Guterres writes about the dramatic financial situation of Peacekeeping missions worldwide

 

10 October 2025 | Worldwide | Secretary-General

Contingency Plan Letter to Staff Members Dear Colleagues,   I am writing to update you on the financial status of United Nations peacekeeping operations and what it means for us all.   Our peacekeeping operations are facing an extremely difficult financial situation. The current liquidity crisis is the direct result of arrears and the non-payment of assessed contributions in full and on time. Over the past few years, we have actively engaged with Member States to find solutions to this growing challenge. As a result, the United Nations General Assembly in 2019 and 2022 approved some measures that have enabled us to deal with the operational impact of late or non-payments. However, while the level of peacekeeping budgets has been steadily declining, the outstanding contributions have increased significantly, especially in recent months. At the start of this peacekeeping budget cycle on 1 July 2025, arrears amounted to US$2.066 billion. Our collections for the financial period may fall short by about US$880 million, putting a further strain on our liquidity situation.   In addition to actively engaging with Member States, we introduced measures in 2024 to restrict spending and align it with cash inflows. Thanks to these measures, and your dedication and commitment, and the generosity of troop- and police-contributing countries, we have managed to carry on. The troop- and police-contributing countries are, in effect, financing the system, waiting many months and sometimes over a year for reimbursement of their personnel and equipment costs. This is unsustainable. The margin of manoeuvre gained from earlier liquidity measures approved by the General Assembly, as well as our own spending restrictions, is now exhausted. Despite recent positive news that a sizeable amount from a major contributor will be entirely available to distribute flexibly across the peacekeeping missions and to establish a reserve for the United Nations Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH), the reality remains: the overall shortfall is grave.   In a context of deep uncertainty and a worsening cash position, I asked all peacekeeping missions funded under the peacekeeping budget to prepare contingency plans based on possible reductions of 15 to 25 per cent of their expenditures. Troop- and police-contributing countries were also informed, together with the relevant host countries. I am grateful to our missions for working hard over the past few months to prepare these different scenarios.   Based on our current financial estimates and after a careful review, I have decided to request all peacekeeping missions funded under the peacekeeping budget to implement their contingency plans for a 15 per cent reduction in expenditures, the lower of the two scenarios. These reductions will affect all areas: uniformed components, civilian personnel and operations. Separately, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) will be required to achieve a 25 per cent reduction in expenditures within the current fiscal year, reflecting unique budgetary pressures that will need to be addressed in close coordination with the African Union.   These reductions must now be achieved within the remaining nine months of the budget period. Therefore, the impact on the reduction of capacities — and thus on operations and mandated activities — will be proportionally greater. The consequences will be painful. With the exception of UNSOS, we will need to repatriate around 25 per cent of the uniformed personnel and their equipment in the coming months. Peacekeeping operations — together with the Department of Peace Operations and other relevant departments — have carefully identified the contingents and individual uniformed personnel that should be repatriated.   On 7 October 2025, I briefed the members of the United Nations Security Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries on the contingency plans. We will continue to update them on the implementation and impact on our operations.   Repatriating around 25 per cent of troops and police in the space of a few months will be a major and complex logistical exercise.   The impact on civilian, international and locally recruited staff and affiliate personnel will be significant. Some separations will be inevitable, and missions will soon need to invoke the downsizing policy to reduce their civilian staffing, in consultation with staff representative bodies. I know the impact on affected staff, personnel and their families will be enormous, and I want to acknowledge the personal toll such measures entail.   The work of identifying which contingents and individual personnel will be repatriated has been carried out with care, weighing mandate priorities, operational requirements and, above all, the safety and security of those who will remain. While our missions carry out their contingency plans to address their funding shortfalls, they will continue to implement their mandates to the extent possible under these financial circumstances. The protection of civilians, the advancement of peace processes and support to fragile communities cannot and will not be abandoned. However, given the magnitude of the problem and the challenging context in which our missions operate, it is difficult to predict the impact on the ground. We have planned for this scenario and our staff in the field and at Headquarters will continue to work with dedication and professionalism. But this is a situation that the Organization has never faced before, and the impact remains uncertain.   I want to express my deep appreciation to all peacekeeping personnel for their service and sacrifice. I deeply understand the concerns that carrying out these plans raises, and the impact it may have on missions and personnel. Unfortunately, the Organization has no choice but to move forward with the implementation, despite the difficult impact it will have. I am determined to continue advocating for peacekeeping as a collective and shared responsibility. Without the support of Member States, the Organization cannot function properly. I will continue to appeal to all Member States to pay in full and on time so that our peacekeeping operations can remain a strong and dependable instrument of the United Nations. I remain hopeful that we will be able to resolve the current liquidity crisis, and I will work tirelessly towards that end.   I want to, once again, thank you for undertaking your essential work with enormous strength and resilience under these very difficult circumstances. You have continued to serve in some of the world's most difficult and dangerous situations, not for recognition, but for the cause of peace. That spirit is the heart of this Organization. Together, I am confident that we can take on the challenges, uphold our values and create the opportunities needed to address our unstable and uncertain world.   Yours sincerely, Antonio Guterres

A brief personal note on peacekeeping

Peacekeeping missions and diamonds

Victor Ângelo

 

This week, for not very noble reasons, the United Nations peace operations were in the Portuguese media spotlight

A peace mission, approved by the Security Council and accepted by the host country, has a complex configuration. Each mission - there are currently 12 - includes several components, although the best known is the military one. The other dimensions cover the areas of police, political process and national reconciliation, human rights, support to local administration, elections, and justice. They are usually huge operations, headed by a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), appointed with the approval of the Security Council and at the equivalent rank of Under-Secretary-General.  Today, the largest is based in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with more than 17,000 personnel and an annual budget of more than US$1.1 billion.

The military part is one of the most sensitive, both because of the high number of troops deployed on the ground and because the protection of civilian populations is one of the priorities. I have always defended that the re-establishment of internal security should be one of the first objectives to be achieved, in order to show, without delay, tangible results and facilitate the acceptance of the external presence.

The blue helmets come from the most diverse cultures. Unlike civilian cadres, the military remain in the field for short periods - as a rule, the rotations last for six months. This circumstance and the type of duties they perform do not allow them to gain a sufficient insight into the social and cultural conditions of the people who receive them. That is why I have always determined that the interaction between the military and the population should only be made by elements that are expressly designated and prepared to liaise with the local communities. The rest of the contingent was not allowed to establish any type of individual contact with the population. This was intended to avoid situations of misunderstanding, abuse, and exploitation of poverty. On the other hand, civilian elements of the mission, working at the local level, were also responsible for permanently observing our interaction with the residents in every corner of the country. The good image of the mission was a precious asset that had to be protected at all times.

As SRSG, I oversaw two peacekeeping missions in countries rich in diamonds, misery and violence.

One of those missions was in Sierra Leone. In certain districts, the main activity was artisanal diamond mining. It was a subsistence economy, with thousands of young men digging holes in the bush or sifting river sands, most of the time without result. Around them circled swarms of middlemen, who bought the stones, if any. They then took care of transporting them to Freetown, where specialised traders, mostly Lebanese, obtained the official documentation that allowed them to be exported legally, in accordance with the Kimberley process.

This process, which was launched by the United Nations in 2003 precisely because of the blood diamonds from Sierra Leone, certifies the origin and the path of each stone. It stops the dubious origins, many of them linked to the violence of armed groups. Almost all diamonds on the market today are Kimberley certified. In the European Union, for example, it is practically impossible to introduce a diamond that does not have this type of guarantee. The same happens in the main world markets.

Later I led a mission in the Central African Republic, which included patrolling the border with Sudan. In that region, there were as many shops purchasing precious stones and gold as there were grocery shops. I deployed special forces from Togo in the region. Their behaviour was exemplary. In preparation for their deployment, it was explained to them that the image of their country was at stake. They understood that. A little pebble can have an enormous political impact.

On Mali and the region

 

In today’s Diário de Notícias (Lisbon)

Notes on Mali

Victor Angelo

 

 

Mali is a fascinating country, diverse in its landscapes and cultures. It is home to great singers and traditional musicians who play the korah, an ancestral instrument made from a large gourd, the Dogon masks and statues, birthplace of the city of Timbuktu, a unique historical reference in Islamic studies. For four centuries, until 1670, Mali was the epicentre of a great empire in West Africa, an empire recognized by Portuguese explorers, who traded extensively with it across the Gambia River. I would also add that I had several Malian colleagues at the UN who proved to be excellent professionals and held important positions in the different multilateral organizations. I write this to fight the summary opinions of those who are in the habit of arranging everything African in a dark corner, in the shadow of the usual prejudices. I am sad, like many others, when I see the country tearing itself apart and becoming insecure, as it continues to do daily.

Mali has made the news again in the last three weeks following the military coup of August 18. It is, for the same reason, the subject of debate, including in European circles. Moreover, some conspiracy theorists have seen Moscow's hand behind the colonels who took power, a hypothesis I consider unlikely. But there are other hands at work in Mali, from France to Saudi Arabia, and with vastly different intentions.

Also, at stake is the role of the United Nations, which has maintained a peace mission in the country since 2013, with more than 15,000 elements. MINUSMA, as the mission is called, has, over time, become a case study because it has not been able to respond to the political and governance issues that are at the heart of Mali's problems. The political direction of the mission resolved, to please the French and out of strategic opportunism, to stick to the president that the coup has now deposed. In New York, at the Security Council, no one had the courage to correct this trajectory. Thus, credibility is lost, and the future is mortgaged. 

Returning to the current debate, it should have emphasized that more than two thirds of Mali's population is under 25 years of age. And that education and the economy are unable to meet the challenges that such an age pyramid entails. When I was in Mali for the first time in 1990, its total population was around eight and a half million. Today, thirty years later, it is close to twenty million. The same happens in the other countries of the region. They all have explosive age pyramids. Demographic pressure has grown throughout the Sahel along with the advance of desertification and poverty. Being young in the Sahel means looking to the future and seeing only a multitude of arid politics, a desert of opportunities and a chaotic and inhumane urban habitat. Thus, hope and social peace are hard to achieve. All that remains is migration to Europe, or else adherence to armed banditry and fanatical rebellions. Fanaticism has grown exponentially over the past decade, thanks in particular to the proliferation of mosques, Wahabist koranic schools and radical preachers, all financed by the Saudis and others of the kind. 

Those who neither emigrate nor join the extremist groups, vegetate in the big cities, where they can observe how social inequalities have become blatant, the fruit of the corruption that prevails in political circles, in the security forces and in the administration of justice. They also see that European countries and other international actors turn a blind eye to the manipulations practiced by the powerful. This is what happened in Mali. After months of popular protest against the indifference of the president and the greed of his own circle of friends, a group of senior officials decided to act. They have popular support, at least for now. It is true that one should not support anti-constitutional coups. But it is also true that one can no longer pretend that one does not see corruption, ineptitude and the failure of territorial administration, with vast areas of national space without any state presence. The mitigation of crises begins with the promotion of probity and the restoration of local power, beyond the treatment of youth issues. This is what we must remind the colonels, the leaders of the region, the UN Security Council and the European partners of Mali, Portugal included. 

 

 

The UN Charter and its long history

75 years ago, visionary leaders have signed the UN Charter and initiated what they thought would be a world without major wars. Their dream has not been fully realised but the Charter remains a solid pillar of the international order. We cannot discuss international affairs without referring to it. And the UN System is still around and doing important things in some key areas, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian and development assistance, and the promotion of justice and human rights. It could do much more, no doubt. But it is not easy, because of the deep antagonisms that currently exist within the Security Council and the lack of support for multilateral solutions, an approach that is particularly strong in Washington and Moscow. This unfavourable reality might change as we go into 2021, but the shift might not be as deep and wide as some expect. In my view, the best option is to bet on a stronger voice coming from the system itself. Experience has taught me that when the UN leaders opt for an independent and principled approach, they regain the initiative and augment their credibility. For that to happen, they must think about the function they are supposed to perform and less about themselves.

It is true we live an extraordinary complex moment. But the 75 years of presence in the world affairs remind us that history is long and can be better than the difficulties and the pessimism of the times.

The UN and the current crises

The United Nations is always required to be politically smart. That’s the way I saw it, when performing the responsibilities that had been assigned to me. And that’s what I still believe to be the best approach. Smart means above all to be able to say what must be said but with the words that build trust and show concern. Timidity is not the best road to achieve results and guaranty the necessary credibility.

I mention it because today I had to state that things must get better. If the UN remains basically inspired by risk aversion, it will keep pushing itself to the margins of the key current issues.

The Member States must be reminded, as often as the opportunity arises and as it is authorised by the UN Charter and by the history of the organisation, that they ought to support the central role the UN is supposed to play in case of international crises and conflicts. They should also be helped to keep in mind – and act accordingly – that any conflict resolution situation and peacebuilding effort require a comprehensive response. The UN System has the know-how to provide comprehensiveness. And the System must say it loud and clear. It should also smartly – diplomatically – challenge those leaders who keep betting on a security solution to complex crises. A security response, even a powerful one, is just a tool. It is not the master key.

Reforming Peacekeeping

There are several areas of the UN´s work that call for reform. Today, I would mention the Protection of Civilians in relation with the mandates of peacekeeping operations. The reason I raise this issue derives from the report the Center for Civilians in Conflict, a Washington based NGO, just published on the recent dramatic events in South Sudan. Basically, the report states that the UN Blue Helmets did not move out of their barracks and therefore neglected to protect the humanitarian workers. Several of these workers became then victims of extreme violence at the hands of the national soldiers, governmental and rebels alike.

These facts are accurate. The truth of the matter is however much more complex. The UN troops had no means to confront the heavily armed South Sudanese fighters. The UN weapons disadvantage was a crying one. And the fighters were simply determined to shoot and kill the UN Blue Helmets, in case the latter would become too visible on the streets.

These raises a very good number of fundamental questions about deploying a UN peacekeeping force where there is no peace to keep. Should the UN be there? Was the Security Council right when approving the mandate for the South Sudan mission? Should we envisage an international fighting force first, for an initial intervention? How should we put together such a combat mission?

There are indeed many questions just on this issue. And this just one of the many issues that call for serious rethinking.

Poverty, drought and neglect in the Sahel

It is with deep sadness that we have learned about the loss of another five peacekeepers deployed in Mali with the UN mission. They were killed yesterday by a group of armed men. The mission has been repeatedly targeted. This time the attack took place in the central region of the country, well outside the troubled areas of Northern Mali. It´s therefore a new development and one should be very concerned. It shows that the insecurity is now reaching other provinces. It also raises a few questions about the dissemination of extremist ideas to different parts of the Malian countryside. Endemic poverty combined with a couple of years of drought and abandonment by the central authorities make some people more attentive to the words of local preachers that have acquired their simplistic views in some faraway places in the Arab Peninsula. 

On UN peace operations

Many political and military leaders are very much influenced by their experiences in the stabilisation missions as implemented in Afghanistan and Iraq and would like the UN peace missions to be somehow modelled on those experiences. That explains also why there is these such a push for more robust UN peacekeeping operations and for enforcement campaigns.

It was a bit the same after the operations in the Balkans in the 1990s. 

The impossible job of leading a peacekeeping operation

The UN Secretary-General has just forced his Special Representative in the Central African Republic (CAR) to resign. The reason is directly linked to the rape of a young girl in Bangui by one or more peacekeepers. The Special Representative, who is also the head of the UN peacekeeping operation in the CAR, had to go, in the opinion of Ban Ki-moon, to show that the SG does not take these matters lightly.

Ban Ki-moon could not afford to display any shade of hesitancy.  There have been, in the past, some serious cases of gender-based violence in the country associated to the external troops. The most notorious case was perpetrated by the initial deployment of French soldiers and the UN was perceived as timid in dealing with it.

This sort of violence has been a recurrent problem in peacekeeping. At present there is no tolerance to it. And that´s the correct approach. But that does not prevent it from occurring.

That was again the case in the CAR. However, now that the Special Representative has been so summarily sacked I should add that he had tried his level best to prevent sexual violence from happening again. It´s fair to say it in a clear manner. It’s true that the ultimate responsibility in a mission comes always to the Special Representative´s level. But it also true that he cannot be behind each one of his soldiers. There are thousands of them in a mission like the one in the CAR. Each military contingent comes from a different country and the responsibility has to start with the national commanding officer at the head of each contingent.

Notes on peace operations

GENEVA CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY

Notes for my seminar of 02 June 2015

Victor Angelo

 Reinventing Peace Operations?

(Reflections and question marks)

World is changing rapidly. But are today´s conflicts very different from the ones 15-20 ago? Yes and no.

Examples:

            South Sudan, CAR and Congo: clear failure of the state building processes. The same in Libya.

            Syria: the national dimensions combined with regional dimensions.

            Very different from civil war in Mozambique in late 80´s or the Cambodia conflict of early 90´s or the Sierra Leone crisis of 1999/2000?

o   The big difference might be at the level of the Non-State Actors:

ü In the past, we had insurgencies, national liberation movements, separatists, revolutionaries with a cause, warlord’s armies…

ü Now, the players are more difficult to categorise and to fight/contact, they are more fragmented, we witness continuous changes of alliances, they make greater use of terrorist methods and pose news threats to peacekeepers and civilians, they have closer links with Organised Crime, they do not accept the role of the UN, they do not seek a peace agreement – they want to win.

From forcing an agreement, that was the past line, to today´s approach, which is about winning the argument.

o   Also, the use of different means of waging war, combining kinetic with soft power: propaganda, social networks; there is indeed a greater emphasis on winning the narrative

The story that is told to the population and the world matters

o   Furthermore, the information is now global. Actions are taken to get international attention

v Above all, what is changing is our approach to conflict management and resolution: from a one-dimension approach to an integrated, comprehensive approach; but we are not yet good enough at dealing with:

            Asymmetric threats

            The narrative/image

Each conflict is different, but they all have in the end a number of common features:

Ø Poor leadership:

We should pay more attention to issues of leadership, time-bound mandates, political legitimacy, inclusiveness, power balancing between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, power-sharing, constitutional issues

Ø Governance performance and state failure:

Many years of unsatisfactory governance, unable to respond to the basic aspirations of the populations, including the human security dimension and human rights, and widespread corruption

Ø The extreme competition for and the control of natural resources:

In the past, diamonds, coltan – short for columbite–tantalite

Now, water in Darfur, and access to rangeland in the Sahel and CAR

Ø A combination of domestic and regional dimensions:

Domestic political crisis are further aggravated by the interference of regional conflicting interests: Syria is a striking example

Ø They are chaotic and their management is about the ability to manage the chaos

Complexity is a key feature of any violent conflict; the response cannot be one-size-fits-all

International order: Are we getting into a more dangerous world?

Depends on one´s perspective. We could spend quite a bit of time discussing the question.

·        However, a more connected world is certainly a more dangerous world. Local problems become easily regional and then international threats to peace, stability and security.

·        The world media channels bring the problems to our homes and we feel threatened

·        There is also a new race for dominance: the West, the Fundamentalist Islam, Russia, China, other emerging powers

·        And a clash of values and cultures, somehow; some type of an anti-West surge

Is the use of force the solution?

Again, yes and no.

We are seeing a new arms race and the witnessing the call for increased investments in defence, after many years when the dominant views were about cooperation, defence budget reductions and disarmament

At the same time, there are calls for greater security cooperation through the Interpol and a better exchange of information: that was the case last week, when the Security Council discussed again the approaches to respond to terrorism.

But we live in culture that tends to give priority attention to the military and the national security issues first, to answer to the issues with a hammer and consider the police as lesser tool

The only long-lasting solution to a conflict is a political agreement that strikes a balance between conflicting interests; this means, politics first and in the end

The UN Security Council is eventually the only source to authorise the legitimate use of force

A few positive comments on the UN SC:

·        Let´s be positive and objective about the Council; a cynical position leads nowhere; we all know about its deficit of representativeness and the need to reform; however, nobody knows when the reform will happen

·        Every State wants to have the Council on its side; the Council´s agreement and support are considered as critical for the international image of any State

·        The UN SC pays special attention to peace operations – in particular to peacekeeping – and has accumulated a lot of experience in the supervision of such operations

·        It is a better position than any other authority to impose an integrated response by the UN agencies, funds and programmes

However, there are a number of short-comings the UN SC should address:

·        Its current divisions; they have been exacerbated in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis of 2011; they are inspired by tensions between the P5, geopolitical interests; they block the decisions on major crisis, such as the one on Syria

·        Strike a better balance between peacekeeping and special political missions; the SC shows greater interest for peacekeeping operations for different reasons (military, police, budgetary, …)

·        Better define the links between peace operations and peace building; peace building approaches are still very much based on phasing out and cost reductions

·        Be able to take into account the interests and grievances of Non-State Actors; the Council´s perspective is still too much based on the State (and the government of the day) as being the key interlocutor and the player; also, there is a need to go beyond the national borders and bring in the regional dimensions – work better with the regional organisations

·        Improve the understanding of the integrated response concept; it cannot be just the approval of a huge and diversified mandate and the expectation that the SRSG will be able to bring together the different parts of the UN

·         Focus more on providing strategic direction when dealing with the UN Secretariat and the peace missions

·        Re-assess the pertinence of the peacekeeping principles – Consent of the parties, Impartiality and Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate – and define better the “robustness approach”

On Robustness:

ü 2/3 of the UN peacekeepers are deployed in countries where ther is no peace to keep

ü The accent is on force not on the politics and dialogue process

ü Tactical use of force: it calls for the UN SC approval and the consent of the host country;

ü Makes the UN a party to the conflict

ü Creates divisions among the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs)  and UN key member states

Looking ahead, we can expect robust operations to be the new norm

The approval should be guided by:

Ø The seriousness and the urgency of the threat; atrocities, Protection of Civilians, extreme humanitarian urgency

Ø A reasonable motive: the military action has to be seen as the best way to stop the threat

Ø Last resort

Ø Proportionate;  just the necessary force

Ø Based on a clear understanding of all its consequences

Ø Clearly explained to the public opinion

But, in my opinion, robust operations should be carried out by either:

Ø Coalition of Forces under a UN SC mandate

Ø Regional organisations  ( AU, AL, NATO, EU, CSTO…)

Ø Making better use of international police systems, shared information and enhanced combination of military/police/civilian responses

It´s indeed time to have a better coordination between the UN and the regional organisations. That´s a key path towards the future.

It´s also time to address the marginalisation of the UN in peace operations; the UN is very busy, the demand is increasing, but it is kept away from the major conflicts. Or it cannot be seen as just a machinery to address the conflicts of the poor countries.

The narrative about peace operations should be seriously improved

The questions and the debate that followed my presentation on UN peace operations – yesterday´s post was about the public address I delivered on 28 April on the subject – have once again shown the need for a greater investment on a positive narrative on peacekeeping. It was clear that even a better educated audience has a biased perception about the mandates and the role of the UN in peacekeeping and peace building. I have actually been confronted with the same situation in the exercises I do with senior officers from my part of the world. The misinformation and misunderstandings are just too many. They have, obviously, an impact on the way the European politicians see the participation of their forces in UN operations. They make it more difficult for people like me to advocate for a stronger EU commitment to military and police missions led by the UN.

There are a number of things the UN and the supporters of international solidarity should do better in the field of peace and security. For sure one of them has to do with messaging. If they cannot win the narrative they will not be able to get more support. 

My keynote address on UN peace operations

Yesterday I delivered a public talk on the reform on the UN peace operations. It was organised by GRIP (Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security), an independent Brussels-based think tank, the APNU (Association pour les Nations Unies de Belgique) and the University of Louvain-la-Neuve. It took place at the headquarters of Wallonie-Bruxelles Internationale and attracted quite a large audience. 

The issue is very much a current one as we come close to know what the panel established at the end of October 2014 by the UN Secretary-General will propose as reforms. This panel is mandated to reflect on sharpening the UN response to peace challenges. Its composition reflects, above all, two things: field experience and a geopolitical balancing act by the Secretary-general.

I think I should share with my readers the notes that guided my presentation, notwithstanding the fact they are written in the French language.

Please find them below.

Conférence du 28 Avril 2015

Mon intervention est inspirée

1.         Résolution pacifique des conflits : négociations, accords de paix, équilibre entre des intérêts divergents ; c´est la seule solution durable

2.         La politique d´abord, avant l´utilisation de la force

3.         La nécessité de renforcer les capacités des Nations Unies en matière de résolution de conflits, y compris une meilleure intégration des efforts de DPA, DPKO et de la PBC ; au fait, les opérations de paix sont avant tout un instrument politique

4.         La valeur de la solidarité entre les états, particulièrement quand il s´agit des états plus fragiles, qui sont confrontés avec des menaces terroristes ou de criminalité organisée à une échelle régionale ou internationale

5.         Le Panel de Haut Niveau, établi à la fin Octobre 2014 est une bonne décision. Beaucoup de choses ont changé depuis le Rapport Brahimi de 2000

Le Rapport du Panel va certainement susciter une série de débats

6.         L´acceptation du rôle du Conseil de Sécurité, malgré toutes les critiques que l´on puisse faire au regard de sa composition ; une vieille question : quand je suis arrivé à NY en Janvier 1998 le Japon…

Le Conseil de Sécurité:

Positif:

1.         Source de légitimité; accepté para les Étas comme l´autorité ultime

2.         Tous les états souhaitent l´accord du SC

3.         SC accorde une attention assez significative aux Opérations de Paix

4.         Expérience en la matière

5.         Ses décisions engagent des ressources financières

6.         Capable de forcer les Agences, Fonds et Programmes à travailler ensemble

  

Négatif

1.         Divisé; primauté des intérêts géopolitiques des P5 par rapport à la résolution des crises; impossibilité de décider sur les grandes crises ; divisions se sont aggravées avec la crise en Libye en 2011

2.         Incapable de donner une direction stratégique au Secrétariat et aux missions; réactif et superficiel ; jaloux des capacités et des prérogatives du Secrétariat

3.         Le concept de mission intégrée n´a jamais été bien compris donnant lieu à des mandats trop vastes

4.         Reste figé dans une perspective d´état national ; tendance à voir tout à partir de la perspective des gouvernements nationaux

5.         Pas vraiment préparé pour répondre aux défis posés par les acteurs non-étatiques

6.         Beaucoup plus intéressé par le Maintien de la Paix que par les Missions Politiques ou de  Peace Building ; les Missions de Maintien de la Paix coutent beaucoup d´argent, ont des militaires et des policiers, sont beaucoup plus « intéressantes »

7.         Les liens entre Maintien de la Paix et Peace Building ne sont pas toujours clairs ; des missions de Peace Building ont été approuvées quand on voulait fermer une mission DPKO ou alors quand on ne voulait pas engager des nouvelles dépenses

8.         Glissement en matière de respect pour les principes fondamentaux des opérations de paix ; préférence des P3 pour des opérations robustes

Les principes fondamentaux du Maintien de la Paix sont de plus en plus mis en cause par les nouvelles façons de maintenir la paix

•          Consentement des Parties

•          Impartialité

•          Non recours à la force (sauf en cas de légitime défense ou de défense du mandat)

Ces dernières années, le CS a introduit le concept de Maintien de la Paix Robuste

•          Le maintien de la paix robuste implique l’emploi de la force au niveau tactique avec    l’autorisation du Conseil de sécurité et le consentement du pays hôte et/ou des principales parties au conflit.

Doit-on revenir aux principes ?

Faut-il laisser le SC décider quand les missions peuvent aller au-delà des principes ? Et dans ce cas, les principes servent à quoi ?

Il faut certainement bien faire la distinction entre Opérations Offensives (Enforcement) et Opérations d´Appui à un processus de paix, à un processus politique

A Mon avis :

•          Les Opérations Offensives devraient être conduites par des Coalitions de Forces avec un mandat du SC 

Ou

•          Par des Organisations Régionales (AU ; NATO ; EU ; CSTO ; etc)

Mais …   Toujours avec un mandat qui a été approuvé par le CS

Aussi il faudrait utiliser les organisations régionales comme

            Entry forces : premières forces sur le terrain en attendant le déploiement ONU

            En cas d´urgence -  POC et atrocités ; pour des raisons d´urgence humanitaire

           

Quelques commentaires au niveau du Secrétariat des NU

o          UN a beaucoup appris depuis 2000 –Rapport Brahimi

            Je le dis souvent aux militaires de l´OTAN

o          UN a surtout beaucoup évolué ces dernières années depuis 2010 en matière de:

                      Logistiques  (Entebbe, Brindisi et Valence)

                      Coopération entre les missions

                      Police

o          Mais DPKO, DPA et PBSO doivent approfondir la coopération entre eux.

o          PBSO devrait être intégré dans DPA ou dans DPKO ; ma préféence serait une intégration dans DPKO

o          Département de Management doit revoir la procédure et autoriser les agences des NU à réaliser des activités, contre remboursement, pour les missions sur le terrain

o          Aussi, il est nécessaire d´établir de  meilleurs liens entre les missions de paix et PNUD et UN Office on Drugs and Crime

o          UN Secrétariat doit aussi être plus courageux, plus direct et ne pas hésiter quand il s´agit de faire des recommandations au SC

United States

US Personnel in DPKO Missions end of March 2015 : 64 UNPOL   44 MIL      ( RUSSIA   UNPOL 24   MIL 46)

African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership:  Annoncée par le Président Obama en Aout 2014 

$110 millions par année entre 3 – 5 ans

6 pays

            Ethiopie

            Ghana

            Rwanda

            Sénégal

            Tanzanie

            Ouganda

US préfèrent une approche par pays ; des pays prioritaires

Autres travaillent directement avec UA comme par ex : EU, Norvège

African Standby Force

Le role croissant des RECs (Africa´s Regional Economic Communities)

La capacité des forces militaires africaines et les standards des NU

European Union :

Personnel in DPKO missions end of March 2015:  UNPOL 214  5583 MIL

A joué un rôle important au Tchad, au Congo et au Mali

Devrait cependant s´engagé davantage aux Nations Unies ; à mon avis, l´expérience (bonne et moins bonne) gagnée avec MINUSMA devrait être considérée comme une opportunité pour identifier ce qui doit être modifié au niveau des NU et permettre une plus grande participation des pays EU

2011  “Plan of Action to Enhance EU CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping”

Parlements et Opinion Publique EU doivent être plus sensibilisés.

L’opinion publique est aujourd´hui une variable stratégique

UE doit contribuer avec plus de :

            Militaires ; différence de préparation, de méthodes de travail et des taux de remboursement

            Police

            Administrateurs civils

Aider certains pays à développer leurs capacités de sécurité. 

EU African Peace Initiative : The three main strands of action are capacity building, peace support operations and the development of an early response mechanism.

Militaire, gendarmerie et surtout police

La police est très souvent le parent le plus pauvre dans les pays en crise.

            En conclusion :

•          Tout peut se résumer à des questions de crédibilité, de capacité de réponse et de temps; il faut savoir gérer les attentes, obtenir des résultats et sortir à temps.

•          Réforme ou marginalisation ? Plutôt le risque de réforme et marginalisation.

Il y a une volonté de réforme, il y aura des améliorations, mais il y a ausssi les contradictions au sein de la communauté internationale et une tradition de timidité au Sécrétariat.

Les NU seront très occupées, il y aura une demande continue pour des opérations de paix, mais le risque est de devoir traiter seulement des conflits d´intérêt local, « les conflits des pauvres ».