A brief personal note on peacekeeping

Peacekeeping missions and diamonds

Victor Ângelo

 

This week, for not very noble reasons, the United Nations peace operations were in the Portuguese media spotlight

A peace mission, approved by the Security Council and accepted by the host country, has a complex configuration. Each mission - there are currently 12 - includes several components, although the best known is the military one. The other dimensions cover the areas of police, political process and national reconciliation, human rights, support to local administration, elections, and justice. They are usually huge operations, headed by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), appointed with the approval of the Security Council and at the equivalent rank of Under-Secretary-General.  Today, the largest is based in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with more than 17,000 personnel and an annual budget of more than US$1.1 billion.

The military part is one of the most sensitive, both because of the high number of troops deployed on the ground and because the protection of civilian populations is one of the priorities. I have always defended that the re-establishment of internal security should be one of the first objectives to be achieved, in order to show, without delay, tangible results and facilitate the acceptance of the external presence.

The blue helmets come from the most diverse cultures. Unlike civilian cadres, the military remain in the field for short periods - as a rule, the rotations last for six months. This circumstance and the type of duties they perform do not allow them to gain a sufficient insight into the social and cultural conditions of the people who receive them. That is why I have always determined that the interaction between the military and the population should only be made by elements that are expressly designated and prepared to liaise with the local communities. The rest of the contingent was not allowed to establish any type of individual contact with the population. This was intended to avoid situations of misunderstanding, abuse, and exploitation of poverty. On the other hand, civilian elements of the mission, working at the local level, were also responsible for permanently observing our interaction with the residents in every corner of the country. The good image of the mission was a precious asset that had to be protected at all times.

As SRSG, I oversaw two peacekeeping missions in countries rich in diamonds, misery and violence.

One of those missions was in Sierra Leone. In certain districts, the main activity was artisanal diamond mining. It was a subsistence economy, with thousands of young men digging holes in the bush or sifting river sands, most of the time without result. Around them circled swarms of middlemen, who bought the stones, if any. They then took care of transporting them to Freetown, where specialised traders, mostly Lebanese, obtained the official documentation that allowed them to be exported legally, in accordance with the Kimberley process.

This process, which was launched by the United Nations in 2003 precisely because of the blood diamonds from Sierra Leone, certifies the origin and the path of each stone. It stops the dubious origins, many of them linked to the violence of armed groups. Almost all diamonds on the market today are Kimberley certified. In the European Union, for example, it is practically impossible to introduce a diamond that does not have this type of guarantee. The same happens in the main world markets.

Later I led a mission in the Central African Republic, which included patrolling the border with Sudan. In that region, there were as many shops purchasing precious stones and gold as there were grocery shops. I deployed special forces from Togo in the region. Their behaviour was exemplary. In preparation for their deployment, it was explained to them that the image of their country was at stake. They understood that. A little pebble can have an enormous political impact.

Some good news from Africa

The people of the Central African Republic are tired of conflict. They have shown it a few days ago when they voted in the second round of the presidential elections. It was a peaceful day and the outcome of the elections was accepted by all the key players and also by the general population.

The former Prime-Minister Faustin Touadéra, a man I know well and have always appreciated, won the elections. It was in many ways a surprise. He was not the candidate the observers were betting on. But he got it. Peacefully. Constitutionally. And I only hope this means we have initiated the national reconciliation path.  

Celebrating the Pope in Bangui

The visit of Pope Francis to Bangui should be highly commended. He took the right decision, notwithstanding all the advice he got, from different countries and institutions, against such a visit on grounds of security. He has shown that leaders ought to be brave. That´s what people expect from leaders. He has also sent the message that conflicts, even very dramatic crisis like the one the Central African Republic experienced during the last two or three years, can only be solved if national efforts are supported by the international community. And that should be the case in CAR.

It was also very sad to see that the media keeps referring to religion and religious differences as the causes of violence in the country. The issue is much deeper. Religion is just a tag, an identification of sides in conflict. The true issues have to do with migrations into the country of pastoralists from much further North, deforestation and climate change, threats to traditional farming, livelihoods, and chaotic urbanization. And on top of all that, very low level leaders for decades, very often with the protection of political elites from Europe.

My fear is that once Pope Francis has left Bangui the country will fall back into the dark well of forgetfulness. It has been in that realm for so long. 

Little minds

There are so many new headlines from Gaza to Ukraine, from the planes that crash here and there, and then the Summer recess, that we just forget that the Nigerian school girls have not yet been freed, after several months in the hands of Boko Haram, and the Central African Republic is still the murderous chaos it was a few weeks back. And that the elections in Afghanistan are yet to be sorted out, long after the polling day. Not to mention Iraq, Libya, South Sudan, and so on...

Keep the eyes on the ball

The Football World Cup started today in São Paulo. The TV screens will be full of soccer news during the next few weeks. At a time when the crises in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mali, Libya, Ukraine, Iraq, Pakistan and other places keep deepening, people´s attention will be busy and focused on the ball. As they say, keep the eyes on the ball, we will take care of the rest…

Chaos as usual in the CAR

The Central African Republic has disappeared from the news. But the internal situation in the country is as chaotic and violent as it has been in the recent past. Lawlessness is the rule, ethnic cleansing is the daily reality. The international community´s response remains insufficient and unfocused. The UN presence is struggling to cope with the humanitarian challenges but lacks political strategy and a clear sense of direction.  

Peacekeeping and peace building in Africa

Thoughts on Peacekeeping within an African background

Victor Ângelo

1.       Introduction

On 10 April 2014 the UN Security Council approved the deployment of a peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (CAR), to be known as MINUSCA. Resolution 2149 (2014) defines MINUSCA´s contextual parameters and objectives. The starting date for the mission will be 15 September 2014.

With another five months to go, that date looks far away. This is especially the case when the serious turmoil in the CAR since late 2012 is taken into account. And this timeline becomes even more problematic when repeated warnings from senior UN staff are recalled – that the situation was out of control and it was clear that the country was sliding into genocide.

A brief comment on the timing of the resolution that has just been adopted would emphasise the absurdly slow decision-making pace of the Security Council. If the premier international body responsible for peace and security – which basically means safeguarding human life and preventing severe violations of human rights – takes such an incredibly long time to respond to a not-so-complex crisis like the one in the CAR, what can we expect from the Council in more intricate situations?

“Not much indeed”, would be tempting to answer.

However, the issue is more intricate than this reply suggests. The slow response to the situation in CAR shows that there are a number of serious problems related to UN’s peacekeeping capabilities, particularly in an African setting and in a region that is not directly linked to the strategic interests of the major global powers.

This is a very serious issue that requires urgent attention. Peacekeeping must be effective, fast-moving and people-centred. The UN remains the key player in matters of peacekeeping. In the end the security question that is so often raised is the security of the ordinary citizens, in particular the most vulnerable among them.  

There is no other international or inter-governmental institution that is in a position to play a comparable role, not even the African Union (AU), notwithstanding all of efforts the African leaders have made over the last 15 years to strengthen this kind of capacity within their regional organisation. The AU´s African Standby Force (ASF) is still work in progress, even in the East African region, where the preparatory work has gone further. At this stage, it is extremely optimistic to believe that the ASF will be fully operational in 2015, as was recently recommended, in the December 2013 assessment, which further recognised the many delays this undertaking has suffered so far.

Outside Africa, NATO has been mentioned as a possible actor in the areas of peace enforcing and peacekeeping. However, the Atlantic Alliance has no vocation to play an international peacekeeping role. It could, in some cases, be used as a rapid response solution, as an entry force. But in the current circumstances, notably after the Libyan expedition and the deep-rooted tensions with Russia on the Eastern European front, it is highly improbable to have a UN Security Council request addressed to NATO. The same is true as far as the Russia-inspired Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is concerned. CSTO countries already established a peacekeeping architecture at the end of 2010. But the force is yet to be seen on the ground. To date, no operation has been assigned to CSTO. And it is difficult to foresee this organization playing any out-of-area active role in the medium term. However, both NATO and CSTO should be included in the wider debate about the future of peacekeeping.

There should be no doubt at this stage that the way forward is to strengthen the UN´s capacity to respond. As that happens, it should not be forgotten that Africa is the continent where most peacekeeping missions are deployed. Recent missions, in South Sudan, Mali and now in CAR, have been approved in response to African challenges. In this context, as the UN should address some of its key shortcomings in peacekeeping, African leaders should also be encouraged to continue strengthening their own capacities. The goal here, in parallel to the reform of the UN apparatus, is to create an African capacity to respond to violent crises within the continent´s five Regional Economic Communities (RECs). In the foreseeable future, the RECs must be able to put together their respective Standby Forces, harmonise operational abilities and develop their regional machinery to deal with peacekeeping, peacebuilding and political transitions.

But, at this stage, it is important to focus on some of the key issues related to UN´s peacekeeping, whilst taking into account African experiences and needs. What follows are some brief observations that should be considered in terms of advocating for the urgent need to sharpen the UN´s tools.

2.       Faster deployments 

UN peacekeeping deployments take too long to materialise. This has now been a key issue for the last seven years or so. This is particularly the case in Africa, but is more generally so in non-English speaking countries.

Large scale Troop-Contributing Countries (TTCs) are overcommitted, in view of the demands coming from huge missions that are still in the field in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, Cote d´Ivoire, Liberia, South Sudan and elsewhere. Take the case of Mali, for instance. Only 55% of authorised military personnel have been deployed so far, despite the fact that the mission was established almost a year ago. Many of the troops that were fielded by the preceding African-only mission in the framework of a regional response – in this case ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States) troops plus Chadian soldiers who were already on the ground before the UN military presence – could not be re-hatted and transferred to the UN because they did not meet the standards the UN requires for its contingents.

This will certainly be the same in the CAR. The 6,000 MISCA soldiers –troops from neighbouring countries belonging to the Economic Commission of Central African States (ECCAS) – will face the same difficulties in terms of their eventual re-hatting as blue berets. For many months there will be a poorly staffed MINUSCA trying to stretch itself in order to fulfil its mandate. Most likely, when the first period of the mandate comes to an end on 30 April 2015, the number of soldiers will be well below the 10,000 that the UN Security Council resolution 2149 authorised.

The same is valid for the police component. MINUSCA should have 1,800 police personnel, most of them gendarmerie. This component is critical in a mission that basically has to respond to issues of law and order in a society in chaos. However it is unlikely that the UN will be able to mobilize the required numbers. In general, states that participate in peacekeeping operations have no spare police capacity that can be made available. This is one of the big differences between police services and military forces – availability. The number of soldiers waiting for a job is much higher. And only a handful of countries have gendarmerie services. In Africa, this is the case mainly in French-speaking countries. Very often those gendarmerie forces are not fully prepared to serve within a UN mission. Like their military counterparts, their standards of training do not meet the minimum requirements for a UN assignment.

All of this has an impact on the timely fulfilment of operations´ mandates as well as the effectiveness and the image of the UN. As they try to emerge from traumatic crises and find any opportunity to make their living, people in the host nation will see many UN military convoys arriving over a long period of time, a never-ending flow of troops and highly conspicuous equipment. They will contrast this with very low levels of security operations. Before anything else, newly arrived soldiers will be busy with their own installation, building their infrastructure. This actually can easily be exploited by those in the country that are not in favour of an international military presence. Experience has shown that heavy and slow-paced deployments can undermine the political consent, which is critical for the mission.

Any crisis that is followed by a peacekeeping deployment must be able to show quick wins. And the easiest problem to turn around in the initial phase of a deployment has to do with the security environment. It might take long to address its most critical dimensions. But it is possible to improve the popular perception related to the low intensity security threats. This is where the priority should be. It has an immediate impact on the lives of the citizens. Changes to the security situation are among the first expectations. An improved situation is a winner, it terms of gaining people´s support. But doing so requires faster deployments, troops that can hit the ground running. This is not the case today, in most of the situations.

3.       Effectiveness 

The countries providing brigades and vast numbers of police personnel are generally African (Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, etc) and South Asian (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan). They are oversubscribed in terms of UN peacekeeping commitments. Very often, however, politically they do not want to recognise this, as the international assignments are an important part of their armed forces’ expectations. Rather, they tend to make promises and accept engagements without being sure they will have the capacity to deliver on time and with the necessary standards of quality. Also, the personnel they might be able to mobilise are general purpose infantry troops and street police officers. The force enablers and multipliers as well as air and ground mobility assets are generally insufficient and sometimes inadequate for the terrain in which they have to operate. Without them, the effectiveness of a field presence is very limited or even non-existent.

Complexity calls for more focussed deployments, highly trained men and women and more specialised military personnel. Missions now require many more Special Forces and intelligence officers – both for people-based and signals information collection and analysis – than just sentinels and patrolmen. The Council is still caught up in an approach that tries to respond to generic skills, poor performance and low standards by increasing the numbers of soldiers. This way of doing business needs to change.

For sure, this is an area where developed countries must be more forthcoming. During the last two decades they have been moving away from engaging troops in UN peacekeeping operations, with one or two exceptions, like the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. It is time to see European and North American troops and police officers back in UN missions. The developed world must be a more active part of the peacekeeping equation. They must unequivocally demonstrate that global responsibility for peacekeeping is not shared out along the lines of money: those who pay for missions do not deploy and those who deploy, largely from the developing South, are paid to keep international peace. This undermines the principle of joint responsibility for world peace. It also does not take into account that the developed countries would have a greater chance to advocate for their values and interests if their soldiers could be found shoulder to shoulder with uniformed men and women coming from other regions of the world.  Moreover, richer countries have and can spare the specialised personnel so much in demand. They also have the specific, highly efficient logistics capabilities that peacekeeping operations in remote areas around the world require.  

The second move that more developed member states should make concerns training for defence and security personnel. The military training programme the EU is implementing in Mali is a good example and it should be replicated in the CAR. As it has just been decided for Mali, after a long hesitation, it must also include the gendarmerie and the police, not just the armed forces. Investing in the development of human resources and institutions is critical to help a country overcome chronic crisis. Richer nations must be much more committed to security sector reform and the development of defence, police and penal institutions in countries coming out of a deep national crisis. The capacity building packages must also include revamping justice systems –without forgetting the relevance of traditional methods of administering justice – as a means of combating impunity and contributing to national reconciliation and long-term stability.

A cautionary note though. Training national forces and reforming national defence and security institutions in a post-crisis country must be accompanied by a plan for financial sustainability. Experience has shown that African officers trained in the best US and European academies often feel a high degree of professional frustration when they return to their national army corps, because those units are underfunded. Indeed, because of lack of resources, most units are unable to go beyond a collection of “barefooted” armed men, dressed in uniforms of fortune and flea market camouflage. They have no real means to operate. They can easily become the breeding ground for the future wave of discontent and crisis, as we have seen in Mali in 2012. The issue of the financial sustainability of modern armed forces and police services in a number of African countries requires an honest debate.

4.       Strong political mandate

The effectiveness of any UN peacekeeping mission is clearly related to its political mandate. This mandate must be realistically defined.

In terms of the African-based missions, there is now a tendency to attach to mandates an array of concerns and objectives. They are certainly important but they are generally more related to long term development goals than to keeping the peace and creating the conditions for political transition and basic human security. It will be wise to strike a balance between comprehensiveness and the core objectives of peacekeeping. Focus would make the mission stronger. It would therefore increase the chances of success.

Mandates should above all aim at creating the political and security foundations on which peace building and development should rest. Actually, an area that requires greater attention, both in terms of knowledge and identification of the practical lessons learnt so far, is the one related to the connections between peacekeeping and peace building. But those links cannot be a pretext for unworkable mandates.

Next to focus, the political role of head of mission is critical for deep-rooted change, for the move from crisis to institutional, representative democracy. It is therefore indispensable to make sure the mission leadership gets the full political support of the Security Council and the relevant regional organisations (the AU, for instance, and the affected REC).

In addition, the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) must be better prepared to exercise their respective backstopping roles. For too long, the state of mind in both departments has been inspired by the arrogant attitude and detachment that comes from working at headquarters and too far away from the realities of the daily life in the field. In particular DPKO has shown, on many occasions, to lack the skills and field experience necessary to provide the right type of advice to the missions that fall under its responsibility and to serve as a permanent channel between the field and the key countries in the Security Council. The rotation of staff between headquarters and field needs to be effectively implemented.

Leadership issues are crucial in all complex situations, particularly in countries that have gone through major national upheavals. Those issues are not only about the quality of the mission leadership or the sorts of diplomatic interventions carried out by regional leaders. Leadership is fundamentally about daring to create the domestic conditions for a renewal of the national political elites in the post-crisis situation and allowing for the right type of leaders to emerge, including at the local level. New times call for new leaders grounded on accepted political practise. Leaders with legitimacy. In this context, proper electoral processes, at the presidential, national and local levels, are critical elements of an exit strategy. They call for continued support by the best technical teams available within the international peace machinery. But they should not be considered the absolute benchmarks. To complete successful elections cannot be seen as the indicator that the mission has done its job and can leave. Nonetheless, fair elections do make the transition process more sustainable and open the door for an earlier exit of the international presence.

The emphasis on national and local political leadership cannot ignore the role of civil society. A strong the civil society is essential for stability, reconciliation and democracy. Peacekeeping missions must give the example and fully accept civil society as a critical partner in the transition process. That will send a clear message to the new political elite that will emerge after the crisis. Expertise on civil society relations must be part of the mission´s skills.

5.       Reducing costs

UN peacekeeping operations are very costly endeavours. A mission like the one just approved for the CAR might require a billion US dollars a year. This is undoubtedly a lot of money. Its financing is mandatory for the UN member states once the mission has been authorised by the Council. At a time of continued cost restraint and belt tightening, governments in key capitals, those that carry the main budgetary burden for UN operations, become very hesitant when it comes to this level of expenditures. This is a basic reason why approval of the resolution on CAR was delayed. Finance ministries have the first word when it comes to deciding about new international operations. Moreover, the Council knows when a mission will begin but has no clear idea about when it will end.  

It is therefore critically important to look at ways of containing costs. Not only should the mission objectives be clearly articulated, they should also be attainable within a reasonable amount of time. It is also imperative to build the national capacity to take over as soon as possible. The ultimate responsibility for peace and security in a country rests within its national borders, with its authorities and its citizens. Financial considerations make this principle more present than ever.

A further cost related question pertains to the exit strategy of the mission, which should be incorporated from the very beginning as a primary component of the mission design. It is essential that the Security Council asks DPKO and the head of the field mission to devise a reasonably defined plan focused on the gradual but steady transfer of responsibilities to the national and sub-regional authorities as soon as it is feasible to do so. Feasible means that peace can be sustained without direct intervention by the international community. A plan that would be both a road map to guide the peace keeping mission and serve as a blueprint for its exit strategy.

6.       Moving ahead

UN peacekeeping has achieved some notable results in the past. Sierra Leone, in Africa, and East Timor in the South Pacific, are just two recent examples of major successes in the recent past. UN peacekeeping has also changed a lot for the better over the last decade. Those who saw peacekeeping in the Balkans during the 1990s and then observe today´s operations notice that the UN has come a long way in terms of integration of different dimensions and creating a balance between the military and the civilian components of missions. There is now much greater emphasis on law and order and policing, justice, local administration and conflict resolution at the community level, as well as on gender equality and human rights. The UN has also accumulated extensive experience in terms of logistics supply and sustainment, air and ground mobility and support to humanitarian emergencies. 

But times keep changing. Conflicts are increasingly about basic natural resources and survival, differences in religious practices and faith-based behaviours, terrorism, wide spread banditry and criminality, and the collapse or limitations of state administration, living vast areas ungoverned. At the same time, violent conflicts tend to have deep and complex root causes, which necessitate time to be resolved. But the attention span of the international community has become shorter. And so many of us have acquired the fever of impatience, we live at the speed of the TV screen or even the social media, shaped by the 140-character approach. We want to see results before too long, if not immediately. Protracted conflicts tend to disappear from the public eye if they become too static or nothing happens. As they lose prominence, they receive less political and financial support. Their prolonged budgetary costs become more difficult to justify.

Sixteen missions are deployed in different parts of the world, nine of them in Africa. The defence sector has also been under review in several key developed countries, prompted by the need to adapt to contemporary threats and be prepared to respond to new international settings. This is therefore the moment to reflect again about the peacekeeping challenges as it was done almost 15 years ago, when the Brahimi report was issued.  Time and circumstances make it advisable to review and update the recommendations of that important and influential report.

It is also the time for the EU and the AU to reflect, in house and in their joint consultations, on what can be reasonably done by both parties to complement the UN peacekeeping work. This is a debate that should take place without further delay. It should be linked to the next evaluation of the EU African Peace Facility (APF) and its transformation into an instrument of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. For Africa, the doubling of APF resources over the next three years, recently decided at the IV EU-Africa Summit, is encouraging and certainly appreciated. But there is a need to go beyond resources, as important as they are, and look at the substance of what really needs to be funded and how that can be integrated in a long-term strategy of greater African self-reliance. This about Africa´s capacity to sort out its own conflicts.

This debate would also benefit from the long experience the Norwegians have acquired in the implementation of their Training for Peace programme (TfP). The programme, funded by the government of Norway since 1995 and managed by African institutions, has been able to evolve over time. It is now particularly attentive to training in the areas of African civilian capacities and police personnel for peacekeeping, as well as focused on the need to support applied research. In this, the EU has a good source of inspiration when designing the new generation of training missions. Such missions should take advantage of the Malian experience – the EU Training Mission –, be civilian led and as inclusive as possible.  

The way forward should further consider the experience of coalitions of the willing and the role of small groupings of countries as suppliers of peace enforcing and peacekeeping tasks. But this is a discussion for another time. However, it cannot be brushed aside and ignored. Nor should China´s ambitions to support peace and security operations in Africa be forgotten. Here, the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, approved in 2012, is worth noting.

All this calls for a very direct question: Who is going to lead the debate on renovating peacekeeping? It must be an institution that is in a position to bring all of the stakeholders together, including the EU, for sure, but above all, the African institutions that have the responsibility for peace and security throughout the continent.

The answer seems obvious.

April 2014

Anothe lame duck mission in the making

The same day I had a discussion about the frustratingly slow and very incomplete deployment of the UN peacekeeping operation in Mali (MINUSMA), the Security Council has approved the fielding of a very large mission to the Central African Republic. To be on the safe side, in terms of readiness to deploy, the Council decided that the effective starting date for this new operation will be September 15. But everyone knows that there is very little spare capacity really available for these very large missions. The new one will be struggling for military, police and civilian staff as MINUSMA is doing.

Actually, it is time to think very differently about the peacekeeping operations. We cannot just base ourselves on the old model of extensive military presence for an extremely large duration of time. Things need to be thought in more dynamic terms, shorter and more specialised missions, with a very firm political mandate. 

Rwanda and the Central African Republic

On this anniversary day, twenty years after the beginning of genocide in Rwanda, as we remember those terrible events and the hundreds of thousands of victims, we seem to forget that we have a similar situation in the Central African Republic. It is true the numbers are not as high, but the hatred between communities and the killing of innocents, of one´s neighbours, just because they look a bit different or dress in a way that shows their religious beliefs, are very similar to what happened in Rwanda.  And once again, we prefer to remember the past and ignore the deep challenges of the present.

Ashton and the hesitant EU states

Today Baroness Ashton, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has issued a statement on “the extremely grave situation in the Central African Republic”. The title says everything. Or maybe, almost everything.

The statement recognises that the situation has been deteriorating very seriously since the beginning of this week. The French troops and the African military mission are just overwhelmed by the increasing violence, the widespread attacks against Muslims, and the generalised chaos in a country that has been pretty chaotic for a bit of time now.

The main addressees of this declaration are the EU states themselves. They have been very reluctant in fielding a peace mission in support of those already on the ground. The EU governments have invented all kinds of excuses to delay the deployment of the forces. Some of these forces are ready to go but their political masters prefer to say that they need additional training, just as a way of procrastinating.

It is true that CAR is far away. One can even say that Libya is much closer and is still in disarray and the Europeans do very little to help this neighbour. There is a big difference though. Libya is not witnessing a genocide-type of conflict. There the issue is more about strengthening the state authority.

I can understand the reluctance on the European side when it comes to sending troops to address a law and order challenge. Troops are not policemen. They are supposed to deal with military threats. But if you do not have enough gendarmes and special police forces to deploy, you go for the military solution as stop-gap approach. It is either that or more innocent civilians being simply massacred.

For those like me who have spent a few years dealing with the country and the region, the short term response – to stop the violence – does not seem too difficult and certainly it would not require a very large force.

It calls however for a commitment on the EU side that is now clearly absent. And Mrs Ashton cannot state it with the same clarity I can. But she means it.

Critical peace issues

I had a long discussion today about the current impact of the UN missions on peace and security. It all started with a silent crisis, Guinea-Bissau. Nobody talks about that country and the lasting disaster that has been around for so long. That is a DPA-led mission, meaning, the UN department of Political Affairs has the responsibility to guide the UN presence on the ground and report to the Security Council on a regular basis. Then, we looked at Cote d´Ivoire, where we have had a peacekeeping operation for quite some time. There is very little progress, I would say in a very diplomatic language, as far as domestic reconciliation is concerned. Next to it there is a UN peacekeeping presence in Liberia. The country has been struggling to rebuild itself, after many years of civil war and wanton destruction. There are now some serious issues of governance. Are we addressing them?

And we moved on, to the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Mali, not to mention the work of the UN missions in Libya and elsewhere. And the same question came out a number of times? Are we addressing the key issues?

The point is very simple. In all these situations, conflicts can come back, sooner or later, if we are not able to deal with the critical causes of instability. And in some cases, it is even worse. We are simply not able to help the countries to move out of the swamp. 

We need a new approach to EU external military deployments

The decision to deploy an EU brigade to Bangui –EUFOR RCA – has now been taken. The level of ambition and the duration of this mission are very limited, at best 6 months, and just to protect the international airport.

But that´s not my point today.

The decision has shown once more that the EU has to adopt a different model to finance this type of missions. They cannot be financed by the participating countries. Some countries would be ready to supply the soldiers and the logistical military support but they can´t afford the costs. Portugal is just one those countries. Lisbon would be willing to deploy but the defence budget for 2014 cannot pay for it. This means the Portuguese will stay away.

These missions should be funded from a common EU budget. Each member state should contribute to the annual replenishment of that fund in accordance with their GDP per capita. This is the only way to approach in more proactive way the external peace keeping operations of the EU. If it is not adopted, we will continue to see a contradiction between the decision to assist counties in crisis and the effective deployment of a credible force. The foreign ministers will taken the decision but the soldiers will not reach the ground on time and in sufficient numbers.

 And Germany, among others, will never be part of any effort of this type. Not even by contributing a few euros. 

The hammer and the security challenges in CAR

My column of today in the Portuguese general affairs weekly magazine Visão is about the deployment of foreign troops in the Central African Republic (CAR). My point is basically that the international community is sending soldiers there in very limited numbers and then asking them to play law and order roles in the midst of a widespread civilian chaos. Not only the deployed military are insufficient in numbers for securing such a vast country, they are also called to do tasks that police and gendarmerie are best suited to implement. This is a major source of frustration for the soldiers. And they see no end to it, as there is no plan to bring formed police units from outside the country, no international police advisors, and no trainers to help the CAR authorities to re-establish their own security institutions. Again, the international community is making use of a hammer when the tools required are quite different. 

The Central African Republic: the coming days can change the situation.

I spent a good deal of the day looking at the new developments in the Central Africa Republic. And I came to the conclusion that the departure from power of Michel Djotodia, the Interim President that rode the March rebellion and subsequently lost control of its own allied rebel forces, the Seleka combatants, opens a window of opportunity for security and reconciliation. The sooner the new Interim President is chosen by the assembly of representatives the better.

Then, the partners of the country should provide enough resources for him to be able to rebuild the national security forces and bring law and order back. This is where the priority should lie. 

Central African Republic: the forgotten crisis

When it comes to political decisions, the Central African Republic remains outside the main radar screens, notwithstanding all the dramatic news about the civil unrest in the country. France is on it alone, playing a complex role that has more to do with gendarmerie and police tasks than with military assignments. But what is on the ground is a military expeditionary force. That is feeling more and more frustrated by the type of challenges they have to face in Bangui, and also because they are so stuck in the capital city that they can´t respond to the problems elsewhere in the country.

This French force should be rapidly complemented by a comprehensive peacekeeping operation, under the overall leadership of the UN. That is not going to happen any time soon. The African Union is very reluctant when it comes to accepting a UN force. They are still convinced, I want to believe, that they will be able to deploy an AU mission and take care of the security situation. It is unrealistic as an approach. The African Union is no measure to put together the required integrated force. They should be confronted with such truth. And they should also cease to play along the interests of the Chadian President, Idriss Déby, who seems to be the key African opponent to a UN presence.

The US is also against a UN mission in CAR. They base their position on the fact that such mission would carry additional financial costs to Washington. And they do not want to put more money, at this stage, on UN peacekeeping operations. OK, I can understand the costs issue. That could be sorted out by drawing down the missions in Haiti, Cote d´Ivoire and Liberia at a much faster pace. These are missions that have long ago achieved their key goals and should only be continued with a much smaller field presence.

By the way, the approval of additional forces in South Sudan, which has a very high budget tag, was accepted by Washington in a matter of hours…

That´s why I say that CAR is the forgotten crisis. It has always been like that. 

CAR and Chad, two neighbours

Since Saturday, two days ago, ten flights have taken place between Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic, and N´Djaména, the Chadian capital. These air bridge is evacuating a large number of Chadian citizens, men, women and children, that for a long period had peacefully lived side by side with their neighbours, the Central Africans, but that are now being targeted by violent mobs. The CAR citizens now see the Chadians as Muslims and enemies.

This is indeed a very sad development.

There are still many Chadians camping at Bangui airport. Most of them will be taken out tomorrow.

As this is taking place, there is no real political process taking place to complement the military presence provided by the French and the African contingents. This basically means that the crisis is not being addressed. The soldiers cannot do more that establish some security pockets here and there. It is up to the politicians, to the regional and international leaders, to create a framework that should bring peace back. 

Central Africa and the Sahel

I spent a bit of the day on the news and comments being produced about the dramatic events in the Central African Republic (CAR). And I end up the day very much amazed by the little knowledge people seem to have about the root causes of the current crisis. Then, I wonder how can the external players contribute to a finding a solution to a problem they do not fully understand?

I served in CAR from 1985 to 1989. Then, I came back in 2008 up to 2010, to be deeply involved with the unfolding events.

I vividly remember my discussions with President Bozizé. Including about the role of Muslim armed groups operating in the border areas with Darfur and South-Eastern Chad. And the growing tensions with pastoralists coming from the Sahel. CAR had obviously changed in its social set-up between my first and second stay in the region. And that change was not only a warning of the crisis in the making. It was, in many ways, one of vectors of much deeper and multifaceted transformation that is being imported from the arid lands of the North and moving into the Bantu areas of central tropical Africa. 

Central African Republic

There is increased noise about the possibility of a UN peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic (CAR). The friends of that country and of Africa should amplify the noise to make sure the key world leaders understand that such a mission is required. It should actually be on the ground soonest.

However, I am afraid the noise will not be strong enough. My sources tell me there is little chance to be able to find the troops and deploy soon enough. The UN is still struggling with its deployment in Mali. To add CAR to the list would be like adding complication to complexity.

But it has to be done.

And at the same time, it calls for decisions on the rapid phasing out of peacekeeping missions where they are no longer critical. That brings to mind Cote d´Ivoire and Liberia, for instance.

Il also reminds us that the UN Security Council has to be better at defining and monitoring exit strategies. Peacekeeping missions need to be goal oriented and time sensitive. 

Central Africa

The Central African Republic (CAR) is now a failed state.

The capital city, Bangui, is controlled by armed groups of uncertain origin. They are most likely dominated by warlords from Southern Darfur and Eastern Chad. They have little to do with CAR’s main ethnic groups but they are allied to Central Africans from the North-Eastern border areas. These are Muslims in a country that is largely Christian.

Besides the capital, there are other armed groups and several “self-defence” committees. But there is no central authority, no law and order, no administration and no modern economy. It is just chaos and extreme hardship.

The situation can easily spill over into some of neighbouring countries. They are also very fragile. They could become the next prey of the roaming armed men.  

The African Union has pledged to send a peacekeeping force to the country. It will be difficult for the AU to be able to mobilise the force and the resources required. It will also be a very delicate mission because of the religious divide that is now taking place, for the first time in the history of CAR.

The international community should understand that the country needs, urgently, not at the pace the AU can mobilise itself, a very robust international force, with full executive powers.

It is the survival of CAR’s population that is, first and foremost, at stake. But not only. It is an entire region. A region that is already the least stable of Africa. 

In politics, you better be your own man (or woman)

During my work with President Francois Bozizé of the Central African Republic (CAR) – from 2008 to 2010 – I always felt that he was too inclined to indiscriminately follow Idriss Déby’s positions.  For me, and I said it several times, it was not good politics to be so much dependent on the Chadian President.

 First, Chad and CAR are too very different socio-political realities. Even Southern Chad, that at the surface could be considered similar to CAR, is distinct and cannot be easily compared with the reality south of the border.

Second, Déby is a man from the Sahel and his views about Central Africa are not necessarily the most appropriate ones.

Third, the support Bozizé was looking for in N’Djamena had a negative impact on CAR’s domestic politics: leveraged by Chad, Bozizé did not see the critical relevance and urgency of moving faster on the issues of national reconciliation and power-sharing.

But Bozizé had a different view.

Now, things have changed. He has been ousted from power. And from his temporary refuge in Cameroon, today Bozizé accused the President of Chad of being behind the rebels that chased him from the presidency and the country.

As they say, quite often in politics the lessons are learned when it is already too late.