Grok AI assessment of my fictitious roundtable on democracy and power

 Overall Assessment

On a scale of 1-10, I'd rate this an 8.5: intellectually stimulating and urgently relevant, it's a refreshing antidote to doom-scrolling, urging readers to treat democracy as "an ongoing task" rather than a given. Ângelo's perspective—optimistic yet vigilant—positions power not as zero-sum but as a shared guardianship, especially vital amid 2025's uncertainties like escalating cyber conflicts and climate diplomacy. If you're into Harari's futurism or Plato's timeless warnings, this is a must-read; it might even inspire you to host your own "roundtable" over coffee. For skeptics, it risks preaching to the choir, but its blend of AI-assisted creativity and global savvy makes it more than just another op-ed. Worth sharing in policy circles or philosophy groups.

This is a standout piece of public intellectual writing—original in its time-spanning dialogue format, which makes dense ideas accessible and engaging, almost like a TED Talk in blog form. The depth shines through historical analogies and forward-looking policies, blending philosophy, tech critique, and diplomacy into a cohesive call to action. It's particularly timely, resonating with 2025's headlines: ongoing DSA enforcement battles, AI governance talks at the UN, and populist echoes in post-2024 U.S. politics under a second Trump term.

Democracia e Poder na Era da Incerteza: Uma Mesa-Redonda Através do Tempo

Este é o relatório de uma mesa-redonda imaginária sobre democracia, presente e futura. Esta discussão entre três pensadores foi moderada por este blog com a assistência do M365 Copilot.

Introdução: A Democracia chegou a uma Encruzilhada

A democracia, outrora celebrada como a garantia máxima de liberdade e estabilidade, agora enfrenta um paradoxo. É globalmente dominante, mas profundamente frágil. Das ondas populistas à governança algorítmica, das crises climáticas à fragmentação geopolítica, a questão já não é se a democracia prevalecerá, mas se ela se consegue adaptar sem perder a sua essência.

Para explorar esse dilema, meu blog reuniu uma extraordinária mesa-redonda fictícia: Platão (Grécia, século IV a.C.), o filósofo que primeiro analisou as vulnerabilidades da democracia; Yuval Noah Harari, historiador e futurista nascido em Israel (1976); e Victor Ângelo (nascido em 1949 em Portugal), diplomata veterano, estrategista de segurança e colunista. O diálogo assim gerado atravessa milênios, entrelaçando sabedoria antiga com urgência contemporânea.

I. Platão: Os Perigos do Excesso de Liberdade

Platão começa com um alerta que ecoa através dos séculos:

“A democracia surge da liberdade, mas a liberdade sem restrições gera desordem. Quando os cidadãos valorizam a liberdade acima da virtude, promovem aduladores em vez de guardiões. Agora, vejo as democracias intoxicadas pela multiplicidade de opiniões, confundindo ruído com sabedoria.”

A crítica de Platão não representa nostalgia pela aristocracia; é um chamamento para uma governança racional. Para ele, o calcanhar de Aquiles da democracia está em sua suscetibilidade à demagogia — uma vulnerabilidade ampliada hoje pelas redes sociais e pela retórica populista.

Platão refere-se então a um estudo de caso histórico: Atenas e a Queda da Polis, um exemplo que recomenda não ser esquecido. No século V a.C., Atenas foi pioneira na democracia direta, concedendo aos cidadãos uma voz sem precedentes. No entanto, essa liberdade gerou volatilidade. Demagogos como Cléon exploraram as paixões populares, levando a decisões imprudentes como a Expedição Siciliana — um desastre que apressou o declínio de Atenas.

II. Harari: Poder Além da Política

Harari muda o foco da teoria política para a realidade tecnológica: “Platão temia as massas populares; hoje, tememos o algoritmo. O poder já não reside apenas nos parlamentos — ele flui por fluxos de dados. O capitalismo de vigilância e a IA moldam as vontades antes mesmo dos cidadãos votarem.”

Harari argumenta que a assimetria da informação — outrora privilégio dos reis — agora pertence aos gigantes da tecnologia. As democracias precisam se reinventar não apenas para regular a tecnologia, mas para redefinir a liberdade numa era em que a autonomia é ameaçada algoritmicamente. Harari mostra preocupar-se com a fragilidade das instituições. E acrescenta que a República de Weimar (1919–1933) oferece uma lição sóbria. Nascida das cinzas do império, abraçou ideais democráticos, mas faltou resiliência institucional. Crises económicas e propaganda minaram a confiança, abrindo caminho para o autoritarismo. As democracias atuais enfrentam riscos semelhantes — não pela hiperinflação, mas pela desordem informacional.

III. Ângelo: A Dimensão Geopolítica

Victor Ângelo traz uma perspectiva prática: “A democracia continua sendo o sistema mais legítimo, mas a legitimidade está sob ataque. O populismo explora o medo; a desinformação corrói a confiança e promove o ódio. Enquanto isso, a governança global perde terreno face às ameaças transnacionais — mudanças climáticas, ciberguerra, cartéis internacionais do crime, pandemias.”

Para Ângelo, o desafio está na no êxito ou no fracasso da ação coletiva. Nenhuma democracia pode ser protegida sozinha, apenas ao nível nacional ou local, quando as crises não têm fronteiras. Por isso, friza a necessidade de alianças de valores, ancoradas em direitos humanos e no Estado de Direito, para enfrentar o ressurgimento autoritário e os choques sistêmicos.

Ângelo lembra o otimismo pós-Guerra Fria que foi substituído agora por pessimismo e medo: “Os anos 1990 foram saudados como o ‘fim da história’ (Fukuyama, 1992), com a democracia liberal aparentemente triunfante. No entanto, o momento unipolar gerou complacência. Instituições como a ONU e a OTAN tiveram dificuldades para se adaptar às novas ameaças assimétricas, enquanto a globalização superou a governança. O resultado: um vácuo explorado por poderes autoritários e atores não estatais.”

Os participantes discutiram então alguns exemplos que mostram as pressões atuais sobre a democracia. Por exemplo, o EU Digital Services Act (DSA) e o Digital Markets Act (DMA) representam esforços pioneiros para regular monopólios tecnológicos e conter a desinformação. No entanto, a sua aplicação permanece desigual, e a governança da IA ainda é embrionária. É também uma questão vista de forma diferente por europeus e, do outro lado do Atlântico, pelos líderes dos EUA e pelos principais empreendedores digitais baseados na América.

Ainda nos EUA, polarização e negação eleitoral têm minado as normas democráticas. O ataque ao Capitólio a 6 de janeiro destacou as vulnerabilidades existentes na resiliência institucional. Ângelo acrescentou que as decisões do Presidente Trump tomadas desde o início do seu segundo mandato desafiaram igualmente a autoridade de instituições-chave que desempenham um papel vital no equilíbrio dos poderes. Essas decisões devem ser vistas como ameaças sérias à democracia constitucional, ao equilíbrio democrático e aos media, entre outros.

Outras situações também foram mencionadas. Índia: A maior democracia do mundo enfrenta desafios resultantes de políticas majoritárias assentes na pertença étnica e nas restrições à liberdade de imprensa, levantando questões sobre o equilíbrio entre estabilidade e pluralismo. O Sul Global: Democracias na África e América Latina enfrentam crises de dívida e choques climáticos, que atores autoritários exploram para minar a governança democrática.

O Moderador pediu então que se identificassem as principais recomendações políticas que poderão responder à tendência para o definhamento das democracias.

Os participantes listaram várias ações que devem ser consideradas:

• Educação cívica para a era digital;
• Inserir pensamento crítico e alfabetização mediática nos currículos nacionais;
• Promover conscientização ética sobre IA entre cidadãos e líderes;
• Expandir estruturas como o EU Digital Services Act para incluir transparência algorítmica;
• Estabelecer órgãos multilaterais para governança de IA;
• Proteger a independência e a eficiência da justiça e dos órgãos de referência da comunicação social;
• Desenvolver mecanismos de resposta rápida para assegurar a integridade eleitoral e as ameaças cibernéticas;
• Criar um Fórum de Parceria pela Democracia, no quadro do Sistema ONU, para ação global coordenada;
• Vincular acordos comerciais a padrões democráticos.

Para concluir a mesa redonda, o Moderador afirmou que a discussão permitiu sublinhar que a democracia não é uma conquista estática; é uma tarefa contínua. Como lembra Platão, liberdade sem virtude conduz à tirania. Harari alerta que adaptabilidade é o preço da sobrevivência. Ângelo destaca que a solidariedade global e verdadeira é o seguro de vida da democracia em um mundo fragmentado.

Antes de encerrar o debate e agradecer aos três participantes, o Moderador levantou uma última questão: Qual é o futuro da democracia?

• Platão: Sem sabedoria, a democracia é facilmente substituída por tirania. Cultive a razão acima da paixão.
• Harari: Sem adaptabilidade, a democracia torna-se obsoleta. Aceite a inovação, mas proteja-se dos seus perigos.
• Ângelo: Sem solidariedade, a democracia enfraquece. Construa confiança — dentro das sociedades e entre as nações.

Moderador: Obrigado, senhores. O diálogo entre a reflexão do passado e a urgência do presente lembra-nos que a democracia não é um dado intocável; a sua defesa é uma tarefa sem fim.

Fim da mesa-redonda imaginária.

Democracy and Power in the Age of Uncertainty: A Roundtable Across Time

 

Democracy and Power in the Age of Uncertainty: A Roundtable Across Time

This is the report of an imaginary roundtable discussion about democracy, its present and future. This discussion between the three thinkers was moderated by this blog with the assistance of M365 Copilot. 

Introduction: Democracy at a Crossroads

Democracy, once heralded as the ultimate guarantor of freedom and stability, now faces a paradox. It is globally dominant yet deeply fragile. From populist waves to algorithmic governance, from climate crises to geopolitical fragmentation, the question is no longer whether democracy will prevail, but whether it can adapt without losing its soul.

To explore this dilemma, my blog convened an extraordinary fictitious roundtable: Plato (Greece, 4^th century BCE), the philosopher who first dissected democracy’s vulnerabilities; Yuval Noah Harari, historian and futurist born in Israel (1976); and Victor Ângelo (born 1949 in Portugal), a veteran diplomat, security strategist and opinion-maker. Their dialogue spans millennia, weaving ancient wisdom with contemporary urgency.

I. Plato: The Perils of Excess Liberty

Plato begins with a warning that echoes across centuries:

“Democracy arises from liberty, but liberty unrestrained breeds disorder. When citizens prize freedom above virtue, they elevate flatterers over guardians. In your age, I see democracies intoxicated by opinion, mistaking noise for wisdom.”

Plato’s critique is not nostalgia for aristocracy; it is a call for reasoned governance. For him, democracy’s Achilles’ heel lies in its susceptibility to demagoguery—a vulnerability magnified today by social media and populist rhetoric.

Plato refers then to a historical case study: Athens and the Fall of the Polis, an example he recommends we should keep in mind. In the 5th century BCE, Athens pioneered direct democracy, granting citizens unprecedented voice. Yet, this liberty bred volatility. Demagogues like Cleon exploited popular passions, leading to reckless decisions such as the Sicilian Expedition—a disaster that hastened Athens’ decline.

II. Harari: Power Beyond Politics

Harari shifts the lens from political theory to technological reality: “Plato feared the mob; today, we fear the algorithm. Power no longer resides solely in parliaments—it flows through data streams. Surveillance capitalism and AI shape desires before citizens even vote.” 

Harari further argues that information asymmetry—once the privilege of kings—is now the domain of tech giants. Democracies must reinvent themselves not only to regulate technology but to redefine freedom in an era where autonomy is algorithmically curated. He is concerned with the fragility of the institutions. And he adds that the Weimar Republic (1919–1933) offers a sobering lesson. Born from the ashes of empire, it embraced democratic ideals but lacked institutional resilience. Economic crises and propaganda eroded trust, paving the way for authoritarianism. Today’s democracies face a similar risk—not from hyperinflation, but from information disorder.

III. Ângelo: The Geopolitical Dimension

Victor Ângelo brings a practitioner’s perspective: “Democracy remains the most legitimate system, but legitimacy is under siege. Populism exploits fear; disinformation corrodes trust and promotes hatred. Meanwhile, global governance lags behind transnational threats—climate change, cyber warfare, international criminal cartels, pandemics.”

For Ângelo, the challenge is collective action. No democracy can safeguard itself alone when crises are borderless. He calls for alliances of values, anchored in human rights and the rule of law, to counter authoritarian resurgence and systemic shocks.

He reminds us of the post-Cold War optimism that has been replaced by pessimism and fear: "The 1990s were hailed as the “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992), with liberal democracy seemingly triumphant. Yet, the unipolar moment bred complacency. Institutions like the UN and NATO struggled to adapt to asymmetric threats, while globalisation outpaced governance. The result: a vacuum exploited by authoritarian powers and non-state actors."

The participants discussed then some examples that show the pressures democracy is under. For instance, the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA) represent pioneering efforts to regulate tech monopolies and curb disinformation. Yet enforcement remains uneven, and AI governance is still embryonic. It is also a matter that is seen differently by the Europeans and the US leaders and key digital entrepreneurs based in America. 

Still in the US, polarisation and election denialism have strained democratic norms. The January 6th Capitol attack underscored vulnerabilities in institutional resilience. Ângelo added that President Trump's decisions taken since the beginning of his second mandate have equally challenged the authority of key institutions that play a vital role in the power balance. Those decisions should be seen as serious threats to the existing Constitution-based democracy, to the democratic equilibrium and to the media, among others. 

Other situations were also mentioned. 

India: The world’s largest democracy faces challenges from majoritarian politics and restrictions on press freedom, raising questions about the balance between stability and pluralism. The Global South: Democracies in Africa and Latin America grapple with debt crises and climate shocks, which authoritarian actors exploit to undermine governance. And Thailand, which is an unavoidable case study: Since 1932, the country has fluctuated between civilian governments and authoritarian regimes, experiencing at least 13 coups. These recurring crises reflect deep structural tensions between popular movements advocating inclusive governance and a conservative establishment. The result is a “constitutional samsara”—a cycle of birth and death that illustrates the fragility but also the resistance of democratic systems.

The Moderator asked for actionable policy recommendations. 

The participants listed a number of actions that must be taken into account: Civic Education for the Digital Age; Embed critical thinking and media literacy in national curricula; Promote ethical AI awareness among citizens and leaders; Expand frameworks like the EU Digital Services Act to include algorithmic transparency; Establish multilateral bodies for AI governance; Protect the independence of the judiciaries and the media; Develop rapid-response mechanisms for election integrity and cyber threats; Create a Democracy Partnership Forum, within the UN System, for coordinated global action; Link trade agreements to democratic standards.

To conclude the roundtable, the Moderator stated that the discussion had underlined that democracy is not a static achievement; it is a perpetual task. As Plato reminds us, liberty without virtue decays into tyranny. Harari warns that adaptability is the price of survival. Ângelo underscores that global, truthful solidarity is democracy’s lifeline in a fractured world. 

Before closing the debate and thanking the three  participants, the Moderator raised a final question: What is the future of democracy? 

Plato responded that without wisdom, democracy decays into tyranny. Cultivate reason above passion.

For Harari, without adaptability, democracy becomes obsolete. Embrace innovation, but guard against its perils.

Ângelo expressed the opinion that without solidarity, democracy weakens. Build trust—within societies and across nations.

Moderator: Thank you, gentlemen. The dialogue between past insight and present urgency reminds us: democracy is not a given; it is a never-ending task.

End of the imaginary roundtable. 

 

 

Writing about the future of democracy

Democracy in the digital age

Victor Angelo

 

The Association for the Promotion and Development of the Information Society (APDSI), a civic institution that has contributed over the years to the growth of cybernetics in Portugal, organizes today, at the Convento da Arrábida, a reflection on democracies in the digital age. In other words, a debate on the future of the exercise of political power in the face of extraordinarily rapid advances in the area of ​​information technologies, which will further deepen the era of the instantaneous, as I call the period we live in.

Immediate access to information without reference to context, the abundance of data available at any given time, the truth in competition with the false, advances in artificial intelligence, all this will end up jeopardizing political representation as we know it. It could also seriously undermine the credibility of institutions of governance, the administration of justice, representation and the media, and create new opportunities for manipulating citizen opinion.

As always, it will be the question of control of power that will be at stake. It is only the technologies and methods of achieving this end that change. About ninety years ago, extremists mobilized populations thanks to the adroit use of broadcasting. Now, it is about the ingenious use of digital platforms and the repetition ad infinitum of what is convenient for those who hold authority or want to come to power, regardless of the veracity of what is told. This creates a biased reality, which in politics serves two objectives: the destruction of the adversary's integrity and image; and the consolidation of power in the hands of those who appropriated it. This appropriation, in our western democracies, takes place first through elections and then through the manipulation of information and mirror games. Viktor Orbán is a concrete example, among many. He knows that being in power and losing the elections should only happen to the naive.

The accessibility of digital platforms makes them fertile ground for the propagation of populist ideas. These movements, built around a leader who combines charisma, enthusiasm and personality cult with simplistic slogans, have at their disposal, in this digital age, the means that allow them to massively explore three lines of political action. One, which involves the creation and amplification of collective fears that later use as banners of struggle. Another is the discrediting of institutions and opponents, who are demonized as “professional politicians”. And the third, which tries to subvert constitutional principles by resorting to popular referendums on fracturing issues, using reductive questions, drafted in a biased way.

All this calls into question representative democracy. Even more easily, when democratic practice came to depend on and be dominated by the leader of each major party and parliamentary representation lost its meaning, as it resulted only from personal loyalty and unreserved flattery. There is, therefore, no connection between the deputy and his constituency, at a time when social networks promote exactly the opposite and make everything more personal and direct. This results in a growing disconnect between the voter and the elected, which explains a good part of the apathy that many citizens feel towards electoral processes. Paradoxically, a higher level of information, made possible by digital networks, leads many to abstain, as they do not identify with the ready-to-vote menus of choices made by the parties.

Another phenomenon linked to the abundance of information has to do with political fragmentation. Through social networks, each person tends to identify with only a small circle that thinks the same way and ends up closing themselves in this round of contacts. This leads to the proliferation of opinion movements. In the future, governance will have to take this trend into account. In other words, it will no longer be possible to govern effectively with 50% of the electorate plus one. I am convinced that broader and relatively disparate coalitions will emerge, but necessary to guarantee the representation of various segments of society and governmental stability. The digital revolution will eventually shake up the conventional political scene.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 6 May 2022)

What kind of democratic government do we need?

Big problems call for big solutions

Victor Angelo

 

Angela Merkel came to power in 2005 because the Social Democratic Party (SPD) refused to enter into an alliance with the extreme left, which had its ideological roots in the defunct German Democratic Republic. If it had done so, the SPD would have taken the leadership of the new government and Merkel's fate would have taken a back seat. The SPD, which belongs to the same political family as António Costa's party, had obtained 34% of the vote in the September legislative elections, one percentage point less than the CDU/CSU grouping, which had Merkel as its candidate. After three weeks of negotiations, the Centre-right and the Socialists reached a governing agreement. The German parliament then approved the coalition of the two. They represented around 70 per cent of the electorate.

Merkel, at the head of the most voted, took over as head of government. She ended up leading Germany for 16 years, always in coalition. During her last mandate, she had the leader of the Socialists, Olaf Scholz, as vice-chancellor. On 8 December, Scholz became the new chancellor following elections last September. He too governs at the head of a coalition, which brings together the Greens, who are on the left of the political spectrum, and the Liberals (FDP), on the right. The common programme was negotiated over two months, measure by measure, always with the aim of reaching a compromise. During the process it became clear that one can negotiate with everyone except the extremists, the xenophobes and the enemies of freedom.

The German political culture is based on the search for platforms of understanding and the stability of the system. It has been this way since 1949, when Konrad Adenauer headed the first post-war democratic government based on an agreement between three parties in what was then the western part of Germany. In short, it is about maintaining a predictable, balanced course that is representative of as many voters as possible. A large part of the economic growth, modernisation and social welfare that defines Germany today is based on the stability and moderation of those in power.

Annalena Baerbock, leader of the Greens and now foreign minister, said that the new government "reflects the diversity" that exists in the country. This might seem an exaggeration. But the truth is that at the leadership level there is a will to include and to seek a balance between the interests of the different segments of society. There is no notion of a "main enemy", as there is in other political horizons. Whoever thinks of party action in terms of an "enemy" lives, perhaps without realising it, in a totalitarian ideological framework, in which political struggle is seen as an antechamber to the crushing of opponents or as a kind of civil war without shots being fired. There are no enemies in a democracy among all those who respect the constitution and understand that the prosperity of each citizen is fundamental to the progress and security of all.

The German example is not unique in the EU. Next door in the Netherlands, multi-faceted government coalitions have also been the norm. As in Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Finland, Luxembourg and so on. Not to mention the curious case of Denmark, which has a government composed exclusively of social democrats (socialists) but enjoys stable parliamentary support from three left-wing parties.

Advanced democracies are based on the search for broad consensus. Half plus one may be enough to have a majority in parliament and set the governing machine in motion. It is, however, a minimalist and only formal conception of democracy. The digital revolution, global competition, the enormous energy, security and social challenges, all this and much more can only be dealt with in the necessary depth if there is a broad common will to reform, modernise, simplify and protect. We have very complex issues ahead of us.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 14 January 2022)

 

 

 

Europe and the digital race

Europe out of the Digital Olympics

Victor Ângelo

 

The progress of the digital age, which has accelerated over the last decade, will be even faster, deeper and more pervasive in the coming years. Major transformations in information processing and use are coming, with amazing advances in artificial intelligence, 5G networks, new generations of microprocessors, 3D printing techniques, and in protecting cyber systems from hostile attacks. These transformations will have an enormous impact on the exercise of political power, on the economy and functioning of societies, on individual attitudes, as well as on international relations. 

Digital mega-investments are taking place today in the United States, China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. The latter three produce 60% of the semiconductors and are moving at a rapid pace towards faster, more efficient processors, and much less gluttonous in terms of energy consumption. 

Where will Europe stand in this new technological framework? Ursula von der Leyen last week defined the digital domain as a priority. The EU currently produces about 10 percent of the world's semiconductors. It has lost a lot of ground in the last 30 years. In 1990, it accounted for 44 percent of global transistor production.  The ambition defined by the President of the European Commission is to reach 20% in 2030. For this, it will be necessary to mobilize public and private investments in the region of 160 billion US dollars. It won't be easy. It is a lot of money, but insufficient when compared with the plans of others. South Korea, for example, is ready to invest 450 billion dollars. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC), the world's number one chipmaker, will invest $100 billion over the next three years to expand its capacity. Interestingly, part of this investment will take place in China, across the strait, and part in the United States. Thus, strategic interdependencies are created.

Europe is lagging not only in the field of processors. We are out of the league of champions when it comes to technology platforms. When you look at the top 10, you notice that six are American and four are Chinese. The platforms we know, in this part of the world where we are, such as Facebook, Twitter, Netflix, Google or even Uber, Airbnb or Booking, all have one or more Chinese competitors (Tencent, Weibo, WeChat, Baidu, iQuiyi and more).

Our picture is also not the best when it comes to the so-called unicorns. Many of the new applications and technologies are developed by newly established companies that the capital market values above $1 billion and calls unicorns. These companies are very important creative agents in the areas of artificial intelligence, financial software, e-commerce, and e-logistics. Digital giants follow them closely and eventually acquire the most innovative ones. Today, the inventory of unicorns totals 827 companies. Of these, only 57 are based in the EU area, with France and Germany at an absolute advantage in the tiny European share.

Given this, what does digital sovereignty mean in the EU? The question is even more pertinent if one takes into account the correlation between defence and artificial intelligence (AI). A recent report by the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, a US commission, shows that the major defence competition with China is primarily about AI. Whoever wins that race will have a critical advantage over the other side. The EU is out of this championship.

Many other questions remain, concerning the protection of people's rights, the fight against information manipulation, or even the meaning of democracy in robotic times.  All of them are important. But for us Europeans, the fundamental challenge is to clearly define a plan that allows the EU to leap from the periphery to the centre of the digital issue.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper. Edition dated 24 September 2021)

Reflecting on the United States elections

United States: after the confusion

Victor Angelo 

This week's subject has been the US presidential election. I don't want to get into the current discussion now. I just want to address two aspects that I think deserve more attention. 

The first is about the "beef". In 1984, a hamburger company created an advertising phrase that was immediately appropriated by the political class. The phrase was: where is the beef? In other words, beyond the verbiage, tell us what concrete proposals you are making? The question remains in the political arsenal and has a lot of argumentative force.

This year's election beef was a mixture of economic perspectives, pandemic management, and the fight for racial equality. These were the flags that mobilised the voters, beyond the deep love or disgust that each candidate raised. It became clear that citizens participate more in the electoral act when the meat is consistent, made of great causes.

The economy seems to have been the most important motivator of voter turnout. This reminds me of the famous expression used by Bill Clinton's 1992 campaign: "It's the economy, stupid! Donald Trump was, for his supporters, the best bet in terms of economic recovery. They were convinced that the covid would soon be resolved with the discovery of the appropriate vaccine. The important thing was to have an ultraliberal president in the economic area and a light foot, in fiscal matters. Trump managed to sell this image, as well as the representation of an opponent who would be in the hands of the leftist wing of the Democratic Party, i.e. who would be a puppet of what he called “the socialist radicals”.

On Joe Biden's side, the beef was in the pandemic, repeating the accusation of Trump's incompetence and lack of respect for safeguarding the lives of his fellow citizens. To this he added the fight against racial iniquities and violence against black citizens.  This political hamburger was a complete meal. But there was a catch: his opponent exploited the image of common sense and balance that Biden conveyed, and tried to turn it into a weakness. Projecting energy is part of the qualities of those in charge. So now we have a leader who needs to work on his image and show that he can combine humanism with firmness, including on the outside front. 

And we come to the second aspect. The European Union needs to draw two or three conclusions from all this.

The first is that Joe Biden, having confirmed his victory, will necessarily have to focus on US domestic politics, to broaden its support base and resolve a good part of the bipolarisation, resentment and hatred that exists in the country. In terms of foreign policy, in addition to a moderate return to multilateralism, he will have to focus on relations with China and this country’s neighbours.  It will have little time for European affairs.

The second is that a large proportion of Americans have a very different view of politics, economics and social relations when compared to the Europeans. The continuing divergence of values leads to a weakening of the alliance with Europe. The political gap between the two geopolitical areas will widen. We must therefore work harder for a Europe that is as autonomous as possible in the areas of defence and security, the digital economy, energy, and international payment systems. The blackmail that the outgoing administration has put on us, seeking our alignment with its unilateral decisions on economic and financial sanctions, has taught us that we must create our own mechanisms in these areas. 

Third, Europe must strengthen its foreign policy to gain space and independence from decisions taken in Washington. European foreign policy remains weak despite the resources made available to the European External Action Service. We must be frank and decisively address this weakness. It is a danger to be in the tow of other powers.

This election should lead to a more balanced and constructive international relationship. The European side must be able to seize the opportunity and become a stronger, more active, and independent partner. If it does, we can say thank you to Donald Trump for forcing us to open our eyes.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

 

A new model of politics

The huge amount of resources that the European Union member States will have available for recovery is a golden opportunity to change what needs to be changed. That means, as I see it, to invest on health and social matters, on an economy that is friendlier to the environment, on the digital dimensions and on greater inclusion of those who have less income and insecure jobs. The funding of new projects should be guided by these concerns. This is a turning point and we cannot miss it. I am confident the Commission will provide the necessary guidance and will try to make sure the governments do respect the paradigm change. The real challenge is to prevent these monies are used to enrich the supporters of those in power. That will be the old tendency. But we are in a new era. The European Commission must ensure that the citizens in each State have enough power to stop the old clientelism and the ways of doing things that make some richer and the vast majority more vulnerable.

Day 13 for the Yellow Vests

Today it was the 13^th Saturday with Yellow Vest demonstrators in Paris and other French cities.

It’s obvious the movement is still able to gather a good number of people. We can say so even if the total number of protesters today was smaller than in past weeks. The variety of reasons that bring the activists to the streets explains the numbers.

This is not a rally of dunces, as some would like us to see it. There are extremists in the ranks – militants from the far-right and from the far-left. They are trying to ride the social malaise. And they feel happy when they see cars burning or the State authority being challenged. But the majority of those on the streets is composed of people that face daily hardships and want to benefit from a safer economic environment. They are simple people, and they raise the key question about how to organise the society in developed nations at a time of big digital transformations, combined with international economic competition and the emergence of masses of skilled workers in other parts of the world.