Comparing sanctions regimes: Iran and North Korea

The prevailing strategy toward the Middle East in 2026—characterized by "maximum pressure," maritime blockades, and paternalistic threats of "punishment"—represents a catastrophic regression in international statecraft. This "predatory diplomacy" is not only ethically bankrupt but strategically illiterate, particularly when contrasted with the long-standing, paralyzed "soft approach" toward North Korea.

1. The Paternalism of "Misbehaviour": A Diplomatic Dead End

The current rhetoric reduces the complex, millennia-old "political DNA" of Iran to a juvenile dynamic. Terming the actions of a regional power as "misbehaving" is a fundamental category error that sabotages any prospect of a lasting settlement.

• The Iran Context: By treating Tehran as a wayward child rather than a sovereign adversary, Washington ignores the reality that Iranian strategic culture is rooted in a "resistance economy" and a deep-seated suspicion of Western diktats.

• The North Korea Contrast: While Iran is threatened with renewed strikes for "bad behaviour" despite its 14-point peace proposal, North Korea has built a nuclear arsenal under decades of "Strategic Patience." The global order is effectively telling Tehran: “Negotiate and we will suffocate you; arm yourself to the teeth like Pyongyang and we will eventually grant you a summit.”

2. The Myth of the "Surgical Strike" and "Elimination"

The political demand to "eliminate" a nation’s missile capacity through military force is a dangerous fantasy.

• The Iran Context: Military infrastructure in Iran is hardened, dispersed, and embedded within civilian hubs. A "strike" is never just a strike; it is a declaration of total war that would inevitably trigger asymmetric retaliation across the Strait of Hormuz—the world’s most sensitive energy artery.

• The Failure of Force: History shows that technical knowledge cannot be bombed out of existence. Strikes on the Iranian "brain trust" only accelerate the resolve to achieve the ultimate deterrent, mirroring the North Korean path where every round of pressure resulted in a more advanced missile test.

3. Economic Suffocation: Humanitarian Crime as Strategy

The current "suffocating" blockade, which prevents even medical and basic cargo from reaching civilian ports, is a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of international law.

• The Iran Context: Claiming that a blockade is "doing very well" because soldiers cannot be paid ignores the millions of civilians whose food and energy security are being held hostage for a "quick-win" deal.

• The North Korea Contrast: For years, the international community provided food aid and "Sunshine Policy" engagement to Pyongyang to avoid humanitarian collapse. Applying a total blockade to Iran while having historically subsidized North Korea’s survival exposes a glaring lack of moral consistency.

4. The Geopolitical Chessboard vs. The Oil Market

Linking peace talks to the UAE leaving OPEC or driving down oil futures exposes the true, cynical motivation of the current escalation: Resource Coercion.

• The Critique: When the US Treasury frames a blockade as a success because it might lower gas prices for Western consumers, it erodes any claim of "defending humanity." It reveals the conflict as a mercantilist war, where Iranian sovereignty is being sacrificed to manipulate the global energy market.

5. The Dangerous Erasion of the UN

Perhaps the most severe failure is the total marginalization of the UN Secretariat and the UN Charter in favour of personalized, "family-business" diplomacy.

• The Strategic Risk: By conducting negotiations through personal envoys and son-in-laws rather than the UN’s institutional framework, the current administration is building a "house of cards." Without the UN's "Blue Book" of neutral mediation and the legitimacy of the Security Council, any deal made is temporary, non-binding, and destined to collapse the moment the political winds shift.

Conclusion: The "Catastrophic Miscalculation"

The world is witnessing a " might-is-right" approach that rewards nuclear proliferation (North Korea) and punishes diplomatic overtures (Iran’s 14-point plan). If the United Nations remains a spectator while the "Big Three" treat the high seas and sovereign nations as personal fiefdoms, we are not just witnessing the end of an Iranian peace process; we are witnessing the final expiration of the post-WWII rules-based order. The result will not be a "great deal," but a era of deliberate, daily insecurity.

Some notes about the USA-Iran conflict and political praxis

 

USA-Iran: The Escalation, the Political Game, and the Possible Way Out

Victor Ângelo

International Security Adviser. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published on: 24 Apr 2026, 01:24

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Constantly promoted by television channels and other media outlets—including digital platforms—the political spectacle functions like a fast-acting drug: it stimulates and excites, but it does not nourish; it promises a cure, but it does not treat the disease. Then, once the adrenaline subsides, the nagging question returns: where are the results? In everyday life, what remains are the exorbitant costs of fuel, healthcare, housing, and everything else, coupled with a growing sense of insecurity.

Once the effect wears off, everything remains the same—or worse. Over time, the circus ends up turning the spectator against the political actors, who fail to produce results, and against the commentators, who change their predictions as often as they change their shirts. This is politics made for the camera: the essential thing is to remain visible, at the centre of the arena.

When results fail to materialise, the strategy usually shifts: either a flurry of reforms is announced (in a "make-believe" style), or polarisation is increased and an enemy is sought to shoulder all the blame. The spectacle can mobilise crowds; it can even win elections. But it is concrete results that sustain power and, for a time, guarantee social peace.

Alternatively, to remain in power, the sinister leader attempts to destroy—or at least weaken—the institutions that sustain democratic regimes. If he is a fascist, he seeks to capture them, subjugate them, and render them entirely obedient. If he is a populist, the objective is more elementary: to reduce the capacity for oversight and scrutiny, to eliminate the checks and balances. From that point on, he rules as he pleases.

Nero, an erratic emperor, obsessively cultivated popular adulation and a cult of personality. He projected himself as a divine figure—from Apollo to the Sun—and ruled almost always in confrontation with the Senate. Trump cannot go quite so far in a system with the separation of powers and a pluralistic press. However, he has attempted to push the boundaries: minimising the role of Congress, pressuring the judiciary, attacking Democratic governors, and attempting to condition the media and social platforms. And, when convenient, he returns to the old expedient of external military operations: projecting force, dominating the news cycle, and galvanising fringes of the electorate.

Lacking results that improve the daily lives of families, he attacks the foundations of democracy and exploits nationalism: the USA is presented as the number one power on the international stage. All this is done as the electoral calendar tightens: the mid-term elections of 3 November are approaching. On that day, control of the Senate and the House of Representatives, several governorships, and other positions will be at stake. In practice, it is Donald Trump’s own power that is on the ballot. And the signs, in general, are not in his favour. Hence the urgency to contain—and, ideally, end—the escalation with Iran before it takes on a life of its own.

How will this escalation evolve, and what is the possible way out—a way out that avoids a significant electoral setback? This, I believe, is the central question, at a time when the possibility of a second round of contacts between the parties in Islamabad is once again circulating.

The answer—an agreement in Islamabad, yes or no?—does not depend on a single variable. I would summarise it as follows: Hormuz, the nuclear issue, the future of Iranian domestic politics, and, finally, the Israeli factor (with the particular weight of Netanyahu’s unacceptable hardline stance). A minimally viable understanding would have to lower the temperature in the Strait, stabilise the nuclear dossier, and create de-escalation channels that function away from the cameras and the major headlines—and not merely in communiqués for international consumption.

It would be a massive error if the authorities in Tehran concluded that it is not worth sitting down again with an American delegation. The list of Washington’s demands is known—maximalist, at the very limit of what Tehran can accept without losing domestic authority—and the Iranian position on each of these conditions is also known. Nevertheless, it is plausible that a meeting, even without formal "negotiations", could prevent a return to large-scale hostilities and allow other actors to continue the diplomatic work already underway—from China to Turkey, not forgetting Pakistan (a close ally of Beijing)—as well as in various Asian and Gulf countries.

China and Pakistan appear to be pressuring Tehran to ensure that this new round of contacts—it is too early to call them "negotiations"—happens now or in the near future.

Both sides would have something to gain from a limited agreement. For Washington, the advantage is obvious: halting an escalatory dynamic that, besides being dangerous on the ground, increases the risk of violations of International Humanitarian Law and further degrades its image in the region and Southeast Asia. And, let us be honest, the American image today is often viewed through two filters: the temptation of "muscle" and the automatic alignment with the Israeli leadership.

For Tehran, the calculation is equally clear: avoiding economic collapse and not falling into the trap of a war of reprisals against oil and natural gas installations—and against the ports of neighbouring Gulf states, where a single incident is enough to set everything ablaze.

This is a crisis that needs to be halted quickly. Under normal conditions, it would be a matter for the UN Security Council. We live, however, in a world where the great powers choose, à la carte, which precepts of International Law they take seriously.

Nevertheless, a combination of efforts of a new type—China, India, and the European Union, with a couple of countries from the South (Pakistan and Indonesia, for example)—could, in my view, make the difference where the UN is paralysed: maintaining permanent channels of contact, securing the acceptance of minimally verifiable ceasefire measures, and designing a pragmatic roadmap for Hormuz and the nuclear dossier. It is this type of diplomatic work that averts disasters. It is essential.