Showing posts with label mediation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label mediation. Show all posts

Friday, 19 June 2026

Russia and Ukraine: War or Diplomacy?

 

G7 and Ukraine: More War or Investing in Diplomacy?

Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published on: 19 Jun 2026

The 2026 G7 summit in Évian once again placed Ukraine at the centre of the agenda. And it followed, essentially, a line already known since 2022: the reaffirmation of support for Kyiv, the condemnation of the Russian Federation, and promises of more weaponry. But this time, the final declaration sounded more like a ritual than a strategy. It was reduced to vague phrases. Behind the façade of cohesion, sanctions, and military commitments, the central question remained unanswered: how to transform support for Ukraine into a strategy that leads to the end of the brutal Russian aggression?

The leaders present praised Ukrainian resilience and promised to bolster arms production, vital for Ukraine's defence, especially air defence. However, the absence of a serious commitment to diplomacy was glaring. A clear statement was missing: peace is not merely a strategic necessity. Diplomacy is the only way out to prevent the situation from worsening and to revive hope in International Law and multilateral mechanisms.

Continuing the conflict indefinitely benefits no one. It drains resources that should be allocated to other urgent challenges and entails tragic human costs, alongside growing material expenditures that are increasingly difficult to mobilize.

The Toll on Nations

  • For Ukraine: It is, above all, a threat to the very survival of the State. Each additional day of aggression means a further shattered economy, newly destroyed civilian infrastructure, and less tax revenue to sustain basic services—not to mention the most intolerable cost of all: the continuous loss of human lives. The longer the war drags on, the more difficult the rebuilding of the country becomes.

  • For Russia: The continuation of its mistake exacerbates the erosion of its economy and society. The flight of skilled professionals and capital, technological shortages, and the rest, are all hidden behind a "war economy" whose logic is imperialist in nature. Ultimately, it is about ensuring the regime's survival, not the country's security. Industries and services linked to the war and the militarization of the economy have become the engines of GDP and employment. And Russian human losses are incalculable.

  • For Europe: The cost is not abstract. The conflict has exposed our external dependencies regarding energy, cybernetics, security, and defence. And it is causing increasing budgetary pressure. Financing our sovereignty and supporting Ukraine's legitimate defence does not come cheap. Extraordinary funds must be found, competing with other priorities, while instability and inflation fuel a growing political fatigue. It is this fatigue that threatens to test the Western bloc's cohesion in the coming years—especially if public opinion begins to ask, quite rightly, what the plans and the timetable are.

The Risk of Escalation

There is yet another cost that rarely enters this accounting: the risk of an uncontrollable escalation. The longer the war drags on, the greater the likelihood of an isolated incident—a disproportionate response—dragging other actors into the conflict. It is precisely this risk that has been exposed in recent days.

While the Évian summit was taking place, a Russian frigate fired warning shots at a British yacht crossing the English Channel. The motive should not be dramatized—the vessel was sailing at a short distance from the frigate, and the shots can be justified as a warning signal to navigation. What matters is the symbolic significance. The incident with the frigate, which is navigating those waters in a back-and-forth manoeuvre intended to provide military protection to the phantom tankers seeking to bypass sanctions, highlights that the Russian frontline can easily expand to Western Europe.

Beyond the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Arctic, the English Channel has become one of the most sensitive points of strategic friction between the West and Russia. It is the most congested maritime highway on the planet, where any Russian military manoeuvre inevitably intersects with civilian traffic. It now receives coordinated attention from the British and French navies, as well as NATO's naval deployments—but a miscalculation carries a high level of probability. In recent months, alongside NATO, the British and French navies have escalated their alert levels in the Channel in the face of Moscow's provocations: espionage by the Yantar ship in November, submarines in April, and the interception of vessels from the Russian phantom tanker fleet.

The Crossroads

Doubt remains as to whether the summit recognized that the Russian war in Ukraine has reached a crossroads: either it gives way to a negotiation process or it enters a spiral, a self-sustaining cycle where each side interprets the other's actions as a justification to escalate its own response.

Defending peace cannot mean Ukraine's capitulation, nor accepting a vague armistice that would merely freeze the aggression today until an inevitable new Russian invasion tomorrow. Rather, it demands the political courage to create the conditions for a verifiable ceasefire, with security guarantees, international monitoring mechanisms, and a political process capable of leading to a lasting peace.

This mechanism should function as an antechamber for genuine multilateral mediation. For this to be possible, we must articulate a narrative that has hitherto not existed—the clear guarantee that this is not about deciding Russia's internal destiny, but rather about reaffirming the primacy of International Law as the foundation of relations between States.

I must reiterate that diplomacy remains the only alternative to achieve peace. Therefore, I highlight the memorandum of understanding signed this Wednesday between the United States and Iran. It is a positive example, even bearing in mind that its implementation faces a minefield of obstacles:

  • The ambiguous dimension of some points in the memorandum;

  • US political instability;

  • The interests of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which blatantly profits from the parallel economy created by the sanctions and resists any opening;

  • The opposition of regional powers such as Israel, a country that views any concession to Iran as an existential threat.

But the memorandum and the negotiations that ought to follow can be seen as an example by the conflicting parties in Ukraine. Namely, they remind us that time is of the essence: without a concrete plan—a UN mandate, a verification mission, a reconstruction fund, and a timetable for negotiations—we risk perpetuating a conflict that no one can endure indefinitely.

Saturday, 13 June 2026

Singapore could be the right place for a mediation between Russia and Ukraine

 The Russian war against Ukraine requires mediation beyond the Euro‑Atlantic framework

Victor Ângelo


Volodymyr Zelensky’s long open letter to Vladimir Putin on 4 June was not a conventional diplomatic initiative. It was another move in a hybrid war with no end in sight. By publicly calling for a ceasefire at the precise moment when Russia’s economic elite and figures from the Global South were meeting in St Petersburg, the Ukrainian president’s primary aim was not to persuade the Kremlin — and it was revealing that he published the letter before delivering it to its addressee, a gesture openly criticised by Putin’s inner circle. Zelensky sought to exploit visible tensions within the Russian system and to remind the international community that Kyiv continues to take the initiative while Moscow remains mired in a devastating war of attrition.


As a political gesture, Zelensky scored points. He again showed that Putin is more concerned with protecting his image and person than with the fate of his people. But wars on this scale do not end because an aggressor suddenly rediscovers the virtues of moderation. They end when military pressure, economic hardship and political isolation reduce the benefits of escalation and compel serious negotiation. The question is not whether Zelensky’s letter was timely. The question is how to turn pressure and stalemate into a mediation process that is not merely a delaying tactic.


In theory, that mediatory role belongs to the United Nations, which in practice has little or no capacity to alter the political calculations of a permanent member of the Security Council.


The alternatives display equally evident limits. Geneva, one of the locations proposed by Zelensky, has its neutrality challenged by Moscow because of Switzerland’s alignment with EU positions. Gulf states are preoccupied with the crises now besetting the Middle East. Turkey — whose mediation capacities were demonstrated in the Istanbul process of March 2022, when negotiations came closest to a result before collapsing — is a NATO member, a geopolitical space the conflict has already outgrown. India has strategic weight but lacks impartiality. New Delhi has consistently shown greater interest in preserving strategic ambiguity than in applying real pressure on Moscow, not least because it has significantly increased imports of Russian oil and purchases of military equipment and components for the development of its civil nuclear energy sector.


A credible host must satisfy four criteria simultaneously. First, political acceptability: it must be accepted, above all, by Moscow and Kyiv, and have political credibility in Washington and Beijing.


Second, legal latitude: the decisions of the International Criminal Court (ICC) cannot be ignored. The host country must provide a clear legal basis to receive senior Russian representatives without undermining the accountability framework the ICC defends.


Third, technical competence: extraordinarily complex issues are at stake — sanctions, frozen assets, security guarantees, reconstruction financing, energy corridors. Peace processes do not fail for want of rhetoric; they fail because guarantees are vague and violations go unsanctioned.


Fourth, structural discretion: public negotiations are fruitless. A host that cannot protect the confidentiality of working sessions will render the process impossible before it begins.


In light of these criteria, I look to Singapore and judge that it deserves more attention than it has received — but the argument requires precision, not mere faith. The country possesses a rare set of institutional conditions that make it a plausible — if not obvious — candidate to coordinate an international mediation.


Indeed, in terms of political acceptability, Singapore simultaneously maintains a strategic partnership with the United States and counts China as its largest trading partner, with decades of functional relations that include discreet channels of communication between Beijing and Western actors. This dual interdependence reveals a substantial capacity to act as a credible interlocutor.


Regarding the ICC, Singapore is not a State party to the Rome Statute. It could also suspend its own sanctions on Russia as an incentive to participate, without compromising the broader architecture of Western sanctions. And it could negotiate with Moscow to be removed from the Kremlin’s list of “hostile countries”. A process of this kind would require concessions that may at first seem unimaginable, but perhaps are not. Curiously, Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lawrence Wong, will visit the Russian city of Kazan next week as part of a Russia–ASEAN summit and will meet Vladimir Putin.


Singapore is one of the world’s major financial and international arbitration centres, with institutional capacity to deal with the most complex aspects of any peace process. Its record also shows it can manage confidentiality, logistics and security for high‑risk events — with exemplary diplomatic professionalism.


Just as Paris, Oslo or Doha became venues for diplomatic processes that transcended their geographic scale, the effectiveness of mediation often depends more on the conditions a host can offer than on its military or geopolitical weight. Singapore would remove the process from the fraught Euro‑Atlantic frame and rewrite it within a genuinely multilateral context.


Intellectual honesty requires recognising the limits. No country can force Russia to negotiate. Mediation will only begin when the Kremlin concludes that prolonging the aggression has become politically and economically unsustainable, and a military disaster. That moment may not be near. But it will come, and it is important to have a prepared and competent diplomatic architecture to initiate mediation.


Singapore would still have to accept the role. Washington, Beijing and other capitals should discuss the option and discreetly sound out the country’s political willingness, as well as the receptivity of Moscow and Kyiv. This mediation, when it occurs, must be handled with great circumspection and originality.

(Published in Portuguese in Diário de Notícias on 12/06/2026)

Friday, 24 April 2026

Some notes about the USA-Iran conflict and political praxis

 

USA-Iran: The Escalation, the Political Game, and the Possible Way Out

Victor Ângelo


International Security Adviser. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published on: 24 Apr 2026, 01:24



Constantly promoted by television channels and other media outlets—including digital platforms—the political spectacle functions like a fast-acting drug: it stimulates and excites, but it does not nourish; it promises a cure, but it does not treat the disease. Then, once the adrenaline subsides, the nagging question returns: where are the results? In everyday life, what remains are the exorbitant costs of fuel, healthcare, housing, and everything else, coupled with a growing sense of insecurity.

Once the effect wears off, everything remains the same—or worse. Over time, the circus ends up turning the spectator against the political actors, who fail to produce results, and against the commentators, who change their predictions as often as they change their shirts. This is politics made for the camera: the essential thing is to remain visible, at the centre of the arena.

When results fail to materialise, the strategy usually shifts: either a flurry of reforms is announced (in a "make-believe" style), or polarisation is increased and an enemy is sought to shoulder all the blame. The spectacle can mobilise crowds; it can even win elections. But it is concrete results that sustain power and, for a time, guarantee social peace.

Alternatively, to remain in power, the sinister leader attempts to destroy—or at least weaken—the institutions that sustain democratic regimes. If he is a fascist, he seeks to capture them, subjugate them, and render them entirely obedient. If he is a populist, the objective is more elementary: to reduce the capacity for oversight and scrutiny, to eliminate the checks and balances. From that point on, he rules as he pleases.

Nero, an erratic emperor, obsessively cultivated popular adulation and a cult of personality. He projected himself as a divine figure—from Apollo to the Sun—and ruled almost always in confrontation with the Senate. Trump cannot go quite so far in a system with the separation of powers and a pluralistic press. However, he has attempted to push the boundaries: minimising the role of Congress, pressuring the judiciary, attacking Democratic governors, and attempting to condition the media and social platforms. And, when convenient, he returns to the old expedient of external military operations: projecting force, dominating the news cycle, and galvanising fringes of the electorate.

Lacking results that improve the daily lives of families, he attacks the foundations of democracy and exploits nationalism: the USA is presented as the number one power on the international stage. All this is done as the electoral calendar tightens: the mid-term elections of 3 November are approaching. On that day, control of the Senate and the House of Representatives, several governorships, and other positions will be at stake. In practice, it is Donald Trump’s own power that is on the ballot. And the signs, in general, are not in his favour. Hence the urgency to contain—and, ideally, end—the escalation with Iran before it takes on a life of its own.

How will this escalation evolve, and what is the possible way out—a way out that avoids a significant electoral setback? This, I believe, is the central question, at a time when the possibility of a second round of contacts between the parties in Islamabad is once again circulating.

The answer—an agreement in Islamabad, yes or no?—does not depend on a single variable. I would summarise it as follows: Hormuz, the nuclear issue, the future of Iranian domestic politics, and, finally, the Israeli factor (with the particular weight of Netanyahu’s unacceptable hardline stance). A minimally viable understanding would have to lower the temperature in the Strait, stabilise the nuclear dossier, and create de-escalation channels that function away from the cameras and the major headlines—and not merely in communiqués for international consumption.

It would be a massive error if the authorities in Tehran concluded that it is not worth sitting down again with an American delegation. The list of Washington’s demands is known—maximalist, at the very limit of what Tehran can accept without losing domestic authority—and the Iranian position on each of these conditions is also known. Nevertheless, it is plausible that a meeting, even without formal "negotiations", could prevent a return to large-scale hostilities and allow other actors to continue the diplomatic work already underway—from China to Turkey, not forgetting Pakistan (a close ally of Beijing)—as well as in various Asian and Gulf countries.

China and Pakistan appear to be pressuring Tehran to ensure that this new round of contacts—it is too early to call them "negotiations"—happens now or in the near future.

Both sides would have something to gain from a limited agreement. For Washington, the advantage is obvious: halting an escalatory dynamic that, besides being dangerous on the ground, increases the risk of violations of International Humanitarian Law and further degrades its image in the region and Southeast Asia. And, let us be honest, the American image today is often viewed through two filters: the temptation of "muscle" and the automatic alignment with the Israeli leadership.

For Tehran, the calculation is equally clear: avoiding economic collapse and not falling into the trap of a war of reprisals against oil and natural gas installations—and against the ports of neighbouring Gulf states, where a single incident is enough to set everything ablaze.

This is a crisis that needs to be halted quickly. Under normal conditions, it would be a matter for the UN Security Council. We live, however, in a world where the great powers choose, à la carte, which precepts of International Law they take seriously.

Nevertheless, a combination of efforts of a new type—China, India, and the European Union, with a couple of countries from the South (Pakistan and Indonesia, for example)—could, in my view, make the difference where the UN is paralysed: maintaining permanent channels of contact, securing the acceptance of minimally verifiable ceasefire measures, and designing a pragmatic roadmap for Hormuz and the nuclear dossier. It is this type of diplomatic work that averts disasters. It is essential.

Monday, 7 March 2022

Talking of mediation: who could it be?

Vladimir Putin's Pandora's box

Victor Angelo

 

The last two years have been exceptional times of great concern at the global level. The truth is that we were not prepared to face challenges of this magnitude and that were added to the very complex - and vital - problem of climate change.

First was the pandemic, which remains a huge challenge, especially for countries with fewer resources and extremely fragile public health systems.

With this backdrop still part of our horizon, a second factor of enormous instability has now emerged and which, like Covid-19, should contribute to reconfiguring the future of our societies and international relations. This factor has its point of origin in Vladimir Putin's inexplicable, anachronistic, and illegal decision to declare war on the people of Ukraine.

The Russian dictator has opened a Pandora's box. One must be aware of this. And now even hope seems to have come out of the box and to be drifting. Russia's own foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, who is now visibly behaving like a lackey of his master, has himself added fuel to the collective sense of anxiety. On Wednesday, speaking of the sanctions that have been imposed on his country, the minister said that the response could be a third world war. And he stressed that it would be "a devastating nuclear war".

Many will think that this is just talk, to raise the stakes, that is, to get Ukraine destroyed and guard the rubble, put pressure on the West, gain strategic weight and avoid a new wave of sanctions.

I for one am one of those who take these bravadoes very seriously. The measures taken against Putin and the circles that support his power are extraordinarily far-reaching, close to a declaration of hostilities. The impact in the areas of the economy, finance and domestic policy will be enormous. In the face of this, the Kremlin's response may be economic, beyond bans on the use of airspace, the transit of goods from China, visas, etc. But I fear that Putin does not consider such retaliation sufficient. He may want to show that Russia is not playing softly, that it is neither Iran nor Venezuela.

As I have written here before, we have reached a very dangerous turning point.

The only reasonable solution would be a diplomatic effort of good offices - understanding that a solution needs to be found that guarantees Ukraine's independence, but also accepting that there is much more at stake than that. The UN and its Secretary-General should be the key players in this initiative. It is part of their remit, and they should dare. But I don't see a chance, Putin would not accept such mediation. For him, the UN is just a secretariat, a structure at the service of the states, but without equal status and below them. And Guterres is now presented in Moscow as an agent of the Americans. 

Mediation would have to be undertaken by a state accepted by all the parties. If the issue were only between Russia and Ukraine, I think the possibility that China could play that role should not be ruled out. Even taking into account that the Chinese anti-American rhetoric has escalated in the last two or three days. Today, given the complexity of the crisis, it would be preferable for mediation to be done by a tandem, or even a triumvirate, of countries. For example, China, France and another country that has the confidence of Europeans and Americans but is independent from NATO and outside the European arena. What might that be?

Having said this, I would like to make it clear that I do not have much faith in the possibility of mediation. I would prefer a palace coup. That might be the solution. But officially we must insist on the diplomatic route. The crossroads we are at is very clear: either there is diplomacy or there is a strong possibility of large-scale confrontation, suffering and chaos. It is up to each one to take responsibility for their choice and, in the end, to pay the bill, starting with Vladimir Putin.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 5 March 2022)

 

 

 

Saturday, 16 October 2021

Reflections on political mediation

More and better mediation in times of conflict

Victor Angelo

The British philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) was one of the most brilliant thinkers of the 20th century. He was also one of the most progressive of his time, one of the first to fight for the institution of a universal minimum income or for the decriminalization of homosexual relations. A profound political analyst, he stressed in 1950, when he received the Nobel Prize for Literature, that "the love of power is, in fact, the strongest motive in the lives of important men. He added that many leaders do not mind impoverishing - and sinking the nation - if they can thereby bring their rivals to ruin. This is still the case in certain parts of the globe.

It was this blind passion for power, a central theme in Russell's work, that served as the starting point for my talk yesterday about conflict mediation. I was participating, by videoconference, in a colloquium of the US Institute of Peace, an independent Washington-based organization dedicated to parallel diplomacy and political negotiations. The challenge was to identify new ways of approaching national crisis resolution, to be shared with the United Nations and other partners active in this area of international politics.

Political intervention, in any society, requires a keen understanding of context and power relations. It is necessary to assess the relative strength of the main leaders, what their power is based on, and what their vulnerabilities are.

In democratic societies, this analysis is easier to do, even taking into account the opacity of certain secret associations, pressure groups and manipulation of social networks. Elections are held regularly, there are visible party structures and an active media. There, credibility is built on electoral legitimacy combined with the projection of a positive public image.

In countries where the abuse of force is the source and instrument of authority, the issue is more complicated. The apparent, institutional system is often deceptive. What counts is the informal web and its hierarchies. The real power is tied to traditional leaders, ethnic affiliations, religious networks, superstitions, or even criminal organizations in the field of drugs or the illegal trade in natural resources.

Throughout my life I have seen many examples of informal power. In Zimbabwe, it was easier to reach Robert Mugabe through the UN representative's driver than through the head of the presidential office. The driver was the first-born son of a tribal chief of the ethnic group to which Mugabe belonged. In Senegambia, a small number of marabouts had more political influence, regionally and nationally, than most ministers in the different governments.

Conflict mediation only works if you negotiate with those in power. The others, ministers and so on, are often mere figureheads or simple stooges of the boss. To get to the decision-maker, you often have to go beyond the formal system of governance.

Another critical aspect concerns the authority of the mediator. Credibility in politics results from the combination of four primary characteristics: a spirit of mission, political realism, balance of opinion, and self-confidence. Several mediators appointed in recent years by the United Nations have been shown to lack this set of qualities. New York tends to pay more attention to regional games, to winning political support in certain quarters, in the Security Council or from influential heads of state in the region concerned, than to the experience and personality of the appointees. The result is a certain marginalization of the UN and a blurring of its image.  During his second term, António Guterres should strive to address this weakness. The strengthening of the mediation capacity should be one of the priority areas in a time that promises to be fertile in conflicts. This is what many millions of people, victims of political violence or on the verge of the ravine, are crying out for every day.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 15 October 2021)

Thursday, 10 September 2020

France and Turkey

The hostility between France and Turkey reached a new level today. For now, it is just a war of words. But words matter a lot, in diplomacy and conflict. I would be very prudent. If I were in a position of international visibility I would advise both sides to moderate their statements and I would offer my good offices for a mediation effort. I would not shy away from my responsibilities. I would be very clear in expressing my deepest concerns.  

Thursday, 2 May 2019

Maduro and Guaidó must accept mediation


Venezuela remains at the top of today’s international agenda. People on both sides of the conflict are convinced that the solution to the current national crisis must come out of an open confrontation. That’s where we are now. It would be a serious mistake. The country is deeply divided. Violence can only lead to death and destruction. It will not address the deep causes of conflict.

I continue to insist on dialogue through mediation. Both leaders must accept this approach. The work of the international community should focus on convincing Nicolas Maduro and Juan Guaidó to accept an agenda for dialogue. This is an urgent task to be accomplished.

Unfortunately, the UN is not in a position to play a role, for reasons that I mentioned in my previous post. The UN Secretariat is afraid of Donald Trump. It is paralysed. It cannot master the courage to tell President Trump that there is no other way out but through a conflict resolution process. Through peace.

The European Union has excluded itself from the solution. It has taken sides.

The Latin American States have also aligned themselves with one position or the other. They are too close to the conflict to be impartial.

The only Latin American country that has remained neutral is Mexico. It could be part of an international mediation group. The other two States I see as able of mediating and facilitating are Switzerland and the Vatican.

My proposal is to encourage the Swiss to take the lead and get the other two countries on board. They would approach Maduro and Guaidó to obtain their commitment to the process. They could get it. Particularly if the mediation is accompanied by a serious effort to provide humanitarian aid to the people of Venezuela. True humanitarian aid, of course.


Tuesday, 30 April 2019

Venezuela: mediation, mediation, mediation


Today’s situation in Venezuela moved a step closer to national tragedy.

Very concerned, the UN Secretary-General called for both Government and opposition forces to exercise “maximum restraint”. That is a necessary call.

But certainly not enough.

It is a passive reaction to a major development in the Venezuelan crisis. Antonio Guterres should also be offering his mediation authority. Mediation between both sides remains the only peaceful opening, the only hope to avoid additional loss of life and humanitarian suffering.

 I know the big bosses in Washington do not want to hear that word, mediation. They are simply betting on Maduro’s total defeat. But the Secretary-General cannot just pay attention to Washington. He is the voice of the world and the standard-bearer of common sense. His duty is to be at the service of peace. For that, he must underline in very clear terms that the UN good offices are the most reasonable way forward as far as Venezuela’s future is concerned.  

Friday, 22 February 2019

Venezuela today: deeper into crisis


The complex crisis Venezuela is going through today has reached a new level of perilousness. Taking into consideration what I have seen in comparable situations – comparable, true, but I know that every crisis has its unique features – we are now closer to an open clash between the two camps.

It is obvious we do not know what is going on in the planning rooms, and what kind of bridging initiatives might be under way. The impression is that there has been a lot of secret planning and no real effort to bridge the opposing parties. It is also palpable that both sides might still be betting on an escalation. They seem to have reached that stage in a confrontation when leaders think that it is time to defeat the other side. To use force. 

That’s why it is now important to express extreme apprehension and add to that a call for mediation by those who are still able to play such a role. An urgent call.

Wednesday, 6 February 2019

Venezuela needs a credible mediation process


There are a few crisis situations in the world that must be seen as requiring urgent attention. Venezuela is certainly one of them. And, in terms of response, mediation is the word. It is necessary to find a mediation mechanism that could be accepted by both sides, meaning the Maduro camp and the Guaidó supporters.

Nicolás Maduro has asked the Pope to lead such mediation. It is true that the Catholic Church could play a facilitating role. But the other side has not expressed the same kind of appeal. Basically, they believe that Maduro´s presidency is not legitimate and, therefore, he must go without any concession being made. That position should be helped to evolve as rapidly as possible.

The United Nations could also be approached. Yet, I think Maduro sees the UN as too close to the Western interests. In the circumstances, the UN Secretary-General should take the initiative and be in personal contact with both leaders. The UN has a lot of experienced people in the field of mediation. And it could also work closely with the Vatican and offer a join platform for negotiations. Countries in the EU should send a message about the UN’s potential.

It’s equally critical that Maduro understands that there is a way forward for him and his family. The other side must leave a gate open for a dignified solution. It’s a mistake to try to push Maduro and his camp against the wall. That would make any bridging effort fail and it could easily bring mass violence instead a negotiated solution.

The mediation agenda would be defined by the parties. That’s how it should be. But I can guess it would certainly include issues such as the shape of the political transition, who would chair it, the organization of credible elections, the role of the armed forces and the police, as well as amnesty matters.

Sunday, 21 September 2014

UN cannot be missing in action

The agreement reached between the two presidential candidates is key for the stability and security of Afghanistan. Ashraf Ghani, the future president, and Abdullah Abdullah,  who will have his nominees in key positions within the new Cabinet and as governors of some provinces, are both top politicians and very reasonable, experienced individuals. They are among the best in the country´s political class. But they represent different domestic interests as their tribal links are based on geography and ethnic politics. The agreement between them should therefore be seen as a balancing act between the tribes from the North, closer to Abdullah, and the South that basically supports Ghani.

The balance was struck thanks to the continued efforts of John Kerry and the US ambassador in Kabul. The US made the agreement possible.

This has shown, as it is nowadays happening quite often, that the UN mission in the country has not been able to play the mediation role they should have. This is no good news. Particularly because the same weak role is now the trademark of the UN in some other conflicts around the world.
It might be the moment to raise one or two questions about the current state of affairs of the UN´s peace-making efforts.

Fortunately, on the same day the deal was announced in Kabul, the UN envoy in Yemen was in a position to convince the warring parties in that collapsing country to sign a ceasefire accord. That´s a bit of good news about the UN. But it is not enough.