The King of Jordan and Portugal’s Test in the Security Council

 Diário de Notícias 
 Opinion 

Victor Ângelo
International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published on: 02 Oct 2026

Portuguese foreign policy has a habit of waiting. It waits for Washington, Brussels, Paris, or Berlin to decide what is to be praised, what is to be condemned, and what is to be passed over in silence. In September 2025, by recognizing the State of Palestine, Lisbon demonstrated that it can decide on its own. This now remains to be confirmed. King Abdullah II’s speech at the 81st United Nations General Assembly on 22 September 2026 provides the occasion.

Diplomacy prefers ambiguity. The King rejected it. For decades, the King stated, the international community has managed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict rather than resolving it, treating every violation as temporary until the temporary became permanent, and the permanent was converted into policy. For him, Gaza and the West Bank are two fronts of a single Israeli strategy: making a Palestinian State unviable. In Gaza, the destruction aims to erase Palestinian life. In the West Bank, settlements, land appropriation, demolitions, and expulsions have become a political objective.

He recalled that the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative remains valid: normalization in exchange for peace and a Palestinian State. He denounced the use of humanitarian aid as an instrument of pressure, and warned that the weakening of multilateral institutions threatens the security of all. Inaction, he said, is a choice, because there are sanctions, asset freezes, and diplomatic isolation, which have already been applied in other cases. He pointed to Israel's "expansionist appetite" and cited Syria as a warning: repeated incursions and faits accomplis, including around vital water resources.

The essence of the speech is rooted in international law. The forced transfer of populations is prohibited by the Fourth Geneva Convention and constitutes a war crime under the Rome Statute. The acquisition of foreign territory by force violates the United Nations Charter. Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016) declared the settlements to have no legal validity. In July 2024, the International Court of Justice concluded that the Israeli presence in the occupied territories is illegal, and that States must refrain from supporting it. The Security Council enshrined the two-state solution in 2002.

Portugal does not possess the colonial past in the Middle East of the great powers. It has centuries of contact with Islam, in its language, tilework, and toponymy, alongside longstanding relations with the Islamic cultures of Africa, the Indian Ocean, and Asia. It can serve as a bridge, provided it does so with States that respect international law. Moreover, Portugal has a direct interest: the stability of the Mediterranean has a decisive bearing on migration, energy, and the security of Europe's southern flank.

Jordan is a stable interlocutor, hosts a vast population of Palestinian refugees, and acts as the custodian of the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem. It is not a democracy, and nobody needs to pretend that it is. In foreign policy, however, it meets the criteria of the rule of law and multilateralism better than some habitual partners.

Consistency will be put to the test when Portugal takes its seat on the Security Council in 2027 and 2028. Two years of votes, declarations, and abstentions will be placed on record. It will fall to the Government to conduct foreign policy. The Council of State, the consultative body to the President of the Republic, must be called upon to offer its opinion on the broad outlines of Portuguese participation in the most sensitive matters. In the Assembly of the Republic, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Portuguese Communities will scrutinize the positions adopted, ensuring that the mandate on the Security Council is not reduced to an uncritical alignment with other governments.

For now, I propose three gestures, in ascending order of demand.

The first is to invite King Abdullah II for an official visit in the coming months. The last visit to Lisbon by the Jordanian monarchy was in March 2009. The invitation is the prerogative of the President of the Republic, in consultation with the Government. Made now, upon entering the Security Council, it signals to the world whom Portugal wishes to speak with, and what it considers to be a priority. In May, Minister Paulo Rangel told his Jordanian counterpart that the two countries share a very similar political vision. An invitation to the King would lend this convergence the seal of the State.

The second is to propose that Jordan join the CPLP (Community of Portuguese Language Countries) as an associate observer, a status already held by Qatar. The decision rests with the Community, but the initiative can originate in Lisbon. A prominent Arab State would connect the CPLP to the Islamic world, within a Lusophone sphere that includes relevant Muslim communities, such as those in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

The third is to move the two-state solution from rhetoric to action. In Brussels, Portugal must advocate for effective conditionalities against those who render it unviable in reality. In European practice, the word sanction remains a taboo when the recipient is Israel: the Union affirms a principle on paper and tolerates its opposite on the ground, even when faced with a Head of Government sought by the International Criminal Court. In New York, Portugal must keep the issue on the agenda and vote according to the law, not according to a bloc reflex.

Jordan has limitations, regime interests, and dependencies, and no serious analysis ignores them. Yet, a speech that names the facts, invokes the precise legal instruments, and links Palestine to regional security provides Portugal with an anchor that Western ambiguity has ceased to offer.

If Portugal limits itself to being a predictable vote, aligned by reflex and silent out of convenience, the recognition of 2025 will remain an isolated episode. The King recalled that attention is a geopolitical resource, and that the world chooses where to focus it. Whoever is to sit on the Security Council for two years cannot pretend not to have heard the speech.

The selection of the new UN Secretary-General in a complex international context

 

UN: A New Secretary‑General in a Fragmented World

Victor Ângelo

The United Nations Security Council will next week enter a new phase in selecting the next Secretary‑General. The vote will be informal, and each candidate will receive one of three assessments: encouragement, discouragement, or no opinion. This step unfolds against an international landscape marked by political fragmentation, strategic rivalry, and a growing scepticism about the capacity of multilateral institutions to respond to shared global challenges. The successor to António Guterres will inherit not only an agenda crowded with crises, but also the responsibility of demonstrating that global problems can only be confronted through some degree of collective cooperation.

For decades, and until the early years of this century, there existed a minimal consensus around the need for a shared international development agenda. That spirit animated the Millennium Development Goals (2000) and re‑emerged, with greater ambition, in the Sustainable Development Goals (2015). Today, however, that consensus has weakened. The rhetoric of cooperation persists, but the political action that once sustained it has been profoundly eroded.

Three structural factors help explain this deterioration.

The first is the intensification of competition among major powers. Development, infrastructure, technology, and global governance have ceased to be mere domains of cooperation; they have become instruments of power. The most influential states now compete over norms, markets, strategic dependencies, and institutional spaces. The Security Council — which should be the principal forum for building compromise — has proved increasingly unable to produce the necessary and lasting agreements.

China seeks to occupy this space through its global initiatives on Development, Security, Civilisation and, since September 2025, Global Governance, recently complemented by the creation of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation (WAICO). These initiatives follow the Belt and Road framework launched by Xi Jinping in the previous decade. China’s official vocabulary is multilateralist, yet in practice these proposals compete with Western initiatives — such as the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (2022) — and with the UN itself. What is at stake is not merely the financing of roads, ports, digital networks, or energy systems, but the definition of standards, the establishment of financing criteria, the shaping of political choices, and the moulding of the international environment in which developing countries make decisions.

The second factor is the governance of technology. Robotics and artificial intelligence can free labour from repetitive or dangerous tasks, accelerating progress in health, education, science, and public administration. But without common rules and shared oversight mechanisms, these technologies risk concentrating economic and political power, deepening inequalities, and reducing the autonomy of entire societies. The Sino‑Western dispute over AI norms makes the creation of multilateral forums capable of setting minimum standards even more urgent.

The third factor is the digital transformation of societies. Social media have profoundly altered how citizens perceive the world, relate to one another, and participate in public life. The philosopher Byung‑Chul Han — an exceptionally original thinker and recipient of the Princess of Asturias Award for Communication and Humanities (2025) — argues that digital capitalism fosters an individualism centred on self‑exposure and egocentrism. This “society of the self” erodes empathy and generates indifference towards collective causes: distant poverty, other people’s wars, the climate crisis, or institutional fragility. A kind of civic anaesthesia has taken hold. Added to this is the impact of transnational disinformation, which crosses borders at digital speed and shapes public perceptions, political decisions, and even the legitimacy of multilateral institutions.

Faced with this landscape of public apathy and interstate rivalry, the next Secretary‑General will need to define priorities that are both realistic and politically sustainable. Even before doing so, he or she must redesign the UN’s relationship with the expanding ecosystem of regional organisations and cooperation platforms led by Global South states. Bodies such as the African Union, ASEAN, CELAC, the Arab League, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS+, WAICO, and the Belt and Road Initiative now shape strategic decisions on security, infrastructure, technology, and finance. They are not merely complementary forums: they are instruments of political and economic influence that sometimes compete with the UN’s universal coordinating role. The challenge for the next SG will be to cooperate with these entities without allowing them to replace the UN’s normative and universal function, ensuring that institutional fragmentation does not become normative fragmentation.

The first priority should be a proposal for reform of the Security Council. Without a composition more representative of contemporary geopolitical realities, without greater presence of emerging powers, and without some limit on the paralysing effect of the veto, the Council will continue to lose legitimacy and effectiveness. Bringing it closer to the General Assembly and making it more accountable to the international community will be equally essential.

The second priority should be the protection of multilateral mechanisms that still produce globally beneficial consensus: public health, food security, climate action, humanitarian assistance, migration, sustainable development, and conflict prevention. These are areas where cooperation remains possible and where the UN retains clear added value.

The third priority will require particular attention to the definition of minimum standards for technological governance, especially in the field of artificial intelligence. The aim is not to impose a single model, but to avoid normative fragmentation that leaves the most vulnerable countries at the mercy of private interests or strategic pressure from major powers.

Rebuilding trust means identifying concrete areas where cooperation remains viable, creating incentives for it to prevail over rivalry, and demanding greater political responsibility from those who weaken institutions serving common interests. It also requires clearer rules for digital platforms, whose impact on public opinion and democratic quality can no longer be treated as a secondary matter.

The choice of the next Secretary‑General matters, but it will not be sufficient. Equally decisive will be the quality of the team that accompanies him or her, its independence from the pressures of its countries of origin, and its ability to build bridges without becoming captive to any bloc. The central challenge is not to restore a lost faith in international solidarity, but to construct more modest, pragmatic, and persistent forms of collaboration in a world where interests diverge, power is more dispersed, and trust is becoming an increasingly scarce resource.

Who is next at the United Nations? What for?

 

An Impossible Job? The Succession of Guterres in a World Adrift

By Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor and former UN Under-Secretary-General/ SRSG

Published: 17 April 2026

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Within a few days, on the 21st and 22nd, the UN General Assembly will interrogate the vision and proposals of each candidate for the position of Secretary-General. António Guterres concludes his second and final mandate at the end of the year. Who will be his successor?

One candidate is Michelle Bachelet, who served as President of Chile twice—from 2006 to 2010 and 2014 to 2018. Bachelet can also claim significant experience within the United Nations. She held several roles and served as the High Commissioner for Human Rights until 2022. However, Human Rights is a highly sensitive field, where conflict with various offending States is frequent. Consequently, the American President and the newly inaugurated president of her own country do not view her candidacy favourably. Although she is, in my opinion, the most qualified candidate, she faces a virtually impossible challenge.

Rafael Grossi, the Argentine who has served as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency since 2019, is also in the race. Grossi gained visibility due to the crises surrounding nuclear power plants in Ukraine and Iran. His name is clearly associated with nuclear issues. He has demonstrated courage and initiative. The support of his country's president, Javier Milei—an eccentric who maintains a special relationship with Donald Trump and has moved closer to China (stating in Davos this year that China is a major trading partner)—will aid his candidacy. The problem may come from Moscow: Milei supports Ukraine, albeit with fluctuations dictated by his alignment with Washington. What impact might this position have on Grossi’s ambitions?

Rebeca Grynspan, the former Vice-President of Costa Rica (1994–1998), is also on the list of official candidates. Grynspan earned credit as one of the officials responsible for the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia regarding maritime security in the Black Sea. She is currently the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, the UN agency that seeks to promote international trade within a framework of sustainable development. She was recently in Baku for an international meeting annually promoted by the President of Azerbaijan, which gathers hundreds of figures active on the international stage. Afterwards, she travelled to Moscow, where she met with Sergey Lavrov. I am told the visit was cordial. However, Russian diplomacy is very shrewd and will only show its hand at the final moment.

Grynspan is, at the outset, the candidate with the greatest chance of success. In addition to her diplomatic qualities and her experience in the field of global economics, she hails from a country of little controversy and is a woman. Furthermore, there is an enormous political campaign in several influential circles pressuring for the election of a woman—an unprecedented feat.

Finally, we have Macky Sall, the former President of Senegal (2012–2024) and the African Union (2022–2023). In performing these roles, Sall demonstrated an ability to dialogue with the great powers independently, without geopolitical alignments. He is a moderate voice of the Global South. He faces, however, a major challenge: the geographic rotation of the Secretary-General position. According to this principle—an unwritten but decisive understanding—the next UN Secretary-General must come from the group of countries that constitute Latin America and the Caribbean. The only Secretary-General from that region was the Peruvian Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who concluded his mandate on the last day of 1991. Thus, it is almost certain that Guterres will hand over his place to a Latin American or a Caribbean—and I am convinced these national designations should be written in the feminine.

We shall see how the hearings of 21 and 22 April unfold. The delegations present at the General Assembly are preparing to raise a wide range of questions. The most delicate will certainly be those linked to the reform of the United Nations, starting with the composition and representativeness of the Security Council. Clarifications will also be sought on how each candidate intends to deal with the veto-wielding States whenever they embark on clear violations of the UN Charter and International Law. This is an all too current issue. Great powers now shamelessly violate the principles and protocols that they themselves and the international community approved over the decades. They tear up the UN Charter when it suits them and protect client-States led by war criminals.

How can each candidate respond to such questions? It will not be easy.

The political dimension of the UN is undergoing a period of accelerated weakening and marginalisation. International relations have ceased to be aligned with the search for solutions to global problems. Today, as in a past thought never to return—prior to 1945—confrontations and wars of aggression matter more than diplomacy and solidarity between peoples. What can the Secretary-General do to reverse this trend?

Put another way: is there still political space for an organisation whose mission is the maintenance of peace between peoples? The answer lies in the various capitals across the world. It is not in the building in Manhattan, in the area known as Turtle Bay. Therefore, the new Secretary-General—be it one of the four mentioned above, or a "wild card" appearing at the final hour with the blessing of the five veto-wielding members—must be a "moving turtle." A pilgrim of peace in permanent transit between capitals. Direct contact with peoples and with the most diverse leaders, including those who pretend to believe in multilateralism, diplomacy, and respect for International Law: that is the master key to the rebirth of the United Nations.

Some comments regarding my text about Guterres's succession

A World Adrift: The UN’s Leadership Crisis and the Fragmentation of Global Order

The debate over António Guterres’s successor as Secretary‑General of the United Nations unfolds at a moment when the international system is experiencing its deepest crisis of coherence since the end of the Cold War. 

My column of yesterday in Diário de Notícias (1)—a sober reflection on the “impossible job” awaiting the next UN leader—captures the structural paralysis of multilateralism. Yet when juxtaposed with the rest of the day’s DN coverage, a broader picture emerges: the UN’s leadership vacuum is only one manifestation of a world in which state‑centric power politics have decisively eclipsed institutional governance.

This contrast between my institutional lens and DN’s event‑driven reporting reveals a deeper truth. The crises dominating the headlines—Middle Eastern escalation, energy insecurity, and domestic political fragmentation—are precisely the types of challenges the UN was designed to manage. Their prominence, coupled with the near‑absence of UN‑related coverage outside my column, underscores the organization’s declining relevance in shaping global outcomes.

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The Candidates and the Constraints

My analysis of the four declared candidates—Michelle Bachelet, Rafael Grossi, Rebeca Grynspan, and Macky Sall—highlights a paradox at the heart of the UN system. Each contender brings a distinct diplomatic pedigree, yet all are constrained by the same immutable forces: the veto power of the Security Council’s permanent members, the unwritten rule of regional rotation, and the political preferences of Washington, Beijing, and Moscow.

• Bachelet, arguably the most experienced, is penalized by her human‑rights professional record—an asset in normative terms but a liability in a system where major powers increasingly reject scrutiny.
• Grossi carries the weight of nuclear diplomacy, but his candidacy is entangled in the triangular dynamics among the U.S., Russia, and Argentina’s unpredictable foreign policy under Javier Milei.
• Grynspan, whom I see as the frontrunner, benefits from geopolitical neutrality of her country of origin (Costa Rica) and gender‑representation momentum.
• Sall embodies the aspirations of the Global South but is constrained by the Latin America–Caribbean rotation expectation. It is almost impossible to have an African candidate as the winner of this year's race.

The common thread is clear: the next Secretary‑General will be selected not for their capacity to lead but for their acceptability to the powers most responsible for the UN’s paralysis.

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A System Under Strain

While I emphasize the current institutional fragility, DN’s broader news cycle paints the operational landscape in which the next Secretary‑General must operate.

Middle East Escalation

DN’s coverage of ceasefire negotiations, U.S.–Iran mediation, and the risk of regional spillover illustrates the erosion of diplomatic norms. These crises unfold largely outside UN frameworks, with major powers preferring ad hoc coalitions and bilateral channels. The UN’s role is reactive at best, symbolic at worst.

Energy Insecurity

Reports on Europe’s jet‑fuel shortages and declining U.S. reserves highlight the geopolitical weaponization of energy. These dynamics—once central to UN‑led discussions on global economic stability—now play out in markets and national capitals, not in multilateral forums.

Domestic Political Fragmentation

DN’s focus on Portuguese political tensions, IMF warnings, and governance challenges mirrors a global trend: domestic politics increasingly dominate foreign‑policy bandwidth. As states turn inward, multilateral commitments weaken.

Together, these stories reinforce my thesis: the UN is being marginalized not by irrelevance but by the deliberate choices of states that no longer see multilateralism as a vehicle for advancing their interests.

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The Return of Pre‑1945 Politics

My most striking argument is that the world is reverting to a pre‑1945 logic—one in which power, not principle, determines outcomes. DN’s coverage supports this view. Whether in the Middle East, energy markets, or domestic politics, the pattern is consistent: states act unilaterally, institutions react belatedly, and norms erode quietly.

The UN’s predicament is therefore structural. It is not merely that the organization lacks tools; it is that the geopolitical environment no longer rewards cooperation. The next Secretary‑General will inherit a system in which the Charter’s foundational assumptions—collective security, sovereign equality, and the primacy of law—are openly contested.

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The Secretary‑General as “Peregrino da Paz”

My metaphor of the Secretary‑General as a “tartaruga em movimento”—a turtle in constant motion—captures the essence of the role in the current era. The next leader will need to be:

• perpetually itinerant, engaging directly with capitals rather than relying on institutional authority
• politically agile, navigating great‑power rivalries without becoming their instrument
• symbolically resilient, embodying the UN’s normative aspirations even when its operational capacity is limited

This is not the Secretary‑General envisioned in 1945. It is a diplomatic pilgrim, operating in the interstices of a fragmented order - that is what is required today. 

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Conclusion: A Leadership Contest That Mirrors a Systemic Crisis

The juxtaposition of my column with the day’s DN coverage (2) reveals a world in which the UN’s leadership transition is both crucial and curiously peripheral. Crucial because global crises demand coordinated responses; peripheral because states increasingly bypass the very institution designed to provide them.

The next Secretary‑General will not reverse this trend alone. But the selection process—shaped by geopolitical bargaining, regional expectations, and normative pressures—will signal whether the international community still believes in the possibility of collective governance.

In that sense, the succession to Guterres is more than a personnel decision. It is a referendum on the future of multilateralism itself.

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(1) https://www.dn.pt/opiniao-dn/um-cargo-impossvel-a-sucesso-de-guterres-num-mundo-deriva
      The English translation will be available soon.
(2) 17 April 2026

Does the Board of Peace has wings?

 

Geopolitical Notes: The International Order and Contemporary Charades

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The Board of Peace: What is its Future?

By Victor Ângelo

Yesterday, the inaugural meeting of the Peace Council took place in Washington—a surreal initiative championed by Donald Trump. At the time of writing, the details of the ceremony have not yet been made public. I know only that no country from sub-Saharan Africa was invited, and that the G7 nations, alongside India, Brazil, the majority of Latin America, and other pre-eminent global actors, were summarily ignored. Peace, in Mr Trump’s conception, is forged by seating at the same table—as members with full rights—Viktor Orbán (the EU leader who enjoys special consideration from the current American administration, as Marco Rubio explicitly stated this week), Alexander Lukashenko, the illegitimate president of Belarus, and Javier Milei, the eccentric head of the Argentine state.

Given the peculiar nature of this project, I was prepared to suggest that Don Quixote de La Mancha—an illustrious knight with an egregious record of tilting at windmills—should likewise join the new organisation’s Executive Committee. He would bring a certain equilibrium to a group that includes, among others, Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner; Steve Witkoff, a great admirer of Vladimir Putin; and Tony Blair, a politician who never misses an opportunity to earn a few pence by advising leaders whose reputations require a marketing fillip in the eyes of international public opinion. But, Don Quixote would not be invited, perhaps for want of sponsorship from the Heritage Foundation—authors of Project 2025, which largely underpins the current White House policy. Nor, it seems, did he secure the patronage of Benjamin Netanyahu or the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, the famous Mohammed bin Salman, both of whom are distinguished figures associated with this new Peace Board.

Curiously, Ajay Banga, the President of the World Bank, holds a permanent seat within the Board’s inner sanctum—the Executive Committee. Conversely, António Guterres, the UN Secretary-General, is nowhere to be found. The recent proclamations emanating from Washington regarding the relative importance of the UN system are merely platitudes intended to pacify the international community.

Despite denials from Trump’s subordinates, the Board of Peace represents a significant step towards attempting to dismantle the United Nations Security Council. Washington recognises that the Security Council has reached an intractable impasse. There is no prospect of reform and, furthermore, it grants immense power to China and other veto-wielding nations. Mr Trump considers all of this contrary to American interests and, above all, to the global influence of his own "extraordinary and genial" persona.

The concept of a Peace Council was originally approved on 17 November 2025 by the UN Security Council (Resolution 2803), with a mandate strictly limited to seeking a solution for the tragedy in Gaza. It was intended as a temporary, transitional administration tasked with coordinating the reconstruction of Gaza and commanding an international stabilisation force.

The body inaugurated yesterday is something quite different; it flouts the terms of Resolution 2803 and assumes a supposedly universal mandate. It is an abuse of power and yet another act of sabotage against the credibility of the UN and its central organ, the Security Council. Every political leader who declined Trump’s invitation, including Pope Leo XIV, grasped and disapproved of the American president’s true intentions.

The agenda of this Board of Peace shall be dictated by Donald Trump, now and forevermore. It will possess a significant real estate component. "Trumpian peace" will adopt a more corporate definition: the submission of the weak to the strong. Reconstruction will primarily signify the proliferation of luxury condominiums.

Had Don Quixote, or a knight of similar virtuous nobility, been admitted, he would have insisted on including situations such as the one currently unfolding in Cuba. International observers consider the country to be facing a grave socio-economic and humanitarian crisis. The Western media—with the exception of a few newspapers —has opted for silence regarding this crisis, which results from the escalation of political confrontation imposed by the Trump Administration. The primary instrument of pressure is an almost total blockade, in effect since late January, on Cuba’s access to foreign fuel. This decision has paralysed essential basic services: healthcare, water, food, electricity, waste management, and transport. As in other similar situations I have witnessed, it is the common citizens who are reduced to absolute destitution. Political leaders and those with relatives abroad invariably find alternative solutions. Thus, the crisis sharpens for the poorest, and the anticipated popular uprising fails to materialise.

These blockades are an unacceptable political gamble, reminiscent of the sieges of castles and boroughs in the Middle Ages. Such actions are prohibited by modern international law, as they constitute indiscriminate punishment with a collective impact. UN human rights experts categorise this energy siege as a "grave violation of international law" and an act of "extreme economic coercion" that threatens to lead to genocide through the deprivation of the means of subsistence.

As was remarked recently in Davos and Munich, we have returned to the rules of yesteryear—to the law of the cannon.

Fortunately, Ukraine continues to remind us of the philosophy of Sun Tzu, a vision I repeat whenever the opportunity arises: in the face of a war of aggression, peace is achieved through moral courage and strategic imagination in the legitimate defence of the aggrieved. I see no one among the guests at yesterday’s "beija-mão" (ceremonial hand-kissing) who possessed the audacity to remind Donald Trump of this truth.