The King of Jordan and Portugal’s Test in the Security Council

 Diário de Notícias 
 Opinion 

Victor Ângelo
International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published on: 02 Oct 2026

Portuguese foreign policy has a habit of waiting. It waits for Washington, Brussels, Paris, or Berlin to decide what is to be praised, what is to be condemned, and what is to be passed over in silence. In September 2025, by recognizing the State of Palestine, Lisbon demonstrated that it can decide on its own. This now remains to be confirmed. King Abdullah II’s speech at the 81st United Nations General Assembly on 22 September 2026 provides the occasion.

Diplomacy prefers ambiguity. The King rejected it. For decades, the King stated, the international community has managed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict rather than resolving it, treating every violation as temporary until the temporary became permanent, and the permanent was converted into policy. For him, Gaza and the West Bank are two fronts of a single Israeli strategy: making a Palestinian State unviable. In Gaza, the destruction aims to erase Palestinian life. In the West Bank, settlements, land appropriation, demolitions, and expulsions have become a political objective.

He recalled that the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative remains valid: normalization in exchange for peace and a Palestinian State. He denounced the use of humanitarian aid as an instrument of pressure, and warned that the weakening of multilateral institutions threatens the security of all. Inaction, he said, is a choice, because there are sanctions, asset freezes, and diplomatic isolation, which have already been applied in other cases. He pointed to Israel's "expansionist appetite" and cited Syria as a warning: repeated incursions and faits accomplis, including around vital water resources.

The essence of the speech is rooted in international law. The forced transfer of populations is prohibited by the Fourth Geneva Convention and constitutes a war crime under the Rome Statute. The acquisition of foreign territory by force violates the United Nations Charter. Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016) declared the settlements to have no legal validity. In July 2024, the International Court of Justice concluded that the Israeli presence in the occupied territories is illegal, and that States must refrain from supporting it. The Security Council enshrined the two-state solution in 2002.

Portugal does not possess the colonial past in the Middle East of the great powers. It has centuries of contact with Islam, in its language, tilework, and toponymy, alongside longstanding relations with the Islamic cultures of Africa, the Indian Ocean, and Asia. It can serve as a bridge, provided it does so with States that respect international law. Moreover, Portugal has a direct interest: the stability of the Mediterranean has a decisive bearing on migration, energy, and the security of Europe's southern flank.

Jordan is a stable interlocutor, hosts a vast population of Palestinian refugees, and acts as the custodian of the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem. It is not a democracy, and nobody needs to pretend that it is. In foreign policy, however, it meets the criteria of the rule of law and multilateralism better than some habitual partners.

Consistency will be put to the test when Portugal takes its seat on the Security Council in 2027 and 2028. Two years of votes, declarations, and abstentions will be placed on record. It will fall to the Government to conduct foreign policy. The Council of State, the consultative body to the President of the Republic, must be called upon to offer its opinion on the broad outlines of Portuguese participation in the most sensitive matters. In the Assembly of the Republic, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Portuguese Communities will scrutinize the positions adopted, ensuring that the mandate on the Security Council is not reduced to an uncritical alignment with other governments.

For now, I propose three gestures, in ascending order of demand.

The first is to invite King Abdullah II for an official visit in the coming months. The last visit to Lisbon by the Jordanian monarchy was in March 2009. The invitation is the prerogative of the President of the Republic, in consultation with the Government. Made now, upon entering the Security Council, it signals to the world whom Portugal wishes to speak with, and what it considers to be a priority. In May, Minister Paulo Rangel told his Jordanian counterpart that the two countries share a very similar political vision. An invitation to the King would lend this convergence the seal of the State.

The second is to propose that Jordan join the CPLP (Community of Portuguese Language Countries) as an associate observer, a status already held by Qatar. The decision rests with the Community, but the initiative can originate in Lisbon. A prominent Arab State would connect the CPLP to the Islamic world, within a Lusophone sphere that includes relevant Muslim communities, such as those in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

The third is to move the two-state solution from rhetoric to action. In Brussels, Portugal must advocate for effective conditionalities against those who render it unviable in reality. In European practice, the word sanction remains a taboo when the recipient is Israel: the Union affirms a principle on paper and tolerates its opposite on the ground, even when faced with a Head of Government sought by the International Criminal Court. In New York, Portugal must keep the issue on the agenda and vote according to the law, not according to a bloc reflex.

Jordan has limitations, regime interests, and dependencies, and no serious analysis ignores them. Yet, a speech that names the facts, invokes the precise legal instruments, and links Palestine to regional security provides Portugal with an anchor that Western ambiguity has ceased to offer.

If Portugal limits itself to being a predictable vote, aligned by reflex and silent out of convenience, the recognition of 2025 will remain an isolated episode. The King recalled that attention is a geopolitical resource, and that the world chooses where to focus it. Whoever is to sit on the Security Council for two years cannot pretend not to have heard the speech.

Spain getting deeper involved in Arica

Spain wants to race in Africa on its own track

Victor Ângelo

 

The Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, was recently in Luanda and, on his return, in Dakar. The trip marked the start of the action plan approved by his government under the title "Focus Africa 2023". The plan is a bet on African prosperity. Spain wants to be a major partner in the development of a set of countries designated as priorities. The list includes, in the North, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt, leaving out Libya and Tunisia - a nation to which Europe should pay special attention. It also includes all West Africa (ECOWAS) and countries from other regions - Ethiopia, the triangle that Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania form, South Africa and, closer to Portuguese interests, Angola, and Mozambique. This dispersion of efforts seems to me to be a weak point.

The plan is based on reinforcing embassies and trade delegations and expanding bilateral cooperation, including in the areas of culture, security, and defence. Beyond the political intentions, it opens the door and protects Spanish private investments in the selected countries. It is an intervention with two complementary fronts, the political and the economic. Arancha González, who headed the International Trade Center, a UN body, and is now Minister of Foreign Affairs, had the opportunity to see what China, India and others are doing in Africa. This experience has allowed her to design a strategy that is current, attractive, and capable of responding to Spanish nationalism. It serves, on the other hand, the personal agenda of the minister, who dreams of great flights on the international scene.

The declared ambition is to turn Spain into an indispensable player in African matters, within the European Union. In this way it will increase its relative weight in the universe of Brussels. The document clearly states that Madrid wants to lead EU action in Africa. Spanish politicians and businessmen know that Europe's relationship with the African continent will be, for several reasons, a central theme of European foreign policy. They are positioning themselves to make the most of that future.

Spain does not have the sub-Saharan experience that other EU countries have accumulated throughout history. But it shows political determination. It will be able to develop more objective relations, without the shadows of the colonial past and the misunderstandings that arose post-independence. It would be a mistake, however, not to seek to take advantage of the connections and knowledge that France, Belgium and Portugal in particular have acquired. The challenge is too great for an incursion without partnerships. That is the second weak point of this move.

The visit to Angola made it clear that it is about occupying the largest economic space possible, from agriculture and fisheries to transport and energy. There are more than 80 Spanish investment projects already underway or in the start-up phase. There also seems to be the intention of counting on Luanda to help Madrid normalize relations with Equatorial Guinea, which was the only colony that Spain had south of the Sahara and is now part of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP). These moves appear to be in direct competition with Portugal's interests. However, knowledge of the complexities of Angola and Equatorial Guinea would rather recommend a joint effort on the part of the two Iberian states.  

In Senegal, the problem is different. It has to do with clandestine migration. The country is a hub for those who want to enter Europe via the Canary Islands. The Senegalese are in second place, after the Moroccans, when it comes to illegal arrivals in the Spanish archipelago. It is also through the Senegalese beaches that many others pass, coming from countries in the region. For this reason, Spain has deployed 57 police officers in Senegal to help dismantle the trafficking networks and prevent people from embarking on a very dangerous sea crossing. The other dimension of the visit to Dakar is that Senegal remains the political centre and an anchor of stability in West Africa.

From all of this, I must say that running on your own track in the vastness of Africa is a challenge that I would not even recommend to a giant.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

Mozambique needs help

In Mozambique, the security and political environment have deteriorated fast during the last four of so weeks.

The political stress between Renamo, the former guerrilla group that became the key opposition party after the peace agreement of the early 90s, and the government led by Frelimo has flared up. There has been some armed violence between the two, albeit very localised and contained. But the tension remains unresolved. It can easily escalate and lead to deep conflict.

In the main urban centres there has been a series of criminal kidnappings for ransom. In one the recent cases, in Beira, the little boy that had been taken was murdered by the bandits. These actions are creating a lot of fear. They add to other types of crimes that are very common in the cities, such as burglaries and armed robberies. The Police seems unable to cope.

On the top of it all, there have been serious accusations of corruption against the close relatives of the President and other political figures. The President himself has a very tarnished image. He has vast business interests. Many believe that his control of business and wealth is related to abuse of power and traffic of influence.

It is sad to see the country moving into crisis. This has been a good example of post-conflict recovery. And also of economic growth. It cannot become now a bad example of bad leadership.

And the external friends of Mozambique need to wake up. Their help can make a difference.