Europe and the big powers: be strategic

 

Europe and the Illusion of Permanent Allies

Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published on: 17 Jul 2026

This week, yet another uncomfortable question arose regarding the Hormuz crisis. What legitimacy does a big power have to treat the chokepoints of global trade – and the States that depend upon them – as mere means to its own ends? On Monday, the President of the United States proclaimed himself the "Guardian of the Strait of Hormuz" and imposed a 20% tax on commercial transit through this maritime corridor. On Tuesday, he backtracked and annulled the measure. He did so under pressure from his Gulf allies.

The episode revealed a lack of strategic discernment – an essential quality in any leadership. Acumen is not hesitation, cowardice, or tactical calculation. It is the ability to assess the consequences of a decision before announcing it; to distinguish between what is legally possible, politically acceptable, and strategically sustainable; and to act in a manner that preserves credibility, rather than squandering it on incongruous gestures. A leader with discernment knows that power is not solely measured by the capacity to impose a measure, but also by the aptitude to foresee the resistance it will trigger.

The ephemeral tax of the self-proclaimed "guardian" was an example of imprudence: imposed as a fait accompli, without a recognised legal basis, without consulting the directly affected partners, and without a serious assessment of the Gulf States' reaction. The measure collapsed not out of generosity, but because the affected countries possessed the power to reverse it. The International Maritime Organisation confirmed there was no legal basis for this levy. The problem was not merely the decision; it was the public demonstration that a great power can announce a global measure and discover the following day that it lacks the conditions to sustain it. Consequently, it undermines trust in its word.

President Trump’s decision should not be read as an isolated episode or a personal eccentricity. It belongs to a broader pattern: that of great powers transforming interdependence into instruments of pressure. It is in Africa that this pattern is most clearly visible. All promise protection, investment, security, or development. All invoke the sovereignty of their partners. Yet, in far too many cases, the outcome is an asymmetrical relationship: African countries surrender resources, strategic positions, or decision-making leeway; great powers reap the advantages; and political promises remain contingent upon convenience.

In February 2025, the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) offered Washington access to the country's critical minerals in exchange for security guarantees. Partnership agreements between the two followed, signed in December of that year: the United States gained preferential access to Congolese mineral concessions and assumed the obligation to protect the sovereignty of the eastern DRC. On the American side, the pact did not translate into action. Washington limited itself to approving sanctions against Rwanda, which it accuses of sponsoring the rebels.

In Zimbabwe, the Chinese conglomerate Huayou Cobalt inaugurated the continent's first lithium sulphate plant in 2026. Zimbabwe banned the export of raw lithium to force local processing; it was China, not Zimbabwe, that built the processor – thereby capturing the enormous value of this project.

In Mali, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, the Russian Africa Corps protects military regimes in exchange for gold. These pacts are presented as exercises in sovereignty and protection of these States, but the result is akin to that observed in Kinshasa and Harare. Local partners pay with natural resources, dependence, and a loss of autonomy; great powers extract value; and the promised protection rarely equates to enduring security for the populations.

Europe must draw a clear warning from these examples. No great power is a full, automatic, and unconditional ally of Europe. Each acts according to its own interests:

• Washington seeks to preserve its geopolitical primacy.

• Beijing wishes to control value chains, markets, and critical technologies.

• Moscow aims to limit European autonomy and exploit its fundamental vulnerabilities.

Europe may cooperate with all powers when interests align. However, it must do so with the necessary political vision.

Thus, it is fundamental to abandon strategic naïvety. Strategic discernment demands that Europe maintain open channels, but reduce critical dependencies; cooperate when advantageous, but prepare alternatives; negotiate with seriousness, but without submission.

Washington may remain an indispensable partner in matters of security, but it must no longer be treated as the automatic guarantor of the European order. China may be a commercial and mutual investment partner, but it must equally be viewed as a systemic political competitor in industry, technology, and the control of raw materials. Russia may one day return to being an interlocutor, but as long as it employs coercion, threats, and military aggression as political methods, it must be viewed with suspicion.

European autonomy cannot be a mere rhetorical formula. The only alliances upon which Europe can rely in a stable manner are, first and foremost, those it manages to build within itself – on a foundation of genuine, not merely declarative, unity – and, subsequently, with blocs and economies of comparable weight.

It is not a matter of exchanging dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing or Moscow. Nor is it about fostering unnecessary enmities with the great powers. It is about recognising that, in an order dispersed among rival poles, without a single authority capable of enforcing international rules, Europe must face the great powers as what they structurally already are: competing entities whose interests may align with European ones at certain moments and diverge profoundly at others.

For Europe, this means one cannot confuse diplomatic proximity with peace; markets with dependence; and protection with tutelage. If Europe fails to learn these distinctions, it risks finding itself in the same league as those illusorily sovereign States, where the essential decisions regarding their security, digital systems, energy, industry, and prosperity run the risk of being made outside their own capitals.

Lukashenko flies low and will crash

Lukashenko in choppy flight

Victor Angelo

 

For some states, the repression of dissidents knows neither limits nor borders. Anything goes when someone is considered an enemy of the regime. Even when he or she lives abroad, convinced that it is safer. One may not be, however, if one is considered a target for the criminals who control power in the home country. Some dictatorships have an awfully long repressive arm. They have no qualms about operating on foreign soil and conducting murders, kidnappings, or making frivolous or unsubstantiated accusations in order to force Interpol to issue international arrest and repatriation notices. In other cases, they brutally intimidate family members who have remained in the country, with the aim of silencing the opponent in other latitudes.

The atrocious execution in Istanbul of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 was the most visible case in recent times. But it is not only Saudi Arabia that violates international law in this way. In a recently published report, the reputable NGO Freedom House took inventory of individual cases of transnational repression and the regimes that practice it, with total disregard for the sovereignty of other states and the norms of political asylum and refugee protection. In addition to the Saudis, the list includes China, Iran, Rwanda, Russia and Turkey. It would be easy, unfortunately, to add a few others. North Korea, for example, which organized the assassination of Kim Jong-un's half-brother at Kuala Lumpur airport in 2017. And as of this week, we have to include Lukashenko's Belarus.

The Belarusian dictator, who is not cleared of the well-founded suspicion of having rigged the August 2020 presidential elections in his favor, is afraid of his population and of those who lead the opposition against his regime. Therefore, it follows the old methods of dictatorships, that is, it represses the street demonstrations with all brutality, creates a generalized situation of fear, and decapitates the organizational summit, the leadership that is capable of making the popular masses move. Lukashenko, who has been in power since 1994, did not go to KGB school like his protector Vladimir Putin, but that does not stop him from acting in "special operations" mode.

That is what he did, by forcibly and cunningly diverting the Ryanair commercial flight from Athens to the Lithuanian capital. The interception violated all international standards related to civil aviation safety. It was also a serious affront to the European Union because it was an air link between two Schengen capitals, and a total disregard for political asylum rules. But it allowed him to kidnap and put out of action an important activist in the fight for democracy in Belarus, the young journalist Roman Protasevich.

The political costs of this criminal act are high. The European Council was expeditious and unanimous in its condemnation and response. The airspace Lukashenko controls is no longer on the route for European flights - and not only that, as several Asian airlines have followed suit - and the national airline of Belarus will have to suspend its connections with destinations within the EU. Moreover, the economic sanctions will be extended.

Some will say that these kinds of penalties have little effect on a country that depends primarily on its relations with Russia. They also add that such measures will increase Lukashenko's political subordination to the Kremlin. It is hard not to recognize the merit of these remarks. Experience shows that sanctions against third countries do not lead to major political transformations, except when they directly hit the ruling clique and the sectors vital for the country's economic survival. It is not yet known which will be the new personalities and which activities will be added to the existing sanctions list. But in these matters, the symbolic dimension is equally important. The political and diplomatic isolation of Alexander Lukashenko, and his people, must be made very clear. It serves as a lever. It is up to the Belarusian democratic opposition to do the rest. 

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published yesterday in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

Genocide: never again?

Today is a day of remembrance. In Rwanda, in Africa, here in Europe and in many parts of the world.

What started twenty-five years ago – a genocide that would last for over three months – is above all a Rwandan tragedy. But it is also a major failure for all of us, starting with the UN Security Council.

All the lessons have now been drawn. All the key responsibilities have been apportioned. But, can we say never again? I really hope so, like everyone else does.

It is true that countries do not want to recognise when a major calamity is in the making. Even when it is already in the horizon, some do not want to say they see it coming. That is also the case within the Security Council. However, I think the global information mechanisms are today more powerful. And that makes it a bit more difficult to pretend that there is no problem.

Boutros-Ghali: a diplomat with strong views

Boutros Boutros-Ghali passed away early in the day. And I feel compelled to say a few words of homage about my former boss. I served as his representative in The Gambia and later in Tanzania. And I want to remember him as a man of courage. He was not afraid of speaking up to the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Actually, he said one day, after he had left the UN, that he regretted not having been aggressive enough with the members of Security Council. In his opinion, the Council had not responded appropriately to the major crises of the time, Rwanda and the Balkans. But we cannot say it was his fault. He was very clear in his messages. In the case of the US, he had some difficult encounters with President Bill Clinton and his senior officers. He insisted but failed to convince Clinton that the situation in Rwanda was extremely serious. Clinton did not appreciate Boutros-Ghali´s critiques. And the mandate was not renewed. The power of the veto did the job

Rwanda and the Central African Republic

On this anniversary day, twenty years after the beginning of genocide in Rwanda, as we remember those terrible events and the hundreds of thousands of victims, we seem to forget that we have a similar situation in the Central African Republic. It is true the numbers are not as high, but the hatred between communities and the killing of innocents, of one´s neighbours, just because they look a bit different or dress in a way that shows their religious beliefs, are very similar to what happened in Rwanda.  And once again, we prefer to remember the past and ignore the deep challenges of the present.