Showing posts with label peace operations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label peace operations. Show all posts

Saturday, 13 November 2021

A brief personal note on peacekeeping

Peacekeeping missions and diamonds

Victor Ângelo

 

This week, for not very noble reasons, the United Nations peace operations were in the Portuguese media spotlight

A peace mission, approved by the Security Council and accepted by the host country, has a complex configuration. Each mission - there are currently 12 - includes several components, although the best known is the military one. The other dimensions cover the areas of police, political process and national reconciliation, human rights, support to local administration, elections, and justice. They are usually huge operations, headed by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), appointed with the approval of the Security Council and at the equivalent rank of Under-Secretary-General.  Today, the largest is based in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with more than 17,000 personnel and an annual budget of more than US$1.1 billion.

The military part is one of the most sensitive, both because of the high number of troops deployed on the ground and because the protection of civilian populations is one of the priorities. I have always defended that the re-establishment of internal security should be one of the first objectives to be achieved, in order to show, without delay, tangible results and facilitate the acceptance of the external presence.

The blue helmets come from the most diverse cultures. Unlike civilian cadres, the military remain in the field for short periods - as a rule, the rotations last for six months. This circumstance and the type of duties they perform do not allow them to gain a sufficient insight into the social and cultural conditions of the people who receive them. That is why I have always determined that the interaction between the military and the population should only be made by elements that are expressly designated and prepared to liaise with the local communities. The rest of the contingent was not allowed to establish any type of individual contact with the population. This was intended to avoid situations of misunderstanding, abuse, and exploitation of poverty. On the other hand, civilian elements of the mission, working at the local level, were also responsible for permanently observing our interaction with the residents in every corner of the country. The good image of the mission was a precious asset that had to be protected at all times.

As SRSG, I oversaw two peacekeeping missions in countries rich in diamonds, misery and violence.

One of those missions was in Sierra Leone. In certain districts, the main activity was artisanal diamond mining. It was a subsistence economy, with thousands of young men digging holes in the bush or sifting river sands, most of the time without result. Around them circled swarms of middlemen, who bought the stones, if any. They then took care of transporting them to Freetown, where specialised traders, mostly Lebanese, obtained the official documentation that allowed them to be exported legally, in accordance with the Kimberley process.

This process, which was launched by the United Nations in 2003 precisely because of the blood diamonds from Sierra Leone, certifies the origin and the path of each stone. It stops the dubious origins, many of them linked to the violence of armed groups. Almost all diamonds on the market today are Kimberley certified. In the European Union, for example, it is practically impossible to introduce a diamond that does not have this type of guarantee. The same happens in the main world markets.

Later I led a mission in the Central African Republic, which included patrolling the border with Sudan. In that region, there were as many shops purchasing precious stones and gold as there were grocery shops. I deployed special forces from Togo in the region. Their behaviour was exemplary. In preparation for their deployment, it was explained to them that the image of their country was at stake. They understood that. A little pebble can have an enormous political impact.

Monday, 28 September 2015

UN General Assembly

It was a busy day at the UN General Assembly. The speeches by key world leaders and the many side meetings have shown that the United Nations remains, notwithstanding all the constraints it faces, the key political forum for dialogue and cooperation. There is no other institution that can match the UN.


More specifically, the emphasis on development matters and on peace operations remains strong. They are important pillars of the UN´s work. But they should not let us forget the key relevance of human rights and women´s empowerment. 

Wednesday, 3 June 2015

Notes on peace operations

GENEVA CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY

Notes for my seminar of 02 June 2015
Victor Angelo



 Reinventing Peace Operations?
(Reflections and question marks)

World is changing rapidly. But are today´s conflicts very different from the ones 15-20 ago? Yes and no.
Examples:
            South Sudan, CAR and Congo: clear failure of the state building processes. The same in Libya.
            Syria: the national dimensions combined with regional dimensions.
            Very different from civil war in Mozambique in late 80´s or the Cambodia conflict of early 90´s or the Sierra Leone crisis of 1999/2000?

o   The big difference might be at the level of the Non-State Actors:
ü In the past, we had insurgencies, national liberation movements, separatists, revolutionaries with a cause, warlord’s armies…
ü Now, the players are more difficult to categorise and to fight/contact, they are more fragmented, we witness continuous changes of alliances, they make greater use of terrorist methods and pose news threats to peacekeepers and civilians, they have closer links with Organised Crime, they do not accept the role of the UN, they do not seek a peace agreement – they want to win.
From forcing an agreement, that was the past line, to today´s approach, which is about winning the argument.
o   Also, the use of different means of waging war, combining kinetic with soft power: propaganda, social networks; there is indeed a greater emphasis on winning the narrative
The story that is told to the population and the world matters
o   Furthermore, the information is now global. Actions are taken to get international attention



v Above all, what is changing is our approach to conflict management and resolution: from a one-dimension approach to an integrated, comprehensive approach; but we are not yet good enough at dealing with:
            Asymmetric threats
            The narrative/image


Each conflict is different, but they all have in the end a number of common features:

Ø Poor leadership:
We should pay more attention to issues of leadership, time-bound mandates, political legitimacy, inclusiveness, power balancing between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, power-sharing, constitutional issues
Ø Governance performance and state failure:
Many years of unsatisfactory governance, unable to respond to the basic aspirations of the populations, including the human security dimension and human rights, and widespread corruption
Ø The extreme competition for and the control of natural resources:
In the past, diamonds, coltan – short for columbite–tantalite
Now, water in Darfur, and access to rangeland in the Sahel and CAR
Ø A combination of domestic and regional dimensions:
Domestic political crisis are further aggravated by the interference of regional conflicting interests: Syria is a striking example
Ø They are chaotic and their management is about the ability to manage the chaos
Complexity is a key feature of any violent conflict; the response cannot be one-size-fits-all



International order: Are we getting into a more dangerous world?
Depends on one´s perspective. We could spend quite a bit of time discussing the question.

·        However, a more connected world is certainly a more dangerous world. Local problems become easily regional and then international threats to peace, stability and security.
·        The world media channels bring the problems to our homes and we feel threatened
·        There is also a new race for dominance: the West, the Fundamentalist Islam, Russia, China, other emerging powers
·        And a clash of values and cultures, somehow; some type of an anti-West surge

Is the use of force the solution?
Again, yes and no.
We are seeing a new arms race and the witnessing the call for increased investments in defence, after many years when the dominant views were about cooperation, defence budget reductions and disarmament
At the same time, there are calls for greater security cooperation through the Interpol and a better exchange of information: that was the case last week, when the Security Council discussed again the approaches to respond to terrorism.
But we live in culture that tends to give priority attention to the military and the national security issues first, to answer to the issues with a hammer and consider the police as lesser tool

The only long-lasting solution to a conflict is a political agreement that strikes a balance between conflicting interests; this means, politics first and in the end
The UN Security Council is eventually the only source to authorise the legitimate use of force


A few positive comments on the UN SC:
·        Let´s be positive and objective about the Council; a cynical position leads nowhere; we all know about its deficit of representativeness and the need to reform; however, nobody knows when the reform will happen
·        Every State wants to have the Council on its side; the Council´s agreement and support are considered as critical for the international image of any State
·        The UN SC pays special attention to peace operations – in particular to peacekeeping – and has accumulated a lot of experience in the supervision of such operations
·        It is a better position than any other authority to impose an integrated response by the UN agencies, funds and programmes

However, there are a number of short-comings the UN SC should address:
·        Its current divisions; they have been exacerbated in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis of 2011; they are inspired by tensions between the P5, geopolitical interests; they block the decisions on major crisis, such as the one on Syria
·        Strike a better balance between peacekeeping and special political missions; the SC shows greater interest for peacekeeping operations for different reasons (military, police, budgetary, …)
·        Better define the links between peace operations and peace building; peace building approaches are still very much based on phasing out and cost reductions
·        Be able to take into account the interests and grievances of Non-State Actors; the Council´s perspective is still too much based on the State (and the government of the day) as being the key interlocutor and the player; also, there is a need to go beyond the national borders and bring in the regional dimensions – work better with the regional organisations
·        Improve the understanding of the integrated response concept; it cannot be just the approval of a huge and diversified mandate and the expectation that the SRSG will be able to bring together the different parts of the UN
·         Focus more on providing strategic direction when dealing with the UN Secretariat and the peace missions
·        Re-assess the pertinence of the peacekeeping principles – Consent of the parties, Impartiality and Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate – and define better the “robustness approach”

On Robustness:
ü 2/3 of the UN peacekeepers are deployed in countries where ther is no peace to keep
ü The accent is on force not on the politics and dialogue process
ü Tactical use of force: it calls for the UN SC approval and the consent of the host country;
ü Makes the UN a party to the conflict
ü Creates divisions among the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs)  and UN key member states


Looking ahead, we can expect robust operations to be the new norm
The approval should be guided by:
Ø The seriousness and the urgency of the threat; atrocities, Protection of Civilians, extreme humanitarian urgency
Ø A reasonable motive: the military action has to be seen as the best way to stop the threat
Ø Last resort
Ø Proportionate;  just the necessary force
Ø Based on a clear understanding of all its consequences
Ø Clearly explained to the public opinion

But, in my opinion, robust operations should be carried out by either:
Ø Coalition of Forces under a UN SC mandate
Ø Regional organisations  ( AU, AL, NATO, EU, CSTO…)
Ø Making better use of international police systems, shared information and enhanced combination of military/police/civilian responses

It´s indeed time to have a better coordination between the UN and the regional organisations. That´s a key path towards the future.
It´s also time to address the marginalisation of the UN in peace operations; the UN is very busy, the demand is increasing, but it is kept away from the major conflicts. Or it cannot be seen as just a machinery to address the conflicts of the poor countries.











Wednesday, 29 April 2015

My keynote address on UN peace operations

Yesterday I delivered a public talk on the reform on the UN peace operations. It was organised by GRIP (Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security), an independent Brussels-based think tank, the APNU (Association pour les Nations Unies de Belgique) and the University of Louvain-la-Neuve. It took place at the headquarters of Wallonie-Bruxelles Internationale and attracted quite a large audience. 

The issue is very much a current one as we come close to know what the panel established at the end of October 2014 by the UN Secretary-General will propose as reforms. This panel is mandated to reflect on sharpening the UN response to peace challenges. Its composition reflects, above all, two things: field experience and a geopolitical balancing act by the Secretary-general.

I think I should share with my readers the notes that guided my presentation, notwithstanding the fact they are written in the French language.

Please find them below.


Conférence du 28 Avril 2015


Mon intervention est inspirée

1.         Résolution pacifique des conflits : négociations, accords de paix, équilibre entre des intérêts divergents ; c´est la seule solution durable

2.         La politique d´abord, avant l´utilisation de la force

3.         La nécessité de renforcer les capacités des Nations Unies en matière de résolution de conflits, y compris une meilleure intégration des efforts de DPA, DPKO et de la PBC ; au fait, les opérations de paix sont avant tout un instrument politique

4.         La valeur de la solidarité entre les états, particulièrement quand il s´agit des états plus fragiles, qui sont confrontés avec des menaces terroristes ou de criminalité organisée à une échelle régionale ou internationale

5.         Le Panel de Haut Niveau, établi à la fin Octobre 2014 est une bonne décision. Beaucoup de choses ont changé depuis le Rapport Brahimi de 2000
Le Rapport du Panel va certainement susciter une série de débats

6.         L´acceptation du rôle du Conseil de Sécurité, malgré toutes les critiques que l´on puisse faire au regard de sa composition ; une vieille question : quand je suis arrivé à NY en Janvier 1998 le Japon…

Le Conseil de Sécurité:

Positif:
1.         Source de légitimité; accepté para les Étas comme l´autorité ultime

2.         Tous les états souhaitent l´accord du SC

3.         SC accorde une attention assez significative aux Opérations de Paix

4.         Expérience en la matière

5.         Ses décisions engagent des ressources financières

6.         Capable de forcer les Agences, Fonds et Programmes à travailler ensemble

  
Négatif
1.         Divisé; primauté des intérêts géopolitiques des P5 par rapport à la résolution des crises; impossibilité de décider sur les grandes crises ; divisions se sont aggravées avec la crise en Libye en 2011

2.         Incapable de donner une direction stratégique au Secrétariat et aux missions; réactif et superficiel ; jaloux des capacités et des prérogatives du Secrétariat

3.         Le concept de mission intégrée n´a jamais été bien compris donnant lieu à des mandats trop vastes

4.         Reste figé dans une perspective d´état national ; tendance à voir tout à partir de la perspective des gouvernements nationaux

5.         Pas vraiment préparé pour répondre aux défis posés par les acteurs non-étatiques

6.         Beaucoup plus intéressé par le Maintien de la Paix que par les Missions Politiques ou de  Peace Building ; les Missions de Maintien de la Paix coutent beaucoup d´argent, ont des militaires et des policiers, sont beaucoup plus « intéressantes »

7.         Les liens entre Maintien de la Paix et Peace Building ne sont pas toujours clairs ; des missions de Peace Building ont été approuvées quand on voulait fermer une mission DPKO ou alors quand on ne voulait pas engager des nouvelles dépenses

8.         Glissement en matière de respect pour les principes fondamentaux des opérations de paix ; préférence des P3 pour des opérations robustes

Les principes fondamentaux du Maintien de la Paix sont de plus en plus mis en cause par les nouvelles façons de maintenir la paix
•          Consentement des Parties
•          Impartialité
•          Non recours à la force (sauf en cas de légitime défense ou de défense du mandat)

Ces dernières années, le CS a introduit le concept de Maintien de la Paix Robuste
•          Le maintien de la paix robuste implique l’emploi de la force au niveau tactique avec    l’autorisation du Conseil de sécurité et le consentement du pays hôte et/ou des principales parties au conflit.

Doit-on revenir aux principes ?
Faut-il laisser le SC décider quand les missions peuvent aller au-delà des principes ? Et dans ce cas, les principes servent à quoi ?
Il faut certainement bien faire la distinction entre Opérations Offensives (Enforcement) et Opérations d´Appui à un processus de paix, à un processus politique
A Mon avis :
•          Les Opérations Offensives devraient être conduites par des Coalitions de Forces avec un mandat du SC 

Ou

•          Par des Organisations Régionales (AU ; NATO ; EU ; CSTO ; etc)
Mais …   Toujours avec un mandat qui a été approuvé par le CS


Aussi il faudrait utiliser les organisations régionales comme
            Entry forces : premières forces sur le terrain en attendant le déploiement ONU
            En cas d´urgence -  POC et atrocités ; pour des raisons d´urgence humanitaire
           
Quelques commentaires au niveau du Secrétariat des NU
o          UN a beaucoup appris depuis 2000 –Rapport Brahimi
            Je le dis souvent aux militaires de l´OTAN
o          UN a surtout beaucoup évolué ces dernières années depuis 2010 en matière de:
                      Logistiques  (Entebbe, Brindisi et Valence)
                      Coopération entre les missions
                      Police

o          Mais DPKO, DPA et PBSO doivent approfondir la coopération entre eux.

o          PBSO devrait être intégré dans DPA ou dans DPKO ; ma préféence serait une intégration dans DPKO

o          Département de Management doit revoir la procédure et autoriser les agences des NU à réaliser des activités, contre remboursement, pour les missions sur le terrain

o          Aussi, il est nécessaire d´établir de  meilleurs liens entre les missions de paix et PNUD et UN Office on Drugs and Crime

o          UN Secrétariat doit aussi être plus courageux, plus direct et ne pas hésiter quand il s´agit de faire des recommandations au SC

United States
US Personnel in DPKO Missions end of March 2015 : 64 UNPOL   44 MIL      ( RUSSIA   UNPOL 24   MIL 46)
African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership:  Annoncée par le Président Obama en Aout 2014 
$110 millions par année entre 3 – 5 ans
6 pays
            Ethiopie
            Ghana
            Rwanda
            Sénégal
            Tanzanie
            Ouganda
US préfèrent une approche par pays ; des pays prioritaires

Autres travaillent directement avec UA comme par ex : EU, Norvège
African Standby Force
Le role croissant des RECs (Africa´s Regional Economic Communities)
La capacité des forces militaires africaines et les standards des NU

European Union :
Personnel in DPKO missions end of March 2015:  UNPOL 214  5583 MIL
A joué un rôle important au Tchad, au Congo et au Mali
Devrait cependant s´engagé davantage aux Nations Unies ; à mon avis, l´expérience (bonne et moins bonne) gagnée avec MINUSMA devrait être considérée comme une opportunité pour identifier ce qui doit être modifié au niveau des NU et permettre une plus grande participation des pays EU
2011  “Plan of Action to Enhance EU CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping”
Parlements et Opinion Publique EU doivent être plus sensibilisés.
L’opinion publique est aujourd´hui une variable stratégique

UE doit contribuer avec plus de :
            Militaires ; différence de préparation, de méthodes de travail et des taux de remboursement
            Police
            Administrateurs civils

Aider certains pays à développer leurs capacités de sécurité. 
EU African Peace Initiative : The three main strands of action are capacity building, peace support operations and the development of an early response mechanism.
Militaire, gendarmerie et surtout police

La police est très souvent le parent le plus pauvre dans les pays en crise.


            En conclusion :
•          Tout peut se résumer à des questions de crédibilité, de capacité de réponse et de temps; il faut savoir gérer les attentes, obtenir des résultats et sortir à temps.

•          Réforme ou marginalisation ? Plutôt le risque de réforme et marginalisation.
Il y a une volonté de réforme, il y aura des améliorations, mais il y a ausssi les contradictions au sein de la communauté internationale et une tradition de timidité au Sécrétariat.

Les NU seront très occupées, il y aura une demande continue pour des opérations de paix, mais le risque est de devoir traiter seulement des conflits d´intérêt local, « les conflits des pauvres ».