Russia and Democratic Europe

DN Opinion

The Russian siege and Europe's response

Victor Ângelo
International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

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Published on: 25 Sep 2026, Diário de Notícias, Lisboa, Portugal
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The recent Duma elections were well staged. They confirmed the internal control exercised by the regime, the decision to continue the illegal war against Ukraine, and Vladimir Putin's structural policy against Europe, which has gradually evolved from occasional provocations to a strategy of persistent and calculated pressure.

Moscow operates on several complementary fronts: sabotage, cyberattacks, electronic signal jamming, the instrumentalization of migrants, propaganda, military intimidation, and support for extremist and pro-Russian political forces. The purpose is not to immediately destroy Western capabilities—not for lack of will, but through strategic calculation. In reality, it is about testing and exposing the political frailties of democratic Europe, with actions surgically below the threshold of NATO's Article 5. The authorship of these actions is systematically denied, exploiting the inherent slowness of democracies in gathering evidence and making decisions. Putin is an expert at transforming political doubt into an instrument of equivocation and at fostering fractures among allied nations.

This pressure materializes on coordinated fronts that many insist on treating as isolated incidents. From Kaliningrad and other unidentified locations, satellite navigation disruptions are already a recurrent issue, affecting aviation and maritime navigation across a vast swath between Poland and Scandinavia. In terms of sabotage, the damage to submarine telecommunication cables in the Baltic Sea since 2024 is now compounded by the threat in the Arctic, where a Russian military unit has reportedly studied ways to disable the region's cables. On the land borders, the migratory instrument orchestrated via Belarus has adapted: in response to the physical barriers erected in Poland, the pressure has shifted towards Lithuania and Latvia through new tactics.

Often treated in isolation by certain political sectors and parts of public opinion, the war of aggression against Ukraine is not a parallel conflict: it is the most brutal manifestation of this very same strategy. There are those who still fail to grasp this connection, viewing support for Kyiv as a mere gesture of solidarity or an obligation that is difficult to justify—a tragic misreading. While on the rest of the continent Moscow operates in the grey zone to avoid collective retaliation, in Ukraine it resorts to direct military force to achieve the same end: to subjugate democracies and unilaterally redraw European security. Support for Ukraine must therefore be unequivocally integrated into the broader framework of defending democratic Europe. Ukraine is our first trench.

Europe's vulnerability, however, is predominantly political and internal. The Kremlin finds Trojan horses within the very heart of the European system: certain extremist parties and movements. Whether through submission, ideological convergence, or financing, or through anti-Americanism or xenophobic repudiation of European integration, these forces ultimately serve Moscow's objectives. By normalizing the Russian narrative, attacking NATO, hindering aid to Kyiv, and sowing scepticism towards European institutions, these extremes amplify the hybrid war.

The European response is dangerously asymmetrical. On the eastern and Nordic flank, the response to the threat is already State doctrine: Finland has integrated hybrid analysis into its comprehensive defence, Estonia is investing in digital resilience, and Warsaw and Vilnius are preparing for escalation scenarios. In Western and Southern Europe, the awakening has been delayed. Although there are shifts in perception and policy in Berlin, Paris, London, Rome, and even Brussels, the response remains too slow, bureaucratic, and fragmented.

This delay reveals a certain incomprehension of the autocratic vision of the regime led by Vladimir Putin. The risk encompasses all of Europe outside the Russian orbit, from the Ukrainian front and the Baltic region to the North Atlantic. Anyone in Lisbon or other European capitals who deems Russia to be distant and their country safe from hybrid attacks demonstrates an embarrassingly naive attitude. In a multidimensional war, traditional geography is no longer a shield. To underestimate this reach is to directly imperil Portuguese critical infrastructure—most notably the Atlantic submarine cables, ports, airports, and energy networks. It is to forget that these connections, if sabotaged, will affect not only our country but a significant part of the West.

This vulnerability is currently exacerbated by the uncertainty surrounding the American commitment. The political distance between Europe and the US continues to widen. They are two perspectives seemingly in the process of divorce. The announced review of the US posture in Europe, involving troop reductions and greater conventional responsibility for allies, has its justifications and will ultimately strengthen European autonomy, but it requires a realistic timetable. The Kremlin is well aware of Western deterrence's reliance on the credibility of its guarantor, and it exploits any hesitation to intensify the pressure.

Russia takes advantage of our difficulty in operating within this intermediate zone between peace and war. It no longer limits itself to testing our degree of tolerance; the signals it sends us should be a cause for concern. It will most likely not act against our part of Europe in the same way it has in Ukraine since 2014, with the occupation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas, and since 2022, with the full-scale invasion. Putin recognizes that an attack on a NATO member could trigger the collective response provisioned in Article 5 and that clandestine actions, including false-flag operations, complicate the unequivocal attribution of responsibility. His political leadership prefers clandestine actions, typical of secret services, agencies in which Putin places a higher degree of trust than in the armed forces. The time has thus come for democratic Europe to abandon its old naivety, grow up, and take its rightful place at the table of international relations: Diplomacy and Defence.

Letter to President Vladimir Putin: Christmas 2025

Formal Diplomatic Communication

Date: December 23, 2025

To: His Excellency Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation

Subject: Strategic Realignment, UN Charter Compliance, and the Restoration of the European Security Architecture

Your Excellency,

In the interest of regional stability and the prevention of a systemic collapse of the Eurasian security architecture, I write to you to propose an immediate pivot toward a negotiated settlement. The ongoing aggression against Ukraine has created a breach of the peace that now threatens not only the immediate belligerents but the very foundations of the United Nations Charter, which the Russian Federation, as a Permanent Member of the Security Council, is sworn to uphold.

Central to this appeal is a return to Article 2(4), which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity of any state. To ensure that a ceasefire is not merely a pause in hostilities but the start of a durable peace, I urge the Russian Federation to engage with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) through the following Chapter VII enforcement mechanisms:

Proposed Chapter VII Enforcement Framework

The invocation of Chapter VII provides the legal authority necessary to guarantee that any peace agreement is both enforceable and permanent:

• Provisional Measures (Article 40): The UNSC should demand a synchronized withdrawal of heavy weaponry to a verifiable distance, monitored by a neutral UN-mandated mission.

• Compliance-for-Relief (Article 41): A roadmap for the phased de-escalation of economic and diplomatic restrictions in correspondence with verifiable military withdrawal and the restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty.

• Security Guarantees (Article 42): The authorization of a Robust Peacekeeping Operation to enforce a demilitarized zone, providing strategic depth without unilateral military presence.

Revitalization of the NATO-Russia Founding Act

Beyond the immediate cessation of hostilities, a long-term solution requires the renewal and modernization of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. A revitalized Act would provide the institutional framework needed to transition from a "balance of terror" to a "balance of interests." 

I propose the following Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) to restore a baseline of predictability:

• Institutionalized De-confliction: Re-establishing the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) at the permanent representative level, supplemented by a 24/7 military-to-military "hotline" between the Russian General Staff and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

• Transparency of Exercises: A commitment to mandatory pre-notification of all military maneuvers involving more than 9,000 troops and the reciprocal invitation of observers to all drills, exceeding the standards of the Vienna Document.

• Strategic Restraint Zones: Negotiating "zones of limited deployment" along sensitive borders where neither side would station permanent, substantial combat forces or nuclear-capable intermediate-range missiles.

• Joint Risk-Reduction Centers: Creating a shared facility for real-time data exchange on missile launches and large-scale troop movements to eliminate the potential for miscalculation or accidental escalation.

The Role of the Security Council as Guarantor

The UN Security Council must act as the primary guarantor of this new arrangement by codifying any final agreement into a binding Resolution. This elevates a bilateral truce to an international legal obligation, making any future violation a matter of collective global response.

A return to the diplomatic track, anchored in the legal weight of the UN Charter and the revitalized principles of the Founding Act, offers the only viable path to a stable, peaceful, and prosperous continent.

Framework for War Reparations and Reconstruction

A sustainable peace is inseparable from the principle of accountability for material and moral injury. In accordance with the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), I propose that the peace process incorporate a structured reparations mechanism. This would involve utilizing the recently established International Claims Commission in The Hague to adjudicate claims recorded in the UN Register of Damage.

To facilitate this, I suggest a "Reparations-for-Reintegration" roadmap: a negotiated schedule wherein the satisfaction of adjudicated claims—covering infrastructure reconstruction, environmental damage, and civilian compensation—is linked to the phased and orderly release of immobilized Russian sovereign assets. This multilateral approach ensures that the immense financial burden of reconstruction is addressed through a legitimate legal process, providing a transparent "off-ramp" for the restoration of Russia's standing in the global financial system while upholding the rights of the victims of the conflict.

Respectfully,

Victor ÂNGELO
Former UN Special Representative/USG

Responding to Putin's threats

 

Respond with Firmness to the Drones, Sabotage, and Threats of Vladimir Putin

Victor Ângelo

The swarms of drones that have recently been flying over military installations and airports in certain Western European states are hostile acts carried out by enemy forces. They should be viewed in parallel with cyber-piracy actions against highly relevant economic infrastructure and as complementary to attempts to interfere in the political life and electoral campaigns of European democracies.

The scale and complexity of these attacks leave no doubt as to their authors. They can only be organized by special secret services, at the behest of a leadership that intends to weaken, create chaos, and shatter our defense alliances and our value systems. They are a threat to the stability of all of us and a cause of great concern, especially for the populations of Eastern and Northern Europe. They are also aimed at diverting attention and forcing the expenditure of resources that could be allocated to supporting Ukraine's legitimate defense.

These aggressive provocations and interventions come with no label or tag that says "made in Russia." But the targeted countries and their allies have every reason to indict the Kremlin's leaders. This is the political stance that must be adopted. Any analysis of the facts inevitably leads to the inescapable presumption that Moscow is launching a disguised, cunning, and hybrid aggression against democratic Europe. We are facing a series of subtle military offensives that, if not met with an adequate response, could lead to an escalation. These are not mere tests to gauge our firmness. We are already in another phase.

The first phase of the response should involve the imposition of even more restrictive diplomatic measures against Putin's Russia. These measures should include non-accreditation of Russian diplomatic personnel beyond a minimum number of officials, the limitation of their scope of action to the metropolitan areas of European capitals, excluding any authorization to circulate outside the capitals, and tight surveillance of the activities carried out by these diplomatic or ostensibly diplomatic agents. Russian ambassadors should face a protocolary demotion in their contacts with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in our countries. Political dialogue with the Kremlin's representatives is of little or no use, except for Putin.

These restrictions would complement the sanctions imposed by the European Union, which, by the way, need to be tightened. Furthermore, the Atlantic Alliance must deepen its capacity to combat these and other threats and provocations. Here there are three fundamental concerns: intensifying air and maritime defense patrols and means on the eastern flank and in the Baltic Sea region; increasing the technological capacity for identification, jamming, and electronic disorientation of enemy vessels, including a significant expansion of radiation beam emitters—"lasers"; and destroying invaders with appropriate, low-cost means. The production of these means must be done on a large scale, in cooperation among member states and taking advantage of the knowledge dramatically developed by Ukraine. There is much to learn from the Ukrainians, even before it becomes necessary to spend fortunes on missiles.

The use of missiles is, however, justified when it comes to violations of NATO airspace by armed Russian fighters. It is an extremely sensitive issue, no doubt. But the 12-minute overflight of Estonian airspace, as happened on September 19 with three MiG-31s, requires an energetic reaction. This time, the Italian air force escorted the intruders out of the Atlantic Alliance's space. But more will be needed: formally and appropriately warning Moscow that new violations of this type will be treated as offensive acts and that, therefore, vessels alien to the Alliance, if considered a real threat, will be shot down. Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary-General, opted for a more generic and ambiguous statement. Perhaps he was right, but ambiguity, in Putin's case, is understood by him as an attitude of weakness.

It is possible that we will continue to see an intensification of attacks without a label or signature against us. Dictatorships are a form of madness, and dictators consider themselves invincible geniuses.

It is advisable not to conclude without adding that it is a mistake to think that Portugal is outside Moscow's orbit of action. The Kremlin wants us to think that way and knows our weaknesses: the existence of vulnerabilities to enemy espionage operations; the lack of resources to protect our maritime area, which can be used for the circulation of Russian attack and sabotage submarines; and the predominance of a political and intellectual class that does not understand or does not want to take seriously the dangers facing democratic Europe. Putin forgets, however, that Portugal counts on the cooperation of its allies, within the framework of NATO.

Might or right?

My professional travels through the world of multilateral organizations, and through dozens of countries with diverse political cultures, have taught me to look at international relations with caution. This does not mean that I do not believe in respecting the values ​​and principles approved over time, particularly since the signing of the United Nations Charter. This has happened with most states. But, contrary to what many people think, there have been many conflicts since 1945. It must have been a time of peace in Europe, except in the Balkans, but not in other parts of the world. Therefore, common sense recommends caution, as rivalries between countries and between big men persist. 

Prudence means, above all, two things: on the one hand, never underestimating the adversary and, on the other, unambiguously cultivating relations with allies, based on mutual interests and a common political vision.

It is a very serious mistake to consider that the enemy can be easily defeated. This was, in fact, Vladimir Putin's original miscalculation, as he thought it possible to destroy Ukrainian sovereignty in three days, when the gigantic military column he sent against Kiev would reach the Mariinsky Palace, the official residence of President Volodymyr Zelensky. The “Special Operation” was exactly that, in the Russian dictator’s view: a quick incursion, capable of subjugating the neighboring country in a matter of days. It wouldn't even be a war. He underestimated Ukraine, which three years later continues to resist the  aggression.

It is equally a mistake not to invest in a close and interdependent diplomatic relationship with the countries with which we maintain a defense alliance and strategic cooperation. And that consider, like us, that individual freedom and human rights are priority issues. This investment involves, in particular, a balance of forces between allies, in which each one brings something truly essential to the collective effort. And it must be based on a similar understanding of the international context. When there are imbalances or a different reading of the external risks, the alliance will end up transforming into subordination, or will end in rupture. Its continuity will be an illusion.

A pact between unequals ceases to work when a major crisis arises. This is the reality that Europe now faces. In terms of defense and cutting-edge technologies, especially in the areas of Artificial Intelligence and the collection of strategic information, Europe's fragility in relation to the USA is immeasurable.

Despite the political promises of the main European Heads of State and Government and the billions announced by the President of the European Commission, the gap between the two sides of the Atlantic is insurmountable in the coming years. And this will continue during Trump's term, which means that Europe will be at the mercy of the American president's decisions throughout this period.

The Europeans will thus pay for the imprudence of having considered, especially since the end of the Cold War, that Washington was a safe and reliable protective shield, and that its political class continued to maintain an unquestionable cultural and sentimental connection with the countries of the European continent. In today's America, that bond is a thing of the past.

With Trump in power, the context became even clearer. He and his followers see Europe as a consumer market with money and resources that are crucial to reinforcing US global hegemony: rare earths from Ukraine, minerals from Greenland, the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, which is essential for controlling navigation in the Arctic, and the link between the North Atlantic and the Sea of ​​Japan.

Europe is seen as a captured continent, held hostage, destined to respond to the demands of the new America, the America that looks at the world with arrogance, except if it is China or Russia.

This is the context in which Europe finds itself. A Europe of Defence, prudent and capable of taking care of its own security, will indeed have to be built, something that will take at least ten to fifteen years to gain strength. It is, for now, a wish., an undefined plan.

I recognize that it is worth having plans of this kind. They provide encouragement, define an objective that can be shared and consolidate convergence. The generation that is now reaching political adulthood will have the challenge of transforming this demand into reality.