Responding to Putin's threats

 

Respond with Firmness to the Drones, Sabotage, and Threats of Vladimir Putin

Victor Ângelo

The swarms of drones that have recently been flying over military installations and airports in certain Western European states are hostile acts carried out by enemy forces. They should be viewed in parallel with cyber-piracy actions against highly relevant economic infrastructure and as complementary to attempts to interfere in the political life and electoral campaigns of European democracies.

The scale and complexity of these attacks leave no doubt as to their authors. They can only be organized by special secret services, at the behest of a leadership that intends to weaken, create chaos, and shatter our defense alliances and our value systems. They are a threat to the stability of all of us and a cause of great concern, especially for the populations of Eastern and Northern Europe. They are also aimed at diverting attention and forcing the expenditure of resources that could be allocated to supporting Ukraine's legitimate defense.

These aggressive provocations and interventions come with no label or tag that says "made in Russia." But the targeted countries and their allies have every reason to indict the Kremlin's leaders. This is the political stance that must be adopted. Any analysis of the facts inevitably leads to the inescapable presumption that Moscow is launching a disguised, cunning, and hybrid aggression against democratic Europe. We are facing a series of subtle military offensives that, if not met with an adequate response, could lead to an escalation. These are not mere tests to gauge our firmness. We are already in another phase.

The first phase of the response should involve the imposition of even more restrictive diplomatic measures against Putin's Russia. These measures should include non-accreditation of Russian diplomatic personnel beyond a minimum number of officials, the limitation of their scope of action to the metropolitan areas of European capitals, excluding any authorization to circulate outside the capitals, and tight surveillance of the activities carried out by these diplomatic or ostensibly diplomatic agents. Russian ambassadors should face a protocolary demotion in their contacts with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in our countries. Political dialogue with the Kremlin's representatives is of little or no use, except for Putin.

These restrictions would complement the sanctions imposed by the European Union, which, by the way, need to be tightened. Furthermore, the Atlantic Alliance must deepen its capacity to combat these and other threats and provocations. Here there are three fundamental concerns: intensifying air and maritime defense patrols and means on the eastern flank and in the Baltic Sea region; increasing the technological capacity for identification, jamming, and electronic disorientation of enemy vessels, including a significant expansion of radiation beam emitters—"lasers"; and destroying invaders with appropriate, low-cost means. The production of these means must be done on a large scale, in cooperation among member states and taking advantage of the knowledge dramatically developed by Ukraine. There is much to learn from the Ukrainians, even before it becomes necessary to spend fortunes on missiles.

The use of missiles is, however, justified when it comes to violations of NATO airspace by armed Russian fighters. It is an extremely sensitive issue, no doubt. But the 12-minute overflight of Estonian airspace, as happened on September 19 with three MiG-31s, requires an energetic reaction. This time, the Italian air force escorted the intruders out of the Atlantic Alliance's space. But more will be needed: formally and appropriately warning Moscow that new violations of this type will be treated as offensive acts and that, therefore, vessels alien to the Alliance, if considered a real threat, will be shot down. Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary-General, opted for a more generic and ambiguous statement. Perhaps he was right, but ambiguity, in Putin's case, is understood by him as an attitude of weakness.

It is possible that we will continue to see an intensification of attacks without a label or signature against us. Dictatorships are a form of madness, and dictators consider themselves invincible geniuses.

It is advisable not to conclude without adding that it is a mistake to think that Portugal is outside Moscow's orbit of action. The Kremlin wants us to think that way and knows our weaknesses: the existence of vulnerabilities to enemy espionage operations; the lack of resources to protect our maritime area, which can be used for the circulation of Russian attack and sabotage submarines; and the predominance of a political and intellectual class that does not understand or does not want to take seriously the dangers facing democratic Europe. Putin forgets, however, that Portugal counts on the cooperation of its allies, within the framework of NATO.

Might or right?

My professional travels through the world of multilateral organizations, and through dozens of countries with diverse political cultures, have taught me to look at international relations with caution. This does not mean that I do not believe in respecting the values ​​and principles approved over time, particularly since the signing of the United Nations Charter. This has happened with most states. But, contrary to what many people think, there have been many conflicts since 1945. It must have been a time of peace in Europe, except in the Balkans, but not in other parts of the world. Therefore, common sense recommends caution, as rivalries between countries and between big men persist. 

Prudence means, above all, two things: on the one hand, never underestimating the adversary and, on the other, unambiguously cultivating relations with allies, based on mutual interests and a common political vision.

It is a very serious mistake to consider that the enemy can be easily defeated. This was, in fact, Vladimir Putin's original miscalculation, as he thought it possible to destroy Ukrainian sovereignty in three days, when the gigantic military column he sent against Kiev would reach the Mariinsky Palace, the official residence of President Volodymyr Zelensky. The “Special Operation” was exactly that, in the Russian dictator’s view: a quick incursion, capable of subjugating the neighboring country in a matter of days. It wouldn't even be a war. He underestimated Ukraine, which three years later continues to resist the  aggression.

It is equally a mistake not to invest in a close and interdependent diplomatic relationship with the countries with which we maintain a defense alliance and strategic cooperation. And that consider, like us, that individual freedom and human rights are priority issues. This investment involves, in particular, a balance of forces between allies, in which each one brings something truly essential to the collective effort. And it must be based on a similar understanding of the international context. When there are imbalances or a different reading of the external risks, the alliance will end up transforming into subordination, or will end in rupture. Its continuity will be an illusion.

A pact between unequals ceases to work when a major crisis arises. This is the reality that Europe now faces. In terms of defense and cutting-edge technologies, especially in the areas of Artificial Intelligence and the collection of strategic information, Europe's fragility in relation to the USA is immeasurable.

Despite the political promises of the main European Heads of State and Government and the billions announced by the President of the European Commission, the gap between the two sides of the Atlantic is insurmountable in the coming years. And this will continue during Trump's term, which means that Europe will be at the mercy of the American president's decisions throughout this period.

The Europeans will thus pay for the imprudence of having considered, especially since the end of the Cold War, that Washington was a safe and reliable protective shield, and that its political class continued to maintain an unquestionable cultural and sentimental connection with the countries of the European continent. In today's America, that bond is a thing of the past.

With Trump in power, the context became even clearer. He and his followers see Europe as a consumer market with money and resources that are crucial to reinforcing US global hegemony: rare earths from Ukraine, minerals from Greenland, the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, which is essential for controlling navigation in the Arctic, and the link between the North Atlantic and the Sea of ​​Japan.

Europe is seen as a captured continent, held hostage, destined to respond to the demands of the new America, the America that looks at the world with arrogance, except if it is China or Russia.

This is the context in which Europe finds itself. A Europe of Defence, prudent and capable of taking care of its own security, will indeed have to be built, something that will take at least ten to fifteen years to gain strength. It is, for now, a wish., an undefined plan.

I recognize that it is worth having plans of this kind. They provide encouragement, define an objective that can be shared and consolidate convergence. The generation that is now reaching political adulthood will have the challenge of transforming this demand into reality.

The Munich Conference and the European views

The US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, addressed the Munich Security Conference today. His line was very clear: the US has not moved away from supporting the European Defence, they remain even more engaged than before. In addition, he expressed the conviction that West is winning in the international arena.

His speech did not generate a lot of enthusiasm. Actually, the participants ‘reaction was very subdued. Polite, but not convinced. The audience’s quietness has shown that the Europeans have serious disagreements about the current Administration’s international politics, including the way it relates to Europe. Among other things, they judge that President Trump is not sincerely committed to collective defence. The NATO exercises, including the large one that is about to start, called DEFENDER-Europe 20, are perceived more as training opportunities for the American troops and less as a demonstration of unity among the allies. Also, those listening to Mr Pompeo have some problems to understand some of President Trump’s approaches to international affairs, in particularly, when it comes to Russia.

Furthermore, the “winning” view expressed by the Secretary of State is not shared by the European leaders. President Macron said it soon after the Pompeo speech. But it is not just the French President that espouses that stance. The German President had stated the same view yesterday, at the opening of the conference.

I take four main points from all of this. First, it is important to continue to assert the European commitment to the alliance with the US. Second, the Europeans should state their views with clarity, particularly when they do not coincide with the decisions and comments coming from Washington. Third, the EU must keep investing on joint military and defence projects. This investment should bring together as many EU countries as possible, knowing that it will not be possible to get all of them to step in, and should be presented as the European pillar of the NATO effort. Fourth, Europe must reach a modus vivendi with Russia and China, that considers the European interests but is not naïve. Russia is our immediate neighbour, which means we must agree on keeping the bordering space between them and us safe and prosperous. China, on the other hand, is a major power in the making. Europe cannot have an indifferent position towards it.  

At the end of the NATO Day

As I look at leaders ‘meeting, and the way they look at their own forces, always over-estimating the capacity of their forces and inter-states cooperation, I want to shout that too much confidence on your abilities defeats you in the end. It has always been like that and I see no reason for it to be different this time.

On the anniversary of NATO

All along, I have listened to a good number of dinner speakers. And I have noticed that, in general, they believe that a successful speech is the one that confirms the views of the attendees. They end up by seeing themselves as “comfort speakers”, as I would call them, invited to reinforce the prevailing ideas that have already gained a seat around the table.

That has been the case, for instance, on matters related to NATO. I mention the Alliance as its leaders get together in London to celebrate its 70^th anniversary. And I recall that I have repeated at a few occasions the Organisation needs an independent view of its relevance and role. They should even listen to some “positive contrarians” – another expression I use –, people that are ready to raise some fundamental questions instead of just re-stating dogmatic or diplomatic views.

I would also like to recall another of my frequent messages to senior officers: we can only succeed if we consult, de-conflict and harmonise our respective strategic and operational interests.  

The approaches towards the future of European defence

When it comes to European defence, it is not either the US or Turkey that count. It is basically how the issue is seen by the French, the Germans and the Poles. The British, with the Brexit imbroglio, have somehow stepped aside. Each one of these three nations lead a different school of thought on the matter. And, in many ways, the Poles are more influential than what many outside analysts think. On top of that, they tend to voice positions that are not too far from the feelings we find within the US side. In this context, the strategy must follow a gradual approach, step by step, starting with less controversial areas. And it has to consider what should be the future of NATO in the Europe of tomorrow.

President Trump and the EU

A few of my readers have expressed some degree of surprise after reading what I wrote in my last blog about President Trump’s policy towards the EU. I basically said the President is not in favour of a strong EU. And that is a radical change of approach, because for decades his predecessors have encouraged the European countries to cooperate and strengthen the EU. Even in the case of the UK, the message coming from Washington has always been in the sense of advising London to be closer to Continental Europe.

 With President Trump, we have a new situation. First, he sees the EU as economic competition and a market that is huge but has too many barriers when it comes to some critical American exports, such as cars and farm products. But there is more to it, beyond the economic and trade issues. He thinks that the key EU leaders have an international agenda that contradicts his own and weakens it. That is the case on climate, on Iran, on Russia, on Cuba and Venezuela, on multilateralism, even on China. Not to mention the new idea of a European common defence, an idea that Emmanuel Macron personalises. On defence, President Trump follows a line that has been present in Washington for long now: the Europeans must spend more on their armies but keep them under the overall control and command of the US military. He senses that in this area the European response is becoming more independent and he does not like it at all.

August is not a good time to discuss these matters. People on both sides of the Atlantic are above all concerned with the weather and their holidays. It is however a debate that must be reopened after the rentrée in September.

On Bastille Day, defence matters

On this Bastille Day 2019, I think we can draw two very clear lines.

First, the European defence must be taken seriously. Our countries share a common set of values. Furthermore, they have pooled several political decisions that show the ambition to create a joint political space. This goes much deeper than any alliance with our non-European friends, including those who have historical ties with Europe. In view of that and because at a certain point our geostrategic interests might diverge from those defined by our non-European allies, it is much wise to build our own independent capacity to fight for our ideas and well-being.

This is a step-by-step endeavour. It might take a bit of time to be completed. But it is now time to initiate its construction.

That message came out clearly from Paris as the Bastille celebrations were taking place.

The second message is about Turkey. President Erdogan has now opted for the Russian S-400 missiles. That is a major challenge to NATO and a very serious breach of Turkey’s commitment to the organisation. He must be told we do not accept his decision. He might not listen to such advice, as he will state his country’s independence of choice. OK, that is fine. But we can no longer take Turkey as a full ally. We ought to make it clear to President Erdogan and limit Turkey’s access to key military and defence information systems available in the West.

It is true we should not mix this matter with Turkey’s ambition to become a EU country. This are two separate matters. However, on the EU issue I think it is also time to be clear.

European Defence and Security

Brief answers to questions about the EU defence and security:

First, it is obvious that NATO remains the strongest defence option for the Europeans. It is a powerful structure, it has invested a lot on training and change, it is well known in the European military circles, and several EU member States see it as the key umbrella. They think that without the might of the Americans, the EU defence is not strong enough.

Second, several EU leaders think that Europe should have its own common defence capacity and that such capacity should be in place in 10 to 15 years’ time. For that to happen, its building must start now, which means more joint EU military activities, more coordination, joint defence industries, shared means, and so on. This option will keep growing but the pace might be slow.

Third, the EU geopolitical interests and views are becoming divergent of those pursued by the US. That is true in Middle East, that is also the case regarding our relations with China, and India, and so on. Diverging interests mean that sooner or later we must be able to put together an independent capability.

Fourth, the EU are afraid of being dragged into conflicts that are only in the interest of the US. They are afraid of a deeper confrontation between the US and China. The EU does not want to automatically take sides on such dispute, if it occurs.

European defence: the way forward

On defence, my position is that in the long-term Europe must have its own capabilities and the ability to defend itself. It is always better to count on one’s force. Moreover, that’s the way to keep an independent international policy and decide about the involvement in other people’s conflicts and other strategic moves.  

It is also the best approach to a balanced relationship with Europe’s key allies, with the US. Indeed, the defence relationship with the US will continue to be a crucial dimension of the European security strategy. However, it cannot remain a lopsided relationship. Europe must be much stronger, closer to the capacity of the US. That would bring balance to the alliance, something that does not exist today and compromises tremendously the interests of both parties. And that puts Europe in a weaker standing.

The road to the long-term objective starts today. For that reason, I agree with those who place the question on today’s EU agenda. I also acknowledge that such discussion and the subsequent plans must not undermine the strength of NATO. They call however for a clear understanding of the roles, in the future, that NATO and the EU Defence should play. That basically means that NATO and Europe will have to coordinate the way they will evolve in the coming years. Transformation for both is inevitable.

NATO days

NATO is seventy years old. It remains a unique type of organisation. Including because it brings together two very distinct ways of looking at geopolitics and is based on an ambiguous relationship between the political and military spheres of power.

Today, it operates in a very different world. And it is confronted with a complete new set of challenges. In all its organisational complexity, NATO has changed quite a bit during the last ten years or so. It has tried to adapt. 

But, in my opinion, it has not deserved the attention it should from the political leaders. Most of the political statements and positions on NATO are just ready-made, repetitive and half-baked declarations. That is not very strategic.

Joint carrier or a smoke screen?

A joint aircraft carrier, as proposed yesterday by the new CDU party leader, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (Germany)? To be funded by the European Commission or by a joint pot made up of contributions coming from 27 countries? And what for, that carrier? What are the vision and the strategy, when it comes to the matter of Europe’s Defence Strategy?

Our neighbour, Vladimir Putin

Again, on defence, it’s clear to us in the EU that one of the key military objectives of Russia is to look stronger than they really are. That’s why they spend so much human and capital resources on mixing facts and fiction. Part of their strength is indeed a fact. On the other side, a good deal of it is just a story that is being told to scare us. It is the Potemkin Village approach. It has a long history in Russia. But it produces results.

The Russian armed forces are ten years ahead of us, in the EU, in terms of cyber warfare. That’s for sure a reality. The rest, it is yes and no. But the truth is that they keep compelling us to increase our spending in military matters. In this kind of game, we cannot take risks. We better be prepared.

Fake, constructed or true, the fact of the matter is that the threats coming from Vladimir Putin must be taken seriously. And he knows that. Smart fellow, he is. And we, in many ways, look like amateurs. Just kicking the ball when it comes in  our direction.

EU's collective defence

The issue of collective defence is again a major concern for many European countries. It has to take into account a good number of major new developments. A more assertive Russia. A new level of foreign policy coordination between Russia and China, a policy that is clearly in competition with the Western interests and approaches. The fake news, the political interference and the funding of populist and far-right radical movements. The growing political gap and related tensions between Europe and Turkey. The situation in the Middle East and the Northern part of Africa. Terrorism. The US unprecedented new official policy towards defence cooperation with Europe. And the very hesitant, ambiguous views of the citizens regarding military expenditures.

And I would add one more, that is often left aside: the inept political direction provided by the EU leaders, particularly when it comes to articulating defence and security, military forces, intelligence and police services.

INF and the UN

President Trump’s decision to pull out of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) is as much about Russia – the other country signatory of the Treaty – as it is about China and its build-up of cruise missiles. Russia has been violating the INF since 2012. And China is investing heavily on new types of missiles capable of carrying nuclear heads. China is actually becoming a major military adversary of the US. And that is done in close coordination with Russia. Both Presidents – Xi and Putin – are consulting and have the same goal: to increase, in their geopolitical areas of influence, their countries’ capacity to confront the US and its allies. This is certainly a very dangerous strategy. The US will respond by augmenting their investment in nuclear capabilities. That means a serious arms race in a field that is particularly destructive and could bring mayhem to Europe and some parts of Asia.

One should be truly worried.

The UN could take the initiative to open a serious process of confidence building in the matters of nuclear armament. There is even a department within the Secretariat in New York that is mandated to deal with this type of matters. But the UN seems unable to move in such a critical area. Or, inaction and silence cannot be the right course of action at this very risky moment.

EU and Defence: additional considerations

Taking into account the ongoing discussions on military budgets, I went back to the text approved at the NATO Summit of 2014, in Wales. The paragraph 5 of "The Wales Declaration on the Transatlantic Bond" is quoted below. It´s worth a careful reading of its words.

"We recognise that these steps will take the necessary effort and funding. In light of this, we agree to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets and aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows; we will direct our defence budgets as efficiently and effectively as possible; we will aim to move towards the existing NATO guideline of spending 2% of GDP on defence within a decade, with a view to fulfilling NATO capability priorities. We will display the political will to provide required capabilities and deploy forces when they are needed."

This commitment follows the recognition stated in the last sentence of the previous paragraph. I quote it as well.

"We will continue to invest in modern and deployable armed forces that can operate effectively together and at a high level of readiness to fulfil NATO's tasks, in full accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act." 

And I would underline the following points:

-             Interoperability and readiness are key dimensions in terms of greater joint effectiveness;

-            Additional defence expenditure is linked to economic growth;

-             Budget allocations should be reviewed to respond to new priorities and up-to-date military approaches and to ensure a more appropriate funding of the new roles of the armed forces as required by a new type of threats;

-            The 2% goal is a guideline and it should be gradually build up to 2014; it cannot happen in the short term;

-           The States must be willing to participate in joint operations and be perceived as able to rapidly respond to needs as they arise, taking into account the capabilities of each nation.

I also find the references to the UN Charter and to the Helsinki Final Act essential. They should be continuously recalled.  

The defence challenge

On defence matters, the EU countries have no other option but to pool resources together. That´s the future and that´s the only way to realise our own share of responsibilities. It´s time to see things from a joint perspective. We are talking about the defence of Europe, not just about the protection of country A or B within the EU. If country A is attacked tomorrow, other countries will be destabilised soon after. What is at stake is our common EU future as democracies and countries that respect the rule of law and the distinct role of the key political institutions.  

There are many inefficiencies and a good deal of overlapping expenditures in between countries. All that needs to be streamlined and approached from a complementary perspective that goes beyond the national borders and the old concept of individual sovereignty in matters of defence.

Unfortunately that´s not easy to achieve. In many parts of the European space, the armed forces are still seen from a national angle only. The challenge is to convince the citizens that that´s no longer the way forward. 

Trident Juncture 2015

I am just back from NATO exercise Trident Juncture 2015.

I have been involved in it for the last 18 months or so. It has been a long process, with different phases of the scenario and the “response” of the international community.

The points here are the following: first, the “crisis” takes place far away from Europe, in an imaginary region to the South of our Continent; second, it is a “crisis response exercise” that follows a model requiring the approval of the UN Security Council; third, it is therefore clear that the exercise is not about defending the Alliance, it is not about collective defence, a concept that is well known; it is about helping a fictional country to address an aggression coming from a neighbouring state; fourth, it is not directly related to the current tensions in Europe or in the Middle East; it was planned well before President Putin´s new posture; and fifth, it was about training the commanders in the context of complex civilian environment.

My role was to play the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-general. It was about sharing many years of UN senior experience. And it is rewarding to see the interest it raised.