Responding to a critique of my BRICS Summit text

My text about the BRICS Summit, available in this blog, was written the day before the meeting in New Delhi.

A preview is not a verdict smuggled in before the evidence. It is a thesis offered for the meeting to test. New Delhi was the test. 

The meeting happened. The record is public. It does not do the work you want it to do.Start with what you treat as refutation. Iran and the UAE held their highest-level contact since the war began. That is true, and it is not trivial. It is also not BRICS acting as a strategic unit. It is two members, sitting on opposite sides of a shooting war, using the host’s rooms to talk.

The same two members had already blocked a foreign ministers’ text in May.

The leaders’ declaration exists because Indian diplomats spent days sanding the language until nobody had to name the United States, Israel, Iran, or the strikes on Gulf territory. “Maximum restraint” and “deep concern,” with national positions recalled in a subordinate clause, is not the cure for tactical paralysis. It is paralysis transcribed into 140 paragraphs. Consensus by omission is still consensus. It is not capacity.

The same holds for the other bilaterals. Modi and Xi discussed border stability. Modi and Putin set a $100 billion trade target for 2030. Those meetings matter. They would have mattered in a hotel corridor without a BRICS logo on the backdrop. 

Present trade is in the region of $65 billion, and the Indian side has been explicit that most of that is Russian oil. A target weighted toward energy shipments is a bilateral energy relationship, not a new payments order. 

When the institution’s value is the corridor, the plenary is the spectacle.

You then enlarge the declaration into a programme. It covers tariffs, coercive measures, the Middle East, terrorism, AI, quantum, digital public infrastructure, a grain exchange, local-currency settlement, NDB lending in local currency, a startup fund under consideration. Listing topics is not the same as moving them. The approved text does not name Ukraine. It does not name the United States on tariffs. It condemns unilateral coercive measures in the abstract and then goes home. 

Whether any of the technical work proceeds is, as you say, a fair question. Calling a document that cannot mention the two largest wars involving its members a strategic coming of age is not.

On payments you accuse me of scoring a test nobody sat. Fine: nobody in New Delhi tabled the yuan as a global reserve currency. India and Brazil would not wear it, for the capital-control reason everyone in the room understands. The live project is interoperability — UPI, Pix, the digital renminbi — plus settlement in national currencies. That work is real, slow, and worth doing. It is also not what the political advertising of this grouping has been for years. The public claim has been an alternative to dollar dominance.

Measuring the summit against the claim its members make when they speak to their own audiences is not a trick. It is taking them at their word.The AIIB point is narrower, and here you land a hit. The bank has a shareholder list that includes Britain, France, Germany, Canada and Australia. London joined as a founder against Washington’s advice. That institution is not a BRICS vehicle, and folding it into the New Delhi story as if it were was a category error. I should not have done it. The error does not rescue the rest of the architecture argument. It simply means the AIIB should be debated as a China-led multilateral with Western capital in it, which is a different and more interesting fight than the one you want.

The NDB is the opposite of a gotcha. The bank halted new business in Russia because American secondary sanctions made the alternative too expensive to operate. You present this as proof that the institution is not Beijing’s political instrument. I presented it as proof that the instrument cannot do the job advertised for it: shelter a founding member from the system it was created to dilute. Both sentences can be true. Only one of them answers the question my column asked. If the “parallel” bank does what Washington requires when the choice is real, the parallelism is conditional. Fragility is the right word for that. Loyalty to Beijing is a separate accusation, and not the one that matters here.

Then the frame. Yes, the criticism of Bretton Woods is legitimate. Quota review has been stuck for a decade. The Fund’s leadership conventions are a Wester relic. An American blocking minority over major IMF decisions is a political fact. None of that converts every communiqué in New Delhi into a working substitute. You set up a closed circuit: reform is vetoed, therefore the alternative must be treated as architecture, and if the alternative is called thin, the critic has left the victims of the veto with “patience.” That is not an argument. It is a demand that disappointment with the IMF be honoured by inflating BRICS. 

States in that position have ordinary options: coalition-building inside the Fund, bilateral swap lines, payment links, commodity trade in local currency. They are already doing some of them. They do not become a new order by being stapled to a 45-page text that cannot say “Ukraine.”

As for the adjectives: they are judgments. The declaration’s silence on a war fought by a founding member is not “abyssal” because a columnist likes the word. It is the measurable gap between the group’s census — eleven members, a large share of population and output — and its ability to describe the world it inhabits. If that register reminds you of agitprop, the remedy is a counter-list: a named loan book that replaced sanctioned finance at scale, a settlement system that cleared Russian or Iranian trade without dollar reach, a Middle East paragraph that could survive contact with the members who were shooting at each other.

You have the talks, the target, and the text. Produce the rest.

Xi skipping the General Assembly is a minor exhibit and I will not lean on it. Leaders skip that General Assembly week. But Xi is a keyn speaker for multilateralism. He should be in New York to show its attachment to the top multilateral organisation. 

You might think that atttendance is a weak test of multilateral sincerity. The stronger test is whether a grouping built to contest the existing order can, when it meets, name the conflicts that divide it and fund the alternatives it announces. 

New Delhi named almost nothing and funded nothing new. That is not a prediction written in the future tense. It is in the minutes.

The BRICS New Delhi Summit

 A Dysfunctional Coalition in the Shadow of Beijing: The BRICS+

Victor Ângelo

International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

Published: 11 Sept 2026, 02:34

The BRICS+ Summit, taking place in New Delhi on the 12th and 13th of September, will essentially be yet another spectacle of geopolitical illusions. The grouping, which began as a platform of financial convenience initiated by Vladimir Putin (with its inaugural summit in 2009), has been successively instrumentalised. Initially, it served Russia as a means to project power and circumvent its isolation; today, it is additionally the principal vehicle for China's hegemonic ambition in the so-called Global South.

Moscow originally viewed the BRICS as a further instrument to force the narrative of a multipolar world in which Russia would maintain the status of an indispensable superpower. Particularly following the escalation of tensions in Eastern Europe, the bloc was envisaged as a diplomatic shield and a financial alternative capable of neutralising Western sanctions. However, harsh economic reality and prolonged isolation have dictated new rules: the Russia of today, increasingly reliant on the export of hydrocarbons at discounted prices to Asia and the importation of critical technology, has been reduced to the status of a subaltern partner to Beijing's colossal economic machine.

It is China that now wields the baton and sets the strategic compass of the grouping. Xi Jinping has grasped that, to challenge the Euro-Atlantic order consolidated since 1945, Chinese economic and military might was insufficient; it was imperative to constitute and lead a coalition that would serve as a counterbalance to the Western bloc.

The 2024 expansion, with the entry of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, along with the integration of Indonesia in 2025, aimed to serve this ambition. Nevertheless, formidable obstacles remain. From the outset, the desire to promote the yuan as a reserve currency, replacing the US dollar, is hindered by a structural contradiction: Beijing refuses to relinquish its stringent capital controls. So long as these controls remain in place, the yuan will struggle to become a credible global reserve currency.

The bloc's discourse regarding the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, however, rests upon criticisms that ought not to be dismissed. For decades, the IMF and the World Bank have been legitimate targets of contestation: the quota review, ratified only in 2016, left China and India under-represented relative to their share of global GDP. The United States preserves a de facto veto over structural decisions, and Europe maintains a monopoly over the leadership of the IMF, reflecting an overarching governance still tethered to the geopolitics of 1944.

Although this Western inertia presents the BRICS+ with a genuine and unifying rallying cry, there is an abyssal difference between reforming multilateral institutions and constructing parallel architectures. China has unequivocally opted for the latter course. The New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) did not merely emerge to rectify systemic deficiencies for the sake of global equity. They were also conceived to allow Beijing to finance strategic projects, more or less aligned with the Belt and Road Initiative. These are political projects, not merely developmental ones. By failing to incorporate robust requirements for transparency, debt sustainability, and good governance, they frequently serve to establish a supremacy built upon fragile foundations.

The enlargement of the BRICS has exponentially increased its demographic weight, yet it has fatally diluted its cohesion. By housing democracies and autocracies under the same roof, alongside economies highly integrated into global markets and regimes asphyxiated by sanctions, the group has become chronically dysfunctional.

An organisation that attempts to harmonise the interests of Iran and the United Arab Emirates, or that harbours the border, technological, and military rivalry between India and China, is condemned to tactical paralysis. The NDB itself illustrates this fragility: with subscribed capital insufficient for the colossal needs of the Global South, the bank found itself compelled to suspend its operations in Russia, faced with the threat of American secondary sanctions.

In this landscape of precarious balances, Narendra Modi, the summit's host, will focus on immediate pragmatism, ensuring that India is not dragged into an anti-Western crusade. Modi will restrict the agenda to the realm of the possible: fostering intra-bloc trade (which continues to be eclipsed by these countries' exchanges with the G7); developing interoperable cross-border payment systems outside the SWIFT network; cooperating in the digital and Artificial Intelligence sectors; and promoting bilateral trade in local currencies (yuan, rupees, reais, roubles), albeit always with the underlying concern of averting the replacement of a dependence on the dollar with a new submission to the yuan.

India and Brazil draw the principal dividing line within the bloc here: both advocate for a reform of multilateral systems, but neither supports the radicalisation of the BRICS+. For India, the grouping is merely one of several options for its strategic autonomy. Modi plays simultaneously with Washington, Canberra, and Tokyo within the framework of the QUAD, well aware that the true threat to Indian sovereignty and territorial integrity emanates from across the Himalayan borders and from the naval hegemony of its neighbouring Asian superpower, rather than from Washington.

The final image that the New Delhi Summit will endeavour to project will be one of unity and cooperation. However, the true metric of global geopolitical priorities will reveal itself the following week, during the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in New York.

Xi Jinping, who at the BRICS will mount his customary ideological defence of inclusive multilateralism, does not plan to travel to the United Nations headquarters to participate in the General Assembly. Instead, on the 24th, a stone's throw from New York, he has scheduled a bilateral meeting at the White House with Donald Trump. The choice exposes the chasm between Chinese rhetoric and its practical interests: political narratives may marshal followers, but the grand decisions concerning the world order continue to be negotiated, above all else, in the bilateral arena of the superpowers.

USA and Iran, a very serious conflict: what's next?

A Profoundly Perilous and Complex Confrontation: The USA and Iran

Victor Ângelo

Are we on the precipice of an armed conflict between Iran and the United States? This remains one of the pre-eminent questions of our days. The answer is neither simple nor definitive. Indeed, the risk may be considered imminent. However, the costs for both parties—and for the world at large—would be so catastrophic that it is both necessary and urgent to reach an accommodation.

Mediation ought to be undertaken by regional states or the more influential members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation—some closer to the Sunni interpretation of Islam, others to the Shia practice—provided they are acceptable to both Washington and Tehran. Ideally, the responsibility would have been vested in the UN or India. Regrettably, neither the UN Secretary-General nor the Prime Minister of India possesses sufficient credibility in this instance. Narendra Modi squandered his political capital regarding the Middle East the moment he chose to anchor his domestic power in the marginalisation of India’s Muslim citizens. He is an autocrat who plays the ethnic card and resorts to populism to retain his grip on power.

As for António Guterres, he carries no weight in Washington and is perceived in Tehran as an outsider—a Westerner approaching the twilight of his tenure. He is regarded as a Secretary-General for humanitarian causes and little else. For many, he lacks the political stature and the requisite "vigour" for conflict resolution. The fact remains that Guterres has been plagued by misfortune. Enduring two Trump administrations, each more deleterious than the last, is a singular stroke of ill luck.

The reality is that we are witnessing a formidable military escalation in the Persian Gulf, one of the world’s most sensitive regions. This escalation could trigger an open war at any moment. This is a dispute of immense complexity. The nuclear carrier USS Abraham Lincoln is currently in the Persian Gulf, accompanied by its strike group, bristling with hundreds of Tomahawk missiles and supported by elite fighter jets, satellites, and surveillance drones that monitor every movement within Iran and its territorial waters. Furthermore, the US maintains tens of thousands of personnel across five bases in the region. They also conduct constant policing of the Strait of Hormuz—a vital artery for oil supplies, primarily to China, but also to India. Should either the US or Iran open a front in this transit zone, they would impede, or at the very least disrupt, the daily passage of approximately 20% of the world’s trade in oil and liquefied natural gas. The economic fallout of such a confrontation would be dramatic, both for the region and for the economies of China and numerous other nations.

Few stand to benefit from such a crisis. It is, however, difficult to believe that a deployment of American forces of such formidable proportions has merely deterrent objectives, regardless of protestations to the contrary.

On the Iranian side, military capacity is significantly inferior to that of the Americans. Currently, following the setbacks of its allies in Lebanon (Hezbollah), Syria, Yemen, and Gaza, its strategic strength rests primarily on three pillars: its vast and diversified ballistic arsenal, the mass production of drones, and the ability to sever navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb—the maritime bottleneck connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and, by extension, the Indian Ocean. Bab el-Mandeb is a vital route through which a significant portion of global trade traditionally flows.

In truth, when considering Iran, one must account for a fourth pillar: the religious fanaticism and the ferocious dictatorship that underpin Iranian political power. It was this volatile mixture of fanaticism and disregard for human life that formed the backbone of the barbaric repression against the populace last month, resulting in an incalculable number of victims. The conclusion is simple: by the standards of modern humanism, the Ayatollahs’ regime resides in a world of five centuries ago—the heart of the Dark Ages. It cannot be countenanced in this day and age, however much one respects national sovereignty or the internal politics of a state. This is a message Guterres ought to convey to Xi Jinping, reminding him that the sovereignty of any state begins with respect for the dignity and human rights of its citizens.

Xi Jinping might, indeed, begin by revisiting the principles adopted by Deng Xiaoping following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. Deng was the architect of "socialism with Chinese characteristics"—the leader who modernised China, liberalised the economy beyond state control, invited foreign investment, and ended the agriculture of famine. Xi Jinping, however, wagers primarily on absolute power, reminiscent of the Maoist era, coupled with unbridled economic capitalism and a personal brand of rivalry and competition against the US. He is above all preoccupied with Chinese supremacy in military, technological, economic, and geopolitical spheres. Consequently, he errs by aligning himself with powers that view geopolitics through an archaic lens—notably Iran and Russia, another staunch ally of the theocratic dictatorship in Tehran. Xi views the future as a zero-sum rivalry between his nation and the United States, proving that he regards global challenges and international solidarity merely as pawns in China’s international geopolitical gambit.

If Iran can only rely on allies of such a kind, the answer to my initial question must be: let there be resolve, extensive diplomacy, and an absolute respect for citizens and for peace.

What is original in my Diário de Notícias (05/09/2025) text about the Tianjin SCO summit

 What is not original:

• The core facts: The existence and location of the SCO summit in Tianjin, the attendance of key leaders like Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Narendra Modi, and the announcement of Xi's "Global Governance Initiative" are all established facts widely reported by international news and political analysis.

• The main geopolitical themes: The analysis of the SCO as a counterweight to Western influence, the concept of a multipolar world order, and the idea that Trump's policies pushed Russia and India closer to China are common topics in contemporary geopolitical discourse. The idea of a "Reverse Nixon" pivot, where Trump's policies inadvertently strengthen the Sino-Russian-Indian axis, is also a concept discussed by other analysts.

What is original:

• https://www.dn.pt/opiniao/a-reforma-da-ordem-mundial-%C3%A9-maior-do-que-a-china

• The author's personal experience and authority: Victor Ângelo's past role as a former high-ranking UN official (specifically, a former Deputy Secretary-General of the UN) gives his commentary a unique angle. He's not just a journalist or academic; he's someone with firsthand experience working within the very international institutions he is critiquing. This background adds a layer of authenticity and personal insight that sets his text apart.

• The "prisoner" analogy: The powerful, if highly subjective, comparison of António Guterres to a "prisioneiro a bater palmas ao juiz" (a prisoner applauding the judge) is a striking and memorable piece of original rhetoric. It goes beyond a simple critique to express a deep sense of disappointment and betrayal from an insider's perspective. This emotional and rhetorical flourish is a key element of the text's originality.

• The focus on symbolism: The entire article is built around the symbolic power of the photograph and the location of the summit. This focus on "an image is worth a thousand words" allows the author to tell a story about the changing world order in a more evocative way than a dry, fact-based report. The emphasis on Xi as a "dominant figure" and Modi as an unignorable presence is the author's personal interpretation, which serves as the backbone of his argument.

In conclusion, the text is not original in its factual basis, but it is original in its insider's perspective, strong rhetorical flair, and symbolic framing. It uses familiar facts to present a highly personal and opinionated take on a major global event, making it a distinctive piece of commentary.

China wants to become the leading nation in international affairs

 

The Summit of Tianjin and the Shifting Global Order

Victor Ângelo’s article, "The reform of the world order is greater than China," published today 05/09/2025 in Lisbon's Diário de Notícias, analyses the Tianjin Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), positioning it as a pivotal event in the geopolitical landscape. The author highlights a photograph of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin with Narendra Modi in the background, seeing it as a powerful symbol of a new international order. In this image, Xi is the dominant figure, while Putin is less prominent and Modi represents India's growing importance. The summit's location in Tianjin, a port city, also underscores the Chinese leadership's focus on international trade.

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Xi Jinping's Ambitions vs. the Role of the UN

Ângelo argues that Xi Jinping's "Global Governance Initiative," announced at the summit, is an attempt to position China's global policy as an alternative to the Western model. However, the author questions the sincerity of this proposal, suggesting that if China genuinely supported multilateralism, it would have prioritised the reform of the United Nations (UN) under António Guterres. The article expresses concern that Guterres was present at the summit and applauded an initiative that could threaten the UN's relevance.

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Geopolitical Tensions and India's Strategic Role

The summit is portrayed as a gathering of nations that oppose the established international order, largely in response to Donald Trump's "America First" policy. The author notes that Trump's approach ironically brought China and Russia closer and pushed India into their orbit. The article also points out Modi's clever political strategy: while attending the summit to strengthen ties with China and Russia, he first stopped in Japan to sign cooperation agreements. This, according to Ângelo, shows that Modi "knows how to play on multiple boards" and that the future of the world is being shaped in Asia, by Asia, and for all of Asia.

Commenting on the G20 Final Communiqué

 I share the frustration expressed by many regarding the outcome of the G20 just held.

The final statement reiterates many of the commitments made elsewhere. Particularly, in many United Nations meetings. As I said in the Portuguese media, the main issue is that promises are made but their implementation lacks far behind or never happens. That is the best way to undermine the leadership, be it at the county level or in the global arena. It explains why the credibility of the international leaders is so low.  

This said, it was important to bring back to the final communiqué all those points that are being discussed in the key international conferences. That includes the SDG, the climate discussions, the gender issues, the inequality problems, the respect for the UN Charter and for people’s rights. And the matters of peace and war. 

The point on the reform of the World Bank is also a wise play.  

Words and statement most be seen as significant, even when we know that human rights or any other key issues are not respected in the country whose leader has pledged to. It gives those who care and who fight for those rights a leverage point. Strength, I would say.

 

Regarding the African Union, I agree it is a crucial move. It is also a smart move for South Africa, that has now a reason to say no to Nigeria or Egypt in the G20.  

In the end, I think we should see India and others encouraging multilateral approaches and multilateralism but planning to play in small groupings and betting as much as possible in bilateral relations and pure and tough national interests.