Letter to President Vladimir Putin: Christmas 2025

Formal Diplomatic Communication

Date: December 23, 2025

To: His Excellency Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation

Subject: Strategic Realignment, UN Charter Compliance, and the Restoration of the European Security Architecture

Your Excellency,

In the interest of regional stability and the prevention of a systemic collapse of the Eurasian security architecture, I write to you to propose an immediate pivot toward a negotiated settlement. The ongoing aggression against Ukraine has created a breach of the peace that now threatens not only the immediate belligerents but the very foundations of the United Nations Charter, which the Russian Federation, as a Permanent Member of the Security Council, is sworn to uphold.

Central to this appeal is a return to Article 2(4), which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity of any state. To ensure that a ceasefire is not merely a pause in hostilities but the start of a durable peace, I urge the Russian Federation to engage with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) through the following Chapter VII enforcement mechanisms:

Proposed Chapter VII Enforcement Framework

The invocation of Chapter VII provides the legal authority necessary to guarantee that any peace agreement is both enforceable and permanent:

• Provisional Measures (Article 40): The UNSC should demand a synchronized withdrawal of heavy weaponry to a verifiable distance, monitored by a neutral UN-mandated mission.

• Compliance-for-Relief (Article 41): A roadmap for the phased de-escalation of economic and diplomatic restrictions in correspondence with verifiable military withdrawal and the restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty.

• Security Guarantees (Article 42): The authorization of a Robust Peacekeeping Operation to enforce a demilitarized zone, providing strategic depth without unilateral military presence.

Revitalization of the NATO-Russia Founding Act

Beyond the immediate cessation of hostilities, a long-term solution requires the renewal and modernization of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. A revitalized Act would provide the institutional framework needed to transition from a "balance of terror" to a "balance of interests." 

I propose the following Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) to restore a baseline of predictability:

• Institutionalized De-confliction: Re-establishing the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) at the permanent representative level, supplemented by a 24/7 military-to-military "hotline" between the Russian General Staff and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

• Transparency of Exercises: A commitment to mandatory pre-notification of all military maneuvers involving more than 9,000 troops and the reciprocal invitation of observers to all drills, exceeding the standards of the Vienna Document.

• Strategic Restraint Zones: Negotiating "zones of limited deployment" along sensitive borders where neither side would station permanent, substantial combat forces or nuclear-capable intermediate-range missiles.

• Joint Risk-Reduction Centers: Creating a shared facility for real-time data exchange on missile launches and large-scale troop movements to eliminate the potential for miscalculation or accidental escalation.

The Role of the Security Council as Guarantor

The UN Security Council must act as the primary guarantor of this new arrangement by codifying any final agreement into a binding Resolution. This elevates a bilateral truce to an international legal obligation, making any future violation a matter of collective global response.

A return to the diplomatic track, anchored in the legal weight of the UN Charter and the revitalized principles of the Founding Act, offers the only viable path to a stable, peaceful, and prosperous continent.

Framework for War Reparations and Reconstruction

A sustainable peace is inseparable from the principle of accountability for material and moral injury. In accordance with the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), I propose that the peace process incorporate a structured reparations mechanism. This would involve utilizing the recently established International Claims Commission in The Hague to adjudicate claims recorded in the UN Register of Damage.

To facilitate this, I suggest a "Reparations-for-Reintegration" roadmap: a negotiated schedule wherein the satisfaction of adjudicated claims—covering infrastructure reconstruction, environmental damage, and civilian compensation—is linked to the phased and orderly release of immobilized Russian sovereign assets. This multilateral approach ensures that the immense financial burden of reconstruction is addressed through a legitimate legal process, providing a transparent "off-ramp" for the restoration of Russia's standing in the global financial system while upholding the rights of the victims of the conflict.

Respectfully,

Victor ÂNGELO
Former UN Special Representative/USG

Reflecting about 2025

Year-End Notes

Victor Ângelo

If I were asked to summarise 2025 in a single word, I would say “turbulence”. This has been a year of great unrest, and I do not know who should be awarded the top spot on the podium of dishonour: Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, Benjamin Netanyahu, or the rebel Sudanese general Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti. Other names could be added to the list, including terrorist leaders, but it is not worth discussing minor players or making the list excessively long.

The year draws to a close leaving leading geopolitical analysts deeply uneasy. Not for decades has the word war been so prevalent in the speeches of influential people. Now the word appears repeatedly, as if it were an inevitability on the near horizon. It is a disturbing way to end the year. When the conversation about war monopolises the media space and public debate, it makes us forget the role of diplomacy and international organisations, opening the door to disinformation, alienation, and hatred. Thus, war criminals—people who should be driven from power and brought to The Hague—are given a platform and credibility.

After all, what has been learned in 2025? In short, that peace, cooperation, and stability based on respect for international law are not—contrary to the illusion created since the end of the Cold War—the pillars of modern times. They ought to be the foundations of globalisation, but globalisation is not apolitical. On one side of the coin, it is positive. On the other, it creates dependencies, vulnerabilities, and brings back the discretionary use of force. Despite everything, it is fundamental to insist on the positive dimension of globalisation and to condemn without hesitation those who do not respect international norms and refuse to recognise that the future of humanity will only be prosperous if there is solidarity between peoples and peace between States. Believing that a peace agreement can be reached with people like Putin, for example, only enters the minds of ambiguous and incomprehensible actors like Steve Witkoff or well-known fifth columnists like Viktor Orbán.

Putin is a tyrant and, like all other totalitarian leaders, does not recognise the value of diplomacy or deliberation. This week, in an exchange of correspondence with a member of his circle, the gentleman tried to convince me that Putin personifies the sentiment and historical soul of the Russian people. Just as Trump is said to be the personification of the will of the majority of American citizens. I had to remind him of something he already knew: that I have met multiple dictators throughout my professional life. The last thing I would say about such people is that they represent the people to whom they belong. The inflation of their outsized egos is their primary motivation. In truth, they represent only themselves, their boundless ambition, and the opportunists who cling to them. It is all a matter of terrible leadership taken to the extreme. They do not accept peace agreements, let alone the spectre of defeat. The subjugation of those they label as enemies is the only solution they consider in their delusion. A dictator oppresses, creates a false narrative, and a system of absolute control over power. Anyone who thinks they can trust a despot is, quite simply, naive.

This must be one of the lessons of the year. Unfortunately, there are leaders who seem not to have learned it. They claim to be convinced—and want to force others to accept—that it is possible to reach an agreement with a Putin acting in good faith.

He will never agree to sign security guarantees that are actually sufficient to ensure the survival of Ukraine. He has already stated this clearly: any stabilisation force, should one ever be established, must not and cannot include European troops. At best, Putin would accept a force composed of soldiers from underdeveloped countries or, failing that, detachments from vassal regimes or those close to the Kremlin’s policies. Such a stabilisation mission would be merely symbolic, like trying to stop the wind with your hand palms. To have legitimacy and effectiveness, it should result from a genuine and sincere commitment between Ukraine and Russia, and stem from a mandate approved by the UN Security Council. None of this has any possibility of happening in the near future. France and the United Kingdom would veto any resolution that did not offer sufficient guarantees. And Ukraine could not approve a setup essentially engineered in the Kremlin.

Whether one likes it or not, the year now ending must remind us of two other dimensions: that the drawing of borders must not depend on the force of arms, and that whoever initiates aggression against another State must be held indisputably accountable for the crimes committed and the damage caused.

It is essential to remember this at a time when there is discussion in Brussels about what to do with the Russian sovereign funds already frozen in Belgium. These funds must remain withheld until the end of the conflict and until Russia’s just assumption of responsibility for what it has destroyed and for those it has injured and killed in Ukraine. Only then, during peace negotiations, should the fate of these funds be decided. They could be used, including accumulated interest, for war reparations, which would be the most appropriate conclusion. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s allied States should issue common debt intended to finance Ukrainian public spending, in the form of loans guaranteed by the frozen Russian assets, and tighten the sanctions regime against Russia and its international partners. This is, however, a temporary solution. Should the Kremlin continue to insist on prolonging the aggression, the matter must be reviewed. The non-use of Russian assets directly, for now, should be presented as a gesture in favour of peace. But one with an expiry date.

---

A brief comment about the new US National Security Strategy and the shared interests with Europe

 An Incomplete Reading of the New US Security Strategy

Victor Ângelo

The elites currently in control of federal power in Washington have a mistaken view of Europe. The document they have just published on the National Security Strategy (NSS) criticises most European leaders in an unacceptable and unfounded manner. Furthermore, it ignores the fact that a strong and united Europe is, among other things, a fundamental commercial and financial partner for the wellbeing and stability of both sides.

From a commercial perspective, trade with Europe in goods and services far exceeds any other bilateral relationship the US has. It focuses on technologically advanced products and sectors, which are vital for both economies and have a huge impact on their respective employment rates. Moreover, cross-investments between the two sides, made by European companies in American subsidiaries and vice versa, known as Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), contribute to a deep transatlantic economic integration. European companies are increasingly investing in various sectors of the American economy, with European figures accounting for almost half of all foreign investment in the United States. Imagine what would happen if part of that amount were diverted by Europe to other economies. In principle, I do not foresee this happening, despite the profoundly distorted, even absurd, assessment that the new strategy makes of European policy and Washington’s adoption of a whole series of other obstacles.

From a financial perspective, a significant portion of US federal debt is financed by capital markets in the EU and the United Kingdom. The American administration lives beyond its means, like many others. It constantly issues notes and government bonds to keep civil and military institutions running. The major difference compared to other states is that US debt securities are mostly acquired by foreign central banks and investment funds. They are considered an essential part of the sovereign reserves of the vast majority of states.

Japan, first and by a clear margin, and China, afterwards, are, as individual countries, the main holders of US Treasury bonds. China is closely followed by the United Kingdom. But the British portfolio, added to that of the EU, far exceeds the sum of the holdings of Japan and China.

Now imagine that the EU, by decision of the European Central Bank, naturally backed by the central banks of the eurozone, slightly reduced the purchase of new US securities and simultaneously placed a small portion of those it currently holds on the market, in order to diversify its currency reserves and strengthen the euro’s position as a global reference currency. The EU could buy more Swiss francs, British pounds, Australian dollars, currencies from Gulf countries, and Japanese yen. Such an initiative, carried out quite gradually, could not be presented as an act of hostility. It would be announced as a prudent measure to diversify risk and an essential step towards European financial autonomy. Nor should it be mentioned as a reaction to what was written in the NSS, but simply as a decision to adapt European reserves to new geopolitical realities. And also, as a process to increase the euro’s relevance on the international stage. The euro is the world’s second most important reserve currency, but its role falls short of the Union’s economic weight.

All this should be considered in light of the assertion of European interests, following the expression that is now part of everyday political life in the US: America first. By following that philosophy in Europe, each partner would look after its own advantages, but always within a complementary political framework. Europe must continue to see the US as an ally, even when it insists on the need to rethink its strategic autonomy and defend its system of values.

Regardless of what was written in the NSS, frequent conversations with President Donald Trump should be regarded as essential. I do not know whether Trump has read the new document produced by his collaborators or others. In any case, his policy is very much his own, entirely personal.

What was written above about the complementarity between American and European interests should be repeated as often as possible to the leader of the White House. The real enemy of both, especially in Europe, the North Atlantic, and the Arctic, is the regime of Vladimir Putin. That is the message, regardless of the opinion one may have of Trump. If Putin were to destroy or seize Ukraine, he would soon move on to the next phase, the devastation of other European states. Trump needs to understand that, if that were to happen, the negative impact on his own country would be enormous. The history of this brand-new era began with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It cannot end with the suffocation of our values or the rupture of the alliance between Europe and the US.

The European Union in a rapidly changing era

 The European Union’s raft needs to reinforce its sails and recalibrate its compass

Victor Angelo

This week, the flames surrounding Federica Mogherini have provided further arguments to those seeking to destroy the forest of the European Union (EU). However, we must not forget that the EU is fundamental for the stability, security, and progress of Europe. Nor can we ignore five existential risks facing the project, which must be prioritised for resolution: political paralysis; lack of strategic autonomy; economic stagnation; the rise of demagogic movements in various European societies; and the erosion of its credibility in much of the Global South.

To address these challenges, the EU must understand two realities.

First, contrary to what certain intellectuals claim, the alliance with the United States has become extremely fragile—not just now, but for the foreseeable future. The international outlook shaped by Donald Trump, with or without him, is here to stay. Beyond “America First”, the geopolitical priorities of the new elites in power are clear and follow this order: their own hemisphere, the Indian and Pacific regions, the Middle East, the Arctic, and, last on the list, Europe.

Second, immediate and structural reforms are needed. We live in a different world—post-neocolonial, diverse, and multipolar. The United Nations, in its most political aspect, and the old Security Council, are stuck in the past. Relations with former colonies have shifted from subordination to equality and the emergence of new networks of interests. Europe must learn to operate within new frameworks of international cooperation, without illusions of neocolonial superiority.

Mario Draghi, in his September 2024 report on European competitiveness, which reads as an urgent appeal, highlights the risk of the EU’s “slow agony” if it does not invest massively in deepening the single market, banking union, digital technologies, and a cohesive and robust foreign policy, especially regarding the United States, Russia, and China. We must move away from a Europe that thinks like petty bourgeois, like would-be nouveau riche who prioritise consumption and appearance over effort and the common good. From a Europe too often led by opportunistic politicians—in Brussels and in the capitals of member states.

Draghi criticises the decline in productivity, the fragmentation of the single market that drives high-growth potential companies across the Atlantic, excessive regulatory burdens that stifle SMEs—we are a space governed by law firms and lobbyists for major private interests—and the lack of focus on clear priorities, such as innovation in advanced technologies and the link between decarbonisation and economic growth.

He also considers it essential to end the unanimity rule in several sensitive areas, such as foreign policy, defence, budgetary issues, and the accession of new members. These are some of the areas where the qualified majority principle should apply: the dual condition requiring both 65% of the population and 55% of the states. The unanimity rule is an obstacle to innovation and prevents rapid responses to geopolitical crises. The world is changing rapidly. We cannot build the future with the rules of the past.

This is also the moment to put forward an ambitious proposal for a common budget of at least 5% of European GDP, instead of the current 1%. This budget would be funded by its own taxes, not currently covered by the member states. Its purpose would be to finance research in high technology, digital, energy, convergence between member states, youth mobility within Europe, and support for initiatives that expand Europe’s geopolitical reach. These new funds could also be used to finance the ongoing mobilisation of a sufficiently broad and robust European rapid reaction military force. This would be an important step towards strategic autonomy. Without energy and military sovereignty, the EU will be nothing more than a mighty but powerless Titan, like the legendary Atlas.

The Global South, in its various forms, already defines much of today’s geopolitical map. Europe must once again become the champion of international solidarity and cooperation. Among other things, it should contribute with donations, not just loans, to help less developed countries combat climate change, organised crime and poverty. Likewise, EU states have a duty to participate in coalitions seeking to modernise the political side of the UN, especially the issue of Security Council representation. The Global South values the UN. Europe would benefit from being seen as committed to this process of renewal.

Just as the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century, the EU believes in the illusion of a certain external grandeur. Rome did not fall because of a single battle, but through slow erosion: loss of citizens’ confidence, collapse of central authority—corrupt and utterly distracted from what mattered—futile quarrels in the Senate, and growing threats from outside. We must not follow the same path.