Spain getting deeper involved in Arica

Spain wants to race in Africa on its own track

Victor Ângelo

 

The Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, was recently in Luanda and, on his return, in Dakar. The trip marked the start of the action plan approved by his government under the title "Focus Africa 2023". The plan is a bet on African prosperity. Spain wants to be a major partner in the development of a set of countries designated as priorities. The list includes, in the North, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt, leaving out Libya and Tunisia - a nation to which Europe should pay special attention. It also includes all West Africa (ECOWAS) and countries from other regions - Ethiopia, the triangle that Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania form, South Africa and, closer to Portuguese interests, Angola, and Mozambique. This dispersion of efforts seems to me to be a weak point.

The plan is based on reinforcing embassies and trade delegations and expanding bilateral cooperation, including in the areas of culture, security, and defence. Beyond the political intentions, it opens the door and protects Spanish private investments in the selected countries. It is an intervention with two complementary fronts, the political and the economic. Arancha González, who headed the International Trade Center, a UN body, and is now Minister of Foreign Affairs, had the opportunity to see what China, India and others are doing in Africa. This experience has allowed her to design a strategy that is current, attractive, and capable of responding to Spanish nationalism. It serves, on the other hand, the personal agenda of the minister, who dreams of great flights on the international scene.

The declared ambition is to turn Spain into an indispensable player in African matters, within the European Union. In this way it will increase its relative weight in the universe of Brussels. The document clearly states that Madrid wants to lead EU action in Africa. Spanish politicians and businessmen know that Europe's relationship with the African continent will be, for several reasons, a central theme of European foreign policy. They are positioning themselves to make the most of that future.

Spain does not have the sub-Saharan experience that other EU countries have accumulated throughout history. But it shows political determination. It will be able to develop more objective relations, without the shadows of the colonial past and the misunderstandings that arose post-independence. It would be a mistake, however, not to seek to take advantage of the connections and knowledge that France, Belgium and Portugal in particular have acquired. The challenge is too great for an incursion without partnerships. That is the second weak point of this move.

The visit to Angola made it clear that it is about occupying the largest economic space possible, from agriculture and fisheries to transport and energy. There are more than 80 Spanish investment projects already underway or in the start-up phase. There also seems to be the intention of counting on Luanda to help Madrid normalize relations with Equatorial Guinea, which was the only colony that Spain had south of the Sahara and is now part of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP). These moves appear to be in direct competition with Portugal's interests. However, knowledge of the complexities of Angola and Equatorial Guinea would rather recommend a joint effort on the part of the two Iberian states.  

In Senegal, the problem is different. It has to do with clandestine migration. The country is a hub for those who want to enter Europe via the Canary Islands. The Senegalese are in second place, after the Moroccans, when it comes to illegal arrivals in the Spanish archipelago. It is also through the Senegalese beaches that many others pass, coming from countries in the region. For this reason, Spain has deployed 57 police officers in Senegal to help dismantle the trafficking networks and prevent people from embarking on a very dangerous sea crossing. The other dimension of the visit to Dakar is that Senegal remains the political centre and an anchor of stability in West Africa.

From all of this, I must say that running on your own track in the vastness of Africa is a challenge that I would not even recommend to a giant.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

Jammeh must go

Following Yahya Jammeh´s tragic volte-face, who has now changed his views on last week´s presidential elections and declared he will not accept the results, the UN Security Council met today to discuss the explosive situation The Gambia is now confronted with. The meeting was called at the request of Senegal, a country that surrounds The Gambia and has a very similar ethnic mix.

The Council has decided that Jammeh has no other option but to acknowledge the legitimacy of the election and move aside, for the winner to be sworn in with no undue delay.

This is not going to be easy to implement. Jammeh does not seem prepared to be reasonable. He is afraid of retribution and legal accusations, if he moves out of the State House.

In the circumstances, he should be offered political asylum elsewhere outside The Gambia. That should be the line of negotiations. It would facilitate the transition to democracy.

Where could he find asylum? That´s for the leaders of the region to decide and negotiate with the receiving state and Jammeh. But there are some countries that could be approached. For instance, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. 

Burkina Faso must return to the democratic path

Burkina Faso is one of the better educated countries in West Africa. And its population is young and dynamic. There is in addition a good sense of national identity and cohesiveness. It is therefore unacceptable to see the Presidential Guard take over the executive power, stop the transition to democratic rule and try to bring back the former President, Blaise Compaoré. The coup d´état, carried out a couple of days ago, must be condemned firmly by all the friends of such an interesting and promising country. It would be a serious disservice to Africa if France and others in the EU would be seen as hesitating in their condemnation of the coup. 

Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea: where are the root causes

At yesterday´s international meeting on Security in the Gulf of Guinea, convened by the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I built my intervention five security dimensions that are critical to understand the root causes of the challenges the region is facing.

They are:

          Widespread poverty, desperation, shrinking opportunities for survival –example, less fish available to the coastal communities – , advancing desertification, over-grazing and community conflicts, high cost of living; this is the livelihood dimension.

          Very high rate of population growth, domestic migrations, rapid urbanization, transfer of poverty to the cities, youth unemployment, marginalization and urban crime, armed gangs; the demographics dimension.

          Extremely weak State institutions in all sectors, including in the areas of national and domestic security; this is State ineffectiveness dimension.

          Governance and democratic deficits, human rights violations, widespread corruption and ineptitude, predatory elites; this is the governance dimension.

          Radicalisation and simplification of the political-religious discourse; the influence of radical preachers trained in and funded by Middle Eastern Countries; the identity and ethnicity as instruments of power and exclusion; this is the extremist dimension.

The need for a cultural change in Mali

I gave a public lecture yesterday in Brussels about the situation in Mali. One of the key issues under discussion was the reconciliation among Malians. A very difficult issue, I knew, as the events of 2012 and the early part of 2013 in the Northern Regions had a major negative impact on trust. Each ethnic group withdrew inside its own identity and became very suspicious of every other ethnicity.

It is an issue that is not moving fast enough, at a time when many other parts of the transition process are gaining momentum. And yesterday, during the discussions that followed my presentation, I came to the conclusion that many Malians are not really ready to reconcile. They tend to look at the Tuareg and other nomadic people from the North of Mali with a certain degree of contempt. And the nomads return the favour and see the black Malians as people that are not really interested in sharing power.

I got the impression that the leadership needs to be talked to into a cultural revolution. They have to change their views. The external partners should help them to do so. This is a priority task. 

Mali needs a much longer political transition

There will be a second donor conference for Mali on 15 May in Brussels. I am afraid it will be another game of smoke and mirrors. Promises, promises, and further promises. The first one, at the end of January in Addis Ababa produced over 450 million dollars of pledges but little –only about a quarter of that amount –has effectively been made available. The humanitarian needs are far from being met. Food vulnerability is widespread in the North. Money for the reform of the armed forces and the security sector has not materialised. The dialogue and reconciliation process is not supported. Public administration is starved of funds and paralysed 

And I am also afraid there will additional pressure on the Transitional Government to move faster on the preparations for the July elections –presidential and legislative –when everybody knows that elections at this early stage are not a solution. The transition phase requires a much longer period of time. 

Mali and a divided UN

Albert Gerard "Bert" Koenders has been the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) in Cote d’Ivoire since August 2011. He is now being shifted from Abidjan to Bamako to lead the new peacekeeping mission in Mali ( MINUSMA). He is very new to peacekeeping and to the African realities, as he spent his time in Dutch politics and as Development Co-operation Minister.

And he has a major job ahead of him. Which will be further complicated because there is a very serious rivalry between two UN departments regarding the Malian agenda: the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) believes that the political transition should be the priority objective, whilst DPKO, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is going to take the lead and push for the military operations and internal security to be at the forefront.

Interesting, isn't it? 

Mali is not moving in the right direction

Mali’s internal situation continues to be very fragile. The key international partners of this country need to coordinate better among themselves and agree on a common strategy in support of the stabilization process and the political transition.  This is a matter of great urgency.

It is also a matter of great concern to see that a country that has played an important role in the history of West Africa and has also been able to produce a large number of fine minds is today politically fragmented. No leader has emerged. Without a clairvoyant leader as a counterpart the external friends of Mali will not be able to succeed. It would be a mistake to forget this evidence.   

Mali and the international community

Mali is still in crisis. The Northern territories are far from being secured and the political situation in the capital and throughout the country is very unstable.  The Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission formally adopted on 6 March 2013 is yet to start working. Many of its Commissioners have not yet been appointed. The UN peace-keeping operation is at the design stage. The Security Council resolution that will approve the mission, under the very strange name of United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) – multidimensional needs not to be in the name, if it is an integrated mission – has been drafted but has not yet been finalised. In any case, if it were approved in the next weeks it will take several months to have the peacekeeping forces fully operational. On the other hand, the EU presence that is supposed to train the new Malian military and security personnel is just beginning its deployment.

In view of all this, the elections scheduled for July 2013 – presidential elections on 7 July 2013 and legislative elections on 21 July 2013 – seem pretty premature. I do not see the necessary minimum conditions being in place by July for peaceful and credible elections to take place. Therefore, I can’t understand the reasoning of the key Northern partners of Mali that continue to insist that this calendar should be abided by. 

Please define a more precise end state!

I was told yesterday that President Hollande defined the eradication of the Islamist terrorists from Mali as the objective of the on-going military campaign. He added that the troops will stay in that African country as long as it is necessary to achieve this goal.

In my opinion, this objective is too vast, dangerously vague as it can lead to a stalemate, a never-ending and unaffordable mission. Furthermore, with time, it has the risk of turning the French public opinion against an operation they support today.

A military intervention like this one needs to have a clear end state.  It should be as short as possible and lead to a political process. It has also to be linked to the actions carried out by others, in the case, by the West African nations as well as by the EU training mission that is being put together. It cannot be taken in isolation. It has also to have a regional dimension. And above all, it cannot ignore that at the end of the day, the ultimate objective is to create the conditions for Mali to take care of its own security and governance. This requires a comprehensive approach and it is much larger than the current military operation by France. This operation, with all its merits, should not be more than a stop-gap in a multidimensional and multi-actor process.