary-General in her work" (notably using the feminine pronoun to signal virtue), yet they refuse to "intervene publicly on behalf of any individual." This allows the group to maintain its "moral high ground" without actually expending any political capital or taking the risk of backing a specific reformer who might actually change the system.

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The text is a diplomatic comfort blanket. It makes the reader feel that "principled leadership" is just one good appointment away, while carefully avoiding the "holy cows" of the UN Charter (like the Veto) that are the true source of the organization's existential threat. It is a document that demands everything and risks nothing.

How do you think a candidate would react to being told they must be a "moral anchor" while simultaneously needing to secure the vote of a Trump-led US or a Xi-led China?

The Straits and the competition between USA and China

 

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Hormuz, Malacca, and the Straits of Power

By Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published: 30 April 2026

There are places on maps that, in times of peace, seem like mere details—curiosities. Yet, when rivalry between great powers intensifies, these details become strategic. The Straits of Malacca and Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb (the Red Sea), and the Indian Ocean routes are now at the heart of global politics: it is through these passages that the economy flows—and it is there that Washington and Beijing test the limits of their competition.

American foreign policy has revealed an emerging pattern: an increasing focus on so-called ‘choke points’—the maritime passages through which energy, commodities, and influence circulate. Control over these points projects both force and deterrence. Consider Hormuz. The figures speak for themselves: the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that, by 2025, over 20 million barrels per day will have transited the strait—approximately a quarter of the world’s maritime oil trade.

For the United States, a robust presence in these corridors is not merely about maritime security; it is also a means of protecting its vital interests in the event of a severe crisis.

This is why the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ remains a strategic obsession for Beijing. China depends heavily on maritime routes that traverse this narrow, congested corridor, which is difficult to replace without colossal costs—precisely the type of vulnerability any state seeks to reduce when anticipating a prolonged period of competition.

The Strait of Malacca, though exceedingly long, is only a few kilometres wide at its narrowest point. From an energy perspective, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) classifies Malacca as a vital choke point: in the first half of 2025, an estimated 23 million barrels of oil per day will have transited the strait. It is this volume—and the immense difficulty of diverting shipping to more expensive alternatives through more treacherous seas south of Indonesia (the Sunda and Lombok waters)—that makes Malacca a national security priority for China and several Asian states.

And it is not merely energy. It is also the container ships, carrying every conceivable type of cargo, and the infrastructure of telecommunications. The Strait of Malacca is a critical corridor for digital connectivity, possessing a high density of subsea cables that link Asia to a significant portion of the globe.

In this context, the agreements and joint exercises between the United States and Indonesia gain a special significance. For Washington, Indonesia is crucial because it sits at the hinge between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, and its territory defines one side of the strait. For Jakarta, cooperation with the US is useful: it bolsters capabilities, signals autonomy, and helps manage frictions with China—including recurring incidents in border waters—without abandoning its tradition of non-alignment.

The Chinese response to all of this has been simultaneously maritime and continental.

The growth of the Chinese Navy—now the world’s largest by number of vessels—follows a simple logic: if trade is conducted primarily by sea, then national security must also be sea-based. Hence the investment in the naval sector, in the capacity to operate further from its shores, and in port partnerships that, even when presented as commercial, may have military utility in crisis scenarios.

The ‘New Silk Road’ reinforces this strategy: it multiplies connections with the outside world. Projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, logistical links through Myanmar, and the pursuit of navigation through the Arctic in coordination with Russia seek to create exits that circumvent Malacca and reduce exposure to the control of rival powers. Furthermore, on the technological level, Chinese dominance in critical segments of certain value chains—for example, in the processing and refining of rare earths, where it remains globally dominant—functions as an instrument of leverage to prevent extreme situations and the risk of shocks.

The result is a rivalry that leaves less and less room for naivety—and which turns the straits into the strongholds of the geopolitical chessboard.

There is, however, a global legal framework worth recalling: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the principle of freedom of navigation. This framework regulates transit through straits used for international navigation and limits arbitrary interference. Rules do not eliminate rivalry, but they increase the political, economic, and reputational costs when restrictions lack acceptable justification.

Summit diplomacy, however theatrical it may seem, matters. The White House has signalled that Donald Trump is slated to visit Beijing in mid-May to meet with Xi Jinping. The meeting will not change geography, but it may help clarify ‘red lines’ and reduce the risk of misunderstandings in an environment where the temptation to ‘test’ the other to the limit is constant. Trump’s trip serves as a test: not of the end of competition, but of the will to define its boundaries. In an interdependent world, the stability of routes is a common interest—even when the rivalry is structural.

If Washington and Beijing transform the straits—and commercial interdependencies—into instruments of permanent pressure, international relations will enter a far more dangerous phase: that of generalised insecurity. In such a scenario, the concern with deterrence becomes a daily occurrence. A miscalculation will, inevitably, be more likely and certainly catastrophic.

The dangerous leader

 

Why the "Natural-Born" Leader is More Dangerous 

From my perspective, the danger lies in the unpredictability of the human ego:

• Irrationality: Unlike an economic system, which follows a certain (albeit flawed) logic, a Nero or Caligula might start a war simply to dominate a news cycle or to avenge a perceived personal slight.

• The "Messiah" Complex: Leaders like Trump or Putin often present themselves as the only ones who can fix the world. This makes them immune to rational advice or institutional checks, as we saw in the Nero analogy.

• The Zero-Sum Game: For these leaders, power is a performance where there can only be one star. This makes "win-win" diplomacy almost impossible.

Some notes about the USA-Iran conflict and political praxis

 

USA-Iran: The Escalation, the Political Game, and the Possible Way Out

Victor Ângelo

International Security Adviser. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published on: 24 Apr 2026, 01:24

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Constantly promoted by television channels and other media outlets—including digital platforms—the political spectacle functions like a fast-acting drug: it stimulates and excites, but it does not nourish; it promises a cure, but it does not treat the disease. Then, once the adrenaline subsides, the nagging question returns: where are the results? In everyday life, what remains are the exorbitant costs of fuel, healthcare, housing, and everything else, coupled with a growing sense of insecurity.

Once the effect wears off, everything remains the same—or worse. Over time, the circus ends up turning the spectator against the political actors, who fail to produce results, and against the commentators, who change their predictions as often as they change their shirts. This is politics made for the camera: the essential thing is to remain visible, at the centre of the arena.

When results fail to materialise, the strategy usually shifts: either a flurry of reforms is announced (in a "make-believe" style), or polarisation is increased and an enemy is sought to shoulder all the blame. The spectacle can mobilise crowds; it can even win elections. But it is concrete results that sustain power and, for a time, guarantee social peace.

Alternatively, to remain in power, the sinister leader attempts to destroy—or at least weaken—the institutions that sustain democratic regimes. If he is a fascist, he seeks to capture them, subjugate them, and render them entirely obedient. If he is a populist, the objective is more elementary: to reduce the capacity for oversight and scrutiny, to eliminate the checks and balances. From that point on, he rules as he pleases.

Nero, an erratic emperor, obsessively cultivated popular adulation and a cult of personality. He projected himself as a divine figure—from Apollo to the Sun—and ruled almost always in confrontation with the Senate. Trump cannot go quite so far in a system with the separation of powers and a pluralistic press. However, he has attempted to push the boundaries: minimising the role of Congress, pressuring the judiciary, attacking Democratic governors, and attempting to condition the media and social platforms. And, when convenient, he returns to the old expedient of external military operations: projecting force, dominating the news cycle, and galvanising fringes of the electorate.

Lacking results that improve the daily lives of families, he attacks the foundations of democracy and exploits nationalism: the USA is presented as the number one power on the international stage. All this is done as the electoral calendar tightens: the mid-term elections of 3 November are approaching. On that day, control of the Senate and the House of Representatives, several governorships, and other positions will be at stake. In practice, it is Donald Trump’s own power that is on the ballot. And the signs, in general, are not in his favour. Hence the urgency to contain—and, ideally, end—the escalation with Iran before it takes on a life of its own.

How will this escalation evolve, and what is the possible way out—a way out that avoids a significant electoral setback? This, I believe, is the central question, at a time when the possibility of a second round of contacts between the parties in Islamabad is once again circulating.

The answer—an agreement in Islamabad, yes or no?—does not depend on a single variable. I would summarise it as follows: Hormuz, the nuclear issue, the future of Iranian domestic politics, and, finally, the Israeli factor (with the particular weight of Netanyahu’s unacceptable hardline stance). A minimally viable understanding would have to lower the temperature in the Strait, stabilise the nuclear dossier, and create de-escalation channels that function away from the cameras and the major headlines—and not merely in communiqués for international consumption.

It would be a massive error if the authorities in Tehran concluded that it is not worth sitting down again with an American delegation. The list of Washington’s demands is known—maximalist, at the very limit of what Tehran can accept without losing domestic authority—and the Iranian position on each of these conditions is also known. Nevertheless, it is plausible that a meeting, even without formal "negotiations", could prevent a return to large-scale hostilities and allow other actors to continue the diplomatic work already underway—from China to Turkey, not forgetting Pakistan (a close ally of Beijing)—as well as in various Asian and Gulf countries.

China and Pakistan appear to be pressuring Tehran to ensure that this new round of contacts—it is too early to call them "negotiations"—happens now or in the near future.

Both sides would have something to gain from a limited agreement. For Washington, the advantage is obvious: halting an escalatory dynamic that, besides being dangerous on the ground, increases the risk of violations of International Humanitarian Law and further degrades its image in the region and Southeast Asia. And, let us be honest, the American image today is often viewed through two filters: the temptation of "muscle" and the automatic alignment with the Israeli leadership.

For Tehran, the calculation is equally clear: avoiding economic collapse and not falling into the trap of a war of reprisals against oil and natural gas installations—and against the ports of neighbouring Gulf states, where a single incident is enough to set everything ablaze.

This is a crisis that needs to be halted quickly. Under normal conditions, it would be a matter for the UN Security Council. We live, however, in a world where the great powers choose, à la carte, which precepts of International Law they take seriously.

Nevertheless, a combination of efforts of a new type—China, India, and the European Union, with a couple of countries from the South (Pakistan and Indonesia, for example)—could, in my view, make the difference where the UN is paralysed: maintaining permanent channels of contact, securing the acceptance of minimally verifiable ceasefire measures, and designing a pragmatic roadmap for Hormuz and the nuclear dossier. It is this type of diplomatic work that averts disasters. It is essential.