Russia and Democratic Europe

DN Opinion

The Russian siege and Europe's response

Victor Ângelo
International Security Advisor. Former UN Under-Secretary-General

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Published on: 25 Sep 2026, Diário de Notícias, Lisboa, Portugal
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The recent Duma elections were well staged. They confirmed the internal control exercised by the regime, the decision to continue the illegal war against Ukraine, and Vladimir Putin's structural policy against Europe, which has gradually evolved from occasional provocations to a strategy of persistent and calculated pressure.

Moscow operates on several complementary fronts: sabotage, cyberattacks, electronic signal jamming, the instrumentalization of migrants, propaganda, military intimidation, and support for extremist and pro-Russian political forces. The purpose is not to immediately destroy Western capabilities—not for lack of will, but through strategic calculation. In reality, it is about testing and exposing the political frailties of democratic Europe, with actions surgically below the threshold of NATO's Article 5. The authorship of these actions is systematically denied, exploiting the inherent slowness of democracies in gathering evidence and making decisions. Putin is an expert at transforming political doubt into an instrument of equivocation and at fostering fractures among allied nations.

This pressure materializes on coordinated fronts that many insist on treating as isolated incidents. From Kaliningrad and other unidentified locations, satellite navigation disruptions are already a recurrent issue, affecting aviation and maritime navigation across a vast swath between Poland and Scandinavia. In terms of sabotage, the damage to submarine telecommunication cables in the Baltic Sea since 2024 is now compounded by the threat in the Arctic, where a Russian military unit has reportedly studied ways to disable the region's cables. On the land borders, the migratory instrument orchestrated via Belarus has adapted: in response to the physical barriers erected in Poland, the pressure has shifted towards Lithuania and Latvia through new tactics.

Often treated in isolation by certain political sectors and parts of public opinion, the war of aggression against Ukraine is not a parallel conflict: it is the most brutal manifestation of this very same strategy. There are those who still fail to grasp this connection, viewing support for Kyiv as a mere gesture of solidarity or an obligation that is difficult to justify—a tragic misreading. While on the rest of the continent Moscow operates in the grey zone to avoid collective retaliation, in Ukraine it resorts to direct military force to achieve the same end: to subjugate democracies and unilaterally redraw European security. Support for Ukraine must therefore be unequivocally integrated into the broader framework of defending democratic Europe. Ukraine is our first trench.

Europe's vulnerability, however, is predominantly political and internal. The Kremlin finds Trojan horses within the very heart of the European system: certain extremist parties and movements. Whether through submission, ideological convergence, or financing, or through anti-Americanism or xenophobic repudiation of European integration, these forces ultimately serve Moscow's objectives. By normalizing the Russian narrative, attacking NATO, hindering aid to Kyiv, and sowing scepticism towards European institutions, these extremes amplify the hybrid war.

The European response is dangerously asymmetrical. On the eastern and Nordic flank, the response to the threat is already State doctrine: Finland has integrated hybrid analysis into its comprehensive defence, Estonia is investing in digital resilience, and Warsaw and Vilnius are preparing for escalation scenarios. In Western and Southern Europe, the awakening has been delayed. Although there are shifts in perception and policy in Berlin, Paris, London, Rome, and even Brussels, the response remains too slow, bureaucratic, and fragmented.

This delay reveals a certain incomprehension of the autocratic vision of the regime led by Vladimir Putin. The risk encompasses all of Europe outside the Russian orbit, from the Ukrainian front and the Baltic region to the North Atlantic. Anyone in Lisbon or other European capitals who deems Russia to be distant and their country safe from hybrid attacks demonstrates an embarrassingly naive attitude. In a multidimensional war, traditional geography is no longer a shield. To underestimate this reach is to directly imperil Portuguese critical infrastructure—most notably the Atlantic submarine cables, ports, airports, and energy networks. It is to forget that these connections, if sabotaged, will affect not only our country but a significant part of the West.

This vulnerability is currently exacerbated by the uncertainty surrounding the American commitment. The political distance between Europe and the US continues to widen. They are two perspectives seemingly in the process of divorce. The announced review of the US posture in Europe, involving troop reductions and greater conventional responsibility for allies, has its justifications and will ultimately strengthen European autonomy, but it requires a realistic timetable. The Kremlin is well aware of Western deterrence's reliance on the credibility of its guarantor, and it exploits any hesitation to intensify the pressure.

Russia takes advantage of our difficulty in operating within this intermediate zone between peace and war. It no longer limits itself to testing our degree of tolerance; the signals it sends us should be a cause for concern. It will most likely not act against our part of Europe in the same way it has in Ukraine since 2014, with the occupation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas, and since 2022, with the full-scale invasion. Putin recognizes that an attack on a NATO member could trigger the collective response provisioned in Article 5 and that clandestine actions, including false-flag operations, complicate the unequivocal attribution of responsibility. His political leadership prefers clandestine actions, typical of secret services, agencies in which Putin places a higher degree of trust than in the armed forces. The time has thus come for democratic Europe to abandon its old naivety, grow up, and take its rightful place at the table of international relations: Diplomacy and Defence.

European leadership and their incoherence

Artificial Intelligence translation of my opinion column dated 2 Feb. 2024 and published in Lisbon in Diário de Notícias

From Ukraine to Gaza: where is European coherence?

Victor Angelo

With exceptions, politics is a world inhabited by opportunists. Five hundred years ago, Niccolò Machiavelli entered the history of modern political science when he wrote on the subject, placing emphasis on the word cynicism. But the practice came from antiquity and continues today, in governments, parties and the ability to manipulate citizens' opinions. Ethics, that is, respect for principles, for the common interest, for contemporaries and for future generations, is a word that makes many people in politics laugh, covertly. For these, the only thing that counts is their personal benefit, guaranteed by maintaining power thanks to a political clientele.

In the case of the EU, Viktor Orbán repeatedly reminds us of this truth. It is the worst example of a European leader. Orbán plays with a double-edged stick: on the one hand, to show that he belongs to the club of democracies, as a member of the EU, and, on the other, to make the most of the available funds. The staff he leans on is called Vladimir Putin. This allows him to spend the money coming from Brussels without serious controls and to govern without respect for democratic rules and in a corrupt manner. The counterpart that gives him strength is to complicate European politics in a way that pleases his friend of convenience, the master of Russia. This explains why Hungary continues to not approve Sweden's accession to NATO. There is no other reason than to do Putin a favour. And that is also why, until yesterday, it prevented financial aid to Ukraine — 50 billion euros. This amount is essential to keep Ukraine afloat over the next four years. Hungary has also opposed the creation of another European fund for military cooperation.

All this serves the interests of Russian imperialism. It contributes to the weakening of Ukraine and aims, in the long term, at the disintegration of the EU. Now, Russia is currently the main threat to peace in Europe. It is a hostile country, an enemy in the style of the past. As long as it maintains this behaviour, Russia must be treated as such, without hesitation. Orbán, when he behaves like a de facto ally of Putin, is betraying European interests.

It's time to call things by their names. Years ago, at a European summit, Jean-Claude Juncker patted Orbán on the back and joked, calling him a dictator. Today, he could perhaps add the word traitor.

However, at the "H" time when it is essential to guarantee Ukraine's future, we see the US handcuffed for months on end. The country is deeply fractured, internally, from a political and social point of view, and faces a number of foreign policy problems that disperse its intervention capabilities and confuse the order of priorities. It's the southern border. The problematic alignment with Israel. The obsession with Iran. The suicidal competition with China. The fear of North Korean madness. Putin's unpredictability. And now, the specter of Trump. All of this gives rise to two major conclusions. Europe, that is, NATO on this side of the Atlantic, cannot rely on US assistance in the event of a conflict in Europe. And Ukraine must seek to establish bilateral alliances with European and other countries as it continues its response to the Russian invasion. These alliances must above all be established with nations neighbouring or close to Russia. These are states that sooner or later could come into the Russians' sights, if Ukraine were unable to resist the Kremlin's aggression.

Europeans must step up support for Ukraine. Approving financial assistance for the next four years is an excellent step. Regarding the Ukrainian crisis, Europe has adopted the most appropriate positions. The same cannot be said with regard to Israel. There has been, on the part of the major European nations, an incoherent attitude towards the drama in Gaza. They swallow everything that Benjamin Netanyahu serves them on a plate. When the Prime Minister of Israel wanted to forget, last week, the preliminary orders of the International Court of Justice, which were clearly addressed to the Israeli government, he spoke of the 12 UNRWA agents who would have participated in the attacks of October 7, in a universe of 13,000 Agency employees in Gaza. He did not present any kind of evidence, nor did he talk about the colossal disproportion between the numbers, nor about the extraordinary work that UNRWA has been doing for 74 years, but his diversion was a masterstroke. And he managed to create an uproar against an organization that has helped millions of Palestinian lives. Several European countries opportunistically took advantage of the wave created by Netanyahu.

Many will think that on the European side, meekness, armchair politics and inconsistency prevail. Or, simply put, the cynicism of those who pretend not to understand what the word ethics means dominates.

Reflecting on the United States elections

United States: after the confusion

Victor Angelo 

This week's subject has been the US presidential election. I don't want to get into the current discussion now. I just want to address two aspects that I think deserve more attention. 

The first is about the "beef". In 1984, a hamburger company created an advertising phrase that was immediately appropriated by the political class. The phrase was: where is the beef? In other words, beyond the verbiage, tell us what concrete proposals you are making? The question remains in the political arsenal and has a lot of argumentative force.

This year's election beef was a mixture of economic perspectives, pandemic management, and the fight for racial equality. These were the flags that mobilised the voters, beyond the deep love or disgust that each candidate raised. It became clear that citizens participate more in the electoral act when the meat is consistent, made of great causes.

The economy seems to have been the most important motivator of voter turnout. This reminds me of the famous expression used by Bill Clinton's 1992 campaign: "It's the economy, stupid! Donald Trump was, for his supporters, the best bet in terms of economic recovery. They were convinced that the covid would soon be resolved with the discovery of the appropriate vaccine. The important thing was to have an ultraliberal president in the economic area and a light foot, in fiscal matters. Trump managed to sell this image, as well as the representation of an opponent who would be in the hands of the leftist wing of the Democratic Party, i.e. who would be a puppet of what he called “the socialist radicals”.

On Joe Biden's side, the beef was in the pandemic, repeating the accusation of Trump's incompetence and lack of respect for safeguarding the lives of his fellow citizens. To this he added the fight against racial iniquities and violence against black citizens.  This political hamburger was a complete meal. But there was a catch: his opponent exploited the image of common sense and balance that Biden conveyed, and tried to turn it into a weakness. Projecting energy is part of the qualities of those in charge. So now we have a leader who needs to work on his image and show that he can combine humanism with firmness, including on the outside front. 

And we come to the second aspect. The European Union needs to draw two or three conclusions from all this.

The first is that Joe Biden, having confirmed his victory, will necessarily have to focus on US domestic politics, to broaden its support base and resolve a good part of the bipolarisation, resentment and hatred that exists in the country. In terms of foreign policy, in addition to a moderate return to multilateralism, he will have to focus on relations with China and this country’s neighbours.  It will have little time for European affairs.

The second is that a large proportion of Americans have a very different view of politics, economics and social relations when compared to the Europeans. The continuing divergence of values leads to a weakening of the alliance with Europe. The political gap between the two geopolitical areas will widen. We must therefore work harder for a Europe that is as autonomous as possible in the areas of defence and security, the digital economy, energy, and international payment systems. The blackmail that the outgoing administration has put on us, seeking our alignment with its unilateral decisions on economic and financial sanctions, has taught us that we must create our own mechanisms in these areas. 

Third, Europe must strengthen its foreign policy to gain space and independence from decisions taken in Washington. European foreign policy remains weak despite the resources made available to the European External Action Service. We must be frank and decisively address this weakness. It is a danger to be in the tow of other powers.

This election should lead to a more balanced and constructive international relationship. The European side must be able to seize the opportunity and become a stronger, more active, and independent partner. If it does, we can say thank you to Donald Trump for forcing us to open our eyes.

(Automatic translation of the opinion piece I published today in the Diário de Notícias, the old and prestigious Lisbon newspaper)

 

 

 

Macron leads on defence

Today President Macron of France delivered a very long, dense speech to the top military personnel. The President shared his deep concern with the new international order, which is basically defined by rapports de force and not by international law and underlined once again the need for an autonomous European defence pillar, as well as his call for a strategic dialogue with Russia. But his main messages were about France as a global power and his country’s nuclear capabilities. He spent a bit of time explaining his approach to nuclear power, as a means of deterrence, a weapon that is there not to be used. France is the only nuclear power within the European Union, now that the British are outside.

But my deep reading of his address makes me conclude President Macron wants to take the lead in European defence matters. That could be part of his legacy. But he is very much aware that Germany is not ready to move too far in such field and that several other EU countries, particularly those in the East, think that the key dimension of our common defence passes through keeping the US fully engaged in Europe. 

In such circumstances, the French President wants to convince the Poles to adopt his views. That’s why he was in Poland at the beginning of the week. He also needs to convince the Polish leaders that European defence is a genuine concern, not just a screen to have France and Germany dominating the European military scene. There is a bit of a silent rivalry between Poland and Germany on defence matters.

Poland pays a lot of attention to its armed forces and it has become a key player in European military matters. The problem with Poland is that its leaders follow a political line that is very different from the one Macron promotes. And that does not facilitate a collaborative approach.

The approaches towards the future of European defence

When it comes to European defence, it is not either the US or Turkey that count. It is basically how the issue is seen by the French, the Germans and the Poles. The British, with the Brexit imbroglio, have somehow stepped aside. Each one of these three nations lead a different school of thought on the matter. And, in many ways, the Poles are more influential than what many outside analysts think. On top of that, they tend to voice positions that are not too far from the feelings we find within the US side. In this context, the strategy must follow a gradual approach, step by step, starting with less controversial areas. And it has to consider what should be the future of NATO in the Europe of tomorrow.

Our 2019 political rentrée

Here, in our corner of the world, the political rentrée is upon us. The summer break is now over. And this year’s rentrée will see the changing of the guard in the EU institutions. With the new leaders, old unresolved issues could gain a new breath of life.

One of such issues must be the strengthening of the EU external policy.

We must develop a stronger common approach to critical international matters, such as the many crises in the Middle East and the pressing issue of Africa’s development. In addition, we must give shape to a more independent view of Europe’s global interests and dare to seriously move towards joint defence and security efforts. 

We also need to strengthen our alliances with other parts of the world. However, we must recognise that our perception of certain key issues is not necessarily coincidental with that promoted by some of our key allies. Such differences are not just momentary. They are not simply the result of leader X or Y being in charge in one of the countries that matters to us. They are deeper, as we have walked different historical paths and have created our own way of looking at what is going on in some problematic regions of the world.

On Bastille Day, defence matters

On this Bastille Day 2019, I think we can draw two very clear lines.

First, the European defence must be taken seriously. Our countries share a common set of values. Furthermore, they have pooled several political decisions that show the ambition to create a joint political space. This goes much deeper than any alliance with our non-European friends, including those who have historical ties with Europe. In view of that and because at a certain point our geostrategic interests might diverge from those defined by our non-European allies, it is much wise to build our own independent capacity to fight for our ideas and well-being.

This is a step-by-step endeavour. It might take a bit of time to be completed. But it is now time to initiate its construction.

That message came out clearly from Paris as the Bastille celebrations were taking place.

The second message is about Turkey. President Erdogan has now opted for the Russian S-400 missiles. That is a major challenge to NATO and a very serious breach of Turkey’s commitment to the organisation. He must be told we do not accept his decision. He might not listen to such advice, as he will state his country’s independence of choice. OK, that is fine. But we can no longer take Turkey as a full ally. We ought to make it clear to President Erdogan and limit Turkey’s access to key military and defence information systems available in the West.

It is true we should not mix this matter with Turkey’s ambition to become a EU country. This are two separate matters. However, on the EU issue I think it is also time to be clear.

European defence: the way forward

On defence, my position is that in the long-term Europe must have its own capabilities and the ability to defend itself. It is always better to count on one’s force. Moreover, that’s the way to keep an independent international policy and decide about the involvement in other people’s conflicts and other strategic moves.  

It is also the best approach to a balanced relationship with Europe’s key allies, with the US. Indeed, the defence relationship with the US will continue to be a crucial dimension of the European security strategy. However, it cannot remain a lopsided relationship. Europe must be much stronger, closer to the capacity of the US. That would bring balance to the alliance, something that does not exist today and compromises tremendously the interests of both parties. And that puts Europe in a weaker standing.

The road to the long-term objective starts today. For that reason, I agree with those who place the question on today’s EU agenda. I also acknowledge that such discussion and the subsequent plans must not undermine the strength of NATO. They call however for a clear understanding of the roles, in the future, that NATO and the EU Defence should play. That basically means that NATO and Europe will have to coordinate the way they will evolve in the coming years. Transformation for both is inevitable.

Macron and the Germans

The CDU Leader’s response to Emmanuel Macron shows there is a big gap between the German right-wing vision of Europe’s future and the more centrist proposals made by the French President. And, in many ways, the CDU’s views, as expressed by Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, reflect the opinion we can find in the German streets.

They also send a clear message to Macron. We can cooperate but we do not belong to the same political family. And we, Germans, we lead our grouping of parties in the European institutions.

Macron must feel a bit alone tonight.  

Our neighbour, Vladimir Putin

Again, on defence, it’s clear to us in the EU that one of the key military objectives of Russia is to look stronger than they really are. That’s why they spend so much human and capital resources on mixing facts and fiction. Part of their strength is indeed a fact. On the other side, a good deal of it is just a story that is being told to scare us. It is the Potemkin Village approach. It has a long history in Russia. But it produces results.

The Russian armed forces are ten years ahead of us, in the EU, in terms of cyber warfare. That’s for sure a reality. The rest, it is yes and no. But the truth is that they keep compelling us to increase our spending in military matters. In this kind of game, we cannot take risks. We better be prepared.

Fake, constructed or true, the fact of the matter is that the threats coming from Vladimir Putin must be taken seriously. And he knows that. Smart fellow, he is. And we, in many ways, look like amateurs. Just kicking the ball when it comes in  our direction.

EU's collective defence

The issue of collective defence is again a major concern for many European countries. It has to take into account a good number of major new developments. A more assertive Russia. A new level of foreign policy coordination between Russia and China, a policy that is clearly in competition with the Western interests and approaches. The fake news, the political interference and the funding of populist and far-right radical movements. The growing political gap and related tensions between Europe and Turkey. The situation in the Middle East and the Northern part of Africa. Terrorism. The US unprecedented new official policy towards defence cooperation with Europe. And the very hesitant, ambiguous views of the citizens regarding military expenditures.

And I would add one more, that is often left aside: the inept political direction provided by the EU leaders, particularly when it comes to articulating defence and security, military forces, intelligence and police services.