Responding to a critique of my BRICS Summit text

My text about the BRICS Summit, available in this blog, was written the day before the meeting in New Delhi.

A preview is not a verdict smuggled in before the evidence. It is a thesis offered for the meeting to test. New Delhi was the test. 

The meeting happened. The record is public. It does not do the work you want it to do.Start with what you treat as refutation. Iran and the UAE held their highest-level contact since the war began. That is true, and it is not trivial. It is also not BRICS acting as a strategic unit. It is two members, sitting on opposite sides of a shooting war, using the host’s rooms to talk.

The same two members had already blocked a foreign ministers’ text in May.

The leaders’ declaration exists because Indian diplomats spent days sanding the language until nobody had to name the United States, Israel, Iran, or the strikes on Gulf territory. “Maximum restraint” and “deep concern,” with national positions recalled in a subordinate clause, is not the cure for tactical paralysis. It is paralysis transcribed into 140 paragraphs. Consensus by omission is still consensus. It is not capacity.

The same holds for the other bilaterals. Modi and Xi discussed border stability. Modi and Putin set a $100 billion trade target for 2030. Those meetings matter. They would have mattered in a hotel corridor without a BRICS logo on the backdrop. 

Present trade is in the region of $65 billion, and the Indian side has been explicit that most of that is Russian oil. A target weighted toward energy shipments is a bilateral energy relationship, not a new payments order. 

When the institution’s value is the corridor, the plenary is the spectacle.

You then enlarge the declaration into a programme. It covers tariffs, coercive measures, the Middle East, terrorism, AI, quantum, digital public infrastructure, a grain exchange, local-currency settlement, NDB lending in local currency, a startup fund under consideration. Listing topics is not the same as moving them. The approved text does not name Ukraine. It does not name the United States on tariffs. It condemns unilateral coercive measures in the abstract and then goes home. 

Whether any of the technical work proceeds is, as you say, a fair question. Calling a document that cannot mention the two largest wars involving its members a strategic coming of age is not.

On payments you accuse me of scoring a test nobody sat. Fine: nobody in New Delhi tabled the yuan as a global reserve currency. India and Brazil would not wear it, for the capital-control reason everyone in the room understands. The live project is interoperability — UPI, Pix, the digital renminbi — plus settlement in national currencies. That work is real, slow, and worth doing. It is also not what the political advertising of this grouping has been for years. The public claim has been an alternative to dollar dominance.

Measuring the summit against the claim its members make when they speak to their own audiences is not a trick. It is taking them at their word.The AIIB point is narrower, and here you land a hit. The bank has a shareholder list that includes Britain, France, Germany, Canada and Australia. London joined as a founder against Washington’s advice. That institution is not a BRICS vehicle, and folding it into the New Delhi story as if it were was a category error. I should not have done it. The error does not rescue the rest of the architecture argument. It simply means the AIIB should be debated as a China-led multilateral with Western capital in it, which is a different and more interesting fight than the one you want.

The NDB is the opposite of a gotcha. The bank halted new business in Russia because American secondary sanctions made the alternative too expensive to operate. You present this as proof that the institution is not Beijing’s political instrument. I presented it as proof that the instrument cannot do the job advertised for it: shelter a founding member from the system it was created to dilute. Both sentences can be true. Only one of them answers the question my column asked. If the “parallel” bank does what Washington requires when the choice is real, the parallelism is conditional. Fragility is the right word for that. Loyalty to Beijing is a separate accusation, and not the one that matters here.

Then the frame. Yes, the criticism of Bretton Woods is legitimate. Quota review has been stuck for a decade. The Fund’s leadership conventions are a Wester relic. An American blocking minority over major IMF decisions is a political fact. None of that converts every communiqué in New Delhi into a working substitute. You set up a closed circuit: reform is vetoed, therefore the alternative must be treated as architecture, and if the alternative is called thin, the critic has left the victims of the veto with “patience.” That is not an argument. It is a demand that disappointment with the IMF be honoured by inflating BRICS. 

States in that position have ordinary options: coalition-building inside the Fund, bilateral swap lines, payment links, commodity trade in local currency. They are already doing some of them. They do not become a new order by being stapled to a 45-page text that cannot say “Ukraine.”

As for the adjectives: they are judgments. The declaration’s silence on a war fought by a founding member is not “abyssal” because a columnist likes the word. It is the measurable gap between the group’s census — eleven members, a large share of population and output — and its ability to describe the world it inhabits. If that register reminds you of agitprop, the remedy is a counter-list: a named loan book that replaced sanctioned finance at scale, a settlement system that cleared Russian or Iranian trade without dollar reach, a Middle East paragraph that could survive contact with the members who were shooting at each other.

You have the talks, the target, and the text. Produce the rest.

Xi skipping the General Assembly is a minor exhibit and I will not lean on it. Leaders skip that General Assembly week. But Xi is a keyn speaker for multilateralism. He should be in New York to show its attachment to the top multilateral organisation. 

You might think that atttendance is a weak test of multilateral sincerity. The stronger test is whether a grouping built to contest the existing order can, when it meets, name the conflicts that divide it and fund the alternatives it announces. 

New Delhi named almost nothing and funded nothing new. That is not a prediction written in the future tense. It is in the minutes.

The BRICS New Delhi Summit

 A Dysfunctional Coalition in the Shadow of Beijing: The BRICS+

Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published: 11 Sept 2026, 02:34

The BRICS+ Summit, taking place in New Delhi on the 12th and 13th of September, will essentially be yet another spectacle of geopolitical illusions. The grouping, which began as a platform of financial convenience initiated by Vladimir Putin (with its inaugural summit in 2009), has been successively instrumentalised. Initially, it served Russia as a means to project power and circumvent its isolation; today, it is additionally the principal vehicle for China's hegemonic ambition in the so-called Global South.

Moscow originally viewed the BRICS as a further instrument to force the narrative of a multipolar world in which Russia would maintain the status of an indispensable superpower. Particularly following the escalation of tensions in Eastern Europe, the bloc was envisaged as a diplomatic shield and a financial alternative capable of neutralising Western sanctions. However, harsh economic reality and prolonged isolation have dictated new rules: the Russia of today, increasingly reliant on the export of hydrocarbons at discounted prices to Asia and the importation of critical technology, has been reduced to the status of a subaltern partner to Beijing's colossal economic machine.

It is China that now wields the baton and sets the strategic compass of the grouping. Xi Jinping has grasped that, to challenge the Euro-Atlantic order consolidated since 1945, Chinese economic and military might was insufficient; it was imperative to constitute and lead a coalition that would serve as a counterbalance to the Western bloc.

The 2024 expansion, with the entry of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, along with the integration of Indonesia in 2025, aimed to serve this ambition. Nevertheless, formidable obstacles remain. From the outset, the desire to promote the yuan as a reserve currency, replacing the US dollar, is hindered by a structural contradiction: Beijing refuses to relinquish its stringent capital controls. So long as these controls remain in place, the yuan will struggle to become a credible global reserve currency.

The bloc's discourse regarding the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, however, rests upon criticisms that ought not to be dismissed. For decades, the IMF and the World Bank have been legitimate targets of contestation: the quota review, ratified only in 2016, left China and India under-represented relative to their share of global GDP. The United States preserves a de facto veto over structural decisions, and Europe maintains a monopoly over the leadership of the IMF, reflecting an overarching governance still tethered to the geopolitics of 1944.

Although this Western inertia presents the BRICS+ with a genuine and unifying rallying cry, there is an abyssal difference between reforming multilateral institutions and constructing parallel architectures. China has unequivocally opted for the latter course. The New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) did not merely emerge to rectify systemic deficiencies for the sake of global equity. They were also conceived to allow Beijing to finance strategic projects, more or less aligned with the Belt and Road Initiative. These are political projects, not merely developmental ones. By failing to incorporate robust requirements for transparency, debt sustainability, and good governance, they frequently serve to establish a supremacy built upon fragile foundations.

The enlargement of the BRICS has exponentially increased its demographic weight, yet it has fatally diluted its cohesion. By housing democracies and autocracies under the same roof, alongside economies highly integrated into global markets and regimes asphyxiated by sanctions, the group has become chronically dysfunctional.

An organisation that attempts to harmonise the interests of Iran and the United Arab Emirates, or that harbours the border, technological, and military rivalry between India and China, is condemned to tactical paralysis. The NDB itself illustrates this fragility: with subscribed capital insufficient for the colossal needs of the Global South, the bank found itself compelled to suspend its operations in Russia, faced with the threat of American secondary sanctions.

In this landscape of precarious balances, Narendra Modi, the summit's host, will focus on immediate pragmatism, ensuring that India is not dragged into an anti-Western crusade. Modi will restrict the agenda to the realm of the possible: fostering intra-bloc trade (which continues to be eclipsed by these countries' exchanges with the G7); developing interoperable cross-border payment systems outside the SWIFT network; cooperating in the digital and Artificial Intelligence sectors; and promoting bilateral trade in local currencies (yuan, rupees, reais, roubles), albeit always with the underlying concern of averting the replacement of a dependence on the dollar with a new submission to the yuan.

India and Brazil draw the principal dividing line within the bloc here: both advocate for a reform of multilateral systems, but neither supports the radicalisation of the BRICS+. For India, the grouping is merely one of several options for its strategic autonomy. Modi plays simultaneously with Washington, Canberra, and Tokyo within the framework of the QUAD, well aware that the true threat to Indian sovereignty and territorial integrity emanates from across the Himalayan borders and from the naval hegemony of its neighbouring Asian superpower, rather than from Washington.

The final image that the New Delhi Summit will endeavour to project will be one of unity and cooperation. However, the true metric of global geopolitical priorities will reveal itself the following week, during the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in New York.

Xi Jinping, who at the BRICS will mount his customary ideological defence of inclusive multilateralism, does not plan to travel to the United Nations headquarters to participate in the General Assembly. Instead, on the 24th, a stone's throw from New York, he has scheduled a bilateral meeting at the White House with Donald Trump. The choice exposes the chasm between Chinese rhetoric and its practical interests: political narratives may marshal followers, but the grand decisions concerning the world order continue to be negotiated, above all else, in the bilateral arena of the superpowers.

The ladies are in charge

Harvard professor Carmen Reinhart has just been appointed as the new Chief Economist at the World Bank. The Chief Economist at the IMF, Gita Gopinath, has also come from Harvard University. Both ladies have collaborated with Professor Ken Rogoff, from the same university. They might all think alike which is not the best approach in times of crisis. Diversity and contradictory opinions are much more creative, at a time when we have to imagine a new economic order. But they are all for debt forgiveness when the challenge is too big to be managed, which is not a bad approach. And they have studied financial crashes and deep national crisis extensively.

People say that when two economists discuss there are at least three divergent opinions. In this case, let us see if both ladies can bring fresh ideas to their institutions. The IMF and the WB will be very much in demand in many countries in the post-Covid situation. They must propose an approach that goes beyond austerity and keeps investments flowing across the globe, particularly in the direction of poorer countries.

Time for exceptional leadership to step up

This is a time of great anxiety. It’s a global challenge. It would require global political leadership, men and women in decisive positions of authority that would come together and would address the crisis with a single voice. It is not enough to have the G7 or the G20 finance ministers talking about debt relief and access to tremendous amounts of theoretical money. It is also not enough to get statements from the IMF, the WB or the WHO. Even the UN Security Council, if it could agree on a resolution, that would be good but insufficient. We need the key heads of State and government to agree on a joint declaration that would be some guide of roadmap out of the crisis. It would send an exceptionally important message of togetherness, cooperation and hope.

Unfortunately, we are very far from such a common position. The world is leaderless and more fragmented than ever.

If we can’t have a global message, why don’t we try to agree on a common European position at the leadership level? Is it too difficult to formulate a joint way forward, that would be larger than just talking about the post-crisis recovery, something of a shared vision about the kind of European society we would like to build together, after such a unique test?

The moment calls for leadership that can unite people and envision tomorrow’s world.  

IMF and the EU's ambivalence

The best people that could compete for the leadership of the IMF, following Christine Lagarde's departure, are not from Europe. They are from Mexico – Agustin Carsten, who is currently the General Manager of the International Bank of Settlements –, from Singapore –Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Chairman of the Singapore Monetary Authority and Senior Minister –, and from India – Raghuram Rajan, former Governor of the Indian Central Bank.  These three are head and shoulders above the names the European are putting forward as their candidates. In a better system of global governance, one of them should be the next Managing Director of the IMF.

But, again, it will be a European. This has been the game for the last seven decades. The US gets the top job at the World Bank and Europe goes for the IMF. The European will be chosen because of EU’s political considerations – the balance between the different regions of the Union – and that will be it. It might end up by being someone competent. But certainly, if we give credence to the short list that is under consideration, an intellectual pygmy compared with the names I mention above, from other parts of the globe.

This would have been an opportunity for the EU to show to the world that it means business when it talks about the reform and the strengthening of the institutions of global governance. But the EU leaders do not want to walk the talk. They prefer a narrower view and respond to their EU internal politics first.

It is a bit of a shame, isn’t it?

Greece: calling a spade a spade

Today´s prevailing position on Greece´s fate, in the European political and financial circles that have power, was rather clear: it´s time to call a spade a spade.

This basically means, as I see it, that those leading circles have come to the conclusion that the Greek situation has reached a decisive point. And the decision is to let Greece go its own way. It makes no sense to advocate for a solution that the other side does not accept.

I tend to agree. Default is painful but it is not the end of the road. Argentina and other countries have gone through that experience. Even California did. Default can actually be the beginning of a new cycle.

On the markets side, it looks as if the default possibility is now perceived as inevitable but with a manageable impact.

In the end, those who will be seriously affected are the poor people in the streets and villages of Greece. Unfortunately it´s always like that.

Greece´s poker game

The Greek government is playing hard ball. They are convinced, I guess, that in the end the EU creditors will do whatever it takes to keep Greece within the Eurozone. And their poker hand is based on that assumption.

It´s a risky position. Athens might know more than we know about the concessions the other Europeans could possibly be ready to accept. But I am not sure they know. They just take the chance and hope to be right, that´s what I believe.

At this stage it is difficult to forecast the events of next week or so. We are certainly close to a clarification. And that moment of truth might be a difficult one for the Greek people. 

Greece is now against a tough rock

Greece´s financial situation is now reaching a breaking point. We might have a surprise in the coming week or so as it is abundantly clear that the public coffers are more or less dry. The State´s engine is now running on fumes, no longer on real fuel. The chances of agreement with its European creditors have become pretty remote. They still exist, it is true. But they seem very unlikely. 

If there is an agreement it will be in response to the surprise I anticipate, to a major default crisis, a precipitated reaction to tears and shouts. Drama first, spur-of-the-moment repairs afterwards.

Greece´s very delicate position

Greece´s future is at play. One should be very clear about it. The new leadership will have to be very strategic in their negotiations with the key European actors. These actors have time and money and are in no rush to achieve an agreement. And they do not want to take any measure or agree on anything that might be perceived as a precedent, as a Pandora box.

The same cannot be said of the Greek side. They have little time and little money. They cannot engage in a very long process. Results will have to be achieved soon. And that puts them in a much weaker position. It is, in many ways, an almost impossible position. 

Ghana is not moving in the right direction

For a number of years Ghana has been a model country in West Africa. It has managed to move from chaotic politics and poor economic management in the Eighties to democracy and growth in the Nineties and thereafter. But recently things started to move in the wrong direction as the government gave up to extraordinary demands for salary increases and accumulated a high level of fiscal deficit. These actions were taken because the party in power thought they would bring in popular support. They brought economic bankruptcy.

Now, the situation turned to the worst, with the national currency losing value at a rapid pace and the state being unable to meet its commitments. The government had to call the IMF in. This will mean quite a number of public budget cuts. I do not think the Ghanaian public servants are ready for any type of salary reductions.

We might therefore see some political instability coming back to a country we would like to keep calling a model nation.   

Weak EU leadership

It is becoming fashionable in some of the European leading circles to blame the IMF for the failure of some financial adjustment programmes such as the Greek or the Portuguese. It is as if the EU Commission and the European Central Bank, the two other members of the Troika that has negotiated such programmes on behalf of the international creditors, had just been compelled to go along with the IMF.

Nothing is less true. In many ways, it has been the EU Commission that had shown up to recently the most dogmatic approach to programme design and its implementation. They have been the ones pushing some very single-minded ideas such as labour cost reductions and a short-term approach to fiscal corrections. Now, having realised that the public opinion is turning in large numbers against these measures, they backtrack and blame the weaker member of the group.

This shows again that the European leadership feels corralled against the wall and has no guts to fight back for their position.  

Strong, capable and accepted leadership is critical

The Portuguese Constitutional Court has reviewed the 2013 national budget law and declared four revenue generating measures invalid because they violate the spirit of the country’s Constitution. The cancellation of these fiscal initiatives has an impact on the overall budget deficit, as they increase it by 0.8% to reach a deficit of around 6.3% of GDP this year. This is way above the amount agreed with Portugal’s external creditors. It projects a negative international image that contradicts the very serious stabilisation efforts the country has implemented so far.

The Court’s decision has created a major political crisis. The Prime-Minister met the President this evening to review possible options. But there aren't many, in the short term. The stabilisation process requires a long time horizon. The country has to be able to convince its external partners that as it pleads for more time and flexibility it also stays the reform course. It has also to show that it has a strong, capable and accepted leadership at the rudder…  

Portugal on the street

Large crowds marched today in the key cities and towns of Portugal against the austerity measures the government is implementing. The key feature of these manifestations was their peaceful nature. People have shown, once more, that they can be on the streets and behave responsibly.

Many of the protesters could be defined as middle class families that are going through a process of impoverishment. For many of them and for many years their living standards were based on a fiction: that the country could afford a level of public expenditures that was well beyond the means of the economy. With the international financial crisis this fiction could no longer be sustained. The state could no longer borrow in the international markets at low rates of interest. To be able to finance the public sector and adjust spending to the real possibilities of the economy over a short period of time, the state had to look for funds coming from the IMF, the ECB and the European Commission. These monies came with strings attached, as expected. And that hurts. It hurts even further because the government has realised – but cannot explain it properly and clearly, for reasons that are beyond my understanding – that the long term sustainability of public expenditures calls for further cuts, particularly if one takes into account the fragility of the economy and the very low rate of productive investment that has been recorded so far.

In a country where the state was the true engine of the economy – unfortunately the private sector had not been able during the last two decades to take off and expand; it remained too dependent of state projects and orders and largely linked to political patronage – if public expenditure goes significantly down most of the economy tends to collapse.

The point is to get as many investments from outside as possible. My hope is that today’s popular civism be perceived by those potentially interested in investing in Portugal as an encouragement to do so. 

On Greece: what should we conclude?

On Greece, from today's Eurointelligence daily report:

Confidential troika report reveals significant delays in tax collection

Greece missed key revenue targets by a wide margin last year, triggering concern over whether the government is fully committed to cracking down on tax evasion and graft, the FT quotes a confidential troika report leaked to the Greek press. The collection of overdue tax raised only €1.1bn in 2012, compared with a target of €2bn, while unpaid tax increased by 10% to €55bn, equivalent to almost 30% of national output. Two years after the launch of broad-ranging tax reforms, Athens each year still collects less than 10% of total assessed taxes on personal income and corporate profits. Thousands of Greek company owners and self-employed professionals routinely contest their assessments through the courts waiting for the finance ministry to grant tax amnesty settling for a tax bill cut by at least 30%.  The official Greek translation of the report, dated January 31, was accessible on Thursday on the websites of several Athens newspapers.

The Portuguese kindergarten

The IMF has just published a review of Portugal’s public expenditures. The report came as a bomb at a time when the public debate about 2013 State budget had already generated an avalanche of political fights and great instability, including within the governing parties. Now, with the IMF’s recommendations on the table, the country looks like a big fire being dealt with gasoline. There is widespread cacophony, exaltation and very little self-examination and reflection. It is like a kindergarten without any adult in charge.