The BRICS New Delhi Summit

 A Dysfunctional Coalition in the Shadow of Beijing: The BRICS+

Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published: 11 Sept 2026, 02:34

The BRICS+ Summit, taking place in New Delhi on the 12th and 13th of September, will essentially be yet another spectacle of geopolitical illusions. The grouping, which began as a platform of financial convenience initiated by Vladimir Putin (with its inaugural summit in 2009), has been successively instrumentalised. Initially, it served Russia as a means to project power and circumvent its isolation; today, it is additionally the principal vehicle for China's hegemonic ambition in the so-called Global South.

Moscow originally viewed the BRICS as a further instrument to force the narrative of a multipolar world in which Russia would maintain the status of an indispensable superpower. Particularly following the escalation of tensions in Eastern Europe, the bloc was envisaged as a diplomatic shield and a financial alternative capable of neutralising Western sanctions. However, harsh economic reality and prolonged isolation have dictated new rules: the Russia of today, increasingly reliant on the export of hydrocarbons at discounted prices to Asia and the importation of critical technology, has been reduced to the status of a subaltern partner to Beijing's colossal economic machine.

It is China that now wields the baton and sets the strategic compass of the grouping. Xi Jinping has grasped that, to challenge the Euro-Atlantic order consolidated since 1945, Chinese economic and military might was insufficient; it was imperative to constitute and lead a coalition that would serve as a counterbalance to the Western bloc.

The 2024 expansion, with the entry of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, along with the integration of Indonesia in 2025, aimed to serve this ambition. Nevertheless, formidable obstacles remain. From the outset, the desire to promote the yuan as a reserve currency, replacing the US dollar, is hindered by a structural contradiction: Beijing refuses to relinquish its stringent capital controls. So long as these controls remain in place, the yuan will struggle to become a credible global reserve currency.

The bloc's discourse regarding the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, however, rests upon criticisms that ought not to be dismissed. For decades, the IMF and the World Bank have been legitimate targets of contestation: the quota review, ratified only in 2016, left China and India under-represented relative to their share of global GDP. The United States preserves a de facto veto over structural decisions, and Europe maintains a monopoly over the leadership of the IMF, reflecting an overarching governance still tethered to the geopolitics of 1944.

Although this Western inertia presents the BRICS+ with a genuine and unifying rallying cry, there is an abyssal difference between reforming multilateral institutions and constructing parallel architectures. China has unequivocally opted for the latter course. The New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) did not merely emerge to rectify systemic deficiencies for the sake of global equity. They were also conceived to allow Beijing to finance strategic projects, more or less aligned with the Belt and Road Initiative. These are political projects, not merely developmental ones. By failing to incorporate robust requirements for transparency, debt sustainability, and good governance, they frequently serve to establish a supremacy built upon fragile foundations.

The enlargement of the BRICS has exponentially increased its demographic weight, yet it has fatally diluted its cohesion. By housing democracies and autocracies under the same roof, alongside economies highly integrated into global markets and regimes asphyxiated by sanctions, the group has become chronically dysfunctional.

An organisation that attempts to harmonise the interests of Iran and the United Arab Emirates, or that harbours the border, technological, and military rivalry between India and China, is condemned to tactical paralysis. The NDB itself illustrates this fragility: with subscribed capital insufficient for the colossal needs of the Global South, the bank found itself compelled to suspend its operations in Russia, faced with the threat of American secondary sanctions.

In this landscape of precarious balances, Narendra Modi, the summit's host, will focus on immediate pragmatism, ensuring that India is not dragged into an anti-Western crusade. Modi will restrict the agenda to the realm of the possible: fostering intra-bloc trade (which continues to be eclipsed by these countries' exchanges with the G7); developing interoperable cross-border payment systems outside the SWIFT network; cooperating in the digital and Artificial Intelligence sectors; and promoting bilateral trade in local currencies (yuan, rupees, reais, roubles), albeit always with the underlying concern of averting the replacement of a dependence on the dollar with a new submission to the yuan.

India and Brazil draw the principal dividing line within the bloc here: both advocate for a reform of multilateral systems, but neither supports the radicalisation of the BRICS+. For India, the grouping is merely one of several options for its strategic autonomy. Modi plays simultaneously with Washington, Canberra, and Tokyo within the framework of the QUAD, well aware that the true threat to Indian sovereignty and territorial integrity emanates from across the Himalayan borders and from the naval hegemony of its neighbouring Asian superpower, rather than from Washington.

The final image that the New Delhi Summit will endeavour to project will be one of unity and cooperation. However, the true metric of global geopolitical priorities will reveal itself the following week, during the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in New York.

Xi Jinping, who at the BRICS will mount his customary ideological defence of inclusive multilateralism, does not plan to travel to the United Nations headquarters to participate in the General Assembly. Instead, on the 24th, a stone's throw from New York, he has scheduled a bilateral meeting at the White House with Donald Trump. The choice exposes the chasm between Chinese rhetoric and its practical interests: political narratives may marshal followers, but the grand decisions concerning the world order continue to be negotiated, above all else, in the bilateral arena of the superpowers.

Notes about the election of the new United Nations Secretary-General

 

The choice of the next Secretary-General could decide the UN’s fate

The Elders Foundation

38,221 followers

May 1, 2026

Dear friends,

More than two months since the US and Israel began their illegal attacks on Iran, the fallout continues to be felt globally. As peace talks continue to stall, maritime traffic remains blocked in the Strait of Hormuz, and global energy markets show no signs of stabilising. The United Nations Secretary-General might be expected to play a critical role in resolving such a conflict, yet the diminishing scope for political leadership by the UN in recent years has made this impossible.

In January, the UN will welcome a new Secretary-General. This is not a routine appointment, but one with existential implications. Who member states choose to lead the UN will play a crucial role in shaping its future. As emerging candidates come under scrutiny following their participation in online interactive dialogues last month, we must ask: what kind of leadership does the world demand at this moment?

First and foremost, the successful candidate must possess the personal qualities needed to restore the UN’s credible leadership on the world stage. They should serve as a moral anchor, with the political courage and strategic clarity required to speak truth to power. This means acting independently – not constrained by political caution or beholden to the governments they are meant to hold to account. They must have the courage to take principled positions, even when they are unpopular.

In today’s world, this may all sound rather naïve. But a UN without an empowered Secretary-General is a UN that cannot fulfil its primary purpose: to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. It is a UN that becomes increasingly irrelevant in a violent and chaotic "might is right" world.

It is for all UN member states to choose a Secretary-General, not just the permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly must make full use of its leverage in the appointment of a recommended candidate, including the prerogative to reject a recommendation.

For eight decades, the office has been held by men. The gender imbalance at the top of the UN is undeniable, but addressing it must go beyond symbolism. What is needed is a transparent, merit-based process that selects a credible, independent and globally respected leader – chosen not on gender alone.

There is no escaping the scale of the task ahead. Trygve Lie, the first UN Secretary-General, described it as ‘the most impossible job in the world’. Today, it is harder still.

As Elders, we will not intervene publicly on behalf of any individual candidate. However, we will continue to advocate for courageous leadership to address shared existential threats, and we are looking forward, as a group, to support the next Secretary-General in her work.

With thanks for your ongoing support,

Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein

My critique:

While Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein’s letter for The Elders presents itself as a clarion call for principled leadership, a severe critique reveals it to be a masterclass in "lofty impotence." It relies on a series of romanticized platitudes that ignore the brutal realpolitik of the United Nations, offering a vision that is functionally disconnected from how power is actually exercised in 2026.

Here is a my critique of the text’s core failings:

1. The Fallacy of the "Moral Anchor"

The text demands a Secretary-General (SG) who acts as a "moral anchor" with the "courage to speak truth to power."

• The Critique: This is a category error. The SG is not a secular Pope; they are the "Chief Administrative Officer" of a body composed of sovereign states. Zeid’s demand for an "independent" leader ignores the fact that any candidate who actually demonstrated the "political courage" to regularly offend the P5 (US, Russia, China, UK, France) during the selection process would be vetoed instantly. By advocating for a leader who is "not beholden to governments," The Elders are essentially advocating for a candidate who cannot be elected.

2. Strategic Naivety Regarding the P5

Zeid admits that his vision might sound "naïve," yet he proceeds to double down on that naivety.

• The Critique: The text frames the diminishing scope of UN leadership as a failure of "personal qualities." It fails to mention the structural reality: the UN’s paralysis is not a lack of SG "courage," but the result of the veto power and the active hostility of Great Powers toward multilateralism. Suggesting that a "credible leader" can simply bypass the "might is right" world through sheer force of personality is a dangerous simplification that misleads the public about where the actual bottleneck lies.

3. The Empty Threat of the General Assembly

The letter urges the General Assembly (GA) to use its "leverage" to reject a Security Council recommendation.

• The Critique: This is a hollow revolutionary posture. In the 80-year history of the UN, the GA has never rejected a Security Council nominee for SG. Why? Because the GA is not a monolith; it is composed of states that are themselves beholden to the P5 through aid, trade, and security pacts. Promoting the "prerogative to reject" without a viable strategy for how 193 disparate nations would survive the ensuing constitutional crisis is irresponsible "activism-lite."

4. Gender Symbolism vs. Reality

The text argues that addressing the gender imbalance must "go beyond symbolism" but then fails to provide any concrete mechanism for how to achieve this while maintaining a "merit-based" process.

• The Critique: By stating the leader should be "chosen not on gender alone," while simultaneously noting that the office has only been held by men, the text enters a rhetorical loop. It avoids taking a hard stand (e.g., "The next SG must be a woman") to remain "principled," yet by doing so, it effectively permits the status quo to continue under the guise of "merit," which has historically been defined by the very male-dominated governments the text claims to hold to account.

5. Institutional Paternalism

As a group of "former" leaders, The Elders occupy a position of consequence-free moralizing.

• The Critique: The letter is steeped in the paternalistic tone of retired elites. Zeid writes that The Elders will "support the next Secretary-General in her work" (notably using the feminine pronoun to signal virtue), yet they refuse to "intervene publicly on behalf of any individual." This allows the group to maintain its "moral high ground" without actually expending any political capital or taking the risk of backing a specific reformer who might actually change the system.

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The text is a diplomatic comfort blanket. It makes the reader feel that "principled leadership" is just one good appointment away, while carefully avoiding the "holy cows" of the UN Charter (like the Veto) that are the true source of the organization's existential threat. It is a document that demands everything and risks nothing.

How do you think a candidate would react to being told they must be a "moral anchor" while simultaneously needing to secure the vote of a Trump-led US or a Xi-led China?

Some comments regarding my text about Guterres's succession

A World Adrift: The UN’s Leadership Crisis and the Fragmentation of Global Order

The debate over António Guterres’s successor as Secretary‑General of the United Nations unfolds at a moment when the international system is experiencing its deepest crisis of coherence since the end of the Cold War. 

My column of yesterday in Diário de Notícias (1)—a sober reflection on the “impossible job” awaiting the next UN leader—captures the structural paralysis of multilateralism. Yet when juxtaposed with the rest of the day’s DN coverage, a broader picture emerges: the UN’s leadership vacuum is only one manifestation of a world in which state‑centric power politics have decisively eclipsed institutional governance.

This contrast between my institutional lens and DN’s event‑driven reporting reveals a deeper truth. The crises dominating the headlines—Middle Eastern escalation, energy insecurity, and domestic political fragmentation—are precisely the types of challenges the UN was designed to manage. Their prominence, coupled with the near‑absence of UN‑related coverage outside my column, underscores the organization’s declining relevance in shaping global outcomes.

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The Candidates and the Constraints

My analysis of the four declared candidates—Michelle Bachelet, Rafael Grossi, Rebeca Grynspan, and Macky Sall—highlights a paradox at the heart of the UN system. Each contender brings a distinct diplomatic pedigree, yet all are constrained by the same immutable forces: the veto power of the Security Council’s permanent members, the unwritten rule of regional rotation, and the political preferences of Washington, Beijing, and Moscow.

• Bachelet, arguably the most experienced, is penalized by her human‑rights professional record—an asset in normative terms but a liability in a system where major powers increasingly reject scrutiny.
• Grossi carries the weight of nuclear diplomacy, but his candidacy is entangled in the triangular dynamics among the U.S., Russia, and Argentina’s unpredictable foreign policy under Javier Milei.
• Grynspan, whom I see as the frontrunner, benefits from geopolitical neutrality of her country of origin (Costa Rica) and gender‑representation momentum.
• Sall embodies the aspirations of the Global South but is constrained by the Latin America–Caribbean rotation expectation. It is almost impossible to have an African candidate as the winner of this year's race.

The common thread is clear: the next Secretary‑General will be selected not for their capacity to lead but for their acceptability to the powers most responsible for the UN’s paralysis.

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A System Under Strain

While I emphasize the current institutional fragility, DN’s broader news cycle paints the operational landscape in which the next Secretary‑General must operate.

Middle East Escalation

DN’s coverage of ceasefire negotiations, U.S.–Iran mediation, and the risk of regional spillover illustrates the erosion of diplomatic norms. These crises unfold largely outside UN frameworks, with major powers preferring ad hoc coalitions and bilateral channels. The UN’s role is reactive at best, symbolic at worst.

Energy Insecurity

Reports on Europe’s jet‑fuel shortages and declining U.S. reserves highlight the geopolitical weaponization of energy. These dynamics—once central to UN‑led discussions on global economic stability—now play out in markets and national capitals, not in multilateral forums.

Domestic Political Fragmentation

DN’s focus on Portuguese political tensions, IMF warnings, and governance challenges mirrors a global trend: domestic politics increasingly dominate foreign‑policy bandwidth. As states turn inward, multilateral commitments weaken.

Together, these stories reinforce my thesis: the UN is being marginalized not by irrelevance but by the deliberate choices of states that no longer see multilateralism as a vehicle for advancing their interests.

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The Return of Pre‑1945 Politics

My most striking argument is that the world is reverting to a pre‑1945 logic—one in which power, not principle, determines outcomes. DN’s coverage supports this view. Whether in the Middle East, energy markets, or domestic politics, the pattern is consistent: states act unilaterally, institutions react belatedly, and norms erode quietly.

The UN’s predicament is therefore structural. It is not merely that the organization lacks tools; it is that the geopolitical environment no longer rewards cooperation. The next Secretary‑General will inherit a system in which the Charter’s foundational assumptions—collective security, sovereign equality, and the primacy of law—are openly contested.

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The Secretary‑General as “Peregrino da Paz”

My metaphor of the Secretary‑General as a “tartaruga em movimento”—a turtle in constant motion—captures the essence of the role in the current era. The next leader will need to be:

• perpetually itinerant, engaging directly with capitals rather than relying on institutional authority
• politically agile, navigating great‑power rivalries without becoming their instrument
• symbolically resilient, embodying the UN’s normative aspirations even when its operational capacity is limited

This is not the Secretary‑General envisioned in 1945. It is a diplomatic pilgrim, operating in the interstices of a fragmented order - that is what is required today. 

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Conclusion: A Leadership Contest That Mirrors a Systemic Crisis

The juxtaposition of my column with the day’s DN coverage (2) reveals a world in which the UN’s leadership transition is both crucial and curiously peripheral. Crucial because global crises demand coordinated responses; peripheral because states increasingly bypass the very institution designed to provide them.

The next Secretary‑General will not reverse this trend alone. But the selection process—shaped by geopolitical bargaining, regional expectations, and normative pressures—will signal whether the international community still believes in the possibility of collective governance.

In that sense, the succession to Guterres is more than a personnel decision. It is a referendum on the future of multilateralism itself.

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(1) https://www.dn.pt/opiniao-dn/um-cargo-impossvel-a-sucesso-de-guterres-num-mundo-deriva
      The English translation will be available soon.
(2) 17 April 2026