Briefing Note: Russia’s Policies and Implications for APEC

Purpose

To inform APEC leaders of the strategic risks posed by Russia’s current foreign and economic policies and their potential impact on regional stability and economic cooperation.

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Key Observations

1. Militarisation and Geopolitical Assertiveness

   • Russia prioritises hard power over diplomacy, using the Ukraine conflict as leverage for global influence.
   • Increased military presence in the Arctic and Asia-Pacific signals readiness to escalate tensions, undermining regional security.

2. Economic Weaponisation

   • Energy exports remain a geopolitical tool, with infrastructure projects used to divide allies.
   • Despite extensive sanctions, Russia sustains its war economy through alternative trade networks, deepening global fragmentation.

3. Strategic Dependence

   • Russia’s “pivot to Asia” has led to structural reliance on China, limiting autonomy and raising long-term viability concerns.

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Implications for APEC

• Trade Disruption: Russia’s stance on sanctions and WTO mechanisms introduces friction into APEC’s consensus-driven model.
• Security Spillover: Militarisation risks transforming economic forums into arenas of strategic rivalry.
• Normative Erosion: Push for “multipolarity” challenges rules-based governance, creating uncertainty for smaller economies.

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Recommended Actions

• Reaffirm APEC’s Core Principles: Emphasise rules-based trade and economic cooperation.
• Strengthen Collective Resilience: Diversify supply chains and enhance energy security to reduce vulnerability.
• Engage with Caution: Maintain dialogue on economic issues while countering destabilising tactics through coordinated responses.

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Bottom Line:
Russia’s policies combine revisionist geopolitics, economic opportunism, and strategic dependency. APEC must navigate engagement carefully to safeguard stability and uphold its mission of inclusive, sustainable growth.

To start the New Year: reflections about ongoing conflicts

 

2024 is a crucial year, demanding courage and responses to match
Victor Ângelo

 

I spent decades leading United Nations political, peace and development missions. It was at the UN that I grew professionally and learned how to resolve conflicts, some quite serious, in which death and pain lurked behind every dune, tree or rock. I thus gained a broader view of the international system and the way in which the relationship with the Security Council should be carried out. Then, for years, I worked as a civilian mentor at NATO, preparing future heads of military operations, repeatedly highlighting the need to obtain the support of populations and humanitarian organizations in these operations.

Experience taught me the paramount importance that must be given to safeguarding people's lives. When I addressed generals, police force commanders and UN security agents, the priority was to emphasize the value of life. That of ours, who were part of the mission, as well as protecting the lives of others, simple citizens, whether or not suspected of collaborating with the insurgents, and even the lives of enemies.

Nothing can be resolved in a sustainable way if there is not deep respect for the civilian populations living on either side of the barricades, if others are treated as worthless people, to whom access to vital goods, such as mere animals, can be cut off. to slaughter without mercy or mercy. Killing does not resolve any conflict. For every death today, new fighters emerge tomorrow, with even stronger feelings of revenge. The fundamental thing is to create the conditions for peace, open the doors to negotiations and understanding. A retaliatory war is a mistake. It is a retaliatory response, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, inspired by an ancient legal order. Or, in a more current hypothesis, it is a war directed by political leaders who lack common sense and foresight.

I also had in mind, in my guidelines, the wisdom of the brilliant Charlie Chaplin, in the moving character of the clown Calvero. In his film Highlights (1952), Chaplin at one point makes the clown Calvero say that “life is a beautiful, magnificent thing, even for a jellyfish”. Yes, even for a jellyfish, a gelatinous invertebrate for whom few will have any sympathy. I have always thought that this phrase, so simple, should occupy a top place in our way of facing conflicts. Politics only makes sense when it allows everyone to live in freedom and safety.

One of the great challenges of 2024 is to be able to explain this understanding to the medusa, the life and work of the United Nations in a language that certain leaders are able or forced to understand. How can we say this in the perverse and sophistry patois that is said in the Kremlin? How can we express this wisdom in progressive Hebrew or Arabic with accents of peace? How can we make the speech of reconciliation heard by people responsible for conflicts in other regions of the world, taking into account that 2023 was a year of acceleration in multiple expressions of hatred and radicalism?

We have two issues here that will need to be clarified and resolved as quickly as possible.

First, anyone who doesn't understand Charlie Chaplin and the value of life should not be at the head of a nation. The place of war criminals is in The Hague or before a special court created for that purpose, as happened in Yugoslavia or Rwanda. I say this, and I emphasize it, so that there is no doubt, in my capacity as someone who was at the forefront of the founding of the Arusha Court, in Tanzania, established to judge those mainly responsible for the genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994. The precedents exist and those responsible for the massacres in Ukraine and the Middle East know them. As criminals always fantasize, they may even think that they will escape these trials. At the speed at which things are changing, they should not be calm.

Second, the Secretary-General of the United Nations must go far beyond humanitarian issues. Humanitarian assistance is essential, without a doubt, and cannot be forgotten. But this is something short-term and precarious, as there are many situations of need, tragedies are enormous in various parts of the world, and resources are always scarce. The UN Charter is above all about political solutions. The Secretary-General must maintain tireless dialogue with the parties and present without further delay a peace plan for Ukraine and another for Palestine. Plans that address the roots of the problems, that are based on international law and that courageously point out the political steps that the Security Council must consider.

We have to rise to the very serious challenges that lie ahead, in what has everything to be a crucial year in contemporary history.

Published in Portuguese in today's edition of Diário de Notícias, Lisbon, 5 January 2024. 

The narrative about peace operations should be seriously improved

The questions and the debate that followed my presentation on UN peace operations – yesterday´s post was about the public address I delivered on 28 April on the subject – have once again shown the need for a greater investment on a positive narrative on peacekeeping. It was clear that even a better educated audience has a biased perception about the mandates and the role of the UN in peacekeeping and peace building. I have actually been confronted with the same situation in the exercises I do with senior officers from my part of the world. The misinformation and misunderstandings are just too many. They have, obviously, an impact on the way the European politicians see the participation of their forces in UN operations. They make it more difficult for people like me to advocate for a stronger EU commitment to military and police missions led by the UN.

There are a number of things the UN and the supporters of international solidarity should do better in the field of peace and security. For sure one of them has to do with messaging. If they cannot win the narrative they will not be able to get more support. 

My keynote address on UN peace operations

Yesterday I delivered a public talk on the reform on the UN peace operations. It was organised by GRIP (Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security), an independent Brussels-based think tank, the APNU (Association pour les Nations Unies de Belgique) and the University of Louvain-la-Neuve. It took place at the headquarters of Wallonie-Bruxelles Internationale and attracted quite a large audience. 

The issue is very much a current one as we come close to know what the panel established at the end of October 2014 by the UN Secretary-General will propose as reforms. This panel is mandated to reflect on sharpening the UN response to peace challenges. Its composition reflects, above all, two things: field experience and a geopolitical balancing act by the Secretary-general.

I think I should share with my readers the notes that guided my presentation, notwithstanding the fact they are written in the French language.

Please find them below.

Conférence du 28 Avril 2015

Mon intervention est inspirée

1.         Résolution pacifique des conflits : négociations, accords de paix, équilibre entre des intérêts divergents ; c´est la seule solution durable

2.         La politique d´abord, avant l´utilisation de la force

3.         La nécessité de renforcer les capacités des Nations Unies en matière de résolution de conflits, y compris une meilleure intégration des efforts de DPA, DPKO et de la PBC ; au fait, les opérations de paix sont avant tout un instrument politique

4.         La valeur de la solidarité entre les états, particulièrement quand il s´agit des états plus fragiles, qui sont confrontés avec des menaces terroristes ou de criminalité organisée à une échelle régionale ou internationale

5.         Le Panel de Haut Niveau, établi à la fin Octobre 2014 est une bonne décision. Beaucoup de choses ont changé depuis le Rapport Brahimi de 2000

Le Rapport du Panel va certainement susciter une série de débats

6.         L´acceptation du rôle du Conseil de Sécurité, malgré toutes les critiques que l´on puisse faire au regard de sa composition ; une vieille question : quand je suis arrivé à NY en Janvier 1998 le Japon…

Le Conseil de Sécurité:

Positif:

1.         Source de légitimité; accepté para les Étas comme l´autorité ultime

2.         Tous les états souhaitent l´accord du SC

3.         SC accorde une attention assez significative aux Opérations de Paix

4.         Expérience en la matière

5.         Ses décisions engagent des ressources financières

6.         Capable de forcer les Agences, Fonds et Programmes à travailler ensemble

  

Négatif

1.         Divisé; primauté des intérêts géopolitiques des P5 par rapport à la résolution des crises; impossibilité de décider sur les grandes crises ; divisions se sont aggravées avec la crise en Libye en 2011

2.         Incapable de donner une direction stratégique au Secrétariat et aux missions; réactif et superficiel ; jaloux des capacités et des prérogatives du Secrétariat

3.         Le concept de mission intégrée n´a jamais été bien compris donnant lieu à des mandats trop vastes

4.         Reste figé dans une perspective d´état national ; tendance à voir tout à partir de la perspective des gouvernements nationaux

5.         Pas vraiment préparé pour répondre aux défis posés par les acteurs non-étatiques

6.         Beaucoup plus intéressé par le Maintien de la Paix que par les Missions Politiques ou de  Peace Building ; les Missions de Maintien de la Paix coutent beaucoup d´argent, ont des militaires et des policiers, sont beaucoup plus « intéressantes »

7.         Les liens entre Maintien de la Paix et Peace Building ne sont pas toujours clairs ; des missions de Peace Building ont été approuvées quand on voulait fermer une mission DPKO ou alors quand on ne voulait pas engager des nouvelles dépenses

8.         Glissement en matière de respect pour les principes fondamentaux des opérations de paix ; préférence des P3 pour des opérations robustes

Les principes fondamentaux du Maintien de la Paix sont de plus en plus mis en cause par les nouvelles façons de maintenir la paix

•          Consentement des Parties

•          Impartialité

•          Non recours à la force (sauf en cas de légitime défense ou de défense du mandat)

Ces dernières années, le CS a introduit le concept de Maintien de la Paix Robuste

•          Le maintien de la paix robuste implique l’emploi de la force au niveau tactique avec    l’autorisation du Conseil de sécurité et le consentement du pays hôte et/ou des principales parties au conflit.

Doit-on revenir aux principes ?

Faut-il laisser le SC décider quand les missions peuvent aller au-delà des principes ? Et dans ce cas, les principes servent à quoi ?

Il faut certainement bien faire la distinction entre Opérations Offensives (Enforcement) et Opérations d´Appui à un processus de paix, à un processus politique

A Mon avis :

•          Les Opérations Offensives devraient être conduites par des Coalitions de Forces avec un mandat du SC 

Ou

•          Par des Organisations Régionales (AU ; NATO ; EU ; CSTO ; etc)

Mais …   Toujours avec un mandat qui a été approuvé par le CS

Aussi il faudrait utiliser les organisations régionales comme

            Entry forces : premières forces sur le terrain en attendant le déploiement ONU

            En cas d´urgence -  POC et atrocités ; pour des raisons d´urgence humanitaire

           

Quelques commentaires au niveau du Secrétariat des NU

o          UN a beaucoup appris depuis 2000 –Rapport Brahimi

            Je le dis souvent aux militaires de l´OTAN

o          UN a surtout beaucoup évolué ces dernières années depuis 2010 en matière de:

                      Logistiques  (Entebbe, Brindisi et Valence)

                      Coopération entre les missions

                      Police

o          Mais DPKO, DPA et PBSO doivent approfondir la coopération entre eux.

o          PBSO devrait être intégré dans DPA ou dans DPKO ; ma préféence serait une intégration dans DPKO

o          Département de Management doit revoir la procédure et autoriser les agences des NU à réaliser des activités, contre remboursement, pour les missions sur le terrain

o          Aussi, il est nécessaire d´établir de  meilleurs liens entre les missions de paix et PNUD et UN Office on Drugs and Crime

o          UN Secrétariat doit aussi être plus courageux, plus direct et ne pas hésiter quand il s´agit de faire des recommandations au SC

United States

US Personnel in DPKO Missions end of March 2015 : 64 UNPOL   44 MIL      ( RUSSIA   UNPOL 24   MIL 46)

African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership:  Annoncée par le Président Obama en Aout 2014 

$110 millions par année entre 3 – 5 ans

6 pays

            Ethiopie

            Ghana

            Rwanda

            Sénégal

            Tanzanie

            Ouganda

US préfèrent une approche par pays ; des pays prioritaires

Autres travaillent directement avec UA comme par ex : EU, Norvège

African Standby Force

Le role croissant des RECs (Africa´s Regional Economic Communities)

La capacité des forces militaires africaines et les standards des NU

European Union :

Personnel in DPKO missions end of March 2015:  UNPOL 214  5583 MIL

A joué un rôle important au Tchad, au Congo et au Mali

Devrait cependant s´engagé davantage aux Nations Unies ; à mon avis, l´expérience (bonne et moins bonne) gagnée avec MINUSMA devrait être considérée comme une opportunité pour identifier ce qui doit être modifié au niveau des NU et permettre une plus grande participation des pays EU

2011  “Plan of Action to Enhance EU CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping”

Parlements et Opinion Publique EU doivent être plus sensibilisés.

L’opinion publique est aujourd´hui une variable stratégique

UE doit contribuer avec plus de :

            Militaires ; différence de préparation, de méthodes de travail et des taux de remboursement

            Police

            Administrateurs civils

Aider certains pays à développer leurs capacités de sécurité. 

EU African Peace Initiative : The three main strands of action are capacity building, peace support operations and the development of an early response mechanism.

Militaire, gendarmerie et surtout police

La police est très souvent le parent le plus pauvre dans les pays en crise.

            En conclusion :

•          Tout peut se résumer à des questions de crédibilité, de capacité de réponse et de temps; il faut savoir gérer les attentes, obtenir des résultats et sortir à temps.

•          Réforme ou marginalisation ? Plutôt le risque de réforme et marginalisation.

Il y a une volonté de réforme, il y aura des améliorations, mais il y a ausssi les contradictions au sein de la communauté internationale et une tradition de timidité au Sécrétariat.

Les NU seront très occupées, il y aura une demande continue pour des opérations de paix, mais le risque est de devoir traiter seulement des conflits d´intérêt local, « les conflits des pauvres ». 

Poor weather in the EU capital

Poor weather in Brussels today. Time thus to get ready for my quarterly meeting on peace building. And to realise that there is no strategy, in my part of the world, to deal with the current turmoil in the Middle East. More than ever, the piecemeal approach is the one that dictates the policy. Even so, I am not sure we have a clear policy for each case that is developing in the region. Maybe influenced by the weather, I come to the conclusion that the approaches we are now following are very tentative and full of messy actions. With the exception, maybe, of the dialogue with Iran on the nuclear issues. But the nuclear package is only one dimension of what our Iranian policy should be. Are we connecting it with the rest?

Leaders and demagogues

Just back from two days in Geneva. I was there to lead a workshop on peace building and crisis response and to deliver a lecture on responding to new types of conflicts. The audience was composed of mid-career professionals, both from the military and the civilian areas. They are in Geneva for an advance masters on peace studies but come from different corners of the world. Some of them will be, later in their professional life, important players in their own countries. They know that. And then, I shouldn't be surprised that several of the questions they raised to my attention were about leadership issues. The role of leaders, how to deal with rogue leaders, how to get leaders to lead.

Leadership in politics is indeed a very current topic. There are many that believe that leaders are not taking up their responsibilities. They are just chambers of resonance for the public opinion. And that´s not leadership. That´s demagogy.